

PHILIP II AND THE SACRED WAR

BY

JOHN BUCKLER



E.J. BRILL
LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KØBENHAVN • KÖLN
1989

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

ISSN 0169-8958
ISBN 90 04 09095 9

© Copyright 1989 by E.J. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or translated in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche or any other means without written permission from the publisher

PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS BY E.J. BRILL

To
Caroline H. Buckler

CONTENTS

List of maps	ix
Abbreviations	xi
Preface	xiii
 I. The peace of 362 BC	 1
II. The road to war (363–357 BC)	9
III. First blood (355–354 BC)	30
A) The theater of war	30
B) Philomelos and the Battle of Neon (355 BC)	38
C) Onomarchos takes command (355 BC)	45
D) Onomarchos takes the offensive (354 BC)	53
IV. Onomarchos, Philip, and Thessaly (354–353 BC)	58
A) Crisis in Thessaly (354 BC)	58
B) Decision in Thessaly (354/3 BC)	69
C) Boiotian postscript (353 BC)	81
V. The war widens (353–347 BC)	85
A) Conflict in Central Greece and the Peloponnesos (353–351 BC)	85
B) Attrition and stalemate (351–347 BC)	99
VI. Peace in 346 BC	114
VII. Epilogue	143
Appendix I: Chronology	148
Appendix II: Internal politics at Delphoi	196
Selected bibliography	205
Index	208
List of plates	211
Plates I–XII	

LIST OF MAPS

1. GREECE.

J.P. McKay, B.D. Hill, and J. Buckler, *A History of Western Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1979), by courtesy of Houghton Mifflin Company.

2. PHOKIS AND EASTERN LOKRIS.

Adapted from Nomos Phthiotidos, *Ethnike Statistike Hiperesia tes Hellados* (1972).

3. SOUTHWESTERN BOIOTIA.

Adapted from Nomos Boiotias, *Ethnike Statistike Hiperesia tes Hellados* (1963).

4. THE THERMOPYLAI CORRIDOR.

Adapted from Nomos Phthiotidos, *Ethnike Statistike Hiperesia tes Hellados* (1972).

ABBREVIATIONS

The names of ancient authors are abbreviated in the Notes according to H.G. Liddell and R. Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 9th ed. by Sir H.S. Jones (Oxford 1940) xvi – xxxviii, except that here they are transliterated from the Greek. Abbreviations of modern works, especially periodicals, follow the style-sheet of the *American Journal of Archaeology* 90 (1986) 381 – 394. For the convenience of the reader, the abbreviations most frequently used in this work are listed below.

<i>AJA</i>	<i>American Journal of Archaeology</i>
<i>AJAH</i>	<i>American Journal of Ancient History</i>
<i>AJP</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de correspondance hellénique</i>
Beloch, <i>GG</i> III ²	K.J. Beloch, <i>Griechische Geschichte</i> , 2nd ed., (Berlin and Leipzig 1922–1923)
Bengtson, <i>SdA</i> II ²	H. Bengtson, <i>Die Staatsverträge des Altertums</i> , 2nd ed. with R. Werner, Vol. 2 (Munich 1975)
<i>BSA</i>	<i>British School at Athens, Annual</i>
Buckler, <i>TH</i>	J. Buckler, <i>Theban Hegemony, 371–362 BC</i> (Cambridge, Mass. 1980)
<i>CP</i>	<i>Classical Philology</i>
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>FdD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i>
<i>FGrH</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i>
<i>FHG</i>	<i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i>
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
Griffith, <i>HM</i> II	N.G.L. Hammond and G.T. Griffith, <i>A History of Macedonia</i> , Vol. 2: 550–336 B.C. (Oxford 1979)
<i>HSCP</i>	<i>Harvard Studies in Classical Philology</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i>
<i>JHS</i>	<i>Journal of Hellenic Studies</i>
Larsen, <i>GFS</i>	J.A.O. Larsen, <i>Greek Federal States</i> (Oxford 1968)
<i>RE</i>	<i>Real-Encyclopädie der klassischen Altertumswissenschaft</i>
<i>RFIC</i>	<i>Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica</i>
<i>RhM</i>	<i>Rheinisches Museum für Philologie</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i>
<i>SIG³</i>	W. Dittenberger, <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd. ed. (Leipzig 1915–1921)
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
Tod, <i>GHI</i> II	M.N. Tod, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i> , Vol. 2: <i>From 403 to 323 B.C.</i> (Oxford 1948).

PREFACE

No modern, systematic study of the Third Sacred War exists in print. Even the pamphlet of Th. Flathe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs* (Plauen 1854) runs only to 21 pages, and since its time much has been learned and new sources discovered. The contemporary reader must therefore resort to such standard and often dated general histories as K.J. Beloch's *Griechische Geschichte* or the *Cambridge Ancient History* for an account of the war. Thus, a new treatment of these neglected events is obviously needed, if only to understand them in their own right. Furthermore, the great amount of recent work on this period, most of it devoted more to the conflict between Athens and Philip than to broader Greek affairs, makes such a study even more desirable in order to put the Sacred War in its proper place in Greek history.

The Third Sacred War was the last great internecine conflict of the classical Greeks, the culmination of a continual series of wars that began as early as 465 BC, only to be ended by Philip of Macedonia in 338. More specifically, the war marks both the true end of the Theban Hegemony, the period in which Thebes broke the predominance in power of Athens and Sparta, and the nadir of political fragmentation among the Greek *poleis*, a situation that Philip would soon exploit. In that respect alone, it is something of a turning-point in the history of fourth-century Greece. The struggle was not a typical Greek conflict simply because one main combatant, the Phokians, relied primarily on mercenary armies rather than the citizen hoplite-levy in order to wage war. To do so the Phokians robbed the treasures of Delphoi, a rich and steady source of income beyond the means of the ordinary polis. Hence, the Phokians could absorb huge numbers of casualties without breaking, so long as Apollo's wealth lasted, an advantage not shared by their enemies. The dependence on mercenaries prefigures Hellenistic practice, if only because the great Hellenistic kingdoms also recruited large numbers of foreign troops for war and defense.

Although Philip of Macedonia figures prominently in these events, this is not a study of his career, except insofar as his ambitions in Greece affected the course of events there and the manner in which he turned the Sacred War to his own larger ends. One weakness of contemporary work on Philip is that full recognition of the opportunities opened to him by the war has not been fully appreciated. Even so, Philip is treated here primarily as another combatant in that unhappy conflict, in which his participation is duly considered as part of a broader whole.

A word on method is in order. At first glance the literary sources appear too attenuated and meager to provide a basis for a continuous account of the Sacred War. That is to a certain degree true, just as one cannot depend solely on Thucydides' narrative to understand the Pentekontaetia. In the case of Diodoros, the principal source for this period, a knowledge of his goals and manner of composition helps greatly to understand how he abbreviated a much longer and fuller source and hence to comprehend the major points that he records. Diodoros had at his disposal many great, detailed, and contemporary works that unfortunately vanished in antiquity or survived only in fragments, their contents not now fully to be recovered. In most cases, he abridged them freely in an often unsuccessful attempt to display moral lessons from the past to serve as a guide to correct human conduct. For Diodoros history for its own sake was much less important than as a moral tool. Hence, he often omits events, however intriguing to the modern reader, that are irrelevant or insignificant to his theme. In case after case, as is demonstrated in the chronological appendix, he condensed under the heading of one archon-year the events of several years whenever those events were subordinate to his immediate topic. At least some of Diodoros' gaps can be covered by other sources. In these areas of Diodoros' concentration of his narrative, the epigraphical sources are especially useful, for they often provide datable and contemporary evidence for events. The same can be said of Demosthenes, and to a lesser extent of Aischines, whose allusions in various contemporary speeches help to establish both the course of events and their chronology.

Topography also serves as a valuable guide. In many cases, the literary sources record only that a particular place or region had been attacked, without however mentioning how or why. Modern investigation of the terrain has often provided an almost unexpected key to these actions. Once one understands the strategic needs of the belligerents, topography readily explains how they could most easily realize their goals in the field. Therefore, I have felt it essential to identify, locate, and visit every site mentioned in connection with the Sacred War. Likewise, I have attempted to trace all routes used by the combatants insofar as they could be determined. No battle has been analyzed in any detail unless the precise scene of conflict could be established and enough information existed to allow a comprehensive description of the action. With regard to modern Greek toponyms, I have inserted in the text and on the maps names as they are printed on standard, published maps, specifically the so-called "Nomos" maps (properly Ἑθνικὴ στατιστικὴ ὑπηρεσία τῆς Ἑλλάδος), not as they are used on the countryside, simply for the sake of clarity. Therefore, one reads here "Modion" or "Tithronion", but hears in Greece "Modi" and "Tithroni", owing to the Greek habit of dropping the ending. Lastly,

with regard to method, I have avoided that bane of modern scholarship, the unpublished dissertation, even though it sometimes be pertinent to the topic, solely on the grounds that it is unnecessary to discuss views not readily available to the general public. As Loren Eisely aptly wrote: "The years have a way of caring for things that do not seek the safety of print" (*The Unexpected Universe* [New York 1964] 219). It proved impossible to make use of material published after the date of this preface.

Laurence Sterne once observed that "when a man sits down to write a history . . . he knows no more than his heels what lets and confounded hindrances he is to meet with in his way" (*Tristram Shandy* [London and New York 1903] 34). Lets and hindrances there have been, but help and encouragement also. Above all it is a pleasure and an honor to thank the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, which generously awarded a fellowship that enabled me to spend 1984–1986 at the Institut für Alte Geschichte of the University of Munich. The gracious support and hospitality of the Humboldt-Stiftung made research possible, productive, and pleasant. Others have also helped. The Penrose Fund of the American Philosophical Society kindly supported my topographical work in Greece in 1983, and both the American Council of Learned Societies and the Scholars' Travel Fund of the University of Illinois permitted me to present some initial ideas at a conference held at the University of Lyon in 1983. Thanks are also due to the Deutsche akademische Austauschdienst for a fellowship in 1984, which allowed study in Germany. The McDonald-Currie Foundation of Montreal kindly provided a guest-lectureship at McGill University that enabled me to share in amiable and stimulating surroundings some of the ideas subsequently developed here. Likewise, Professor Dr. Jochen Martin and Dr. Linda-Marie Hans generously invited me to share some of the ideas found herein at the University of Freiburg i. Br. in May 1986. Sincerest thanks go also to Messrs. J.G. Deahl and T. Joppe, and to all of their colleagues at E.J. Brill who have done so much to see that this manuscript reached print.

It is a singular pleasure to acknowledge with gratitude many personal debts. Professor Dr. Hatto H. Schmitt, Director of the Institut für Alte Geschichte of the University of Munich, did everything possible to make my stay in Munich productive and enjoyable. To my friend and colleague Dr. Hartmut Beister and his wife Lena there can never be thanks enough for their graciousness, affection, and consideration, and for much more. Miss Elke Bernlocher warmly gave help, encouragement, and friendship. Dr. med. Max Roth and his wife Christel made Munich a special home—still another debt impossible to repay. For advice on various details I am grateful to Professors Albert Schachter and Jakob Seibert, and for other support to Professors E. Badian, W. Robert Connor, and John M.

Fossey. Dr. Rainer Felsch, Director of the excavations at Kalapodion, genially took time from his research in May 1983 to discuss at length his findings there and their significance. As earlier, but unfortunately for the last time, M.C. Buckler lent his own idiosyncratic support. I am also deeply indebted to the friendship and kindness of Professor Ann Perkins, who helped to read proof. Caroline H. Buckler, who developed and printed the photographs, shared the journey. Lastly, a word of gratitude is due to a number of people who will never see this book—the many Greeks who helped me in my topographical work and showed kindness to a stranger who wandered through their midst. They epitomized the noble sentiments uttered by Nausikaa:

ἀλλ' ὅδε τις δύστηνος ἀλώμενος ἐνθάδ' ἰκάνει,
τὸν νῦν χρὴ κομέειν· πρὸς γὰρ Διὸς εἰσιν ἅπαντες
ξεῖνοί τε πτωχοί τε, δόσις δ' ὀλίγη τε φίλη τε.

Odyssey 6.206–208

To all I offer heartfelt thanks.

Munich
23 July 1987

CHAPTER ONE


THE PEACE OF 362 BC

The battle of Mantinea in 362, which involved the major powers of Greece, spelled the end of the Theban Hegemony and the beginning of a stormy period of political uncertainty in Greece. Never again would any single Greek state win ascendancy over the others. Although the combatants, except Sparta, concluded a Common Peace after the battle, Xenophon described the outcome otherwise: "still more confusion and disorder occurred in Greece after the battle than before". Even a brief survey of the situation between the Peace of 362 and the outbreak of the Third Sacred War in 356 substantially supports Xenophon's gloomy verdict. What Xenophon could not have known when he wrote that line is that order would come to Greece from an unexpected source, the young, ambitious, and able king of Macedonia, Philip II. Permanent stability lay still further in the future with the coming of the Romans. The long and brilliant season of the polis was drawing to an end, and the stalemate of 362 was the harbinger of change.¹

In the Peloponnesos Sparta, impoverished in men, land, and money, dared not attack its nearest opponents, Messenia, Megalopolis, and Argos, especially with Thebes still free to come to their aid. Perforce they watched quietly in 361 while *stasis* broke out in Megalopolis and the Thebans intervened to restore peace. No longer subsidized by Sicilian tyrants or the Persian king, the Spartans remained inactive, while seeking to recoup their fortunes. Their opportunity came when Tachos, the king of Egypt, rebelled against his Persian master. In need of troops, Tachos sent an appeal to Sparta, where the authorities responded by dispatching their aged king Agesilaos and 1000 hoplites. Although the Spartan troops returned with 230 talents of silver, their very absence in the meantime further dictated a quiescent Spartan policy in the Peloponnesos. Thus, between 362 and 356 Sparta played the part of a watchful bystander, quietly removed from broader Greek affairs.²

¹ Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.27; Bengtson, *SdA* II².292; cf. Justin 8.1.1-2. Th. Fläthe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs* (Plauen 1854) 5; T.T.B. Ryder, *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965) 140-144; Buckler, *TH*, 205-219.

² Xen. *Ages.* 2.28-31; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 FF106-108; Lykeas, *FHG* IV.441; Polyb. 4.33.8-9; Nepos *Ages.* 8; *Chab.* 2; Diod. 15.89.2-94; Plut. *Ages.* 35.3-6; 36-40; *Mor.* 214D-E; Paus. 3.10.2. F.K. Kienitz, *Die politische Geschichte Aegyptens* (Berlin 1953) 96, and for Sparta in general P. Cartledge, *Agesilaos and the Crisis Of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987).



1. Greece

In contrast to Sparta, Athens actively pursued its interests in the years after the Peace. The battle of Mantinea marked the end of Kallisthenes' policy of intervention on the mainland of the Greek peninsula and a return to Timotheos' concentration on the Aegean Sea and the Second Athenian Confederacy. Principally naval in character, that policy aimed at securing control of the northern Aegean and of maintaining the hegemony of the Confederacy. Nonetheless, the Athenians were usually more energetic than successful. In 362 Alexander of Pherai attacked Athenian possessions and allies in northern waters, capping his success by a bold raid on the Peiraeus itself. Although the Athenians countered by allying themselves with the feeble Thessalian Confederacy, no action was taken against Alexander, who ceased his depredations of his own accord.³

Equally fruitless was Athenian activity in Macedonia and neighboring areas. In 359 Philip ascended the Macedonian throne to find his kingdom beleaguered and his own position challenged by Argaios, a pretender who enjoyed Athenian support. The Athenians hoped that their efforts would result in the reacquisition of Amphipolis. Instead, Philip defeated Argaios, leaving the Athenians little choice but to make peace and to recognize him as the legitimate king. This bad beginning set the pattern for future relations. In 356 Philip captured Poteidaia, which contained an Athenian garrison. In an adroit diplomatic move, he released the Athenians unharmed and without ransom. Nonetheless, the Athenians were again checked in the north, and Philip had no reason to trust them. All too soon Athens would learn that it had made a lethal enemy.⁴ Only in Euboia did Athens enjoy success. After the battle of Leuktra in 371 the major cities on Euboia seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy to become staunch Boiotian allies. As late as 362 they had fought on the side of Thebes at Mantinea. In 357, however, *stasis* broke out on the island, with some Euboians calling for Theban assistance and others appealing to Athens. A month-long contest, marked by numerous skirmishes, resulted in Athenian victory. Eretria, Chalkis, Hestiaia, and Karystos all rejoined the Athenian league. The restoration of Athenian influence on Euboia was important both in checking Thebes and in protecting the Athenian grain trade.⁵

³ Alexander of Pherai: Diod. 15.95; Ps.-Dem. 50.4; Polyainos 6.2.1-2. Thessalian alliance: *IG* II² 116, 175. Athenian policy: Buckler, *TH*, 91-92, 165-169; cf. also H.D. Westlake, *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London 1935) 153-155; J. Cargill, *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley 1981) 169-170.

⁴ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F29; Dem. 6.20; 7.10; 23.121; cf. 2.14; 5.35; Tod, *GHI* II.158; Diod. 16.2.6, 3.5-8.6; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8; Justin 7.6.6. J.R. Ellis, *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976) 47-52 [hereafter cited as "Ellis, Philip"]; G. Cawkwell, *Philip of Macedon* (London and Boston 1978) 36-40 [hereafter cited as "Cawkwell, Philip"]; G. Wirth, *Philipp II.* (Stuttgart 1985) 27-35.

⁵ Aischin. 3.85; Dem. 21.174; *IG* II² 124; Tod, *GHI* II.153-154; *IG* XII 9 7; Diod.

The Social War, which also broke out in 357, gave the Athenians far less cause for joy. With the considerable aid of the Karian dynast Mausolos, such powerful allies as Byzantion, Rhodes, Chios, and Kos seceded from the Second Athenian Confederacy. The rebels launched a vigorous naval campaign in the eastern Aegean in which they raided the Athenian possessions of Imbros and Lemnos and hit Samos particularly hard. Other adherents of Athens were likewise ravaged for booty. Athenian counter-measures were singularly ineffective. Some of the finest Athenian commanders of the fourth century uselessly ended their careers in the futile contest, with Chabrias being killed in action, while Iphikrates and Timotheos were cashiered as victims of Chares' venom and Athenian frustration. Matters worsened when Chares stupidly helped the rebel satrap Artabazos to defeat a loyal Persian army. The Persian king angrily responded by offering the Athenians the choice between war and the recall of Chares. Appalled, they ordered Chares to return home. Exhausted and impoverished, Athens also made peace with the rebels, accepting defeat and a truncated confederacy. For all of its noise and energy during this period, Athens had succeeded in alienating Philip, further antagonizing Thebes, losing the choicest members of its naval league, and angering the Persian king.⁶

While Athens was distracted by the Social War, Philip entrenched himself firmly in the north, often at the expense of Athenian interests. His earlier experience had persuaded him that his ambitions clashed with those of Athens, so he lost no opportunity to take advantage of Athenian weakness in the area. In 357 he captured Amphipolis, which had vainly sought Athenian help. To check Philip's Thracian projects the Athenians in that same year concluded an alliance with the three heirs of Kotys. By 356 the Athenians were openly at war with Philip. In response to his victories over the Paionians and Illyrians and his conquest of some Thracian territory, the Athenians widened their system of alliances in the area to include the kings of the Illyrians and Paionians, and renewed their commitment to the kings of Thrace. Philip answered by allying himself with the Chalkidians. Athenian diplomacy failed to check Philip's progress, and increasingly the Athenians and their northern allies stood insecurely on the defensive.⁷

16.7.2. A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, I² (Leipzig 1886) 162–163 [hereafter cited "Schaefer, *Demosthenes*"].

⁶ Isok. 8.16; 7.8, 81; 15.64; Dem. 15.3ff.; Ps.-Dem. 50.6; Tod, *GHI* II.153–154; Diod. 16.7.3, 21–22.2. R. Sealey, *JHS* 75 (1955) 74–81; Cargill, *Second Athenian League*, 176–184; *The Ancient World* 5 (1982) 100–102; S. Hornblower, *Mausolus* (Oxford 1982) 206–214.

⁷ Capture of Amphipolis: Tod, *GHI* II.150; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F42; Dem. 1.8; Diod. 16.8.2. Athenian alliance with Kotys' heirs: Tod, *GHI* II.151. Philip's victories

Nor were Philip's ambitions limited to the northern Aegean. The king was also eager to take advantage of endemic strife in Thessaly. Throughout the fourth century various tyrants of Pherai had attempted to rule the entire region as legitimate *tagoi*. Their efforts were routinely opposed by the aristocratic family of the Aleuadae in Larisa and by nobles in other Thessalian cities. If Philip had learned anything while a hostage at Thebes in his youth, it was presumably how to turn Thessalian civil war to his own advantage. As early as 358 he campaigned in Thessaly, probably against Pherai. Although he made no territorial gains, he did not go away empty-handed. He returned home with a Thessalian wife, Philinna of Larisa, and perhaps even at this time married in addition Nikesipolis of Pherai. In this fashion he forged links with at least one important Thessalian city, and like earlier Macedonian kings displayed a marked interest in Thessalian affairs.⁸

From virtually the outset of his career Philip showed marked respect for the cult of Apollo and especially for his chief sanctuary at Delphoi. In 357, upon gaining control of Amphipolis, he brought about the exile of Stratokles and Philon and the confiscation of their goods, a tithe of which went to the local cult of Apollo. In the following year he received a Pythian oracle approving his alliance with Olynthos, and erected copies of its terms at Delphoi. Later legend, probably without foundation, maintained that Philip dispatched Chairon of Megalopolis to Delphoi for an oracle concerning a dream of Olympias. In time Philip would forge such close links with Delphoi that Demosthenes would complain that the Delphian priestess favored the king. At any rate, Philip demonstrated by his earliest displays of consideration that he had a vested interest in the welfare of the Delphic sanctuary and the goodwill of Apollo.⁹

Thebes, like Sparta, played a rather unassuming role in the events of these years. The Peace of 362 had left Thebes the leading power in Greece, despite the loss of its brilliant leader Epameinondas. Nonetheless, the source of its strength, the Boiotian Confederacy, was intact. The league was a federal organization embracing the citizens of Boiotia, with Thebes

over the Paionians and Illyrians: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 FF38–39; Diod. 16.4.2–7, 8.1, 22.3; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8. Athenian alliance with the kings of Thrace, Illyrians, and Paionians: Tod, *GHI* II.157. Philip's alliance with the Chalkidians: Tod, *GHI* II.158.

⁸ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F34; Athen. 13.557b–d; Justin 7.6.7–10. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 166–168; Ellis, *Philip*, 61; Griffith, *HM* II.218–230; T.R. Martin, *HSCP* 86 (1982) 55–78.

⁹ Apollo at Amphipolis: Tod, *GHI* II.150 lines 13–14; cf. Diod. 16.8.2; J. Papastavru, *Amphipolis, Geschichte und Prosopographie* (Leipzig 1936) 50–51. Olynthian alliance: Bengtson, *SdA* II².308 lines 7–8, 12–17. Chairon: Plut. *Alex.* 3.1; cf. J.R. Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander* (Oxford 1969) 6. Delphic priestess: Cicero *de Div.* 2.118; Plut. *Dem.* 20.1.

as its capital. Each citizen retained local civic rights, about which nothing is known, in addition to federal citizenship; but there is no evidence to indicate that Boiotian cities enjoyed any formal political relations with Thebes, such as those which existed under the constitution abolished by the King's Peace of 386. A fundamental Theban policy was the maintenance of the confederacy. In external affairs, Thebes staunchly supported its allies in the Peloponnesos against Sparta, chief among them being the Messenians, the southern Arkadians, and the Argives. Only once after the Peace of 362, however, did the Thebans intervene in the south. In 361 Thebes sent its general Pammenes to end the *stasis* in Megalopolis. On other fronts, Thebes was allied both to the tyrannical house in Pheraï and to the Thessalian Confederacy. Thus, much of the diplomatic edifice erected by Epameinondas survived him.¹⁰

In its own neighborhood Thebes generally enjoyed peace. That peace was temporarily broken in 357 by the conflict with Athens in Euboia, in which Thebes had the support of Teisiphonos, one of the Pheraian tyrants. Even this fighting was short-lived and limited to Euboia. The long border between Boiotia and Attika remained peaceful all the while. Although Justin (8.1.5) claims that the Phokians ravaged Boiotian territory during this period, his testimony is contradicted by better sources. Relations between Thebes and Phokis, while cool perhaps, were peaceful; and technically the two still observed a defensive alliance. Bereft of the principal men who had propelled it to hegemony and wearied by its many exertions, Thebes was content to catch its breath.¹¹

The Phokians were seldom strong enough to pursue a vigorous foreign policy, and from 362 to 357 they were content to remain at peace with the larger Greek world. The cities of Phokis were autonomous, but they had banded together to form the Phokian Confederacy with its capital at the Phokikon, where an assembly met to decide matters of common interest. Delphoi and its sanctuary of Apollo were not members of this confederacy. The assembly elected three *strategoi* who exercised the executive

¹⁰ For a full description of the constitution of the Boiotian Confederacy, see Buckler, *TH* 18–33. Although P. Roesch, *Études béotiennes* (Paris 1982) 415, denies the existence of federal citizenship before 338, he ignores, among other things, the evidence of three inscriptions, one of which he edited himself, in which the *damos* of the Boiotians conferred *proxenia* upon foreigners: *IG* VII 2407, 2408; *Teiresias* 13 (1983) no. E.82.50; see also *IG* II² 178; Tod, *GHI* II.101; and *FdD* III.5.14 col. 2 line 14. Obviously, the grant of *proxenia* in the name of the Boiotians is a sure indication of a federal citizenship. Pammenes' intervention: Diod. 15.94.2–3; S. Dušanić, *Arkadski Savez IV Veka* (Belgrade 1970) 307–308. Thessalian alliances: Bengtson, *SdA* II².281, 288; cf. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4; schol. Aristeides *Panathenaikos* 319; P. Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie* (Namur n.d. [1952]) 165–167.

¹¹ Theban-Phokian relations: J. Buckler, *The Ancient World* 5 (1982) 85. Boiotian-Attic border: J. Ober, *Fortress Attica* (Leiden 1985).

functions of the league, which were mainly concerned with foreign affairs. The minting of a common coinage also indicates the existence of a federal treasury, but further details of the confederacy's organization are lacking. The precise relationship between the cities of Phokis and the confederacy is unknown, but at least it was possible for citizens to speak on behalf of their polis and to have their will recognized as distinct, even if it ran counter to the opinion of the majority. Though an ally of Thebes, a traditional foe of Thessaly, and a traditional friend of Athens, Phokis remained aloof from the disputes that distracted Greece from 362 to 357.¹²

The last major component of the events about to follow was the Delphic Amphiktyony, an organization established to administer the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphoi and that of Demeter at Thermopylai. It was in strict terms a religious organization, but politics always played an important part in its deliberations and operations. The very importance of Pythian Apollo and his principal sanctuary in the Greek world ensured that politics would infringe upon religion. The Amphiktyony consisted of peoples in the region of the sanctuaries who had bound themselves by oath to maintain the sanctuaries and to provide that the proper sacrifices, rituals, and games were observed. The members prescribed penalties for those who committed sacrilege against the gods and their sanctuaries. The Amphiktyony also established political rules governing warfare and civil conduct among its members. Those states that violated these rules or unjustifiably violated the liberties of other members were fined and barred from the sanctuaries, festivals, and the Council of the Amphiktyony until recompense was paid in full. The religious duties of the Amphiktyons also had an economic side. For generations great wealth had been bestowed upon the god, and the Amphiktyons were accountable to Apollo and the Greek world for the use of this treasure. They were, in effect, the guardians of it, and they determined how it was to be used.¹³

The constituents of the Amphiktyony established a Council, which was in fact the body that governed the sanctuaries and all that pertained to them whether religious, political, or economic. The Amphiktyonic Council consisted of 24 members, designated *hieromnemes*, and representation on the Council was designed to give all members an equal voice in all deliberations. The Thessalians had two votes, as did the Phokians, Delphians, Boiotians, Phthiotic Achaians, Magnetes, Ainianes, and Malians. Other

¹² F. Schober, *Phokis* (Crossen a.d. Oder 1924) 66–73 [hereafter cited as “Schober, *Phokis*”]; Larsen, *GFS* 40–48. Citizens and their polis: Paus. 10.3.2.

¹³ Amphiktyonic Council: *IG* II² 1126; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 6.5.4; Aischin. 2.116. The best analysis of the Delphic Amphiktyony in the fourth century is G. Roux, *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon 1979) 1–59 [hereafter cited as “Roux, *Amphictionie*”].

peoples shared their two votes in order to reflect in part geographical realities. Thus, the Ionians, meaning those in Attika and Euboia, composed a single voting unit, as did the Dorians, defined as those living in central Greece and the Peloponnesos, the Lokrians of the East and West, and the Perrhaiboi and Dolopes. Even though Delphoi had no greater voting power than the other members of the Council, it always enjoyed a special prestige and position because it was the site of Apollo's sanctuary.

The Amphiktyonic Council, under the titular head of an eponymous archon, met twice a year, once in the spring and again in the autumn. The sessions met first at Thermopylai and then continued at Delphoi. Ordinary sessions were divided into two parts, one devoted to the work of the *hieromnemes* and the *pylagoroi*, the latter being delegates designated to bring specific matters before the Council of which they were not members. In the second part of a normal session the *hieromnemes* voted on the matters raised by the *pylagoroi* and on other business. The vote of the *hieromnemes* became the decision or *dogma* of the Amphiktyonic Council. At the outbreak of the Sacred War the primary topic of discussion in the Council was the rebuilding of the temple of Apollo at Delphoi, for which funds were provided by states throughout the Greek world. While the Council was responsible for the funds, the officials who actually managed the work on the temple were the *naopoioi*, who also rendered accounts of their expenditures.

In sum, Greece during the years 362–357 was a patchwork of old rivalries and expedient alliances. In general, Thebes and its Peloponnesian allies stood as the warders of Sparta. Elsewhere Thebes was on peaceful terms with the states of central and northern Greece, and even the clash with Athens was limited to the fighting on Euboia. Only Athens and Philip pursued active foreign policies, often at each other's expense, with Philip enjoying better success. Yet to most Greeks these events in the northwestern Aegean were too remote to be of concern. Nor was anyone in 357 aware of the looming conflict over Delphoi, which would engulf central Greece, spill over into other regions, and ultimately provide Philip with the opportunity to intervene in Greek politics. The Peace of 362 succeeded only in giving most of Greece a brief and fitful respite from war.

CHAPTER TWO

THE ROAD TO WAR (363–357 BC)

The origins of the Third Sacred War actually precede the Peace of 362. In the spring of 363 the *hieromnemes*, members of the Amphiktyonic Council, met as usual to deal with matters relating to the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphoi. At that time, under the presidency of Andronikos of Krannon, they voted to banish Astykrates and ten other prominent Delphians and to confiscate their property. Nowhere is the actual charge against this group recorded. Nonetheless, the property of the 11 was forfeited to the temple of Apollo and then leased at auction, the proceeds of the rents amounting to slightly more than 37 *mnai*. The exiles found refuge at Athens, where Astykrates was made an Athenian citizen and freed from taxation, while his colleagues received *isopoliteia*. The Athenians also used the occasion to accuse the Amphiktyons of having violated both the laws of Delphoi and of the Amphiktyonic League.¹

These events are both unique and mysterious, for they constitute the only instance of the Amphiktyony intervening in the internal affairs of a member. The mystery lies in the paucity of details. Perhaps this much at least can be said of these proceedings. Despite the Athenian charge of illegality, the Amphiktyons condemned Astykrates and his coterie at a regular *pylaia*, or meeting of the Council. The majority decided by vote that the 11 Delphians were guilty of the charges against them, sentenced them, and saw that the punishment was carried out. Andronikos, the Thessalian who presided over the case, seems never to have been punished for this alleged illegality, and in the 330s he served as a *naopoios* from Krannon. The Athenians, known in antiquity at least for their propaganda, were then at war with most of the other Amphiktyons, which alone gave them motive for making a specious accusation. Nothing compels others to believe it. In fact, the Athenians may well have protected Astykrates and his company as an act of defiance.²

¹ Events of 363: *IG* II² 109; for a new text of this inscription, cf. M.J. Osborne, *Naturalization in Athens* (Brussels 1981) 49–51. Cf. also *FdD* III.5. nos. 15–18; H. Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 89–96; H.W. Parke, *A History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1939) 235, whose views differ significantly from those presented here. Cf. also F.R. Wüst, *Historia* 3 (1954) 129–153.

² Unique occurrence: U. Kahrstedt, *Griechisches Staatsrecht* (Göttingen 1922) I.392. Andronikos as *naopoios*: *FdD* III.5 no. 91 line 19. Athenian propaganda: cf. the caustic remarks of Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F153; W.R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century*

The standard explanation of these events was given long ago by H. Pomtow.³ In his view, the trouble began when the Phokians refused to campaign with the Boiotians against the Thessalian tyrant Alexander of Pherai. In retaliation the Boiotian Confederacy prosecuted the Phokians before the Delphic Amphiktyony, which sparked passionate partisanship among the Delphians. Astykrates and his ten colleagues led a pro-Phokian minority against the pro-Theban majority directed by the aristocratic family of the Thrakidai. The ensuing political turbulence prompted the Thebans to demand that the Amphiktyonic Council expel the pro-Phokians from Delphoi.

Very little of this interpretation will bear scrutiny. First, there is absolutely no reason to think that the Boiotian Confederacy even once called upon the Phokians for military service on behalf of its Thessalian allies. The alliance with Phokis, made in the aftermath of Leuktra, was defensive in nature, so the Phokians were not legally obliged to send troops unless Boiotia itself were attacked. In view of the traditional Phokian-Thessalian enmity, the very presence of a Phokian contingent in a Theban expeditionary force would immediately have put an unwelcome strain on Theban-Thessalian relations. In the face of such a threat Alexander of Pherai could have strengthened his position by posing as the champion of Thessaly against its hereditary foe. Nor is there any reason to conclude that the Thebans would have prosecuted the Phokians in the first place. The Boiotian-Phokian alliance had nothing to do with the Delphic Amphiktyony. When in 362 the Phokians did in fact refuse to campaign in the Peloponnesos, the Thebans dropped the matter without visible protest or recrimination. These factors alone, to which more can be added, remove any reason to conclude that Thebes played a leading role in the exile of Astykrates and his friends. Both the Phokians and the Thessalians, while Boiotian allies, claimed a special and mutually adverse relationship with Delphoi. Hence, a Theban indictment of the 11 might prove enough to

Athens (Washington, D.C. 1968) 78–84; P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* (Munich 1972) 69–70; cf. also above pp. 133–135. My avoidance of the word “party” to denote these political groups is dictated by the findings of W.R. Connor, *The New Politicians of Fifth-Century Athens* (Princeton 1971), who has shown that the term is quite misleading. The objections of J.T. Roberts, *Accountability in Athenian Government* (Madison 1982) 13, and C.D. Hamilton, *Sparta’s Bitter Victories* (Ithaca 1979) *passim*, only give greater force to Connor’s conclusions.

³ *Klio* 6 (1906) 89–126, 400–419. The vast majority of later scholars have accepted Pomtow’s interpretation, including among others, Parke, *A History of the Delphic Oracle*, 233; Cloché, *Thèbes de Béotie*, 167–168; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Geschichte* (Munich 1950) 290–291; Ellis, *Philip*, 73–74; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 63; S. Hornblower, *The Greek World 479–323 BC* (London and New York 1983) 246 [hereafter cited as “Hornblower, *Greek World*”].

set the two traditional enemies at odds, and a crisis in northern Greece would have stretched Thebes' limited resources uncomfortably. In 363 the Thebans, still at war with Sparta and Athens, were further distressed by the war then raging between the Arkadian League and Elis. The last thing that they needed was additional turmoil between their allies. In short, Pomtow's reconstruction, even on its own terms, makes little sense of the situation at Delphoi.⁴

The political position of Delphoi in this controversy is particularly significant. Throughout the classical period Delphoi strove for independence from the rest of Phokis. The Delphians saw themselves as the stewards of a pan-Greek religious center. As early as 448 they asserted this view, much to the consternation of the Phokians. Although the Athenians at first sided with Phokis, they soon endorsed Delphian independence. Later, in the Peace of Nikias the Spartans, Athenians, and most of their allies officially sanctioned this position. Thereafter, Delphoi and the sanctuary of Apollo were virtually one. Although Delphoi was geographically part of Phokis, it was politically independent of the Phokian Confederacy. Its political connections were primarily with the Amphiktyonic League, which consistently endorsed both Delphian independence and Delphian presidency of the sanctuary. In the fourth century the status of Delphoi as international ground was underlined in 369/8, when the site was chosen, much as Geneva often is today, as the seat of negotiations aimed at renewing a multilateral peace treaty. Hence, two features loom in the background of the *stasis* of 363: enduring tension between Delphoi and Phokis and close political ties between Delphoi and the Amphiktyonic League.⁵

It remains to determine what can reasonably and safely be said of this Delphian *stasis*. Pomtow is probably right to argue that Astykrates and his comrades were pro-Phokian, to judge primarily by later events. Their political sentiments would explain why the exiles found refuge at Athens, traditionally a Phokian ally. Pro-Phokian leanings may have prompted them to throw in their lot with Philomelos after he had seized the sanctuary in 356. Yet Pomtow's depiction of the group as primarily anti-Theban, a view shared by most other scholars as well, is excessively narrow.

⁴ For a detailed rebuttal of Pomtow's views, see J. Buckler in P. Roesch and G. Argoud edd., *La Béotie antique* (Paris 1985) 237–246; Arkadian-Elieian dispute; Buckler, *TH* 201–205. Boiotian-Phokian alliance: Bengtson, *SdA* II².271; Buckler, *Ancient World* 5 (1982) 85. Delphoi's relations to the Phokian Confederacy: Larsen, *GFS*, 40–48.

⁵ Fifth-century conditions: *IG* I³ 9; Thuc. 1.112.5; 5.18.2; Philochoros, *FGH* 328 F34; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F156; Eratosthenes, *FGH* 241 F38; Plut. *Per.* 21.2–3. A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* I (Oxford 1945) 337–338, III (Oxford 1956) 667–668. U. Kahrstedt in G.E. Mylonas and D. Raymond, *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson* II (St. Louis 1953) 750; Larsen, *GFS* 42; R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 418–420. Fourth-century: Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.27; cf. Roux, *Amphictione*, 1–59.

Nothing connects the Thebans with these events except their vote in the Amphiktyonic Council. The Thessalians and the Lokrians had their own long traditions of hostility towards Phokis, and their positions on the Council gave them the opportunity and the reason to defend Delphoi from Phokian ambitions. Any dispute at Delphoi threatened to involve many outside factors and to engage many old loyalties and rivalries. So long as Astykrates looked to Phokis for support he need fear several prominent peoples besides Thebes in the Amphiktyonic League.⁶

Pomtow is probably right to portray Astykrates' coterie as a minority, and obviously an unpopular one, in Delphian politics. Yet that alone fails to explain why both Delphoi and the Amphiktyonic League became involved in the exile of the group, especially since each had regular and separate procedures for handling offenses. The unique and extraordinary role of the Amphiktyons in these events calls for some explanation. Nor do Astykrates' pro-Phokian leanings of themselves provide an answer. So long as Astykrates and his followers acted within the law, neither the Delphian majority nor the Amphiktyons had legitimate reason to prosecute them. For that matter, within the law the group posed little danger because it could achieve little in the face of the majority, far too little to goad the Amphiktyonic Council to take the unheard-of step of gratuitously intervening in the internal affairs of Delphoi. The stakes would have been too low.⁷

The most likely explanation is that in 363 violent partisan strife erupted at Delphoi, with Astykrates' coterie struggling for political ascendancy. For reasons now unknown, Astykrates doubtless either resorted to violence or seemed about to do so, thereby embroiling Delphoi and endangering the sanctuary. In all probability, the majority at Delphoi genuinely feared that Astykrates would call for Phokian help to tip the scales in his favor. Similar appeals on the part of desperate minorities were common in classical Greek history. The resort to or the hint of violence would also explain the action of the Amphiktyons. Their intervention was unnecessary so long as normal remedies and avenues of satisfaction were open. But *stasis* in Delphoi could readily have led to the seizure of the sanctuary. In 363

⁶ Astykrates' pro-Phokian position: Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 93–94, 125. Athenian-Phokian friendship: Thuc. 1.111.1; Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.1. The age-old animosity between Boiotia and Phokis also predisposed Athens to friendship with Phokis. Co-operation with Philomelos: *FdD* III.5 no. 19 lines 19, 34. Modern acceptance of Astykrates' anti-Theban policy: e.g. Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, 234–235; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 63. Phokian-Thessalian enmity: Hdt. 8.27; Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.21; Aischin. 2.140; Paus. 10.2.1. Phokian-Lokrian: Thuc. 3.101.2; 5.32.2; *Hell. Ox.* 18.2; cf. I.A.F. Bruce, *An Historical Commentary on the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia* (Cambridge 1967) 118–119; Xen. *Hell.* 3.5.3; Paus. 3.9.9.

⁷ Cf. Buckler in *La Béotie antique*, 240–241.

this was no academic consideration for the Amphiktyons. Only the year before the entire Greek world had looked on while the Pisatans assumed the presidency of Olympia and their Arkadian supporters had begun to plunder Zeus' sanctuary. With this example so vivid before their eyes, the Amphiktyons understandably acted quickly to restore peace in Delphoi, especially since it was their duty to ensure the safety of the sanctuary. In 363 they no doubt determined that the fate of Zeus' shrine would not be shared by that of his son.⁸

Not much can be said of Astykrates' Delphian opponents. Although Pomtow considers them pro-Theban, it is probably more accurate to call them pro-Amphiktyonic, among whom their staunchest supporters were the Thebans, Thessalians, and Lokrians, all hereditary enemies of Phokis. Certainly their appeal to the Amphiktyons was answered immediately and to their satisfaction. They were probably led by the Thrakidai, an aristocratic family. One of its members, Thraix, had served as Delphian archon earlier in the fourth century, and it was one of the leading families of Delphoi. The basis of the Thrakidai's policy was the desire to keep Delphoi independent, which also entailed amicable co-operation with the Amphiktyonic League. There is nothing to indicate that at this time they had broader political ties with individual states.⁹

In the light of the above, a few conclusions are possible. Astykrates and his supporters formed a minority which at least threatened to overthrow the majority at Delphoi with Phokian help. How real the threat was cannot be determined, but Astykrates' ambitions were resisted by the Delphian majority, led by the Thrakidai, who were dedicated to Delphian independence and friendly ties with the other Amphiktyons. In the face of the danger the majority appealed to the Amphiktyonic Council, which intervened to baffle Astykrates' designs. In a regular *pylaia* Andronikos of Krannon presided over the meeting that resulted in the banishment of Astykrates and his comrades. The property of the exiles was confiscated and auctioned, its total value amounting to a trifle more than 37 *mnai*. Athens, then at war with most other Amphiktyons, falsely accused the Council of illegal procedures and in defiance gave refuge to the exiles. Not responding to the Athenian accusation, the Amphiktyons closed the matter, and life in Delphoi returned to normal.

⁸ Minority appeals for outside help: perhaps the classic example comes from Thucydides' description (3.69–85) of the *stasis* at Kerkyra in 427; cf. also Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.25–26; 5.3.11; and in general J. Seibert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten in der griechischen Geschichte*, 2 vols. (Darmstadt 1979). Plundering of Olympia: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–35; Diod. 15.78.1–3, 82.1; Dušanić, *Arkadski Savez IV Veka*, 303–304.

⁹ Thrakidai: Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 98 n. 3; cf. Diod. 16.24.3; Thraix: *FdD* III.1. no. 391.

The Peace of 362 followed quickly on the heels of the *stasis* at Delphoi, giving promise of wider tranquility to Greece. That promise, as noted earlier, proved largely ephemeral. For Delphoi the most ominous renewal of strife occurred in Thessaly. In 361 Alexander of Pherai felt secure enough to pursue his ambitions in the north. He began by attacking Athenian possessions and allies throughout the Cyclades, capping his depredations by a bold and successful raid on the Peiraieus itself. About the same time he also resumed his efforts to defeat the Thessalian Confederacy. For once he met with no opposition from the Thebans, who either through war-weariness or indifference refused to intervene in a situation that seemed incapable of solution. Racked by warfare among its cities, abandoned by its Theban allies, the Thessalian Confederacy turned to Athens for help. In 361/0 the two powers, already at war with Alexander, concluded an alliance for all time. These events had their impact on Delphoi. The civil war in Thessaly enfeebled one of the most powerful members of the Amphiktyonic League, thus weakening one of Delphoi's staunchest supporters. Perhaps even more unpalatable to the Delphians was the sight of Thessaly aligning itself with Athens, which only two years earlier had defied the Amphiktyonic Council by condemning its treatment of Astykrates.¹⁰

Both the Delphians and most other Amphiktyons were alarmed by this turn of events. The prestige of Thessaly plummeted, as Demosthenes (5.23) testified when he asserted that the Thessalians had lost their ascendancy in Amphiktyonic affairs before the outbreak of the Sacred War. No factors better account for this decline than these two developments. For their part, the Delphians were forced to cast about for a new and more dependable protector. Their choice was Thebes. The Thebans had long enjoyed amicable ties with Apollo's sanctuary, and after the battle of Leuktra had begun building a new treasury there to house the dedication of spoils from the battle. Although the precise part played by the Thebans in the *stasis* of 363 cannot be determined, they clearly added their weight to the majority within the Amphiktyonic Council. In 360/59 the Delphians strengthened their ties with the Thebans by granting them the honor of *promanteia*, preference in consulting the oracle. With that privilege went the unspoken, but clearly understood, obligation of the Thebans to remain worthy of the honor. Just as in the fifth century the Spartans had received *promanteia* for having liberated Delphoi from Phokian control, so in 360/59

¹⁰ Alexander: Diod. 15.95.1–2; Dem. 50.4–5; Polyainos 6.2; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 153–155; Athenian-Thessalian alliance: IG II² 116; Bengtson, *SdA* II².293. For earlier Thessalian influence at Delphoi, cf. M. Sordi in B. Helly, ed., *La Thessalie* (Paris 1979) 157–163.

the Thebans were expected to ensure the liberty of the city and the sanctuary. Consequently, Delphian affairs came to have an added significance for Thebes.¹¹

The new ties between Delphoi and Thebes were soon tested under exacting and somewhat mysterious circumstances. At the autumn *pylaia* of 357 the Thebans indicted Sparta before the Amphiktyonic Council. They charged that the Spartan commander Phoibidas had seized the Kadmeia, the akropolis of Thebes, in time of peace. Phoibidas and the Spartans were certainly guilty, but the crime had been committed in 382, and since then the Thebans had reduced Spartan power in a long, victorious war. In practical terms, the Spartans had already paid fully. Nonetheless, the Amphiktyonic Council found the Spartans guilty, and fined them 500 talents, to be paid by the next *pylaia*.¹²

At the same *pylaia* the Phokians were indicted for having illegally cultivated a large amount of sacred land in the Kirrhaian plain. The Amphiktyons also found them guilty, and likewise levied a heavy fine. The scholarly world uniformly attributes this indictment to the Thebans also, but Diodoros subtly indicates that someone other than they accused Phokis. In the only passage where he specifically retails the charges against the Phokians, he states (16.23.2–3)

οἱ μὲν Θηβαῖοι διὰ τὴν κατάληψιν τῆς Καδμείας δίκας μεγάλας ἐπαγαγόντες τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι κατεδίκασαν αὐτοὺς πολλοῖς χρήμασιν, οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς ἐπεργασάμενοι πολλὴν τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας τῆς ὀνομαζομένης Κιρραίας δίκας ὑπέσχον ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι καὶ πολλοῖς ταλάντοις κατεκρίθησαν.

On the one hand, the Thebans, because of the seizure of the Kadmeia, brought serious charges against the Spartans in the Amphiktyonic Council, and obtained a verdict against them for a great deal of money. On the other hand, the Phokians, having cultivated much sacred land called Kirrhaian, were arraigned before the Amphiktyonic Council and fined many talents.

¹¹ Theban *promanteia*: *FdD* III.4. no. 375, with the discussion of J. Pouilloux; cf. also J.-F. Bommelaer, *BCH* 93 (1969) 93–94. Pouilloux suggests that the grant of *promanteia* came in response to the completion of the Theban treasury (Paus. 10.11.5). J.-P. Michaud, *FdD* II.1.8, *Le Trésor de Thèbes* (Paris 1973) 2–7, however, concludes that the completion of the treasury cannot be securely determined, with dates ranging from 371 to 346. Earlier Theban-Delphian ties: Buckler, *TH* 136–137. Spartan *promanteia* in the fifth century: Thuc. 1.112.5; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F34; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F156; Eratosthenes, *FGrH* 241 F38; Plut. *Per.* 21.2–3; for the date: E.M. Walker, *Cambridge Ancient History* V (Cambridge 1927) 88.

¹² Charges: Diod. 16.23.2–3, 29.2; Justin 8.1.5. Phoibidas: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.27–31; Androtion, *FGrH* 324 F50; Diod. 15.20.2; Plut. *Ages.* 23.6; Nepos *Pel.* 1–4. Cf. also Flathe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs*, 5; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².488–491; Beloch, *GG* III².1.246–247; Fiehn, “Philomelos”, *RE* 19 (1938) 2524. Although M. Sordi, *BCH* 81 (1957) 51, and C.D. Hamilton, *Classical Views* 26 (1982) 19, place these events immediately after the battle of Mantinea in 362, Delphic inscriptions give the correct date: cf. Buckler, *La Béotie antique*, 242–243.

Grammar alone indicates that the Thebans brought charges only against the Spartans and that some unnamed party indicted the Phokians. Nothing else explains the odd and awkward shift from the active voice of the main verb in the *men*-clause to the passive of the second verb in the *de*-clause and the shift of subject. The *men-de* construction would certainly have been supported by parallel verb forms if the subject, or plaintiff, were the same in both parts. Indeed, if the Thebans were the plaintiffs in both cases, the *men-de* construction, as it stands, is a poor way in which to impart that information. One can only conclude that Thebes did not indict the Phokians.¹³

Clearly, Diodoros' testimony raises more questions than it answers, among which are why the Thebans indicted the Spartans, who pressed charges against the Phokians, and why these events occurred in 357. Theban motives are hardly obvious. Sparta had posed no threat since 362, and surely the Thebans were neither naive nor stolid enough to expect the Spartans to pay the fine. Nor is it likely that they hoped to use Spartan sacrilege as a pretext for another large-scale invasion of Lakonia. So long as Mantinea and its Arkadian allies were hostile to Thebes, a repetition of Epameinondas' feats was not easily feasible. The only real advantage in thus embarrassing Sparta was diplomatic. If the Spartans refused to pay the fine, as was likely, they would be barred from the Amphiktyonic Council. They would then become outcasts. As Diodoros (16.23.3) reports, the Amphiktyons declared that if the Spartans refused to pay their fine, they should thenceforth be hated for their evil throughout the Greek world, a heavy blow to a people who prided themselves on their piety. Yet even this blow to Spartan prestige, which removed another vestige of Spartan influence, cannot explain the timing of the charges against Phokis.¹⁴

The identity and the motives of those who prosecuted Phokis hold the key to the entire episode. The clue comes from the charges themselves. The Phokians were accused of illegally cultivating the sacred land of the Kirrahaian plain, the size of which was probably equal to that of Delphoi.

¹³ Cf. Buckler, *La Béotie antique*, 243–245; my thanks also to Professor David F. Bright for his observations on this passage. Paus. 10.2.1 does not connect the Thebans with the charge against the Phokians. Only Justin (8.1.4–8), whose work was used by Orosius 3.12, blames the Thebans, but his account of these years is so chaotic as to be unreliable. Modern scholarship: G. Grote, *A History of Greece XI* (New York 1869) 242–243; E. Curtius, *Griechische Geschichte III*⁶ (Berlin 1889) 419; Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, 233; Cloché, *Thèbes*, 167–168; Ellis, *Philip*, 73–74; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 63; and in M.B. Hatzopoulos and L.D. Loukopoulos, *Philip of Macedon* (London 1981) 82; Hornblower, *Greek World*, 246.

¹⁴ Since there can be no legitimate doubt that the Spartans were sincerely pious towards Pythian Apollo (cf. M. Clauss, *Sparta: Eine Einführung in seine Geschichte und Zivilisation* [Munich 1983] 118, 170, 177), one reason for the Theban action may have been religious in nature.

Aischines (3.122–124) clearly testifies that the *hieromnemes* and *pylagoroi* were responsible for the proper use of the god's land. They were aided in their efforts by the Delphian *prytaneis*. Aischines adds that the men of Delphoi were to be present to carry out the Council's orders. Thus, the *hieromnemes* and especially the Delphians themselves had a vested interest in protecting the sacred land from abuse. In view of their experience with Astykrates, the Delphians no doubt considered the Phokian usurpation of the land dangerous to themselves. They stood to gain most from denouncing the Phokians, and their formal complaint brought the crisis to a head.¹⁵

Delphian involvement in these events has the additional advantage of explaining Diodoros' curious shift to the passive voice in his statement of the legal proceedings. It is very difficult to assume that Diodoros knew virtually every other detail of this episode, even if minor, but was ignorant of the party that had indicted the Phokians. A reading of Diodoros suggests the reason for this strange omission. Throughout his narrative he shows consistent piety towards Delphoi and its people, who are portrayed as innocent victims, and corresponding disapproval of the Phokians. He wanted to give the essentials without, however, misrepresenting the truth. If the Delphians had indicted the Phokians, and thus had helped to precipitate the crisis, Diodoros may well have suppressed the fact through piety in order to spare the Delphians from any suspicion of blame. By switching to the passive voice, he could record the accusation, while mercifully leaving the plaintiff unnamed.¹⁶

Pausanias (10.2.1, 15.1) corroborates Diodoros' testimony that the Phokians were charged with tilling sacred land. Although he knows that the Amphiktyons fined the Phokians, he admits that he does not know whether they were indeed guilty. He suggests that the Thessalians may have condemned them because of traditional hostility. Pausanias may have mistakenly assumed that the Thessalians were responsible for the indictment because they customarily presided over the meetings of the Council. As in the case of Andronikos of Krannon's sentencing of Astykrates' coterie, so in 357 a Thessalian doubtless presided over the proceedings.¹⁷

¹⁵ Surveillance of sacred land: Roux, *Amphictionie*, 56–57; extent of sacred land: Kahrstedt in Mylonas and Raymond, *Studies Presented to D.M. Robinson II*, 749–757. For a description of Kirrha, cf. L. Dor *et al.*, *Kirrha* (Paris 1960) 13–34.

¹⁶ Delphians: Diod. 16.24.3, 26–27.3, 28.2; disapproval of the Phokians: 16.58.5, 60–61. A Delphian indictment of Phokis also helps to explain subsequent Phokian harshness towards the Delphians, on which cf. above pp. 25–26.

¹⁷ Cf. Roux, *Amphictionie*, 52–53. Although Roux argues (83) that Pausanias' source ultimately relied on some *fasti delphici*, Pausanias' erroneous date for the end of the war (348/7: 10.3.1) sufficiently disproves the suggestion. Cf. also pp. 174–178 above.

Although Pausanias was uncertain of Phokian guilt, the Phokians were not. In reaction to the Amphiktyonic condemnation Philomelos, soon to be notorious throughout Greece, complained in a meeting of the Phokians that the fine was too large for the cultivation of a small piece of land. He did not dispute the truth of the indictment, but objected only to the magnitude of the penalty. Nor is there reason to suspect that the Amphiktyons had acted without having first investigated the validity of the Delphian charges. As in the case described by Aischines (3.122–124), the appropriate officials actually inspected the land to determine whether or not it was being tilled. This process, as G. Roux has pointed out, was possible only because the boundaries of the sacred land were clearly defined. The truth of the Delphian charge was easily checked. Acting upon the Delphian complaint, the Amphiktyons and the Delphian *prytaneis* surveyed the land, and caught the Phokians red-handed. The full Council punished the offenders accordingly.¹⁸

The part played by Delphoi also explains the Theban involvement in these events. Without protection or support the Delphians could not bring the Phokians to book. They and their fellow Amphiktyons therefore needed someone capable of enforcing the decision of the Council. Thessaly was too distracted by civil war to intervene and Athens, an ally of Sparta, too well disposed towards Phokis. Thebes was the only realistic alternative. Moreover, the Delphians could reasonably expect the Thebans to prove themselves worthy of the honor of *promanteia* bestowed upon them three years earlier. The Delphian indictment of Phokis also provided the Thebans with the opportunity to lodge charges against Sparta, which would at once vent an old Theban grievance and check a friend of Phokis. The Delphian appeal to Thebes has the additional advantage of explaining why the Thebans waited so long to resurrect the seizure of the Kadmeia. In 357 the Thebans endorsed Delphian complaints against Phokis and added their own against Sparta.

Philomelos' speech indicates that the Kirrhaian plain had been tilled long enough to produce at least one harvest and perhaps more. The question then becomes why the indictments were lodged in 357. Of the contributing factors *stasis* in Phokis itself is easily the most difficult to assess. In his *Politics* (5.3.1–5) Aristotle warns against the danger of *stasis* arising from aristocratic quarrels, and gives four examples of how it could grow out of marriage arrangements. In each instance he distinguishes between ordinary marriage¹⁹ and marriage to an heiress.²⁰ As one example he

¹⁸ Philomelos' admission: Diod. 16.23.4–5; cf. also Dem. 18.18. For a first-hand account of the inspection of sacred land, cf. Aischin. 3.122–123.

¹⁹ ἐκ κηδείας: 5.3.3 = 1303b39; ἐκ γαμικῶν: 5.3.4 = 1304a14.

²⁰ ἐξ ἐπικλήρων: 5.3.3 = 1304a5; 5.3.4 = 1304a11.

states that *stasis* arose among the Phokians when Mnaseas, the father of Mnason, and Euthykrates, the father of Onomarchos, fell into a dispute over an heiress (*epikleros*). Aristotle thus testifies that the families of Mnaseas and Euthykrates were related, since both claimed the heiress.²¹ This *stasis*, in Aristotle's opinion, was the cause of the Sacred War for the Phokians.

This incident has never satisfactorily been linked to the outbreak of the war. Aristotle was a *hetairos* of Mnaseas, and thus admirably placed to hear his side of the story. Nonetheless, Aristotle's testimony is rendered suspect by its inability to explain how this feud related to the profanation of sacred land. The two issues must be separate, for the heiress cannot have legally possessed sacred land. It is further weakened by its failure to account for the role actually played by Philomelos, the son of Theotimos. Not a party to this dispute, nor known to be related to either family, he nonetheless rallied Phokian resistance to the Amphiktyonic League and served as *strategos autokrator* until his death. R. Laqueur attempts to salvage Aristotle's claim by suggesting that the dispute over the heiress took place after Philomelos had plundered the sanctuary in order to obtain additional funds for the war. The feud would then be the result, not the cause, of Phokian troubles. Given Aristotle's probable source, there is no need to deny the authenticity of the quarrel. Yet nothing demands the acceptance of Aristotle's interpretation of its significance. He has obviously exaggerated its importance to suit his own theories of state. The prominence of both families in the war would give some plausibility to his view. Onomarchos served as co-commander with Philomelos in the second year of the war and probably in the first. Mnaseas was likewise co-commander and guardian of Phalaikos later in the war. Great weight is given this evaluation of Aristotle's method by another of his examples in this passage. Aristotle (1304a4–6) claims that the *stasis* at Mitylene in 428/7 grew from a dispute over an heiress, but Thucydides (3.1.2–30) deals only with political causes. As with Mitylene so with Phokis—Aristotle has blown both the incidents out of all proportion. The feud between the families of Mnaseas and Euthykrates cannot legitimately serve as the cause of the Sacred War.²²

²¹ For the rights to an heiress in Athenian law, cf. D.M. McDowell, *The Law in Classical Athens* (London 1978) 95. Since nothing is known of Astykrates' kinsmen, one need not accept Parke's (*Delphic Oracle*, 234–235) attempt to link the feud between Orsilaos and Krates (Arist. *Pol.* 5.3.3; Plut. *Mor.* 825B; Aelian *VH* 11.5) to Astykrates and the events of 357. Although, Laqueur, "Mnaseas", *RE* 15 (1932) 2248–2249, tries to correct Aristotle's testimony about the family ties of Euthykrates, his attempt has uniformly been rejected: e.g. W.S. Ferguson, "Onomarchos", *RE* 18 (1939) 494; cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes* I².492 n. 1.

²² Flathe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs*, 6; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².491–492; Laqueur,

With Phokian *stasis* removed from the prominence that Aristotle gives it, one must look to the simplest solution available, namely that the Delphians brought the indictment because the Phokians had only recently begun to cultivate sacred land. Yet external affairs help to explain why the Delphians were then bold enough to complain, and perhaps only here did the larger affairs of the Greek states, the “international situation”, play any part. Sparta was too weak to resist effectively; and Thessaly, embroiled with the tyrants of Pherai, would support neither Sparta nor Phokis. Athens was preoccupied with the Social War. Owing to the weakness and the relative diplomatic isolation of the accused, the Thebans and Delphians probably expected Sparta to refuse to pay the fine and Phokis to abandon the sacred land. In 357 there was very little reason to think that anyone could or would intervene on behalf of the condemned parties.²³

Thus, in autumn 357 the Amphiktyonic Council heard the accusations lodged by the Thebans against Sparta and by the Delphians against Phokis. The *hieromnemes* under the presidency of a Thessalian judged both parties guilty. Fining the Spartans 500 talents and the Phokians a large sum, probably also 500 talents, the Amphiktyons insisted that payment be made by a specific date. That date was in all probability the next *pylaia*, the one held in spring 356, for all known fourth-century amercements are linked to the *pylaia*. Without question the penalties were unduly and unjustifiably harsh in both cases. The Spartans had already suffered greatly for their act. The Phokians, equally guilty of the charges, were nonetheless confronted with punishment out of proportion to their crime. The fine could drain their wealth and enfeeble them for years. The magnitude of the fines is best appreciated by recalling that the total assessment of the Athenian Empire in 454 amounted to about 490 talents. Theban action against Sparta may have been partly motivated by Agesilaos’ service in Egypt, which had helped to refill Spartan coffers. But the Thebans

RE 15 (1932) 2248–2249. Aristotle *hetairoi* of Mnaseas: Timaios, *FGrH* 566 F11; Jacoby, *FGrH* III.b. Komm. Text, 550. Philomelos: Diod. 16.23.4–31.4. Onomarchos: Diod. 16.31.5, 32.3–33.4, 35.2–6; Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 499–506. Mnaseas: Diod. 16.38.6.

Although Diodoros twice (16.56.5, 61.2) states that Philomelos and Onomarchos were brothers without mentioning their patronymics, Pausanias (10.2.2) reports that Theotimos was the father of Philomelos, and Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.3.4) names Euthykrates as the father of Onomarchos. According to Diodoros (16.38.6) and the scholiast to Aischines 2.130, Onomarchos was the father of Phalaikos, but Pausanias (10.2.7) avers that Phayllos was his father. The only point on which Diodoros (16.35.1, 36.1, 37.1, 56.5) and Pausanias (10.2.5) agree is that Onomarchos and Phayllos were brothers. Amid this confusion certainty is impossible, but here the testimony of Aristotle and Pausanias concerning the sires of Philomelos and Onomarchos is accepted on the slender basis of Aristotle’s contemporary knowledge and the fact that a Delphian Theotimos is known (*FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 53) to have been a contemporary of these events.

²³ Diod. 16.14.1–2; cf. also Beloch, *GG* III².1.246–247.

cannot be exonerated from having supported Delphoi's excessive claim against Phokis. Never a rich region, Phokis could not easily, even with the best will, meet Amphiktyonic demands. Phokis and Sparta were driven to resistance. The Thebans and the Delphians had abused the Amphiktyony to pursue petty and destructive vendettas.²⁴

At the spring *pylaia* of 356, which began roughly in February or March, the issue of the fine stood foremost on the *hieromnemonēs*' agenda. When the Phokians and Spartans defaulted, the Amphiktyonic Council took action. Diodoros indicates that the Council dealt first with the Phokians. Once again, he avoids mentioning who specifically brought suit against them, but the Delphians are the obvious candidates. He states instead that in the meeting the *hieromnemonēs* demanded that the Phokians either pay the fine or have their land cursed. Moreover, their fine was doubled. The Phokians protested against the injustice of the proceedings, but to no avail. Next the Thebans persuaded the Amphiktyons to double the Spartan fine to 1000 talents, a sum equal to the total annual income in 404/3 from their newly-won empire. Unable to pay such a huge indemnity, the Spartans likewise complained of the unjust decision. The Amphiktyons responded by condemning both parties. They also ordered their judgments to be inscribed and erected at Delphoi for all to see. Just as the Amphiktyons had given both states a *pylaia* in which to pay the original fine, so they gave the condemned another *pylaia* in which to pay that and the added penalty. Only with the second default would the Council take punitive measures. Few were sanguine. The *naopoioi*, who handled sacred money for the rebuilding of Apollo's temple, feared trouble. To protect themselves they established a special board, the *argyrologeontes*, to render strict accounting of all sacred monies that passed through their hands.²⁵

Condemned and incapable of paying the fine, the Phokians met in special session to discuss the crisis. Philomelos, son of Theotimos, a prominent citizen from Ledon urged his countrymen to defy the Amphiktyonic League. Dismissing the verdict as unjust, he mapped out a broad policy

²⁴ Diodoros (16.60.2) states that after the Sacred War the Phokian indemnity amounted to 60 talents a year, and *FdD* III.5. no. 14 (cf. also *IG* IX 1 110, 111) amply proves that payments were made each *pylaia*. So too with other Delphic monies: cf. *inter alia* *FdD* III.5. nos. 78–88; Roux, *Amphictionie*, 166–168. There is no need to conclude with M. Sordi, *BCH* 81 (1957) 51, that the Phokians and Spartans were given several years before it was necessary to pay their fines; cf. Buckler, *La Béotie antique*, 242–243. Assessments of the Athenians: R. Meiggs, *The Athenian Empire* (Oxford 1972) 60–66; for the first assessment, cf. Thuc. 1.96.2; Diod. 11.47.1; Plut. *Arist.* 24.4.

²⁵ Diod. 16.23.2–4, 29.2–3; Justin 8.1.7. Diodoros' words at 16.29.3 (ὁμοίως τοῖς Φωκεῦσι) indicate that the Amphiktyons dealt first with the Phokians; cf. also Paus. 10.2.2. Spartan income in 404/3: Diod. 14.10.2. Date of spring-*pylaia*: Roux, *Amphictionie*, 3, 41. *Argyrologeontes*: cf. p. 153 below.

to resist the Amphiktyons and to seek support abroad. He advised the Phokians to reject the validity of the condemnation and the authority of the Amphiktyonic Council to speak on behalf of Delphoi. Instead, the Phokians should reassert their ancient presidency of the sanctuary, which would enable them to claim that their use of the sacred land was perfectly legal, a claim that he assured them Sparta and Athens would recognize and support. Sparta was a natural ally in this venture, and Athens had already shown itself willing to defy the Amphiktyons over the case of Astykrates. Whether Philomelos openly recommended the seizure of Delphoi is unknown, but the question is hardly necessary. It followed as a natural consequence of his course of action, for occupation of Delphoi would be a sure sign of Phokian presidency of the sanctuary. He finished his speech by proffering himself as *strategos autokrator* and two others, one of whom was Onomarchos, son of Euthykrates, as *strategoí* empowered to implement these designs. The mere alignment of prominent families indicates that he, his fellow generals, and others had carefully prepared their program of defiance. There was nothing hasty about Philomelos' actions, and in fact he and his adherents had had a year in which to make their plans. Nevertheless, his proposals met with some spirited resistance. His listeners must have realized that effective opposition would be possible only with the eventual use of sacred property. Many refused to support the seizure; and throughout the war, these people, while often subjected to violent oppression, resisted what they considered to be sacrilege, though never successfully. The people of Abai, who steadfastly refused to be a party to it, made their refusal publicly known. Yet seeing no realistic alternative, the majority voted in favor of Philomelos.²⁶

In search of foreign support for his policy, Philomelos journeyed to Sparta, where he was certain of a friendly reception. Having pointed out to King Archidamos the obvious fact that Sparta too had a special interest in seeing the Amphiktyonic decrees revoked, he revealed his intention to

²⁶ Diod. 16.23.4–6, 29.4; Paus. 10.2.2–3; Polyainos 5.45; Justin 8.1.8. Onomarchos as second-in-command in 355: Diod. 16.31.5; cf. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².491; Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 494. Although Larsen, *GFS*, 45, claims that Philomelos did not tell the Phokians how he would use his position, the newly elected *strategos* had drawn a very clear plan of action for all to see. Cf. also Fiehn, *RE* 19 (1938) 2524; Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, 233–235. Laqueur, *RE* 15 (1932) 2248, suggests that at this point the leaders of the Phokians closed ranks against the Amphiktyony, a view that rests on the apparent reconciliation of the families of Euthykrates and Mnaseas at the death of Onomarchos (Diod. 16.38.6). Nothing persuasive connects Philomelos with either family (cf. n. 22 above), and it is not easy to see how he could have ended the feud between them in 355. A different possibility is more likely: in 355 Philomelos took advantage of the dispute for his own ends. By endorsing Onomarchos' candidacy for the *stratagia*, he gained the support of a powerful Phokian family. Internal affairs at Delphoi are treated separately in Appendix 2.

seize the sanctuary, for which he asked Spartan help. In the account of Diodoros, Archidamos promised unofficial support in the form of mercenaries and money, but for the moment refused to commit his state openly. Although Theopompos claims that Phokian officials bribed Archidamos and his wife, Deinicha, the king needed no such persuasion. Quite willing to see the Phokians succeed, he preferred that they take upon themselves the onus of guilt. Moreover, the allegation that Deinicha received sacred money sounds suspiciously like the fabulous stories of the Phokian women who abused sacred treasures. In truth, Philomelos offered Archidamos an easy solution to Sparta's problem. The Phokians would run all of the risk, but would nullify the Amphiktyonic condemnation of Sparta. In return, the Spartans would render them material aid at little expense to themselves, while keeping their hands relatively clean. Archidamos gave Philomelos 15 talents for mercenaries and perhaps more importantly the pledge of support that he needed for his venture. Even though the ancient sources routinely depict Spartan aid to Phokis as a private agreement between Archidamos and Philomelos, the king obviously acted with the full knowledge and approval of the Spartan authorities. Archidamos had received him as the official representative of the Phokian Confederacy, a foreign state, much as Kleomenes had Aristagoras before the Ionian Revolt. The king clearly enjoyed a certain latitude in responding to the Phokian plea, but his decision carried the stamp of approval of the Spartan state.²⁷

Encouraged by his welcome in Sparta, Philomelos returned to Phokis, determined to implement his designs. First he must build an army to enforce his will. The levy of the Phokian Confederacy alone was no match for the Thebans, much less for the combined might of the Amphiktyonic League. With Archidamos' 15 talents and as much of his own money, he began to assemble a mercenary army. He also recruited 1000 Phokians to serve as peltasts, a force that would be particularly useful in any fighting around Delphoi. He did not, however, muster the whole levy of the Phokian Confederacy. At the end of the spring *pylaia*, or around July 356, Philomelos and his army marched on Delphoi. He did not wait for winter

²⁷ Diod. 16.24.1–3, 29.4; Paus. 3.10.3; Justin 8.1.11. Bribery: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F312; cf. also 16.64.2; Timaios, *FGrH* 566 F11. Archidamos' guilt: Diod. 16.63.1; Paus. 3.10.3. For the erroneous view that Archidamos acted solely in a private capacity, cf. E. David, *Sparta between Empire and Revolution (404–243 B.C.)* (New York 1981) 107, and C.D. Hamilton in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza, *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington, D.C. 1982) 63; *Classical Views* 26 (1982) 15–17. Perhaps they were misled by N.G.L. Hammond's mistaken insistence (*JHS* 57 [1937] 52) that Philomelos himself was conducting private negotiations. Kleomenes and Aristagoras: Hdt. 5.49–51.

before acting, which would have eliminated the threat of counter-attack, because with the end of the *pylaia* the additional penalties fell due. He had to strike before the Amphiktyons could take punitive measures. He and the Phokians had run out of time. Delphoi and the sanctuary fell easily, whereupon Philomelos vented his anger on the people who had indicted the Phokians. He slew the noble family of the Thrakidai, who had opposed Phokian ambitions, and confiscated their possessions. Although he contemplated wiping out the city and either killing or enslaving the population, Archidamos dissuaded him. Whether Philomelos also exiled the supporters of the Thrakidai or was content to cow them is unknown, but he calmed the other Delphians by promising them no harm.²⁸

The news of Philomelos' stroke sparked the Lokrians, probably those from neighboring Amphissa, to rush to Delphoi's relief. To meet the attack Philomelos led his mercenaries onto open ground outside the sanctuary of Apollo. The Lokrians advanced to the Phaidriadaï Rocks, which tower above the sanctuary to the north. On the northwestern side, above the stadium, a ridge juts southwards towards the Pleistos river. Immediately to the west of this ridge opens a small sloping plain, higher at the foot of the Phaidriadaï than at the end above the modern town of Delphoi (cf. Pl. 1). On this small, rocky field the Lokrians clashed with Philomelos' army, and were repulsed with heavy loss. Although many Lokrian survivors reached safety in flight, many others were taken prisoner, whom Philomelos ordered thrown from the Rocks. This atrocity, if one excepts the slaughter of the Thrakidai, was the first of a cruel war, but it was part of Philomelos' policy. Traditionally, those guilty of sacrilege against Apollo's sanctuary were punished by being hurled from the steep and lofty Phaidriadaï. By subjecting the captured Lokrians to this fate, Philomelos emphasized the Phokian claim to the presidency of the sanctuary. Those who opposed him and his countrymen opposed the god, and would be punished accordingly. In his first acts, Philomelos set a brutal stamp on this war.²⁹

²⁸ Aischin. 2.131, with schol.; 3.133; Diod. 16.24.2–3, 28.2; Paus. 3.10.4; 10.2.3; Justin 8.1.8. Flathe, *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs*, 6; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².492–493; Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 98–99; Fiehn, *RE* 19 (1938) 2524; Seibert, *Die politischen Flüchtlinge und Verbannten*, I.134–135.

²⁹ Diod. 16.24.4, 28.3. P. Cloché, *Étude chronologique sur la troisième guerre sacrée* (Paris 1915) 21 [hereafter cited as "Cloché, *Étude*"]; Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 46 n. 10; L. Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, II (1952) 47–48. Phaidriadaï Rocks and the fate of the sacrilegious: Plut. *Mor.* 825B; Aelian *VH* 11.5; schol. Aischin. 2.142; Aesop test 22; schol. Ar. *Birds* 1446; Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.14 (392C); cf. J. G. Frazer, *Pausanias's Description of Greece* V (London 1898) 248 [hereafter cited as "Frazer, *Pausanias*"]. Battlefield: C. Bursian, *Geographie von Griechenland I* (Leipzig 1862) 178 [hereafter cited as "Bursian, *Geographie*"]; personal observations of 1 June 1983.

Flushed with victory, Philomelos turned his attention to Delphoi and the sanctuary. Claiming that the verdict was unjust, he destroyed the inscribed *stelai* bearing the charges of and condemnation by the Amphiktyonic Council. He next crushed the legal government of the city, which forced him to decide whether to rule it directly or bring to power Delphians predisposed to co-operate with him. The only group likely to assist him was the exiled company of Astykrates, which already entertained pro-Phokian leanings. Moreover, Astykrates was in a good position to further Philomelos' goals by persuading his Athenian patrons of the purity of Phokian motives. He could hope to win Athenian support for Phokis, or at least neutrality. His use of the connections developed in his years of exile would thus handsomely complement Philomelos' diplomacy. Each side received something greatly desired. Philomelos temporarily obtained influential advocates in Athens and thereafter men whom he could trust in Delphian politics. Astykrates and his friends returned home after seven years of exile, regained their confiscated possessions, and assumed control of Delphian politics. They were even in a position to mete out vengeance to those survivors who had exiled them. Hence, the association was mutual. In 356 the exile Aristoxenos became eponymous archon at Delphoi, and another, Aigylos, served as Delphian *bouleutes*. The Delphian *naupoios* Aristagoras, an opponent of Astykrates and the Phokians, left office, perhaps removed forcibly by the returned exiles or perhaps simply in protest. His place was taken by Nikomachos, son of Menekrates, an otherwise obscure Delphian and not an exile. Nonetheless, he obviously had no qualms about participating in Philomelos' new regime. In 354 he in turn gave way to Hagesarchos, another of the returned exiles. The Phokians now had political as well as military control of Delphoi.³⁰

To tighten that control even further and to protect against future attacks Philomelos ordered the sanctuary to be fortified on its most vulnerable side. Along the ridge overlooking the recent battlefield arose a line of wall, anchored at the foot of the Phaidriadaí Rocks and running along the western face of the ridge. Punctuated by at least one square tower, the enclosed area included barracks for a garrison. Not merely a field fortification, the wall was stoutly built of large, ashlar limestone blocks, stretches of which are still prominent. The presence of a white, marble architectural member within the enclosure suggests that the Phokians may

³⁰ Aischin. 2.131; Diod. 16.24.4–5. Return of the exiles: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 4–64. Aristoxenos: *FdD* III.1. no. 146 lines 4–5; no. 392 lines 12–13; III.5. no. 19 lines 4, 8, 31. Aigylos: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 5–10. Aristagoras: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 5. Nikomachos: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 6, 9, 11, 23. Hagesarchos: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 34, 38. Cf. also Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 98–100; P. Cloché, *BCH* 40 (1916) 95; Roux, *Amphictionie*, 109.

have robbed out some Delphic offerings in order to build the line. To the east the garrison enjoyed an unimpeded view of the entire sanctuary, including the lower area of Marmaria. This strongpoint, regularly garrisoned, was intended to stop attack from the west and to guard the sanctuary from any threat from below.³¹

Philomelos then turned to Apollo for ratification of his actions. Forcing the priestess against her will and against custom to mount the tripod, he demanded an oracle of her. Unintimidated but unable to resist, she told him that he could do whatever he wanted. Philomelos accepted the sneer, called it an oracle, and had it inscribed for all to see. It gave him all of the divine justification that he needed. With Delphoi firmly in his hands and the spurious oracle prominently displayed, Philomelos took his next step. He summoned an assembly at Delphoi, which despite Diodoros' terse account, was clearly an extraordinary session of the *ekklesia* of the Phokian Confederacy. The very choice of Delphoi as the site of the meeting further underlined the Phokian claim to the presidency of the sanctuary, which Philomelos enunciated at the meeting as the essence of the official Phokian position. After assuring the Phokians that Apollo had expressed his approval of their deeds, he recommended that they send embassies to the leading states of Greece to explain their position. Phokian ambassadors were to reassure the rest of the Greek world that far from intending to seize the sacred treasures, the Phokians were merely reasserting their ancestral presidency. Philomelos avoided all mention of the Amphiktyonic fine and condemnation, once again refusing to address the causes behind Phokian actions. He also ignored the slaughter of the Thrakidai and the Lokrian prisoners. Instead, he piously promised to render a full account of the god's possessions to all. Lastly, he charged Phokian ambassadors to urge the Greek states either to join him or at least remain neutral. He then selected trusted and qualified friends as envoys, whose job it was to repeat this sanctimonious nonsense. Philomelos was not simple enough to expect the Greeks to endorse him, but he hoped at least to draw support away from the Amphiktyonic League. As before, the Phokians gave Philomelos their vote.³²

The Spartans welcomed Philomelos' message. The Amphiktyonic condemnation had been erased and the curse lifted at the cost to themselves of 15 talents. They well knew that Philomelos' policy would lead to war

³¹ Diod. 16.25.1; personal observations of 1 June 1983. For a good plan of Philomelos' fortifications, cf. *BCH* 21 (1897) pl. xiv–xv.

³² Diod. 16.24.5, 27.1–4; cf. Plut. *Mor.* 292 D–F Beloch, *GG* III².1.248; Parke, *History of the Delphic Oracle*, 236; J. Fontenrose, *The Delphic Oracle* (Berkeley 1978) 307, does not consider this a genuine oracle.

in central Greece, a prospect distinctly pleasing to them. The Peloponnesos was racked by confusion and strife, but the Spartans could not take advantage of the situation so long as the Thebans were free to intervene on behalf of their allies. With the Thebans embroiled with Phokis, however, the Spartans could attempt to reconquer Messenia and to attack southern Arkadia. Entering a sacred war on the side of Phokis would give the Spartans all the pretext needed to recoup their losses in the Peloponnesos. Long-standing hatred of Thebes also played a prominent part in the Spartan decision to support Phokis. In Athens too traditional hatred of Thebes guaranteed the Phokian ambassadors a sympathetic hearing. Beyond defiance of Thebes the Athenians stood to gain very little from the looming conflict. Only if the Thebans should suffer a catastrophic defeat could Athens hope to reconquer Oropos, which they fervently desired. On the other hand, Athenian entry in the war might endanger the northern border of Attika. Although this alone gave the Athenians ample reason to remain aloof from the strife, they also endorsed Philomelos' position, thereby defying the rest of the Amphiktyony again.³³

Phokian embassies to the Boiotians, Thessalians, and other Amphiktyons met with failure. Those who had found the Phokians guilty of profaning sacred land could hardly condone a violent program that set at naught the will of the Amphiktyonic League. Instead, the Lokrians appealed to the Boiotian Confederacy to vindicate them and the god. This plea, especially after the spilling of blood, could not be ignored. The general course of subsequent events is clear, although many details are not. The Thebans sent embassies to other Amphiktyons demanding action against Phokis. The Amphiktyons probably met in special session, sometime around September or October 356, to deal with the crisis. Since Sparta and Athens had publicly declared for Philomelos, they may have boycotted the meeting. Demanding that the Amphiktyonic decrees be enforced, the Thebans called for a sacred war against the Phokians on the grounds of sacrilege. Support for the Theban proposal was considerable, and actually it was high time for the Amphiktyonic League to take an official stand, if it hoped to maintain its authority. The Thessalians and other Amphiktyons enthusiastically voted for war, again condemning the Phokians in general and perhaps Philomelos and Onomarchos in particular. The Amphiktyonic decision divided Greece along predictable lines, which depended for the most part on whether a state was friendly or hostile to Thebes. The Thebans could obviously depend upon the support of the

³³ Xen. *Poroi* 5.9; Dem. 16.28; 18.18; Aischin. 3.118 with schol.; 3.133; Diod. 16.27.5; Paus. 3.10.3; 4-28-1; Justin 8.1.11. Beloch, *GG* III².1.248; Hamilton in Adams and Borza, *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 65.

Amphiktyons and the neutrality at least of their Peloponnesian allies, who in fact avoided the conflict. The latter had their own good reasons for keeping watch on Sparta. Athens, Sparta, and most of their allies favored the Phokians in an alignment similar to the one that existed during the Theban Hegemony. Many other Greek states, however, through piety took the side of the Amphiktyons, as witnessed by a fragmentary list of contributions paid to Thebes for conducting the war. Among the donors are Byzantion, the Boiotian *proxenos* at Tenedos, and the Athenian allies Alyzeia and Anaktorion.³⁴

When the Amphiktyons determined for war, they also mapped their strategy against Phokis. Since the season was too far advanced for military action, they decided to launch their first campaign in the coming spring. They set a date and a place for their forces to rendezvous, as proven by the convergence in 355 of their several contingents in the same area within a short time of one another. They could hope that during the winter the Phokians would reconsider their policy in view of the Amphiktyonic decision, a hope that was not fatuous. Debate over the issue of war and how it was to be conducted took place openly in the Amphiktyonic Council, as it did in other Greek assemblies. No attempt at secrecy was made, which meant that the Council's intentions were common knowledge. In a recent and similar case, the Arkadian occupation and pillage of Olympia, not uniformly popular among the Arkadians, coupled with the burden of war, had spawned *stasis* within the Arkadian League. One result of the *stasis* was the Arkadian decision to abandon the sanctuary and to make restitution to the god. Similar tensions and doubts might induce the Phokians to withdraw from Delphoi. Whatever its hopes, in the autumn of 356 the Amphiktyonic League voted to wage war against Phokis.³⁵

The Amphiktyonic declaration of war was answered in turn by Sparta and Athens, which had already signalled their intention to support Phokis.

³⁴ Diod. 16.25.1, 28.3–29.1. In addition to the Boiotians, Lokrians, and Thessalians, the Dorians of central Greece, the Dolopians, Athamanians, Phthiotic Achaians, Magnesians, Ainianes, and others declared for war; cf. also Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F63; Sordi, *BCH* 81 (1957) 43 n. 1. Date of the extraordinary session: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 8–30, where it is recorded that work on the temple of Apollo was stopped in the month of Heraios; on the calender, cf. Roux, *Amphictionie*, 235. Thessalians and their allies: Helly in *La Thessalie*, 187. List of contributions: *IG* VII 2418 = Tod, *GHI* II.160.

³⁵ Open debate within the Amphiktyonic Council and public knowledge of proceedings: Aischin. 3.115–122, for a vivid, first-hand account of a session. D.J. Mosley, *Ancient Society* 3 (1972) 5–7, stresses the ease with which states could learn of the decisions made in open assemblies. Arkadia and Olympia: Xen. *Hell.* 7.4.28–33; *IG* IV 616; Buckler, *TH*, 203–204; W.E. Thompson, *Historia* 32 (1983) 157–160. The declaration of war in winter, with the opening campaign being delayed until the following spring is more reminiscent of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian War than Hornblower's (*Greek World*, 246–247) contentions; cf. also pp. 176–181 below.

Although the reasons for the Spartan decision are obvious, the Athenian response, which is perhaps now beyond precise explanation, was influenced by factors unrelated directly to the situation in Delphoi. An important ingredient was the Social War, which split Athenian politics. Established politicians like Aristophon and Euboulos, both of whom desired friendly relations with Thebes, divided sharply over the war with the maritime allies. As a result, the entire foreign policy of Athens was scrutinized and re-evaluated, especially by a new generation of politicians, foremost among whom were Demosthenes, soon to become the leading opponent of Philip II, Hegesandros, who unsuccessfully attacked Aristophon in court, and Hegesippos, whose nickname Krobulos ("Topknot") described his affected and antiquated way of wearing his hair. Of them Hegesippos is the most important for the Sacred War. In essence, he urged a return to the policies of Kallistratos, which entailed espousing the principles enunciated in the Decree of Aristoteles (*IG* II² 43), which established the Second Athenian Confederacy, friendship with Sparta and Phokis, and hostility towards Thebes. The Amphiktyonic declaration of war against Phokis gave him the opportunity to pursue the latter two goals. Hegesippos was chiefly responsible for the Athenian decision to declare war against the Amphiktyons. Although some agreed with the historian Xenophon, who urged restraint, Hegesippos somehow persuaded the majority that the safety of Phokis would profit Athens. He carried the day without, however, making the war popular among the Athenians, who seldom exerted themselves against Thebes or for Phokis. Demosthenes would later find it necessary to distance himself from Hegesippos, even though both opposed Philip, because of the part he had played in bringing the Athenians into the Sacred War. For the moment, however, Hegesippos had drawn his countrymen back to a familiar policy, but one that proved no more successful than in the days of the Theban Hegemony. The various states had made their decisions. The Third Sacred War had officially begun.³⁶

³⁶ Policies of Aristophon and Euboulos: Dem. 18.162; schol. Dem. 3.28; Dem. 20.146. Hegesippos: Aischin. 1.64; 3.118 with schol.; Dem. 19.72–75; schol. Dem. 19.72; Plut. *Mor.* 187E; Dem. 17.4; Diog. Laert. 3.24; Tod, *GHI* II.154; cf. Dem. 19.61, 84; J. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attika* (Berlin 1901–1903) 6381; Hegesandros: Aischin. 1.64, 70 with schol.; *IG* II² 123; Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attika*, 6307. Demosthenes' disavowal of Hegesippos' Phokian policy: Dem. 18.18. Unsettled conditions at Delphoi at this point: Xen. *Poroi* 5.9; A. Griffen, *Sikyon* (Oxford 1982) 75–76; J. Buckler, *Klio* 68 (1986) 348–350.


CHAPTER THREE

FIRST BLOOD (355 – 354 BC)

A) *The theater of war*

Although the Sacred War occasionally spilled over from central Greece to other areas, the principal scene of action was a circular region from Epiknemidian Lokris in the north, Doris in the west, Phokis in the south, and western Boiotia in the east. Within this area three geographical features influenced the course of events. First were the various mountain chains, which sometimes provided safety, as did lofty Mt. Parnassos to the Phokians ensconced at Delphoi, while at other times they served as a highroad of invasion, as did Mt. Helikon to the Phokians against cities in southcentral Boiotia. The second significant geographical factor was Lake Kopais, which divided the eastern part of Boiotia, dominated by Thebes, from the west. During the war Lake Kopais often impeded Theban communications with other Boiotian cities and allies, and complicated attempts to carry the war to Phokis. The last factor is the Kephisos valley, the long fertile expanse that sustained the major cities of Phokis, but was also vulnerable to attack from the east. Thus, geography, which gave the Phokians interior lines of communication, separated their enemies, but left the heart of Phokis prey to attack. So long as Phokis derived its economic power to wage war from the wealth of Delphoi, and the fruitful territory of Thebes was safe from Phokian attack, the conflict promised only attrition, inasmuch as neither side could strike a vital blow against the other.

Since the seat of war is not the best known area of Greece, a brief description of it forms a useful background of events. Phokis, geographically and politically the center of the Sacred War, is the logical place to begin. When Philomelos persuaded his countrymen to seize the sanctuary of Apollo, the Phokians used Delphoi as their capital, whereas ordinarily delegates from the Phokian cities convened at the Phokikon, situated on the road between Daulis and Delphoi. Perched high on the southern edge of Mt. Parnassos, immediately under the Phaidriadaí Rocks, Delphoi occupied a strong position. The sanctuary sat in a shallow bowl in the mountains, while the ancient city, like its modern counterpart, spread along a ridge to the southwest. From Delphoi a road led northwards past the West Lokrian city of Amphissa to Doris and from there passing between Mt. Oite and Mt. Kallidromon it reached the coast west of Thermopylai. The Ozolaian, or West Lokrians, whom geography virtually isolated from



their allies, played little part in the war. Another road led eastwards from Delphoi towards the Phokian city of Daulis, the valley of the Kephisos river, and western Boiotia.¹

The valley of the Kephisos—broad, green, rich, and well-watered—was both the heart of ancient Phokis and the home of Doris. Bordered by Mt. Parnassos in the south and the mountains of Oite, Kallidromon, and Knemis in the north, it stretched from the headwaters of the river in Doris as far east as Lake Kopais. The western part of the valley formed the land of Doris, a small region ringed around by mountains and economically dependent upon its Phokian neighbors. Although the lowland capable of cultivation was fertile, the total area was so restricted that it sustained only four cities and a small population. The abrupt, but not lofty, hill of Philoboiotos marked the southern boundary between Phokis and Boiotia. Immediately to the south Mt. Hyphanteion and Mt. Hedylion left a narrow passage for a road that was dominated by the Phokian city of Parapotamioi. Although the mountains shielded the valley, within the plain itself there were virtually no natural obstacles to impede the march of armies. Scattered the length of the valley were some 22 Phokian cities, most of which shared some common features. Cities on both sides of the valley sat on heights, sometimes on foothills, as at Tithronion, and in other cases on mountain spurs, as at Neon, the akropolis of Tithorea. Other cities, notably Abai and Hyampolis, occupied free-standing hills. Rarely was a city located, like Elateia, in the open plain. Thus, most Phokian cities enjoyed strong positions from which inhabitants could till the plain at their feet. If these cities were generally proof against attack, they could not easily defend their land from depredation. Although few Phokian cities are specifically mentioned in the imperfect sources of the war, they all at some point felt the scourge of invasion.²

Some cities figure more prominently in events than others because of their strategic positions. Tithorea and its akropolis Neon are notable because of their geographical strength and location. The ancient city, like

¹ Phokikon: Paus. 10.4.1, 5.1; E. Vanderpool, *Hesperia* 32 (1963) 213–225; 33 (1964) 84–85. Delphoi: Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.248–402; R.V. Schoder, *Ancient Greece from the Air* (London 1974) 45–53. The photograph on his p. 51 well illustrates the ridge above the stadion that Philomelos fortified (cf. pp. 25–26 above).

² In general: W.M. Leake, *Travels in Northern Greece II* (London 1835) 71–95 [hereafter cited as “Leake, *Northern Greece*”]; Bursian, *Geographie*, I.152–186; H.G. Lolling in I. Müller, *Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, III. *Geographie und politische Geschichte des klassischen Altertums* (Nördlingen 1889) 129–134 [hereafter cited as “Lolling, *Geographie*”]; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.213–417; Philippson, “Doris”, *RE* 5 (1905) 1564–1565; W.A. Oldfather, *AJA* 20 (1916) 32–61, 154–172; Schober, *Phokis*; “Phokis”, *RE* 20 (1941) 474–496; J.M. Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis* (Amsterdam 1986).

the modern town, stood at the foot of a cliff of Parnassos, which extends into the plain. In the modern town there are only random traces of the ancient city wall, but higher on the slopes stand the remains of towers and walls, overgrown with vegetation. At the foot of the hill runs a river, which apparently carries water only during the winter. The akropolis is very precipitous, indeed mostly sheer rock face, and ancient walls added to its natural strength. The natural and artificial advantages of Tithorea enabled it to blunt an invasion from the east, but in enemy hands a garrison there could easily harry the most prosperous part of Phokis.³

Lying to the east of Tithorea were Abai and Hyampolis, the scenes of much fighting because they stood astride a significant military route, from which an army could turn westwards into the Kephisos valley, thus out-flanking Parapotamioi, or press northwards into eastern Lokris. The two cities, located within twenty minutes of each other, dominate a small plain. Abai was famous for its oracle of Apollo, and its involvement in the war is all the more bitter because its inhabitants stoutly condemned the seizure of Delphoi and the plundering of the sacred treasures. Commanding the southern end of the plain, the akropolis of Abai occupied the summit of a tall, steep peak, where the traces of polygonal masonry can still be seen. To the north Hyampolis overlooked the northern end of the plain. Not so high as Abai, the akropolis of Hyampolis stood on a low, walled, flat-topped hill, formidable enough to resist attack. Yet like their countrymen in the Kephisos valley, it was easier for the inhabitants of Abai and Hyampolis to defend their homes than either to check an invader or preserve their land from devastation.⁴

Several other cities in northern Phokis were important because they also stood along mountain passes. Mt. Kallidromon in the northwest and Mt. Knemis in the northeast, which separated the Kephisos valley from eastern Lokris, also divided the latter into two parts. That to the east, Opountian Lokris, with its capital at Opous, perhaps the modern town of Atalante, played little or no part in the war, even though a long coastal road, which could be reached from Hyampolis, ran from Opous to Thermopylai.⁵ Of

³ Leake, *Northern Greece*, II.76–84; Bursian, *Geographie*, I.166–167; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.402–410; L.B. Tillard, *BSA* 17 (1910/11) 56–60; personal observations of 10 August 1980; 4 June 1983.

⁴ Leake, *Northern Greece*, II.163–166; W.W. Yorke, *JHS* 16 (1896) 291–312; Hirschfeld, “Abai”, *RE* 1 (1899) 11; Bölte, “Hyampolis”, *RE* 9 (1914) 17–22; Schober, *Phokis*, 20–21, 31–32; V. Burr, *NEON KATALOGOS* (Leipzig 1944) 33 [hereafter cited as “Burr, *NEON KATALOGOS*”]; R. Hope Simpson and J.F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford 1970) 43 [hereafter cited as “Hope Simpson-Lazenby, *Catalogue*”]; Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis*, 72–76, 78–81; personal observations of 5 August 1980; 2 June 1983.

⁵ Bursian, *Geographie*, I.186–194; Lolling, *Geographie*, 132–134. Coastal route:

far greater importance was the western part, Epiknemidian Lokris, which was connected with the Kephisos valley by several good routes suitable for large numbers of infantry and cavalry. Tracing them from east to west, the first leaves Elateia west of Hyampolis, and climbs through the Vassilika pass over Mt. Kallidromon to Naryx, a Lokrian city near the modern village of Rhenginion. Situated on a narrow spur that juts northwards towards the village, the ancient city possessed a very strong position which commanded three routes besides the one with Elateia. From Naryx a road descended to the north onto the Lokrian city of Thronion, the akropolis of which towered above the coastal road between Thermopylai and Opous. To the south of Naryx a road through the Fontana pass led to the Phokian city of Triteis, the modern village of Modion, situated on a foothill overlooking the Kephisos valley. Another road ran westwards along the crest of the mountain to the modern village of Mendenitsa, probably the ancient Argolas. Mendenitsa also lay astride several routes, one of which descended to the north to Skarpheia, a Lokrian city situated above the coastal road a little south of the modern village of Molos and west of Thronion. Another way ran westwards to the Lokrian city of Alponos, just east of Thermopylai. Through a track south, which crossed Mt. Kallidromon by the Kleisoura pass, the traveler could reach the Phokian city of Tithronion, which like Triteis, perched on a foothill overlooking the Kephisos valley.⁶ One obvious geographical weakness of the cities of Epiknemidian Lokris is that, scattered along the coast, they were in a poor position to band their forces against Phokian invaders, who could use any one of the several routes to hurl their full weight against individual cities. To prevent being conquered piecemeal it was essential for the Lokrians to hold Naryx and Argolas. That Phokis cut the Lokrians off from their

Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV. 138, 146. The principal reason for equating Atalante with Opous was the discovery there of many Opountian inscriptions. Pritchett (*op. cit.*, V. 184–185, with earlier bibliography) has recently argued that these stones had been moved from Kyparission, a site nearer the coast. Yet in a different connection (*Topography* V. 116) he warns against identifying sites on the hypothesis that many stones would have wandered from their place of origin. Having identified the Herakleion at the battlefield of Marathon on the basis of two stones, he observes “Two stones carry a good deal more weight than one”. If so, one must ask how much weight the 47 stones found in and around Atalante must carry: cf. *IG IX* 1 267–307 (incorrectly cited by Pritchett); *SEG* III.422–424; XXVI.549; XXVII.145–146. A much more useful guide to the problem is the balanced discussion of Hope Simpson-Lazenby, *Catalogue*, 47–48. The best general description of Lokris is Oldfather, “Lokris”, *RE* 13 (1926) 1135–1288, still unsurpassed.

⁶ Von Geisau, “Kallidromon”, *RE* 10 (1919) 1633–1634; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV. 123–175; personal observations of three visits between July 1980 and July 1986. Admittedly, when I explored the area between Mendenitsa and Skarpheia on 25 May 1983, I found no traces of an ancient road, but the walk took just over two and a half hours.

Boiotian allies was a second strategical weakness. If the Lokrians enjoyed one advantage, it was their easy communications with Thessaly through Thermopylai.

The last major theater of war was western Boiotia, which opened onto Phokis by three main routes. Beginning in the northwest, there was the road from Hyampolis and Abai, which debouched north of Orchomenos in the vicinity of modern Polygyra. The Thebans had destroyed Orchomenos as a city in 364, which left the area exposed. Since the region north of Lake Kopais was the least heavily populated in Boiotia, poverty alone protected it from the ravages of war. Nevertheless, Phokian invaders often used this road to assail the area of the destroyed city of Orchomenos and the prosperous city of Lebadeia to the south, which often faced the grim prospect of being cut off from Theban help.⁷

The primary route between Phokis and Boiotia was the long valley of the Kephisos, at the eastern end of which stood the Boiotian city of Chaironeia, the walled akropolis of which occupied the eastern heights of Mt. Orthopagos. The citadel of Chaironeia was a strong place, not easily vulnerable to the siege tactics of the later fourth century, but the fields of the inhabitants were as exposed to attack as those of the Phokian cities in the valley. From Chaironeia the main road to the east continued through a narrow corridor between Lake Kopais and Mt. Helikon, passing by the small city of Lebadeia, more important for its sanctuary of Trophonios than its political power, then continuing to Koroneia, a major city of strategical significance. Koroneia dominated a small, but fertile, plain, overlooked by a low hill which served as the akropolis. Not only did Koroneia command the main road, but it also stood at the end of an upland route over Mt. Helikon, which descended from the heights down the Phalaros valley. Still farther to the east was the city of Haliartos, the circuit-walls of which have only recently come to light. Haliartos stood immediately above the lake on an elevation in a valley narrower than that of Koroneia. Although the land supporting the city was restricted and the place was smaller than Koroneia, it was a more difficult military target; for it could not readily be taken in flank, and enjoyed a more defensible position. Beyond Haliartos opened the eastern basin of Boiotia, dominated by Thebes and untouched by the Sacred War.⁸

⁷ Bursian, *Geographie*, I.194–251; Lolling, *Geographie*, 122–129; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.1–212; F. Cauer, “Boiotia”, *RE* 3 (1899) 637–663; P.W. Wallace, *Strabo's Description of Boiotia* (Heidelberg 1979); Buckler, *TH*, 4–14; J. Knauss, B. Heinrich, and H. Kalcyk, *Die Wasserbauten der Minyer in der Kopais* (Munich 1984); S. Lauffer, *KOPAIS: Untersuchungen zur historischen Mittelgriechenlands*, I (Frankfurt a.M. 1986); J. Knauss, *Die Melioration des Kopaisbeckens durch die Minyer im 2. Jt. v. Chr.* (Munich 1987).

⁸ Cf. Bursian, *Geographie*, I.205–210; J.P. Mahaffy, *Rambles and Studies in Greece* (London 1892) 220–242.

The third route into Boiotia lay over Mt. Helikon. Beginning at Ambrossos, the modern town of Distomon, this track climbs the mountain east of the ancient site of Stiris. Above the point where the road reaches the summit near modern Kyriakion are the remains of a fortress built during the war to guard the way. The highroad continues eastwards atop Mt. Helikon until it reaches a triangular vale immediately north of the peak now known as Palaiovouna. From here one route descends upon Koroneia and another leads to Haliartos. Still another broaches the flank of Palaiovouna before descending to the Corinthian Gulf. Along this way was located the Boiotian city of Chorsiai, perched on a spur overlooking the modern bay of Sarandi. Chorsiai, near the modern village of Khostia, held a strong position, its natural strength bolstered by stout walls. The city commanded a small plain bordering the sea. The chief strategical weakness of the place was its isolation, for a tall ridge cut it off from its Boiotian neighbor Thisbe to the east. The third track from the vale of Palaiovouna led directly eastwards onto Thisbe. It led past the spot now occupied by the modern village of Koukoura, from which it climbed somewhat along a road that was cobbled in Turkish times, before it descended abruptly onto Thisbe. This was the route taken by Spartan king Kleombrotos on his fateful march to Leuktra. Thisbe was a strong, walled city at the eastern foot of Mt. Helikon, stoutly fortified in the aftermath of the Spartan invasion in order to bar the road. From Thisbe the land opens eastwards into a plain, larger than that of Chorsiai, bordered by low hills on the south and west. A narrow valley connected ancient Thisbe with Thespiiai and Plataia to the east, then in ruins, and with Thebes. In 356 this spacious and fertile eastern part of Boiotia, which extended roughly from Aulis and Tanagra in the north to Plataia and Kreusis in the south, formed the economic base of Theban power.⁹

B) *Philomelos and the Battle of Neon (355 BC)*

The Amphiktyonic declaration of war meant that Philomelos could expect a concerted attack in spring 355. Not one to blanch at danger, he decided to meet the Amphiktyons in the field, and to do so he needed to increase his army substantially. Rather than rely on the full levy of the Phokian Confederacy, he preferred to recruit still greater numbers of mercenaries. These troops could, if necessary, serve as a private army, as other mercenaries later did under Phalaikos, giving Philomelos freedom of action without restraint from the confederacy. At the same time the mercenaries

⁹ A.R. Burn, *BSA* 44 (1949) 313–323; H. Beister, *Untersuchungen zu der Zeit der Thebanischen Hegemonie* (Munich 1970) 36–45; Buckler, *TH*, 57–59.

removed the burden of war from the Phokian citizenry. Philomelos could meet the additional financial costs only by plundering the wealth of the Delphic oracle. Although Diodoros (16.28.2, 56.3) claims that Philomelos left Apollo's property untouched, he nevertheless contradicts himself (16.30.1), when he ascribes Philomelos' pillaging of the sacred dedications to the need for money. His notices of Philomelos' fate (16.31.4, 61.2) clearly indicate that he saw divine retribution in the manner of the Phokian's death. Theopompos and all other ancient sources agree that Philomelos set the example for later Phokian generals by appropriating sacred property. H.W. Parke has perhaps made the best defense of Philomelos' conduct, but one that ultimately fails to convince. He points out that the Greek polis, when confronted by a major war, often felt free to borrow from the gods, it being clearly understood that the sums would subsequently be repaid. He emphasizes Philomelos' promise to render a strict accounting of the god's property (Diod. 16.27.4), but admits that the pillaging of dedications made by other Greeks could not be justified. In Parke's view, only the Amphiktyonic declaration of war forced Philomelos to lay hands on the dedications to the god.¹⁰

In this matter there should actually be no room for doubt. Apollo's sanctuary at Delphoi was not a polis, and most of the dedications there came from the broader Greek world. They were the possessions of the god, not of the Phokians, and the pillaging of them was an affront to those, whether states or individuals, who had made them. Thus, comparisons with Athens or other *poleis*, in which citizens borrowed their own wealth from their own civic deities, is false and misleading. Nor is there any reason to doubt Philomelos' complicity. Philomelos plundered the sanctuary and not always for patriotic reasons, as when he removed a golden crown, a dedication from Lampsakos, to give to a dancing girl. The Delphians later accused him of stealing the golden shield dedicated by King Croesus of Lydia, probably to meet the needs of his mercenaries.¹¹ Regardless of what he said publicly, regardless of his promise not to touch the dedications, he could finance his policy only with the god's wealth. Simply put, the only way in which the Phokians could maintain a large, standing

¹⁰ Diod. 16.30.1–2. Philomelos' sacrilege: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F248; Plut. *Tim.* 30.7; Paus. 10.2.4, 33.2; Polyainos 5.45; Eusebios *Præp. Ev.* 8.14 (392C); cf. Timaios, *FGrH* 566 F11. Cf. also Fiehn, *RE* 19 (1938) 2525. Although Parke originally (*Greek Mercenary Soldiers* [Oxford 1933] 134–135) relied on Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F96, as evidence that Philomelos left the sacred treasures untouched, he later (*Delphic Oracle*, 237 n. 1) realized that this view cannot be correct. Better is the discussion of Ferguson, "Onomarchos", *RE* 18 (1939) 504–505.

¹¹ Dancing girl: Athen. 13.605c; Plut. *Mor.* 397F. Croesus' shield: Paus. 10.8.7; cf. Hdt. 1.92.

mercenary army, otherwise beyond their means, was by robbing the sanctuary. Philomelos must have been aware of this rudimentary fact from the outset, or at the very latest when he and Archidamos discussed the plan to seize the sanctuary. To illustrate the sums needed by the Phokians for a large mercenary army even a rough calculation will suffice. Philomelos started with only 30 talents, although he added to his war-chest when he plundered the Thrakidai (Diod. 16.24.2–3). If normal pay for one mercenary foot soldier be set at one drachma¹² and the increased pay at one and a half drachmas, daily pay for 5000 mercenaries (Diod. 16.25.1) would amount to 7500 drachmas, monthly pay to 225,000 drachmas (37.50 talents), and yearly pay to 450 talents. When Philomelos decided to double his army from 5000 to 10,000, he thereby doubled his expenses to some 900 talents a year.¹³ The maintenance of mercenaries on this scale is enough to substantiate Diodoros' claim that during the war the Phokians spent more than 10,000 talents of sacred money.¹⁴ Those who exonerate Philomelos from guilt have never considered the realities of his situation. Obviously, then, from a very early period Philomelos looked to Apollo as his paymaster. Having looted sacred treasures, Philomelos was able to attract a host of mercenaries by increasing the current rate of pay by half. This inducement enabled the Phokians to field an army of some 10,000 infantry and cavalry. Philomelos may have started to recruit troops as early as autumn 356 to judge by the cessation of work on the temple of Apollo in Heraios (September/October) of that year. He could then use the winter to prepare his army for battle.

In the spring of 355 Philomelos stood ready to confront the Amphiktyons. Although his diplomatic efforts gained him nothing from Athens and Sparta, the Achaians sent him 1500 men. Achaian participation was probably due far less to religious sentiment than to political animosity towards the Thebans, who had intervened there unsuccessfully in 366. Next Philomelos needed to determine how to confront the Amphiktyons. He doubtless possessed accurate knowledge of his enemies' general plans, since they had been a matter of common knowledge for months. The Lokrians and Thessalians threatened him from the north and the Boiotians from the east, presenting him with the classical problem of conducting

¹² Cf. Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.21, where three Aiginetan obols equal four and a half Athenian. Demosthenes (4.28) in 351 proposed a scale of pay of 40 talents for 2000 men and twelve for 200 cavalry per month, sums unrealistically low: cf. W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War I* (Berkeley 1971) 3–29.

¹³ When the Phokians paid their indemnity after the Sacred War, they did so at the rate of 60 talents a year (*FdD* III.5. no. 14; *IG* IX 1 110–111; Diod. 16.60.2).

¹⁴ Diod. 16.56.6; cf. Athen. 6.231d; A. Boeckh, *The Public Economy of Athens* (Eng. trans. London 1828) 1.19.

a war on two fronts. He could allow the Amphiktyons to join forces and either challenge them in Phokian territory or stand siege at Delphoi. As *strategos autokrator* of the Phokian Confederacy he was expected to protect his native land from invasion. An alternative strategy was to use his interior lines of communication to defeat his enemies piecemeal. He decided upon a bold course. He would strike at East Lokris before the Amphiktyons could assemble their several contingents in a combined army. This plan offered the possibility of knocking the Epiknemidian Lokrians, who were close at hand, out of the war at the very outset. A quick victory in this quarter would also give the Phokians command of the mountain chain separating the southwestern coast of the Euboian Gulf from the Kephisos valley. With the passes in his hands, Philomelos would have the opportunity to block the Thessalian ascent from the sea, thereby forcing them either to fight on unfavorable ground in order to break through, perhaps even before the arrival of the Boiotians, or to retreat without striking a blow. Then he could deal with the Boiotians alone. This plan was Philomelos' only hope of defeating his enemies individually.

Another factor favoring this strategy was the relative strength of the opposing armies. Philomelos commanded 10,000 infantry and cavalry, a force far greater in numbers than the individual levies of most Greek *poleis*. Moreover, he could estimate the numerical strength of his opponents with some accuracy. Despite the exaggeration of Diodoros (16.30.4), who claims that the Thessalians and their neighbors contributed 6000 men in 355, while the Boiotians appeared 13,000 strong, Philomelos knew that he would not face an army of 19,000 men. The Boiotian Confederacy had never put an army 13,000 strong in the field at any other time during the fifth and fourth centuries. Instead, as K.J. Beloch saw long ago, the average Boiotian field-army, when engaged in a major campaign, normally numbered 8000 infantry and cavalry at most. Hence, Beloch suggested, doubtless rightly, that Diodoros' 13,000 included the combined Amphiktyonic levy, with the Thessalians and their allies contributing 6000, the Lokrians 1000, and the Boiotians the rest. Thus, the size of the Boiotian contingent in the campaign would correspond closely to the size of the one that had defeated the Spartans at Leuktra. Diodoros' figure of 13,000 should probably be taken as a reasonable, but approximate, assessment of the strength of the Amphiktyonic army as a whole. If, however, Philomelos could engage the Lokrians and Thessalians before they had joined the Boiotians, he would outnumber them considerably. A victory, even with casualties, would enable him to meet the Boiotians with some superiority in numbers.¹⁵

¹⁵ Beloch, *GG* III².1.250 n.l. For fifth-century numbers, cf. P. Salmon, *Étude sur la*

Word that the Boiotians were ready to march triggered events. Without awaiting the arrival of the Achaians, Philomelos took the initiative. Despite the vagueness, repetition, and confusion of Diodoros' narrative, topography provides the key to a coherent reconstruction of the campaign that ended in the battle of Neon. Philomelos doubtless left a garrison in the newly built fortifications above the stadium to protect Delphoi from another attack by the West Lokrians. He next led the Phokian army onto Mt. Kallidromon in a swift invasion of Epiknemidian Lokris. Although it is impossible to determine whether he used the route from Triteis to Naryx or that from Tithronion through the Kleisoura pass to the modern Mendenitsa, both reach the same general area, from which he could observe all of the roads available to the Thessalians and quickly descend onto Thermopylai, if necessary. His stroke caught the Amphiktyons by surprise before they could assemble their forces. The Lokrians sent cavalry to oppose him, only to meet with defeat. Yet the sacrifice bought the Thessalians and their allies enough time to arrive on the scene, thereby preventing the Lokrians from being overwhelmed. With his superior numbers, Philomelos immediately gave battle to the Thessalians, whom he readily defeated at a place named Argolas, a fortified city on a hill next to a river, to which the Amphiktyonic forces retired to await the Boiotians. The cavalry battle, the arrival of the Thessalians, and the geographical details combine to locate the battlefield. The valley in which the modern villages of Mendenitsa and Kallidromon are located is the only upland plain suitable for a cavalry battle; and it can easily be reached from Thermopylai, through which the Thessalians must pass, by way either of Alponos or Skarpheia. The only place in this area that accords with the description of Argolas is Mendenitsa, the ancient name of which is unknown.¹⁶

Confédération béotienne (447/6–368) (Brussels 1976) 190; for fourth-century, cf. Buckler, *La Béotie antique*, 239. Beloch's figure of 1000 for the Lokrians is possible; cf. Hdt. 7.203.1; Diod. 11.4.7; Larsen, *GFS*, 52–53.

¹⁶ The reasons for identifying Mendenitsa with Argolas are many and cumulative, but the argument for it requires some unavoidable repetition of material. (1) Diodoros 16.25.2 and 16.30.3–4 are a doublet (cf. pp. 190–210 above). (2) Philomelos invaded Lokrian territory at a point where both the Thessalian and Boiotian armies could reinforce the Lokrians (Diod. 16.30.3–4). Therefore, the Phokians ascended Mt. Kallidromon. (3) Large numbers of troops were engaged, which meant that major routes must be used (cf. pp. 36–38 above). (4) When Philomelos arrived in Lokris, he laid siege to φρούριον ὄχυρόν, near which flowed a river (Diod. 16.25.2). According to *LSJ*⁹ s.v. φρούριον, the word is normally used of a "hill-fort", as distinguished from a "fortified town". (5) The Thessalians, some 6000 strong, also engaged the Phokians in this same area (Diod. 16.30.4), which means that the area in question had to be spacious enough for large numbers of troops to be deployed and level enough for cavalry to operate. (6) This battle took place near a hill named Argolas (περὶ λόφον Ἀργόλαν; but the name is corrupt, as so often happens with Diodoros, and also appears in the manuscripts as Ἀργόλανον and Ἀργόλαιον.). (7) Yet at 16.31.1, once the Boiotians had arrived to succor the Lokrians

There the ruins of the medieval fortress of Boudonitza rest upon the remains of a Hellenic akropolis beside a stream-bed, which is normally dry during the summer (cf. Pl. 2). Although Philomelos laid siege to the city, he failed to take it, whereupon both sides skirmished, with the Phokians sacking as much Lokrian territory as they could. Meanwhile, Pammenes, the best Theban general of the day, led the Boiotian levy to Lokris, probably by way of the Fontana pass. Philomelos preferred not to challenge the victors of Leuktra and Mantinea, who had come in sufficient numbers to deal with him unaided. Furthermore, a pitched battle under these circumstances would give the Amphiktyons in Argolas the opportunity to sally against him. The Boiotians joined their allies in the

and Thessalians, Diodoros refers to a polis. (8) Around this place the land was open and fertile enough for the Phokians to forage (Diod. 16.25.3). (9) The Boiotians then appeared on the scene in relief of the Lokrians and Thessalians. (10) After the Achaians had arrived in support of the Phokians, there was some desultory skirmishing, a part of which involved the Boiotians killing in front of the city a number of Phokian mercenaries (Diod. 16.31.1–2; cp. 16.25.2–3). (11) After further skirmishing, the two armies retired to Phokis, with both forces marching through heavily-wooded regions (Diod. 16.31.3). (12) The two armies collided at Neon, where Philomelos was defeated (Diod. 16.31.3; Paus. 10.2.4).

Such are the recorded facts, if indeed they all be facts. The place to start is the scene of the action. Since the Thessalians were able to reach the Lokrians at a hill, they obviously experienced no difficulty in traversing the Thermopylai corridor; therefore, the site of Argolas is not to be sought in that region. Hence, the area is limited to the heights of Mt. Kallidromon. Diodoros 16.25.2 and 16.30.3–4 being a doublet, one learns that both armies encamped by a fortified hill, next to which flowed a river. Diodoros also refers to this place as a polis. The site also commanded ample space for the movements of some 23,000 foot and horse. Being a master neither of Greek military affairs (cf. pp. 165–166 below) nor of Greek geography—much less of chronology—Diodoros has nonetheless given enough topographical information to suggest the one site on Mt. Kallidromon that meets all of the requirements of his text: Mendenitsa, on which cf. Hirschfeld, "Argolas", *RE* 2 (1896) 728; W. Miller, *JHS* 28 (1908) 234–249; Beloch, *GG* III².1.250 n. 1; A. Bon, *BCH* 61 (1937) 148–163; Burr, *NEON KATALOGOS*, 35–36; Hope Simpson-Lazenby, *Catalogue*, 49; personal observations of 7 August 1980; 25 May 1983. (1) The foundations of the medieval fortress there are classical Greek, and the black-glazed sherds there date inhabitation to the fourth century. (2) The site crowns a hill next to which flows a river. (3) The upland plain surrounding Mendenitsa is more than spacious and level enough to allow the movements of large numbers of infantry and cavalry. (4) The roads emanating from Mendenitsa lead to the Kephisos valley and Neon. (5) A walk through the Kleisoura pass can even today be called διὰ τόπων καταδένδρων καὶ τραχέων. Cf. Miller, *JHS* 28 (1908) 237, who records that in 1209 the Latin Emperor Henry and his entourage took this route between Mendenitsa and Thebes. Miller himself traversed this track by horse (cf. also Leake, *Northern Greece* II.69; W. Gell, *Itinerary of Greece* [London 1819] 237; J. A. Buchon, *Grèce continentale de la Morée* [Paris 1834] 283–284), which was no longer possible on 30 May 1983, when I traced it. Today it is used largely by hunters and shepherds. (6) Since according to Diodoros' account, the two armies lost contact with each other until they reached Tithorea, one must conclude that the Boiotians took the Fontana pass (cf. pp. 33–34 above). The convergence of the two armies also explains why the battle took place at Tithorea. Therefore, on the basis of existing evidence, one must equate Mendenitsa with Argolas.

city, using it as a base, just as Epameinondas had used Tegea in 362. Philomelos' only consolation was the arrival of the Achaians, which made him a match for the combined Amphiktyonic army. Both sides continued to skirmish, but contact was limited to small encounters between foraging parties. The capture of some Phokian mercenaries led to another atrocity in a war marked by atrocity. The Boiotians, on behalf of the Amphiktyons, shot down the captives on the grounds that they were punishing them as temple-robbers. The Boiotians were probably also seeking revenge for the captured Lokrians whom Philomelos had slain for sacrilege the year before. Enraged, Philomelos and his mercenaries meted out the same punishment to a group of their captives, which for the moment ended the brutality.¹⁷

Random skirmishing did nothing to retrieve Philomelos' position. The arrival of the Boiotian army both marked the failure of his plan to defeat the Amphiktyonic levies individually and tipped the scales against him. In fact, his position had become untenable. He could clearly achieve nothing more at Argolas, especially against an army equal to his in numbers and in firm possession of a fortified position. A pitched battle under these circumstances could mean disaster, if only because the region provided him with no place of refuge in case of defeat, whereas the Amphiktyons could always fall back on Argolas. Under the circumstances, it was advantageous for him to withdraw before the Amphiktyons could bring him to battle. Accordingly, he ordered his army to retire to the Kephisos valley to cover Phokis probably by way of the Kleisoura pass, the fastest route open to him. The road before him runs south from Mendenitsa up a deep, heavily wooded cleft, carved by a river, over Mt. Kallidromon. Today used only by hunters and shepherds, the route climbs steadily above the ravine until it reaches the crest, a walk of some two hours. A spring on the southern side of the summit brings welcome relief on the easy descent to Tithronion. Pammenes likewise ordered the Amphiktyonic army to move off at once. Perhaps to prevent Philomelos from making

¹⁷ Diod. 16.31.2; cf. 16.25.3. Beloch, *GG* III².1.249; Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 135; Fiehn, *RE* 19 (1938) 2525; W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, II (Berkeley 1974) 158. Although Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².501 n. 1, asks whether the Phokian dedications mentioned by Pausanias (10.13.6; cf. *SIG*³ 202–203) resulted from Philomelos' defeat of the Thessalians in this engagement, it is preferable to conclude with H. Hitzig and H. Blümner, *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*, III.2 (Leipzig 1907) 708, that Pausanias is referring to the second cavalry battle (10.1.10) that occurred between the Phokians and Thessalians before the Persian War, the first being the "battle of the amphoras" (10.1.3); cf. also Hdt. 8.28; Plut. *Mor.* 244A–E; Polyainos 6.18.2. Cf. also P.A. Stadter, *Plutarch's Historical Methods* (Cambridge, Mass. 1965) 34–41. Finally, one should not conclude with Jacoby, *FGH* IIIb (Sup. I) I.141, on the basis of Diodoros (16.27.5, 29.1) that the Athenians actually contributed a levy to Philomelos' army.

a quick dash through the Kephisos valley to Boiotia, he led his troops southeastwards along the upland valley of Mt. Kallidromon until the road reached the Fontana pass south of Naryx. From there he marched south along a spacious path, often shaded by trees and with springs along the way, running immediately east and below the modern motor road linking the villages of Rhenginion and Modion. Although seldom used now, the track crosses the heights at an easy gradient before descending to Triteis, which brought the Amphiktyons into Phokian territory.¹⁸

The two armies collided as they converged on Tithorea, the akropolis of which, Neon, gave its name to the ensuing battle. Philomelos with his headstart and faster route had reached the Kephisos valley first, but the route of the Amphiktyons had brought them squarely across his path. The two armies clashed in the level region north of the lower city, where a rolling area opens between the slopes of Mt. Parnassos to the west and the gorge of the Kachales river to the east. This ground, which affords easy marching to armies, is spacious enough to accommodate large bodies of troops (cf. Pl. 3). The Boiotians and other Amphiktyons defeated the Phokians in a hard battle, details of which are lacking, and then drove the survivors up the heavily wooded slopes of Parnassos, where many were killed in flight. Still others escaped to safety, but Philomelos was not among them. When he found himself badly wounded and trapped on the heights, he hurled himself from the rocks rather than risk capture, the manner of his death precisely that prescribed for temple-robbers. Onomarchos succeeded in leading the wreck of Philomelos' army to safety, and he left a rearguard to hold Philoboiotos, the hill that blocks the eastern end of the Kephisos valley. Around Philoboiotos to the east and west are two narrow routes, both overlooked by gentle slopes which afforded the defenders very good ground for challenging the enemy without much risk to themselves (cf. Pl. 4). Owing to paucity of numbers, the Phokians could not defend both passages, which enabled Pammenes to use a feint to bring his army through without opposition. Nonetheless, Onomarchos safely escaped to Delphoi, and Pammenes retired to Thebes.¹⁹

¹⁸ Cf. n. 16 above, to which add W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV (Berkeley 1982) 125–128, 134–135; personal observations of 30 May 1983 and 14 July 1986.

¹⁹ Diod. 16.31.3–5; Paus. 10.2.4; Eusebios *Præp. Ev.* 8.14 (392C). Beloch, *GG* III².1.250 n. 1; Fiehn, *RE* 19 (1938) 2525. Neon and Tithorea: cf. n. 3 above, to which can be added Hdt. 8.32; Androton, *FGH* 324 F23; Dem. 19.148; Strabo 9.5.18; Plut. *Sulla* 15.5; Paus. 10.2.4, 3.2, 32.8–11. H.N. Ulrichs, *Reisen und Forschungen in Griechenland*, II (Bremen 1863) 116; W.W. How and J. Wells, *A Commentary on Herodotus*, II (Oxford 1912) 244; Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortifications*, 482 s.v. "Tithorea". Philoboiotos: Polyainos 5.16.1; Plut. *Sulla* 16. Bursian, *Geographie*, I.157; personal observations of 10 July 1986.

The battle of Neon was a major Amphiktyonic victory. The defeat of a mercenary army of this size was quite unusual in Greek history, at least outside of Magna Graecia, and the Amphiktyons had good reason to conclude that their victory had ended the crisis. Even so, Pammenes' conduct is difficult to understand and impossible to praise. Having won the greatest battle of his career, he failed to use his victory to end the Sacred War. With the road open to him, he could have marched on Delphoi to free the sanctuary and suppress the Phokians. Perhaps he balked at pushing the defeated mercenaries into a desperate defense, expecting them instead to melt away rather than return to the fray, or wished to give the Phokians the opportunity to sue for peace and themselves disband the remnants of Philomelos' army. Nor did the Amphiktyons make reprisals against the Phokian cities in the Kephisos valley, where it was within their power to punish them for their support of Philomelos' sacrilege. Whatever the explanation, when the Amphiktyons decided to return to their homes rather than march on Delphoi, they wasted an excellent chance to end the Sacred War in its first year, and Pammenes must bear much of the blame. They would never again have such a splendid opportunity, their next coming many years later, but only when Philip brought to their side the might of Macedonia.²⁰

C) *Onomarchos takes command (355 BC)*

When in summer 355 Onomarchos led the shattered remnants of Philomelos' army back to Delphoi, it looked as though the Sacred War were lost. On the contrary, Phokis was about to come its closest to victory. Unwilling to accept defeat, Onomarchos urged his countrymen to continue the struggle, and the combination of his insistence and his legal powers as *strategos* of the Phokian Confederacy resulted in a federal meeting, to which the allies of Phokis were invited, to discuss the issue. The

Diodoros has once again confused the details of the battle. As was mentioned in n. 16 above, the roads used by the two armies debouched onto the Kephisos valley, from which points Tithorea is visible from afar. Topography suggests that the vanguard of each army collided while attempting to seize the city, which brought about a general engagement, with the defeated army fleeing up the slopes of Parnassos. It is scarcely imaginable that two such large armies could have approached Tithorea along the trackless slopes of Parnassos.

²⁰ Many Phokians did indeed wish to capitulate, but Onomarchos, with the surviving mercenaries under his command, persuaded the Phokians to continue the fight; cf. p. 196 below. Diodoros (16.32.1–3) provides evidence that the Boiotians thought that the victory at Neon would bring peace. For a fuller discussion of Pammenes' actions, cf. J. Buckler in H. Beister and J. Buckler, *BOIOTIKA: Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Böotien-Kolloquium, zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (Munich 1989) 156–157, hereafter cited as "Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA*".

allies responded, even though Athens and Sparta had so far not been actively engaged, and found the Phokians seriously divided over the question of continuing the war. One group, which the pious Diodoros naturally describes as the more moderate, was inclined towards peace. Some Phokians had been adverse from the start, and the defeat at Neon had intensified their fears. Their opponents, whom Diodoros castigates as impious men carried away by recklessness and greed, refused to abandon Philomelos' policy. The latter still constituted the majority in Phokian politics. The issues between the two groups, however, were larger than the question of peace and war. Surrender would put the Phokians at the mercy of the Amphiktyonic League, not a cheerful prospect after the shedding of so much blood. In addition to the original fine, the Phokians could now expect still another punitive fine to pay for the sacred treasures already appropriated and punishment for those responsible. Yet they had no hope of blaming the sacrilege solely on their leaders, for the Amphiktyonic Council had cursed the Phokian people as a whole. Individuals may have originally tilled the sacred land; but Philomelos and Onomarchos, duly elected magistrates of the Phokian Confederacy, had seized the sanctuary, plundered its wealth, and defied the Amphiktyons in the field. The Phokians themselves were thereby ultimately responsible for the sacrilege, and could expect punishment accordingly. Phokian leaders and their partisans, especially in Delphoi, must have been especially anxious, for Amphiktyonic wrath would fall most heavily on them. A decision to continue the war was hardly more attractive. The Phokians could recoup their losses only by raiding the sacred treasures ever more extensively than before in order to finance another mercenary army that would not necessarily be more effective or successful than Philomelos'. The primary loyalty of that army would go to its commander and paymaster, not to the Phokian Confederacy. In effect, continued war forced the Phokians to put their faith in the hands of a man who could act regardless of their wishes but the responsibility for whose acts would be theirs.²¹

At the meeting of the Phokians and their allies Onomarchos stepped forward to call upon the assembled to persevere in the war. Condemned by the Amphiktyons, he had defied them and thus remained outlawed, so surrender would mean either his exile or his death. Having supported Philomelos from the outset and having served with him in the field, he was the logical successor to provide continuity of command and policy to those still bent on war. To these advantages he added the considerable weight

²¹ Diod. 16.32.2–3; cf. Aischin. 2.117. Continued allied support of Phokis: cf. Diod. 16.37.3 and pp. 125–126 below. Cf. also G. Busolt and H. Swoboda, *Griechische Staatskunde* II (Munich 1926) 1451; Parke, *Delphic Oracle*, 238–239; Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 495–496.

of his family, one of the foremost in Phokis and one also committed to the war from the outset. At the moment, his oratory, policy, and family connections were less persuasive than were Philomelos' mercenaries, who stood ready to enforce his will. With armed might and the support of the majority, Onomarchos won the political battle. The assembly of the Phokian Confederacy voted to carry the program of Philomelos to completion: Onomarchos was elected *strategos autokrator* and his brother Phayllos *strategos*. The Phokians were now irretrievably committed to victory over the Amphiktyons.²²

His position as *strategos autokrator* legitimate and secure, Onomarchos nonetheless tried to crush the opposition that had pressed for peace, and was clearly numerous enough to impede his designs. Under no illusions about the dangers and difficulties confronting his policy, he wanted unanimous support from his countrymen; and the "moderates", outvoted but unpersuaded, were the only Phokians capable of undermining his efforts. Onomarchos had his major opponents arrested and executed and their property confiscated to swell his war-chest. As *strategos autokrator*, he probably acted within the law, but his conduct was indistinguishable from that of a tyrant. He intimidated the pro-peace group, and eliminated its most vocal adherents, but he had failed to destroy it. All the same, his severity succeeded temporarily in quelling local opposition to his aims, allowing him to proceed untrammelled.²³

Onomarchos' next task was to rebuild Phokian military power, to which end he began relentlessly to plunder Delphic treasures on an unprecedented scale. Bronze and iron dedications became the raw materials for Phokian weapons. A new element in Onomarchos' arsenal was the introduction of non-torsion stone-throwing machines, capable of hurling a five-pound shot and light enough to serve in an emergency as primal field artillery. Some bronze was minted into coins, with the Phokian device of a bull's head on the obverse and Onomarchos' name encircled by a wreath on the reverse. Gold and silver dedications were also melted down for coins. None of Onomarchos' gold coinage has survived, but some of Apollo's gold may only have been melted down into bars and sold in that way. Regardless of form, these precious metals financed Onomarchos' recruitment of mercenaries, which was no easy matter after the disaster at Neon. Not only did he fill the empty ranks of the slain, but he also increased the size of his army, until he could field a force of some 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry. All of these efforts took time; but since the

²² Diod. 16.32.3; Paus. 10.2.5.

²³ Diod. 16.33.3, despite which opposition to the Phokian generals continued: cf. Appendix 2.

Amphiktyons failed to press their advantage, he had the winter of 355/4 at his disposal.²⁴

Strategy was the most demanding problem confronting Onomarchos. Because of their losses the previous year, the Achaians were unlikely to reinforce him, so he could expect even less allied help than Philomelos had enjoyed. His very decision to maintain a huge mercenary army reflects his decision to dispense with the idea of Athenian and Spartan assistance. Nevertheless, his strategic position showed some slight improvement over that of Philomelos, whose work had not entirely been in vain. Phokis was still encircled by enemies, but one of them was badly shaken. After their defeat at Argolas, the Thessalians were unlikely to intervene again against an even larger force than Philomelos', especially in 355, when the persistent feud between Pherai and the Thessalian Confederacy flared anew, doubtless encouraged by the defeat. Peitholaos and Lykophron, the tyrants of Pherai, readily seized the moment to challenge other Thessalians for mastery of the land, and as usual the Aleuadaí of Larisa were prepared to resist. Onomarchos decided to turn the internal discord to his advantage by aiding the Pheraian tyrants so that the Thessalian Confederacy could not again oppose Phokis. Then only the weak East Lokrians would impede his way to Thermopylai, the securing of which would end the menace from the north. He easily accomplished his aims by allying himself with Lykophron and Peitholaos and by contributing substantial sums to the maintenance of their own mercenary army. In 354 the Thessalian Confederacy would have its hands full merely defending itself. By wise use of Philomelos' victory and by diplomatic intrigue, Onomarchos removed the Thessalian Confederacy from the Phokian theater of the Sacred War and virtually from the war itself.²⁵

Onomarchos next dealt with an enemy closer to home, and here again he built upon the work of Philomelos. Although one defeat had sufficed to knock Ozolaian Lokris out of the war, Onomarchos further strengthened his position in this area, both militarily and diplomatically. He bullied the people of Amphissa and probably the rest of West Lokris, who were still formally Theban allies, into concluding an alliance with Phokis. Amphissa itself was garrisoned. Onomarchos thereby gained two things:

²⁴ Onomarchos' pillage of the sanctuary: Diod. 16.33.1; Aischin. 2.131; Dem. 19.21. Weapons: Diod. 16.33.2; E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Developments* (Oxford 1969) 59. Coinage: Diod. 16.33.2; Plut. *Mor.* 401F; G.F. Hill, *Historical Greek Coins* (London 1906) 89–91; B.V. Head, *Historia Numorum*² (Oxford 1911) 339. Mercenaries: Diod. 16.32.4, 35.4.

²⁵ Thessaly: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.35–37; Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F352; Isok. 8.118; Diod. 16.14.2; cf. also 16.33.3, 34.2, 37.4; Plut. *Pel.* 35.6–12. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 160–173; M. Sordi, *La lega tessala* (Rome 1958) 240.

first, he secured himself from attack from that quarter, and secondly he could allow acceptable Lokrians to participate in Delphic affairs. Indeed, in the following years two Lokrians joined other pro-Phokian *naopoioi* who met at Delphoi for the first time since the declaration of war.²⁶

Onomarchos probably now dragooned the Amphissans and their neighbors into an alliance with Athens. A Lokrian-Athenian treaty, known from an undated and fragmentary Athenian inscription (*IG* II² 144), has been much debated. No terms of the alliance are preserved, and the inscription does not distinguish between Epiknemidian Lokris and Ozolian Lokris. L. Lerat, who dates the pact before the Sacred War, thinks that an earlier treaty was renewed as the result of the unforeseen events of 357/6. W.A. Oldfather suggests that the alliance was concluded when the Sacred War became inevitable, in effect a last-minute Athenian effort to rob Thebes of an ally. W.S. Ferguson places the treaty squarely in 354, and observes that the presence of Lokrian *naopoioi* at Delphoi in 353 argues in favor of his date. Ferguson specifically refutes Oldfather's hypothesis by pointing out how vehemently the Lokrians had opposed the Phokians before the war, and his arguments are equally valid against Lerat, who overlooks his article. Moreover, Lokris had been a faithful Boiotian ally throughout the Theban Hegemony, making it difficult to postulate a suitable time before the war for the initial treaty proposed by Lerat. Other arguments bolster a date of 355/4 for the Athenian-Lokrian alliance. First, the only known Phokian-Lokrian alliance in these years is that with Amphissa, mentioned above; and while under Phokian control, Amphissa could hardly refuse a treaty with Athens. Since Amphissa was the leading city of West Lokris, which was important to Delphian security, one can reasonably conclude that the rest of the area was included in the agreement, even if it were only by fiction. Secondly, the Lokrian *naopoioi* presuppose a formal reconciliation between Lokris and Phokis and its allies. Nevertheless, the evidence argues against any involvement of the Epiknemidian Lokrians in this treaty. Although Onomarchos captured Thronion in 354 (*Diod.* 16.33.3), East Lokris was not entirely overrun until 351 (*Diod.* 16.38.3). That leaves only the matter of terminology. The Athenians did not specify that the treaty was only with West Lokris simply because of the demands of propaganda, the need to have Lokrian support of Phokian claims to the *prostasia* of Delphoi, which Athens had endorsed. The primary importance of Lokris in this context was to help counter the claim of the Amphiktyonic League to legitimate authority over Delphoi. As in the case of Thessaly, Onomarchos'

²⁶ *Diod.* 16.33.3; *Plut. Mor.* 249E–F; Lokrian *naopoioi*: *FdD* III.5 no. 19 lines 34, 44.

policy, with which the Athenians connived, was as much diplomatic as military.²⁷

The Thebans also encouraged Onomarchos' hopes by becoming involved in Asian affairs. When in 355 the Athenians recalled their general Chares at the demand of Artaxerxes, king of Persia (cf. p. 4 above), the rebel satrap Artabazos was left suddenly in the lurch. He turned to the Thebans for help, doubtless because of their victories at Leuktra, Mantinea, and now Neon. To the surprise of the Greek world, the Thebans agreed to send him Pammenes and 5000 hoplites in return for handsome remuneration. Thinking that the battle of Neon signalled the end of the Sacred War, Pammenes and his men began their march to Asia sometime in the summer of 355.²⁸

The startling conduct of the Thebans calls for explanation, for ties between them and the king of Persia went back to the Persian War, and as recently as 367/6 the two had jointly sponsored a Common Peace. The latter experience suggests an answer, for the episode ended in the most humiliating failure in Theban foreign policy since the King's Peace of 386. Not only did the Thebans fail to win general Greek support for the new treaty, but Epameinondas' subsequent naval campaign, financed by Persia, also proved fruitless. The two events provided an excellent reason for the Thebans to reject the idea of a close relationship with the King. In 355, on the other hand, Artabazos offered the Thebans something simple and tangible—gold for hoplites with no risk of the King's retaliation. A direct attack from the King, even if militarily possible, was extremely unlikely and not worth the cost of provoking massive Greek resistance. Furthermore, with the Egyptians and Orontes, satrap of Mysia, also in rebellion, Artaxerxes could not afford to divert his attention to Thebes.²⁹

The timing of the Theban decision is harder to explain, the difficulties being compounded by chronological uncertainties. The two unknowable factors that make this problem insoluble are ignorance of precisely when Pammenes left Thebes and of when the Thebans first realized that Onomarchos was determined to pursue the war. More time may have elapsed

²⁷ Diod. 15.57.1, 85.2. Oldfather, "Lokris", *RE* 13 (1926) 1204–1205; Ferguson, "Onomarchos", *RE* 18 (1939) 489; Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, II.50–51.

²⁸ Chares: Diod. 16.22.1–2. Boiotian attitude after Neon: Diod. 16.32.1. Pammenes: Diod. 16.34.1. Artabazos' revolt: cf. p. 4 n. 6 above, to which can be added Beloch, *GG* III².1.242–243; A.B. Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander I* (Oxford 1980) 113, who places this event immediately after Artaxerxes Ochos' accession; cf. also A. Sachs, *AJAH* 2 (1977) 138. Chronology: cf. pp. 177–181 below. For a full discussion of this episode, cf. Buckler, in Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA* 157–160.

²⁹ Theban-Persian relations: Buckler, *TH*, 151–175. Greek resistance: Tod, *GHI*. II.145. Egyptians and Orontes: Dem. 14.31; cf. Diod. 15.90.3 and in general E. Badian, *Pulpuveda* 4 (1983) 58.

between the two than most scholars think. Although Neon did not immediately lead to Phokian surrender, it ended military activity for the rest of that campaigning-season, giving Onomarchos a much-needed interlude in which to deal with his own complex and time-consuming problems. Since Pammenes had already reached Maroneia in Thrace by November 355 at the latest, he may easily have left Thebes before Onomarchos' success and ultimate aims became known. Perhaps by then it was too late to recall the Theban force, which anyway would entail the forfeiture of Artabazos' money.³⁰ Or perhaps the Thebans thought the risk worth taking. The Theban attitude may have been reinforced by the superiority of the Boiotian hoplites over Philomelos' mercenaries, thus leaving the Thebans with the feeling that their remaining troops were sufficient at least to defend Boiotia. The full magnitude of their error would not become obvious until Onomarchos actually fielded his new mercenary army in 354, when he met with no substantial resistance in western Boiotia.

Pammenes' outward march took him to Macedonia, the realm of his old friend Philip, and introduced him to the tangled affairs of Thrace. Philip granted him the right of passage through Macedonia; and in a meeting that was more than social, the two agreed to march together into Thrace, where Philip had ambitions that could perhaps be realized with the support of the Thebans. The journey gave Philip the opportunity to learn details of the recent fighting in the Sacred War, of which those concerning the composition and performance of the Thessalian contingent were of particular interest. The two men doubtless discussed Theban-Macedonian relations, which had been reasonably good since the Theban Hegemony and perhaps even improved by their common hostility to Athens. For his part, Pammenes gained specific information about the chaotic situation in Thrace, an area forming an important link in his line of communications between Phrygia and Boiotia.

G.T. Griffith has argued that Pammenes and Philip used this occasion to cement an alliance between the Boiotian Confederacy and Macedonia,

³⁰ This interpretation is strengthened by Pammenes' route. Since Beloch's day (*GG* III².2.269), scholars have agreed that the Theban force marched overland: e.g. Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 59; Griffith, *HM*, II.264–265. D.H. Kelly, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 79, has more recently suggested that Pammenes sailed to Asia, because in his view the victory at Neon failed to open the way through Thermopylai. Before Neon Philomelos' army never reached, much less seized, any of the strategically important places along the Thermopylai corridor. Nor does he explain why Pammenes would have found it more difficult to reach Thermopylai by way of Hyampolis than did Jason of Pherai under very similar circumstances: cf. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.25; Diod. 15.57.2. Secondly, if Pammenes had sailed direct to Phrygia, his detour to Maroneia would be very difficult to explain. There is no obvious reason for the detour, and Pammenes could not instinctively have known that Philip would be at Maroneia.

his evidence being Pausanias' statement that Thebes and Macedonia were allied by the time that Philip won the battle of the Crocus Plain (353). Accordingly, Griffith sees Philip's later intervention in Thessaly as co-operation with Theban war-aims. Diodoros (16.58.2–3, 59.2), however, states that the Theban-Macedonian alliance was not concluded until near the end of the Sacred War. Pausanias' testimony, which places the end of the war in 348/7, presents such obvious chronological difficulties that it must be dismissed, especially in view of contemporary Delphic inscriptions that disprove it. Not particularly interested in the Sacred War for its own sake, Pausanias has simply gotten things wrong in his abbreviated sketch of Phokian history.³¹ As will be noted below (cf. pp. 58–62) Philip's interest in Thessaly conformed to a well-established Macedonian pattern, one that went back earlier than any ties with Thebes and had nothing to do with Pammenes. Nor is it at all likely that Pammenes sought Philip's help against Phokis. His very march to Asia was an indication that Thebes thought the war over, and *en route* he had little opportunity to obtain news of Onomarchos, whose first attack did not even come until the following spring. Philip was well disposed towards Pammenes, Thebes, and Delphic Apollo, but in late 355 these three entered very little into his immediate plans.³² Thebes was a useful counterweight to Athens, but one that Philip could not at the moment use. Philip doubtless assured Pammenes of his moral support for the Theban defense of Delphoi, and professions of friendship between Thebes and Macedonia were exchanged. A formal alliance between the two, however, is extremely improbable at this point.³³

Far more urgent was the situation in Thrace, which was complicated by a number of factors, the most important being the political fragmentation of the area itself. The death of Kotys, king of all Thrace, in 360 or 359 had thrown the region into confusion. Kotys' realm was divided among his sons, Berisades, Amadokos, and Kersebleptes, with whom the Athenians had made an alliance, but one that failed to restore stability to the area. Both Philip and Kersebleptes had designs on the realm of Amadokos, which stretched from the Hebros river in eastern Thrace to the city of Maroneia in the west. They probably hoped to crush Amadokos

³¹ Griffith, *HM*, II.266–267, whose view is rejected on other grounds by Kelly, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 79. Pausanias' testimony: cf. p. 157 above.

³² Before Philip could become seriously involved in southern affairs, he had to possess or eliminate Methone; cf. Ellis, *Philip*, 75; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 37.

³³ Moreover, even though Pammenes was doubtless a *boiolarchos* in 355, as witnessed by his command of the army at Neon, that office did not empower him to conclude treaties without the endorsement of the federal assembly of the Boiotian Confederacy; cp. the example of Epameinondas in Achaia: Buckler, *TH*, 188–191.

between them and divide the spoils, and here is where Pammenes and his 5000 troops could prove valuable. Pammenes himself needed the permission of Kersebleptes to pass through his kingdom in peace; and since he would be operating in Phrygia on the eastern side of the Hellespont, it was important to him to be on good terms with the Thracian king who held the western side, especially in the event that the Thebans must beat a hasty retreat. Thus, all three leaders had excellent reasons for mutual support and co-operation.³⁴ When the combined forces of Philip and Pammenes reached Maroneia, they were met by Apollonides, an envoy of Kersebleptes. Amadokos ruined these machinations by ordering Philip to leave his realm, but he prudently allowed Pammenes to continue his march. At Maroneia the two men parted company; but Philip, as he turned west, plundered Maroneia and Abdera. Pammenes reached Phrygia safely, and in 354 proved his military ability by winning two battles for Artabazos. Nonetheless, the rebel satrap doubted the Theban's loyalty, and treacherously seized him, after which Pammenes passes out of history. Thereafter, Artabazos could hardly depend on the Boiotians, whom he probably dismissed at the end of the campaigning-season. Further weight is given this hypothesis by Artabazos' own career. Shortly after Pammenes' own downfall, Artabazos himself fled to the refuge of Philip's court. The departure of the Boiotian troops probably sealed Artabazos' own fate.³⁵

D) *Onomarchos takes the offensive (354 BC)*

While Pammenes campaigned in Asia, Onomarchos planned his first campaign. The absence of Pammenes and his 5000 hoplites threw the Thebans back onto the defensive, and without Theban support the other Amphiktyons were unlikely to threaten Phokis. This situation relieved the pressure on Onomarchos, who now had the luxury himself of taking the offensive. The weakness of the Boiotians and the quiescence of the other Amphiktyons in 354 gave him his best, and perhaps his only real, opportunity to win the Sacred War. He had only to decide how to use his

³⁴ Cf. pp. 177–181 below.

³⁵ Maroneia: Dem. 23.183; Diod. 16.34.1; Polyainos 4.2.22; cf. Badian, *Pulpuveia* 4 (1983) 57–60. Pammenes' end: Diod. 16.34.2; Polyainos 5.16.2; 7.33.2; Th. Lenschau, "Pammenes", *RE* 18 (1949) 298–299. W.K. Pritchett, *The Greek State at War II* (Berkeley 1974) 91, who largely repeats the conjectures of others, mistakenly states that Pammenes later took part in the Sacred War; cf. instead Buckler in Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA* 161–162. Artabazos' fate: Diod. 16.52.3; Curt. 5.9.1; 6.5.2. H. Berve, *Das Alexanderreich II* (Munich 1926) no. 152; cf. also J. Hofstetter, *Die Griechen in Persien* (Berlin 1978) no. 241; R.N. Frye, *The History of Ancient Iran* (Munich 1984) 131.

opportunity. His diplomacy promised to remove the Thessalian Confederacy from the war. With that the East Lokrians, separated from their Boiotian allies by the Kephisos valley, were isolated and thereby vulnerable to Onomarchos' superior forces. Victory in East Lokris meant control of Thermopylai, which would enable him to block the northern road to central Greece. So even if his diplomatic support of Lykophron and Peitholaos failed to produce the desired results, he could still erect a military barrier to any future Thessalian intervention. Secure in the north, Onomarchos could then deal with the Thebans themselves. The time was ideal for a full-scale invasion of northwestern Boiotia, which could not be defended by the full weight of the Boiotian army. Defense of their territory exposed the remaining Boiotian forces, if they chose to fight, to defeat at the hands of Onomarchos' numerically superior army.

In spring 354 Onomarchos launched an invasion of East Lokris with Thronion as his target. Probably using the Fontana pass, which led through Naryx, he descended directly into the Boagrios valley. The city of Thronion occupied an important strategic position in the corridor of Thermopylai at the northernmost end of the best route from Phokis (cf. p. 34 above). The lower city spread along the eastern bank of the Boagrios river, where today only scattered limestone blocks, abundant sherds, and broken roof-tiles mark the site of ancient inhabitation. Standing above the city was the akropolis, the sparse remains of which still crown a towering spur of Mt. Knemis (see plate 5). Today the summit is overgrown with thick brush, and little remains to be seen of ancient construction. In the direction of modern Molos the heights drop away steeply into a small hilly plain above the lower city, while to the north above the road the drop is precipitous. To the east a ridge rises to a higher peak nearby, distant a few minutes' walk. Along the southeastern side a narrow and somewhat steeply sloping valley lies between the akropolis and a lower summit. At least one permanent spring waters the akropolis. Thus, the upland area is naturally strong and spacious, affording more than sufficient room for a large garrison.³⁶

Thronion and its command of northern routes were so important that Onomarchos chose it as his primary objective. His attack was no mere

³⁶ Diod. 16.33.3. Thronion: *IG IX 1 309*, identifies the site of the city; cf. also Thuc. 2.26; Aischin. 2.132; Strabo 1.3.20; Polybios 18.9.3; Livy 35.37.6, 38.14, 36.20.5, 33.3.6 (unfortunately, J. Briscoe, *A Commentary on Livy*, 2 vols. [Oxford 1973, 1981] is useless for Greek topographical matters). Leake, *Northern Greece*, II.176–177; Bursian, *Geographie*, I.189–190; Wm. A. Oldfather, "Thronion", *RE* 6A (1936) 609–613. Pritchett, *Studies in Greek Topography*, IV.151–155; personal observations of 7 August 1980 and 24 May 1983. G.S. Kirk, *The Iliad: A Commentary* (Cambridge 1985) 203, adds no new information on Skarphcia, Tarphe, and Thronion.

raid. He came prepared to reduce the city by siege, which suggests that his other military plans hinged on success here. Onomarchos' siege isolated the Thronians, who harbored little hope of relief from their fellow Lokrians, who had yet to recover from their defeat at the hands of Philomelos. Thessaly was distracted and Thebes unable to help. In the face of Onomarchos' superior numbers, the Thronians surrendered, only to be enslaved. The second year of the Sacred War thus opened with unabated cruelty. Thronion became the seat of a Phokian garrison. Onomarchos' victory divided the Epiknemidian Lokrians from their Opountian kinsmen, and thrust them both onto the defensive. The road from Thessaly was closed, and not until Philip led them south in 346 would the Thessalians again take part in the Sacred War.³⁷

From Thronion Onomarchos retired to Doris, where he plundered the four Dorian cities and ravaged their territory. This campaign effectively knocked the Dorians out of the Sacred War, and further protected the western and northern borders of Phokis. Command of Doris also put Onomarchos in control of an excellent all-weather route between the Malian and Corinthian Gulfs. This route, which Philip would take in 338 in his attack on Amphissa, entered Doris well north and west of Thermopylai. Onomarchos had closed still another invasion route. Moreover, the Phokians now commanded nearly all of the Kephisos valley, and could politically depend upon the Dorian vote in the Amphiktyonic Council.³⁸

The southern part of the Kephisos valley was Onomarchos' next target, and he must have been encouraged by the lack of any Theban response to his operations in East Lokris and Doris. He invaded northwestern Boiotia, striking first at Orchomenos, doubtless by way of Hyampolis. Although the site of Orchomenos is geographically strong, the Thebans had earlier rendered the city powerless. In 364 the Thebans had unjustly punished the Orchomenians for complicity in a conspiracy to overthrow the Boiotian Confederacy. They occupied Orchomenos, to which they did so much damage that it had to be rebuilt in 335, after Alexander the Great had suppressed a Theban rebellion. Not all of the inhabitants were sold into slavery, but the remnants were probably forced to live in villages

³⁷ Diod. 16.33.3: εἰς δὲ τὴν πολέμιαν ἐμβαλὼν Θρόνιον μὲν ἐκπολιορκήσας ἐξηνδραποδίαστο. Diodoros' terminology supports a siege: cf. also 16.33.4 (Chaironeia) and in general J.I. McDougall, *Lexicon in Diodorum Siculum*, (Hildesheim 1983) s.v. ἐκπολιορκεῖν: to force to capitulate; *LSJ*⁹, s.v. ἐκπολιορκέω: to force a besieged town to surrender. There is no evidence to support Ferguson's view (*RE* 18 [1939] 498) that at this point Onomarchos advanced beyond Thronion; cf. pp. 92–95 below.

³⁸ Diod. 16.33.4; Strabo 9.4.11; cf. also Philippon, "Doris", *RE* 5 (1905) 1565. All-weather route: E.W. Kase and G.J. Szemler, *Klio* 64 (1982) 353–366. Amphiktyonic Council: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 34, 44 (Lokrians); *FdD* III.5. no. 5 line 11 (Dorians).

scattered across the countryside, much as did the Mantineians after the Spartan destruction of their city in 385. These people welcomed Onomarchos as a liberator. Thus, in 354 he easily captured a ruined and deserted city but hardly an empty prize, for it stood at the southern end of an easy and strategically important route through Abai and Hyampolis. In the process, Onomarchos denied the Thebans the use of this route to outflank the main road between Boiotia and Phokis, which ran from Chaironeia past the strongpoint of Parapotamioi into the Kephisos valley.³⁹

From Orchomenos, which he garrisoned, Onomarchos moved westwards onto Chaironeia, to which he laid siege. Chaironeia was the last major city in the area still in Boiotian hands, and its fall would give the Phokians control of the southern valley of the Kephisos and the entire northwestern basin of Lake Kopais. Besides securing the safety of the Phokian cities in the vicinity, victory at Chaironeia would be a serious blow to Thebes and the Boiotian Confederacy. While in the full tide of success, Onomarchos received the disturbing news that Philip had entered Thessaly. Chronology permits, if not demands, the association of events, and nothing else so satisfactorily explains subsequent developments. Upon receipt of the news, Onomarchos sent 7000 men under the *strategos* Phayllos to Thessaly, while he continued the siege. Though isolated, Chaironeia occupied a strong position, and the dispatch of Phayllos' detachment prompted the Boiotians to march to the relief of the city. Only thus can one explain how the Boiotian army, inferior in numbers, could confront the Phokians with any hope of success. Onomarchos' weakened army suffered defeat, surely nothing major but enough to compel the Phokians to break off the siege and return home. Philip's very appearance in Thessaly had relieved the pressure on Thebes. Despite this reversal, Onomarchos had enjoyed a successful campaigning-season. He had greatly enhanced the security of Phokis, while throwing the Thebans onto the defensive for the first time in the war.⁴⁰

Onomarchos' successful campaign of 354 taught the Thebans a stern lesson about the Sacred War, which was unlike anything to which they were accustomed. By ordinary standards they had every reason to conclude

³⁹ Capture of Orchomenos: Diod. 16.33.4. Orchomenos during the Theban hegemony: Diod. 15.57.1, 79.3–6; Plut. *Comp. Pel. and Marc.* 1.3; Paus. 4.27.10; 9.15.3; cf. *WS* 90 (1977) 78 n. 8. Remnants of the Orchomenians: Aischin. 2.141. Mantinea: Xen. *Hell.* 5.2.7. Rebuilding of Orchomenos: Arr. *Anab.* 1.9.10; Bosworth, *A Historical Commentary on Arrian's History of Alexander*, I.91; Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification*, 135–136, 440 n. 9.

⁴⁰ Diod. 16.33.4. The Phokian garrison at Orchomenos is inferred from Dem. ¹⁵4. For an excellent study of Chaironeia, cf. J.M. Fossey and G. Gauvin in J.M. Fossey and H. Giroux, *Proceedings of the Third International Conference on Boiotian Antiquities* (Amsterdam 1985) 41–76, with earlier bibliography.

that a victory of the magnitude of Neon would force the defeated either to capitulation or to quiescence. No polis could easily afford heavy casualties or long-standing maintenance of huge mercenary armies. These factors lay in large part behind the dispatch of Pammenes to Asia. In 355 the Thebans did not realize that the war would continue unabated and that their troops would still be needed at home. Use of Delphic treasures enabled the Phokians to replace mercenary forces at will. In 354 Onomarchos' victories taught the Thebans that the ability to win the big battles was insufficient to win this war. Nor could the Thebans strike at the heart of Phokian strength, simply because Delphoi was now beyond their reach. In order to win the Sacred War the Thebans must so harry the Phokian cities of the Kephisos valley and so ravage their land that the Phokians themselves would relinquish control of Delphoi. Otherwise, the Thebans must defeat every fresh mercenary army until the coffers of Apollo were empty.

CHAPTER FOUR

ONOMARCHOS, PHILIP, AND THESSALY (354–353 BC)

A) *Crisis in Thessaly (354 BC)*

Onomarchos' decision to support Lykophron and Peitholaos of Pherai against the Thessalian Confederacy (cf. p. 48 above) worked all too well in 354, when the tyrants themselves went over to the offensive and thus created the conditions that enabled Philip to intervene in Thessaly and to become more generally involved in Greek affairs. Although the strength of the tyrants' army cannot be determined, it sufficed to intimidate the rest of Thessaly, which had the year before sent 6000 troops to the Amphiktyonic army. Certainly, the new Pheraian army posed the greatest danger to the Thessalian Confederacy since the days of Alexander of Pherai. The Thebans being unable to lend help, the Aleuadai of Larisa responded to the danger by asking Philip to intervene on their behalf, which he did willingly. Thus, Onomarchos' own diplomacy raised a threat to his overall plans, one soon destined to destroy Onomarchos himself and later to overwhelm the Phokians. Yet Philip's intervention was only partly connected with the Sacred War. Thessaly had a long history of unrest, intensified at least in the fourth century by the ambitions of successive Pheraian tyrants. Their dogged, though largely ineffectual, opponents were the Aleuadai, who also enjoyed traditional ties of friendship with the Macedonian monarchy, to which they often turned for help against their domestic rivals. For their part, Macedonian kings frequently fished in these troubled waters both to extend their influence southwards and to secure their own border. Hence, the situation created by Onomarchos gave Philip the opportunity to pursue a favorite Macedonian policy.

Philip's aspirations in Thessaly and the whole topic of Macedonian-Thessalian relations are so important to the outcome of the Sacred War that a review of them elucidates the motives behind Philip's intervention. Political alliance and friendship between Macedonian kings and the Aleuadai can be traced back at least to the early fifth century BC. During Xerxes' invasion of Greece, King Alexander of Macedonia and the Aleuadai, caught between the Persians and the Greeks, played and won a duplicitous game with both. Later in the fifth century King Perdikkas made it his policy always to be on good terms with the leading men of Thessaly, one of whom was Nikonidas of Larisa. Perhaps the acme of Macedonian influence in Thessaly—at least in the period before Philip—

came with King Archelaos, to whom the Aleuadae handed over Larisa. His control over the city was such that some Larisaians feared that they would become his slaves. After Archelaos' Macedonian fortunes waned. Amyntas, the father of Philip, held his throne against the Illyrians only with the help of the Thessalians, after which he stood in the shadow of Jason of Pherai. Upon Jason's death, the pendulum swung again in favor of Macedonia; and as recently as 369 the Aleuadae had appealed to Amyntas' successor to protect them from Alexander of Pherai.¹

Even this cursory sketch indicates the intertwined destinies of Macedonia and Thessaly, the strength or weakness of the one providing opportunities or dangers to the other. Moreover, the might of a unified Thessaly, which was considerable, was well known. When undistracted by internal discord, Thessaly could field an army of 6000 first-rate cavalrymen and 10,000 hoplites.² At worst it was to Macedonia's advantage to be on the side of such a force, at best to control it. Philip realized the importance of Thessaly at the very outset of his reign. He appreciated the potential threat of a strong Pherai, and valued the friendship of the Aleuadae. There is good reason to conclude that Philip first intervened in Thessaly in 358, although little is known of the event or the specific reasons behind it.

Four pieces of evidence, none without its own peculiar difficulties, have been adduced for this early episode in Philip's career: (1) the testimony of Diodoros (16.14.1–2) that in 357/6 Philip entered Thessaly and defeated the tyrants of Pherai; (2) Justin's (7.6.6–9) abbreviated account of Philip's career in which he states that having defeated the Illyrians Philip captured Larisa and seized Thessaly; (3) Satyros' list of Philip's wives (*apud* Athen. 13.557b–d); and (4) fragments of the first book of Theopompus' *Philippika* (FF34, 35, 48), which refer to Philip's activity in Thessaly. Most historians agree that the compressed accounts of Diodoros and Justin are proleptic—namely that they refer to Philip's later success in Thessaly after his victory at the battle of the Crocus Plain.³ Indeed, either Philip's conquest of Thessaly or his overthrow of the Pheraean tyrants at this point makes nonsense of what is actually known of the events of the years 354–352. Neither Diodoros nor Justin should be taken as credible evidence for Philip's earliest Thessalian adventures.

¹ Diod. 16.33.3, 34.2, 35.1. Macedonian-Thessalian relations: Hdt. 7.172–173; Damastes, *FGH* 5 F4; Thuc. 4.78.2, 132.2; Ps.-Herodes *Pol.* 16–18; Thrasymachos fr. 2 (Diels); Plato *Meno* 70B; Arist. *Pol.* 5.10.12; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.11; Isok. 5.20; Diod. 11.2.6–3.2; 14.92.3; 15.19.2, 61.3–5. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 52–53; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 148–151; N. Robertson, *JHS* 96 (1976) 119; Buckler, *TH*, 112–119.

² Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.8; Diod. 16.30.4.

³ Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 349; C. Ehrhardt, *CQ* 17 (1967) 296; Griffith, *CQ* 20 (1970) 68–69; *HM*, II.224–230; T.R. Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 188–201; *HSCP* 86 (1982) 72–73.

Satyros' list, which has received a great deal of attention, has been variously interpreted. The fragment, as found in Athenaios, reads in translation:

Philip of Macedon did not, like Dareios (the one overthrown by Alexander, who, though fighting for the survival of his whole empire, took three hundred and sixty concubines around with him, as Dikaiarchos recounts in the third book of the *History of Greece*), take women along to war; Philip rather on each occasion used to contract marriages to do with (? according to) (the) war (currently in hand). At any rate, "in the twenty-two years he was king", as Satyros says in his biography of him, "he married Audata the Illyrian and had from her a daughter Kynna. And then he married Phila, a sister of Derdas and Machatas. Then, as he wanted to appropriate the Thessalian people as well, on grounds of kinship, he fathered children by two Thessalian women, one of whom was Nikesipolis of Pherai, who bore him Thessalonike, and the other, Philinna of Larisa, by whom he fathered Arrhidaios. Then he acquired the kingdom of the Molossians as well, by marrying Olympias. From her he had Alexander and Kleopatra. And then, when he conquered Thrace, Kothelas, the king of the Thracians, came over to him bringing his daughter Meda and many gifts. Having married her too, he brought her into his household besides Olympias. Then, in addition to all these, he married Kleopatra, the sister of Hippostratos and niece of Attalos, having fallen in love with her. And when he brought her into his household beside Olympias, he threw his whole life into confusion. For immediately, during the actual wedding celebrations, Attalos said, "Now surely there will be born for us true-bred kings and not bastards". Now Alexander, when he heard this, threw his cup, which he was holding in his hands, at Attalos; thereupon he too threw his goblet at Alexander. After this Olympias fled to the Molossians and Alexander to the Illyrians. And Kleopatra bore Philip the daughter named Europa.⁴

Scholarly debate has chiefly centered around the question of whether the list is in chronological order, with most historians claiming that one or another of Philip's wives is out of place.⁵ The relative absence of external evidence, combined with the scant information about the first years of Philip's career, make it impossible either to prove or disprove Satyros' chronology of Philip's earliest marriages. One must either accept or reject it as it stands. Though hardly conclusive, A. Tronson has at least demonstrated that the list is a conventional aspect of ancient biography, which argues for its chronological accuracy. Tronson has also explained how Athenaios used Satyros' testimony to support his own thesis that Philip's marriages involved the war that he was then fighting.

⁴ Athen. 13.557b–d; text and translation by A. Tronson, *JHS* 104 (1984) 119–120.

⁵ Beloch, *GG* III².2.68–72; Ehrhardt, *CQ* 17 (1967) 297; Griffith, *CQ* 20 (1970) 70; J.R. Ellis in H.J. Dell ed., *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honor of Charles D. Edson* (Thessaloniki 1981) 111–112; Martin, *HSCP* 86 (1982) 67–69. Tronson, *JHS* 104 (1984) 116–126, is unique in defending the accuracy of the list.

As evidence for Philip's involvement in Thessaly as early as 358, Nikesipolis of Pherai and Philinna of Larisa, the mother of Arrhidaios, are the important wives. One chronological clue comes from the fact that Arrhidaios was of marriageable age in 337, another from the date of 358 or 357 for Philip's marriage to Olympias.⁶ Although C. Ehrhardt has argued that Arrhidaios could have been 15 years old in 337, thus giving a possible date of 352 for the marriage to Philinna, G.T. Griffith has demonstrated that marriage at so young an age would have been very unusual among the Greeks and Macedonians.⁷ Significantly, Philinna's name is not associated with any victory, or even a war, thus providing neither Satyros nor Athenaios with any obvious reason to manipulate her position in the list. The admittedly limited corroborating evidence suggests that Philinna is correctly placed. Ehrhardt also argued that Philip's marriage to Nikesipolis, whose daughter was named Thessalonike, should be placed in 352, after Philip's victory at the Crocus Plain. T.R. Martin has countered by pointing out that the birth of Thessalonike could have occurred some years after Philip's marriage to Nikesipolis or that the girl could have been named after an earlier, and now unknown, victory in Thessaly.⁸ In all of these arguments there is more speculation than evidence. Perhaps the most that one can say is that Satyros had no demonstrable reason to put Philip's marriages to the two Thessalians out of chronological order and some literary reason to get the order right. The marriage of the Thessalians before Olympias and the age of Arrhidaios lends some support to Satyros' accuracy in the case of Philinna.

The fourth piece of evidence, the fragment (F34) from Theopompos' *Philippika*, provides the only secure basis for Philip's early activity in the south. Nevertheless, the passage is marred by a corrupt phrase. As F. Jacoby prints it, the fragment reads Χάλκη . . . ἔστι καὶ ἄλλη Χάλκη Λαρισσαίας πόλις. λέγεται καὶ πληθυντικῶς Χάλκαι· Θεόπομπος ἃ Φιλίππικῶν ** καὶ γ (F48) "ἔτι συνεπολέμησεν ὠρμημένος ἐκ Χαλκῶν τῆς Λαρισσαίας". Martin reasonably emends Jacoby's καὶ γ ἔτι to καὶ γ ἔται, which yields the following meaning of the last line: "And in the third year (of his reign), he (Philip) began to make war with them (the Larisaians and their allies), having set out from Larisan Chalkai".⁹ Elsewhere in Book 1 of the *Philippika* Theopompos again deals with Philip in Thessaly. In F35 he mentions the Thessalian Kineas, who substantially aided

⁶ Plut. *Alex.* 3.5; 10.1; Hamilton, *Plutarch, Alexander*, 7.4. Although Ellis, *Philip*, 61, places Philip's marriage to Olympias in 357, Wirth, *Philipp II.*, argues for 358.

⁷ CQ 17 (1967) 297; 20 (1970) 70.

⁸ Cf. n. 5 above.

⁹ Cf. Martin, *HSCP* 86 (1982) 56, who also points out that a double reference to Theopompos in a single entry is unique in Stephanos, who records the information. Martin also draws attention to the anomalous wording of F48. Cf. also Badian, *Pulpuveva* 4 (1983) 53.

Philip's ambitions. In the light of the emended F34, there is no reason to think this fragment proleptic, and Jacoby has warned against emending the book number cited there.¹⁰ Theopompos thus indicates that in 358/7 Philip campaigned on the side of the Larisaiaans, most probably against Pherai. One cannot tell whether the specific enemy was Alexander or his successors, nor is the question important for the Sacred War. Theopompos' testimony also lends support to Satyros' information about Philip's early marriages to Nikesipolis and Philinna.¹¹

Despite the lack of detail, several significant things are evident from this episode. The early years of Philip's reign were beset by dangers from almost every side, yet the young king lost no time in renewing Macedonian ties with the Aleuadae, whom he supported in battle and one of whose women he married. While learning of Thessalian politics and society at first hand, he made himself known as an energetic ally. In the process, he demonstrated his friendship with the Thessalian Confederacy, of which Larisa was a leading member. If his later conduct is any indication, he proved personally agreeable to the Thessalians, a man happy to spend his time drinking and dancing with them. He evidently avoided the excesses of his brother Alexander II, whose ambitions in 369 had threatened both Pherai and the confederacy. Indeed, Philip devised a broad Thessalian policy in which amity with Larisa, sealed by his marriage to Philinna, was balanced by an understanding with the tyrants of Pherai, the link there being his marriage to Nikesipolis, the niece of Jason of Pherai. Yet it is impossible to say whether Philip's first Thessalian campaign ended in military victory over Pherai, which is doubtful, or whether his presence led to a diplomatic settlement, which is far more probable. Whatever the outcome, Philip came away from Thessaly with a foot in each camp. Even so, Larisa, because of its strategic position, was far more important to him than Pherai. Situated south of the Vale of Tempe, Larisa commanded several routes running north-south between Macedonia and Thessaly. From Larisa additional routes branched out to other major cities. Thus, the seat of the Aleuadae opened the door to the plains of Thessaly. Above all, this episode shows that Philip had ambitions in this region right from the outset of his career.¹²

¹⁰ *FGrH* IID.361.

¹¹ Cf. Wirth, *Philipp II*, 32.

¹² Philip's conviviality: Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F162. Alexander II's excesses: Diod. 15.61.3–5; Buckler, *TH*, 112–114, 245–246. Understanding with Pherai: Steph. Byz. s.v. "Thessalonike". Importance of Jason's family in Thessalian politics: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.37. For discussions, inconclusive owing to lack of evidence, of whether or not Philip enjoyed success in Thessaly this early, cf. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 164–168; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 230–239; Griffith, *HM*, II.226–228; Martin (*op. cit.*, n. 9 above). Strategic

In the light of traditional Macedonian-Larisaian relations and the young king's own policy, a Thessalian appeal to Philip in 354 was perfectly natural. The Thebans, hard pressed at home, could offer no help. Yet the Thessalian appeal poses a chronological problem in connection with Philip's activity in that it is not entirely clear where Philip was at the time of the plea. The siege of Methone, which lasted at least into the summer, occupied his attention in early 354. Yet Diodoros (16.35.1) states that Methone fell before Philip marched into Thessaly.¹³ Given the chronological problems of Diodoros and his habit of treating even contemporaneous events serially, one can reasonably suggest that the Thessalians found Philip still beleaguering Methone. This hypothesis has the merit of explaining the curious fate of the city. Already a veteran besieger, Philip had earlier reduced Pydna, Poteidaia, Krenides, Galepsos, and Apollonia, and there was no reason to doubt that Methone would share their fate. Moreover, Methone gave Philip a personal grievance, when a defender blinded his right eye with an arrow.¹⁴ Now given an excellent reason for revenge, he continued the siege with his usual patience and tenacity while his wound healed.¹⁵ Yet he suddenly came to terms with Methone, and spared its inhabitants. The simplest explanation for his behavior is the arrival of the Thessalian embassy. The Aleuadai gave him an opportunity that he could scarcely ignore. Far stronger than he had been in 358/7, he now far better able to make permanent gains in Thessaly. Furthermore, he had nothing elsewhere to distract him. He had secured his borders, and had strengthened his position in western Thrace. With Methone out of the way, he was at liberty to expand southwards. Thus, to pursue this aim he ended the siege of Methone as quickly as possible by granting the defenders terms.

There is no need to speculate about Philip's reasons for responding to the Aleuadai's appeal. Thessaly was rich in land, produce, cities, and

importance of Larisa: A. Philippson, *Thessalien und Epirus* (Berlin 1897) 118; F. Stählin, *Die hellenische Thessalien* (Stuttgart 1924) 94–100; Robertson, *JHS* 96 (1976) 119–120; W.K. Pritchett, *Studies in Greek Topography*, III (Berkeley 1980) 353–365.

¹³ 16.35.1: Μετὰ δὲ ταῦθ' [the fall of Methone] ὁ Φίλιππος ὑπὸ Θετταλῶν μετακληθεὶς ἦκεν εἰς Θετταλίαν μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως. Although McDougall, *Lexicon in Diodorum*, s.v. μετακληθεῖν, renders the verb "to call back", it can also mean "to call away to another place": Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 188–191; cf. also pp. 178–179 below.

¹⁴ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F52; Douris, *FGrH* 76 F36; Marsyas, *FGrH* 135–136 F16; Dem. 18.67; Strabo 7 fr. 22; Diod. 16.34.5; cf. 16.31.6. According to the spurious fragment of Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F57, the archer, whose name was Aster, added insult to injury. Some idea of the magnitude of such a wound can be had from the controversial reconstruction of the skull found at Vergina, which some consider to be Philip's: A.J.N.W. Prag et al., *JHS* 104 (1984) 60–78.

¹⁵ Griffith, *HM*, II.258, however, suggests a temporary lack of will, which contradicts the testimony of Dem. 18.67 and Justin 7.6.14–16.

men. Thessalian cavalry was the best in Greece, and the mountainous country surrounding Thessaly supplied numerous peltasts. Success in Thessaly would provide Philip with a whole new army and additional revenues. Nor could he wisely stand idly by only to watch the tyrants of Pherai overwhelm the Thessalian Confederacy. Jason of Pherai had given the Greek world a glimpse of a united Thessaly's potential might, and no Macedonian king could afford to forget the lesson. On the other hand, the struggle between Pherai and its neighbors offered Philip rich possibilities. The chronic political instability of the area and the support of the Thessalian Confederacy guaranteed that he would face no united opposition to his ambitions. The Thessalians were giving Philip the same opportunity to become ascendant there that they had given Pelopidas and the Thebans in 369. Unlike the Thebans, Philip could pursue his goals untrammelled by a hesitant democracy. Nor were the possibilities lost upon Philip. As a direct result of Pelopidas' venture, Philip had gone to Thebes as a hostage, there to watch Pelopidas' northern policy falter, a failure that surely provided him with ample food for thought about the dangers of involvement in Thessaly and about the profits to be won there.¹⁶

Ascendancy in Thessaly would not only extend Macedonian power dramatically, but the region would also serve as a buffer between Macedonia and Greece proper. This geographical factor was of special importance to Philip in connection with his war with Athens, simply because with Thessaly in his hands his strategical position would be greatly enhanced. Once north of Skiathos, the Athenian fleet would face a hostile coastline all the way to Olynthos. Philip would thereby put himself farther out of reach of his enemies. Lastly, Thessaly would place him on the doorstep of central and southern Greece, enabling him to intervene even farther southwards, should the occasion arise. If so, his friendship with the Thessalians might well stimulate other friendships. The Thessalians and Boiotians had already fought together against Phokis, thus making Thebes a natural potential ally, all the more so given Philip's amicable, but unofficial, ties with Thebes. In 354, then, Philip had much more to gain in Thessaly than he had had in 358/7, with greater resources for the effort and far less to lose.

So, sometime in high or late summer 354 Philip led his army, this time with a siege train, back to Thessaly. In all likelihood he intended to reduce Pherai, thereby snuffing out all serious opposition to him. His target commanded a strong position. The akropolis of Pherai rises steeply from the

¹⁶ Thessaly: Hdt. 7.196; Isok. 15.298; Xen. *Hell.* 6.1.4–12; Strabo 9.5.17–23. Bursian, *Geographie*, I.40–86; Lolling, *Geographie*, 145–155; Philippson, *Thessalien und Epirus*, 29–91; Jason: Stählin, *RE* 9 (1914) 771–777.

surrounding plain, while the town itself spread below to a lower hill and into the plain. Although few remains of ancient Pherai can now be seen, the akropolis and lower town were walled in antiquity. Some eight miles separated the city from its harbor at Pagasai, itself possessing a strong, fortified akropolis. Philip probably joined forces with the Thessalians at Larisa, which was a convenient rendezvous. They then challenged Lykophron and Peitholaos.¹⁷

The course of Philip's operations cannot certainly be reconstructed. From Diodoros' statement (16.31.6) that Pagasai fell after Methone, some historians have suggested that Philip struck first at the harbor, but there is little to recommend this view. Since later this same summer he was driven out of Thessaly, it is difficult to explain how he could have continued to hold Pagasai when he possessed no substantial fleet with which to supply an isolated garrison. Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that Philip would have laid siege to Pagasai at this time, especially after the wearying investment of Methone, and he knew better than most how secure the port was. The akropolis of Pagasai was encircled by stout walls, stretches of which can still be traced today. The walls crown the top of a ridge, divided by a saddle into two hills, that projects into the modern Bay of Volos. Though by no means lofty, the hills forming the akropolis are in some places steep and always somewhat difficult of access. Moreover, walled harbors were comparatively safe from an army in control of the countryside. Indeed, in classical history there are comparatively few examples of successful land attack, unaided by naval forces, against fortified harbors. A siege of Pagasai promised to be long and fruitless, the besieging army itself vulnerable to quick counter-attack from nearby Pherai. It made much better sense to attack Pherai at the outset of the campaign and thus isolate Pagasai.¹⁸

A direct attack on Lykophron and Peitholaos makes the best sense of what little is known of the early stages of Philip's campaign. Diodoros

¹⁷ Diod. 16.35.1. Topography: Polybios 18.20.1; Livy 42.56.9–10; Strabo 9.5.15; F. Stählin, *Das hellenische Thessalien* (Stuttgart 1924) 106; Kirsten, "Pherai", *RE* Sup. 7 (1940) 984–1026; personal observations of 29 May 1983. Larisa as a meeting-place: Theopompos, *FGH* 115 F34; Polyainos 4.2.11.

¹⁸ Topography of Pagasai: Stählin, *Thessalien*, 66–67; personal observations of 23 May 1983. Greek harbors and sieges: J. Buckler in Dept. of History, U.S. Naval Academy ed., *New Aspects of Naval History* (Baltimore 1985) 13–25; cf. also Griffith, *HM*, II.273 n. 1. Although Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².509 n. 2; Ehrhardt, *CQ* 17 (1967) 299–300, and Griffith, *HM*, II.224, conclude that Philip took Pherai before Pagasai, most others reverse the sequence: Cloché, *Étude chronologique sur la troisième guerre sacrée*, 74–75; *Études classiques* 8 (1939) 191–192, in the latter of which he suggests that Philip captured Pagasai in his first campaign only to lose it after his defeat by Onomarchos. Cf. also Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 65–67; M. Tonev, *Studia philologica Serdicensis* 1 (1939) 169 n. 4; Ellis, *Philip*, 82; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 61; Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 194–195.

(16.35.1) states that Philip waged war against Lykophron, who subsequently summoned help from his Phokian allies. Obviously, the Pheraian tyrants were no match for the combined forces of Philip and the Thessalian Confederacy. In the face of this threat, Lykophron and Peitholaos probably repeated the conduct of Alexander of Pherai, when he was confronted with an identical situation.¹⁹ In 369 Alexander was caught unawares by the intervention of Philip's elder brother, King Alexander II, who had also combined forces with those opposing Pherai. Despite the tyrant's considerable strength, he fled homewards, thinking it preferable to withstand siege than to risk a pitched battle. There is some meager evidence to suggest that in 354 Lykophron and Peitholaos did the same. Polyainos (4.2.20) records an anecdote about Philip investing an unknown city named Karas, which is described as a "strong place" (ἐχυρὸν χωρίον). When forced to lift the siege, Philip ordered his engineers to dismantle the siege machines in such a way as to deceive the defenders into thinking that new ones were being built.

The name Karas appears nowhere else in classical literature, not even in the voluminous writings of Pliny the Elder or Stephanos of Byzantion, which prompted editors to make the easy emendation of the name to Pherai. Griffith has objected to this emendation on the grounds that the phrase ἐχυρὸν χωρίον seems better suited to "some barbarian stronghold than to a famous Greek city".²⁰ Yet *chorion* often denotes a polis, and a "strong place" accurately describes the geographical position of Pherai. One argument against the place being a barbarian stronghold is the very point of the anecdote. The defenders were familiar enough with Greek siegecraft to identify the sounds of machines being constructed, an unlikely feat for barbarians who would probably have been seeing artillery for the first time. Siege machines were a new feature of Greek warfare, but one very likely to be familiar to the Pheraians, who had undergone sieges before. Furthermore, the approach of the Phokian relief-force explains why Philip had to break off operations so hastily. He chose to meet this

¹⁹ Alexander of Pherai: Diod. 15.61.4–5; Buckler, *TH*, 112–113. Although Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 195, suggests that Lykophron held Pherai while Peitholaos commanded forces in Pagasai, there is no more reason to believe so than in the earlier case of the joint tyranny of Polydoros and Polyphron, both of whom held Pherai: Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.31–35; Diod. 15.60.5–61.2; Plut. *Pel.* 26.1.

²⁰ *HM*, II.268–269, who nonetheless suggests that the siege, if involving Pherai, must be dated to this campaign. J. Melber, *Jahrbücher für classische Philologie*, Sup. 14 (1885) 604, also rejects Wölflin's emendation of Κάρας to Φεράς; cf. also his Teubner text of Polyainos *ad loc.* On the basis of Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F226, who writes of a Thracian Καρὸς κῆποι, Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².518 n. 2, attributes the incident to Philip's Thracian campaign. Yet Ps.-Dem. 10.61, places an attack on Pherai apparently before the siege of Olynthos.

new threat in the field, for which he must abandon the siege of Pherai.

Philip's arrival in Thessaly caused major concern to Onomarchos, then probably besieging Chaironeia, for he immediately realized the danger to Phokis of a Thessaly united under someone as talented and powerful as Philip. His dispatch of his brother Phayllos with 7000 men northwards clearly indicates that the stakes in Thessaly were far too great for him to ignore, and his own subsequent defeat at Chaironeia demonstrated that he could not successfully operate simultaneously on two fronts. Meanwhile, Phayllos and his detachment entered Thessaly, only to be repulsed by Philip before they could join forces with Lykophron and Peitholaos. Now forced to make his major effort in one theater or the other, Onomarchos decided to intervene personally in full force against Philip and the Thessalians for the same reasons that he had originally sent Phayllos. In late summer 354 he entered Thessaly, the presence of siege machinery in his army proving that he intended to reduce Thessalian cities, if necessary, after victory in the field. In short, he planned nothing less than the complete domination of Thessaly. It was a bold and sensible decision. Strategically, victory in Thessaly would relieve Onomarchos of a major anxiety, dramatically enhance Phokian military might and financial resources, and leave the Boiotians to pursue the war alone. Moreover, military success in Thessaly promised him decisive political results. Control of Thessaly meant control of its votes in the Amphiktyonic Council, which when added to those of Lokris and Doris, then under Phokian control, and those of allied Athens and Sparta, would give him a majority in the Council. The Phokians could then legally end the Sacred War by having the Amphiktyons endorse Philomelos' repudiation of the original indictment and fines. Lastly, given the age-old enmity between Phokis and Thessaly, it must have appealed to Onomarchos' pride to imagine himself as the conqueror of the traditional foe.²¹

Onomarchos' force, including the remnants of Phayllos' detachment, probably numbered some 20,000 infantry and 500 cavalry, or approximately the same strength that he would lead back to Thessaly in 353. Whatever its precise numbers, the Phokian army was larger than Philip's. Like Phayllos, Onomarchos easily and quickly entered Thessaly, and came to grips with Philip. This campaign, which pitted Onomarchos' mercenaries against Philip's veterans, excites the interest of the military historian, but unfortunately its course is largely unknown. Onomarchos

²¹ Diod. 16.33.4, 35.1. Onomarchos' intentions: Diod. 16.35.2–4; his siege machinery: Polyainos 2.38.2; cf. also E.W. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery: Historical Development* (Oxford 1969) 59; cf. also Beloch, *GG* III².1.253–254; Ferguson, *RE* 18 (1939) 499–500; H.E. Stier, *RE* 19 (1938) 1902; Griffith, *HM*, II.269.

defeated Philip in two battles, the second a major victory. Although neither the name nor the location of the second battlefield is known, enough details survive to give some picture of the action. In the course of his maneuvering, Onomarchos feigned a defensive posture to lure a Macedonian attack. For the battlefield he chose terrain on which he had a crescent-shaped mountain in his rear, upon the heights on either side of which he had placed stone-throwing artillery and ample ammunition. He and his line of mercenaries took their position in the plain below. The Macedonians began the action by unleashing their missiles from afar, whereupon the Phokians retreated up the slopes of the mountain, Onomarchos all the while drawing the Macedonians into the range of his artillery. Then he opened fire on the enemy with devastating effect. As Macedonian casualties mounted, he gave the order for his line to turn about and charge. Still under the punishing artillery fire, the Macedonian phalanx retreated in the face of the Phokian attack. Only with great difficulty and heavy losses did Philip extract his army from its peril. The defeat stunned the Macedonians, who had long been accustomed to victory. Their confidence in Philip was shaken, and some deserted. Philip had been out-generalled and out-fought. Nonetheless, he rallied the majority, thereby preventing the defeat from becoming a rout. Even so, Onomarchos had temporarily taken the fight out of the Macedonians, and Philip was fortunate to lead the survivors safely home. Characteristically, however, Philip himself was unshaken. During the retreat, Philip is rumored to have remarked: "I did not flee, but just like the rams, I walked backwards in order to ram again the harder". If true, Philip declared that he would return.²²

It is impossible now to determine what specific use Onomarchos made of his victories. Griffith has advanced the attractive theory that the Phokians in 354 won Krannon, Pharkedon, Pelinna, and Triikka, gains that Philip later retrieved.²³ The evidence, however, is inconclusive; and, with the exception of Krannon, none of these places was large or particularly significant to the Thessalian Confederacy, Onomarchos' primary target. The adherence of Krannon to the Phokian cause depends upon the restoration of the name in a Delphic inscription in which at least one other restoration is also possible.²⁴ The case of Pharkedon is likewise weak. Although Polyainos (4.2.18) states that Pharkedon fell to Philip, he gives neither the date nor the circumstances of the event. Perhaps the example of Pelinna best illustrates the difficulty of interpreting the evidence. In a

²² Diod. 16.35.1–2; Polyainos 2.38.2. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 59, 164–168; Griffith, *HM*, II.269–270.

²³ *HM*, II.270–272.

²⁴ *FdD* III.5. no. 5 line 11. Although the editor restores Κρα[νώνιοι], he admits that Κρά[νιοι] is also a possibility.

general description of how Philip brought Thessaly under his sway, Polyainos (4.2.19) reports that Pelinna was at war with Pharsalos, Pherai with Larisa, and other Thessalian cities with one another.²⁵ According to Polyainos, Philip intervened in these hostilities only when invited; and by championing the weak against the strong while encouraging *stasis*, he mastered all of Thessaly. This anecdote, general in nature, depicts only the normal state of Thessalian politics and Philip's methods of turning it to his advantage. Polyainos' portrayal of widespread disorder in Thessaly receives strong support from Isokrates, a contemporary of these events. In 355 Isokrates (8.118) observed that the Thessalians were always at war with one another; and in 346 he stated (5.20) that while some Thessalian cities voluntarily allied themselves with Philip, others opposed him only to be razed. Their testimony stands as proof against those who envisage the Thessalian Confederacy as monolithic. Moreover, both Polyainos and Isokrates are describing a process, not a single event. Certainly, nothing chronologically specific can be made of these reports. Polyainos' anecdote about Thessalian strife and Philip's reaction probably, but not demonstrably, dates to the period after the Crocus Plain, when the king systematically put Thessaly under his control. In short, it is impossible to prove that Onomarchos made any new Thessalian conquests in 354 that Philip needed later to regain. Yet Onomarchos' success was considerable. He had proved an able defender of those who had earlier taken his money, thereby heartening them in their resistance to Philip and the Thessalian Confederacy. If he had not made himself master of Thessaly, as he had hoped, he had at least overpowered the region for the moment. And in 354 he could boast, as no one else in history could, that he had twice defeated Philip of Macedonia.²⁶

B) *Decision in Thessaly (354/3 BC)*

The end of the campaigning-season was traditionally a time for diplomacy, and it is possible that the winter of 354/3 witnessed a major effort to end

²⁵ Westlake, *Thessaly*, 177–178, accepts the emendation Φαρκεδονίους, while Griffith, *ad loc.*, prefers Φαρσαλίους. Cf. also Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F82; Polyainos 2.34, gives evidence for other strife in Thessaly. Lastly, Westlake has confused matters. Although he claims that Melber emended the name to Φαρ[κεδον]ίους, Melber has instead printed Φαρσαλίους in his text (cf. 4.2.19, p. 164, line 17).

²⁶ Although Griffith, *HM*, II.270, places great store on the presence of siege machinery in Onomarchos' army as proof of the Phokian's desire to reduce Thessaly, a view that is almost certainly correct, he overlooks the limitations of early Greek artillery: cf. Marsden, *Greek and Roman Artillery*, 59–60. Onomarchos may have spent the rest of the campaigning-season vainly assaulting such major Thessalian cities as Larisa or Pharsalos. One need only to remember the difficulty that such a small place as Methone gave to Philip, adept at siege warfare, to appreciate the situation.

the Sacred War, prompted by Philip's intervention in Thessaly and Athens' lack of enthusiasm for the conflict. The evidence for this hypothesis comes from a small group of enigmatic Athenian inscriptions that are all fragmentary and roughly datable only by letter-style, not a very reliable method of chronology. Naturally, then, given the state of the evidence, one can only make a suggestion as to its significance. Only one thing can be stated certainly: Athens all the while maintained good relations with Delphoi.²⁷ It does not look as though Athens was trying to betray its Phokian allies. The first of two inscriptions, which are little more than tantalizing, prove that Athens sought better relations with the Aitolians, whose territory bordered on that of Phokis.²⁸ Since the days of the Theban Hegemony the Aitolians had been staunch Boiotian allies who had taken the field against Athenian forces. By improving relations with the Aitolians, the Athenians could at least hope to influence them to remain aloof from the Sacred War and to that extent limit the number of their enemies.

Although two more inscriptions concerning Thessaly illustrate the difficulty of interpreting these documents, they nevertheless also indicate a date. One is a mysterious treaty with the Thessalian Confederacy, subsequent to the earlier one between the two in 361/0.²⁹ The other (*IG* II² 186) involves equally mysterious dealings between the Athenians and prominent men from Pharsalos. Although precise details of what transpired are now beyond recovery, one cannot easily find a place for such transactions after the battle of the Crocus Plain, when Philip assumed full control of Thessalian politics. Conceivably, before the battle Athens tried either to wean Thessaly from Boiotia and Philip or sought to end the Sacred War through a diplomatic settlement. The next inscription (*IG* II² 178) allows, but does not demand, the latter interpretation. A maddeningly incomplete inscription records official dealings between Athens and the Boiotian Confederacy.³⁰ Absolutely no details of the proceedings between the two survive, and even the subject of the negotiations must remain unknown. Nonetheless, normal diplomatic protocol was observed, with the Boiotian ambassadors being invited to a state dinner at the Prytaneion. Judging by the existence of an inscription carved to record the results of public business, some mutually desirable goal was achieved, but the subsequent course of events proves that no resolution of the war was reached. Significant,

²⁷ *IG* II² 204.

²⁸ *IG* II² 164, 177.

²⁹ *IG* II² 175; cf. also *IG* II² 116; Bengtson, *S&A* II² 293.

³⁰ Although it is tempting to associate *IG* II² 190 with 178 and the others, that hypothesis must be rejected at the outset, because 190 probably dates to 365/4: W.S. Ferguson, *Klio* 14 (1914) 393 n. 5.

however, is the mere fact of peaceful contact, which perhaps reflects a tentative and ineffectual effort to negotiate an end of the Sacred War.

In Phokis meanwhile Onomarchos had the opportunity to assess his gains in 354 and to make his plans for 353. His achievements included the occupation of Orchomenos and the isolation of Chaironeia in Boiotia, the subjugation of Amphissa in West Lokris and of all Doris, and the possession of Thronion, which divided the East Lokrians. His victories in Thessaly augured well for future success there. His enemies were all on the defensive, and he could dictate the course of the next campaigning-season. Remarkably enough, he decided to invade Boiotia again in the spring. This was a strategic mistake, and some attempt must be made to explain why Onomarchos did not first finish his work in Thessaly, where he refused either to follow up his victories over Philip or to consolidate his gains. If he genuinely wanted to master Thessaly, he had no better opportunity than that offered by 353. Perhaps the only possible explanation for his otherwise incomprehensible decision is the return of Pammenes' hoplites from Asia, who posed such a significant new threat to him that he postponed action in Thessaly to engage his primary foes. Certainly, the reappearance of these veteran and victorious soldiers, even without their gifted commander, greatly strengthened the position of the Boiotian Confederacy. They also enabled Thebes to pursue the Sacred War far more actively than had been possible in 354.³¹

In spring 353, then, Onomarchos led his army against the Boiotians. His target was Koroneia, a city strategically seated on a spur of Mt. Helikon that jutted northwards towards Lake Kopais. Koroneia lay astride the principal road between eastern and western Boiotia, and thus Phokian possession of it would seriously hinder Theban operations in the western basin of the lake (cf. p. 36 above). Onomarchos' route to Koroneia outflanked the main road, which was guarded by Lebadeia and the fortress of Metachoion. Like Kleombrotos on his march to Leuktra, Onomarchos struck direct across Mt. Helikon to his target. From Ambrossos to Stiris an easy road, climbing steadily but gently, leads to the foot of Mt. Helikon. The ascent of the mountain itself, a distance of some seven kilometers, can be made in three hours, after which the traveler finds opening before him the small valley of Kyriakion. From here an excellent way, never rising or falling uncomfortably, runs the length of the mountain. No more than two hours are needed to reach the Phalaros valley, from which a steep descent leads directly onto Koroneia.³²

³¹ Cf. p. 53 n. 35 above.

³² Route over Mt. Helikon: personal observations of 23 December 1970, 21 June 1971, and 8 August 1980; cf. also Burn, *BSA* 44 (1949) 313–323. Kleombrotos: Buckler,

Falling upon Koroneia unhindered, Onomarchos found the city divided against itself. Although some disaffected citizens betrayed the akropolis to him, others banded together to resist. Charon, liberator of the Kadmeia in 379/8 and veteran of the Theban Hegemony, was among the *boiotarchoi* who led federal forces, probably only the Theban contingent, to the relief of the city. Help came also from a band of mercenaries in the service of Boiotia, who garrisoned Metachoion, a fortress located perhaps on Mt. Laphystion, the modern Mt. Granitsa. The *boiotarchoi* and the mercenaries, who were apparently out-numbered by Onomarchos, joined forces with the loyal Koroneians at the Hermaion, a sanctuary within the city walls. Onomarchos led his army down to engage them; and when Charon fell at the outset of the battle, the mercenaries fled. The Koroneians then closed the gates, determined to die rather than abandon their city. Their valor proved unequal to the strength of Onomarchos, and they perished trying to repel the Phokians. Koroneia now securely in his hands, Onomarchos enjoyed an excellent opportunity to detach the entire western Kopaic basin from the Boiotian Confederacy.³³

Onomarchos' use of Mt. Helikon as an invasion-route opened a new stage in the war, one in which Phokian armies traversed the heights to strike quickly and easily deep into Boiotian territory. To this period dates also a Phokian fort on Mt. Helikon, one known today only as Palaiokastron. This large fort, crowning the top of a steep hill, towers above the modern village of Kyriakion. The summit of the hill is ringed by two lines of ashlar walls, the upper enclosing a citadel and the lower a more spacious and somewhat more level area. In the citadel are the remains of barracks for a garrison. Immediately below Palaiokastron to the west lies the plain of Stiris, the first major city in eastern Phokis. Since Palaiokastron and

TH, 57–59. Although R.M. Kallet-Marx in Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA*, 308, n. 33 suggests the possibility that Onomarchos attacked from the pass by Lebadeia, he misses the basic strategic reason for Phokian use of Mt. Helikon. The mountain route enabled the Phokians to enter Boiotia direct from their own territory swiftly and with small danger of detection. Onomarchos thereby turned the flank of all Boiotian strongpoints west of Koroneia, notably that of Metachoion and that of Tilphossaion, if the latter was then occupied (cf. p. 103 below).

³³ Arist. *Nik. Eth.* 3.8.9; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F94; Diod. 16.35.3. Metachoion and Mt. Laphystion: Fiehn, "Metachoion", *RE* 15 (1932) 1317; Pieske, "Koroneia", *RE* 11 (1922) 1425–1426; cf. also Bursian, *Geographie*, I.235. Beloch, *GG* III².1.254 n. 3, suggests that the Hermaion was near the agora, where there was an altar of Hermes Epimyllos, a view not accepted by A. Schachter, *The Cults of Boiotia*, II (London 1986) 40. Repeated visits to the site have failed to indicate a convincing candidate for the Hermaion, but Schachter's work shows that sanctuaries of Hermes in Boiotian cites were often found in the agora. Furthermore, nothing supports Kallet-Marx's contention (n. 32 above) that Charon and the Thebans had already assembled at Koroneia. For the speed with which the Thebans could respond to unexpected local attacks, cf. Thucydides' description (7.29–30) of the events at Mykalessos during the Peloponnesian War.

Stiris are easily visible to each other, a signal from the fort would have given the people of Stiris instant warning of any Boiotian invasion. Yet Palaiokastron's defensive function was not so important as the scope it allowed for offensive operations. Housing a sizeable garrison, it commanded an excellent track across Mt. Helikon from Stiris to Koroneia, Thisbe, and Chorsiai (cf. p. 39 above). Palaiokastron thus kept the mountain open to the Phokians, while barring the Thebans from descending onto Phokis. The existence of the fort and Phokian use of this route further complicated the Theban defense of Boiotia. Especially vulnerable now were the fertile plains of southwestern Boiotia, previously safely removed from the war. Thus, Onomarchos' victory at Koroneia and the construction of Palaiokastron enabled the Phokians to inflict even broader and more serious damage to the Boiotian Confederacy.³⁴

For Onomarchos the capture of Koroneia was the flood of his tide of victory. The ebb immediately began to flow, and it did so when Philip re-entered Thessaly in 353. Philip's promise to return had not been idle boasting. Over the winter Philip had confronted two major problems: the first being how to restore the morale of the Macedonian army, which had been so sorely tried by defeat, the second how to regain his standing in Thessaly. Of the two the first was the easier to solve. An army of disciplined veterans, especially one accustomed to victory, does not normally break at one serious defeat. History provides many examples, and in the spring of 353 the Macedonians proved ready enough to take the field, perhaps all the more so given the opportunity to avenge their losses. The second problem was somewhat harder to solve, but here Philip still enjoyed certain advantages. Onomarchos' victories further imperilled the Thessalians, who no matter how disappointed they were with Philip, had no other prospect of help. The danger posed by Onomarchos demanded close co-operation between the Thessalians and Philip, and subsequent events prove that they used the winter to plan operations for the coming campaigning-season. Such contact was virtually essential to deny complete victory to the Pheraian tyrants and their Phokian ally. Two matters were

³⁴ J. Buckler in J.M. Fossey and A. Schachter, *Teiresias* Sup. 2 (1979) 15–17; cf. also Lolling, *Geographie*, 131, and Bursian, *Geographie*, I.184–185, who identify these remains with the Phokian city of Phlygonion (Pliny *NH* 4.26; Paus. 10.3.2; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Phlygonion"). Schober, *Phokis*, 39–40, suggests with better reason that Phlygonion be placed somewhere south of Amphissa (cf. also Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis*, 54–56). Furthermore, the ruins of Palaiokastron are those of a fort, not of a city. The recent attempt of Fossey, 35–39, to posit two building phases on this site on the basis of suspected differences of masonry styles cannot be demonstrated, and Lawrence, *Greek Aims in Fortification*, 245, has warned against the danger of dating remains on this basis. As importantly, Fossey's suggestion ignores the evidence of the pottery remains, which date to only one period, but one that cannot predate the Sacred War.

settled. Philip would once again be supreme commander of the combined armies. Secondly, a mustering point was decided upon, probably in the vicinity of Larisa. Now committed in the south, Philip could not risk losing Thessaly. So either in late spring or early summer 353 Philip moves south to join his Thessalian allies. The combined force numbered more than 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry, the heart of which was the Macedonians, perhaps some 15,000 strong. Philip began his campaign against the tyrants of Pherai by laying siege to Pagasai, whereupon they immediately and predictably appealed to Onomarchos for help. This time Philip and his allies decided to cut Pherai off from outside support, and only after the fall of the harbor would they attack the seat of the tyrants.³⁵

Onomarchos took a serious view of these ominous developments. His decision to concentrate on Boiotia rather than Thessaly had proven to be a fatal blunder, but he responded to the renewed threat from Philip with alacrity. He immediately cut short his campaign in Boiotia, and alerted his Athenian allies of Philip's movements. Although the Athenians had done precious little to help Phokis in the Sacred War, Philip's Thessalian ambitions spurred them to action. The Athenians had repeatedly lost to Philip in the north, but Onomarchos now offered them their best hope of striking a successful blow against him. They dispatched Chares with a large fleet to Thessaly. Their choice of general was a poor one, for Chares was notoriously dilatory, the choice itself a commentary on the poverty of Athenian military leadership. The subsequent course of events is not entirely certain, but Onomarchos and Chares planned to rendezvous at Pagasai, not only to lift Philip's siege of the place, but also because it was the only port in the area capable of accommodating the Athenian fleet. Pagasai was therefore the most suitable spot for Phokian, Athenian, and Pheraian contingents to meet in order to defend Pherai. The siege of Pagasai was no great impediment to Chares' fleet, for Philip lacked the ships necessary to seal the harbor completely. Onomarchos himself advanced northwards by land.³⁶

The ensuing confrontation is usually known as the battle of the Crocus Plain, but in fact the location of the battlefield cannot be precisely identified. The conflict took place on a large plain that provided ample room

³⁵ Siege of Pagasai: Dem. 1.9, 12; 4.35; Diod. 16.31.6. Since Demosthenes states that the Athenians arrived too late to relieve Pagasai, and since Chares reached the area only while the battle of the Crocus Plain was being fought, it is far preferable to place the siege of Pagasai before the battle than afterwards (cf. also p. 65 n. 18 above).

³⁶ Diod. 16.35.4,6. The Syracusan campaign in the Peloponnesian War affords excellent examples of the ease with which a relieving fleet could enter an embattled harbor: Thuc. 7.42; cf. also Polybios 1.46.4–13, and in general Buckler in *New Aspects of Naval History*, 19–21.

in which some 40,000 men could operate and where thousands of cavalry maneuvered easily. The appearance of the Athenian fleet during the fighting indicates both that the battlefield bordered the sea and that the plain lay in the vicinity of Pagasai. These factors led K.J. Beloch, no doubt rightly, to suggest the Crocus Plain as the field of battle, but the plain is so large and lacking in features that the exact location of the action cannot now be determined, and therefore a detailed reconstruction of the battle is impossible. The plain, through which the Amphrysos river flowed, opens out just above Mt. Othrys, and extends as far north as Phthiotic Thebes and eastwards to the Bay of Pagasai. Onomarchos led 20,000 infantry but only some 500 horse to Thessaly, a notoriously difficult place in which to campaign without cavalry. Philip's superiority in this arm proved decisive. Upon Onomarchos' approach, Philip moved south of Pagasai to prevent his enemies from uniting. He ordered his men to crown themselves with laurel, as though they were the army of Apollo, who would be their leader. They would be fighting against the temple-robbers to avenge the god and hence enjoy his protection. This was a symbolic gesture of some importance, the first of several that form a consistent pattern in Philip's public actions.³⁷

Onomarchos, perhaps forced to action prematurely, engaged Philip and his Thessalian allies without waiting for Chares to arrive. The battle was the bloodiest land engagement in classical Greek history. Philip's Thessalian cavalry, the decisive element in the fighting, doubtless overwhelmed their Phokian counterparts and turned Onomarchos' flank. Pinned between the Thessalian horsemen and Philip's phalanx, Onomarchos' troops broke and ran to the coast, off which Chares' fleet appeared. The pursuit proved bloody, and many men died while trying to swim to the safety of the Athenian ships. Some 6000 Phokians and mercenaries fell in the struggle, Onomarchos among them, and another 3000 were taken prisoner. Philip had on a single day destroyed nearly half of Onomarchos' army, a stunning success by any standards. Pherai stood isolated, while Chares looked on impotently. Thessaly was Philip's.³⁸

³⁷ Beloch, *GG* III².1.477 n. 1, was the first to suggest the Crocus Plain as the site of the battle, and no one has subsequently improved upon his analysis. Cf. also Dem. 19.319; Diod. 16.35.4; Strabo 9.5.8, 14; Paus. 10.2.5; Steph. Byz. s.v. "Demetrios". Stählin, "Κρόκιον oder Κροκωτὸν πεδίον", *RE* 11 (1922) 1943; *Das hellenische Thessalien*, 170. Repeated personal investigations of the area have proved fruitless in determining the site of the battle. Yet cf. Burr, *NEON KATALOGOS*, pl. 36–37. The importance of laurel to Pythian Apollo: C. Sourvinou-Inwood, *CQ* n.s. 29 (1979) 234–235. Lastly, an anonymous reader has kindly pointed out that Pagasai enjoyed a cult of Apollo, which would perhaps have given additional meaning to Philip's gesture: cf. V. Milošević, *AAA* 7 (1974) 74.

³⁸ Diod. 16.35.5–6, 61.2; Dem. 4.35; 19.319. Since Onomarchos, whose position

There are several versions of Onomarchos' fate, a subject important for an understanding of Philip's designs. Diodoros, the earliest extant and best surviving source, indicates only that Onomarchos was killed during the pursuit to the sea. Reporting no sensational details, as he later does regarding the fate of other sacrilegious Phokian leaders (16.61–64), he states (16.35.5) that Philip hanged Onomarchos' body after the battle, and elsewhere (16.61.2) that the body was crucified. He saw in Onomarchos' death a sign of divine retribution, which is precisely what Philip intended the Greek world to think. Because of Onomarchos' sacrilege in plundering Delphoi, however, legend created ignominious and erroneous versions of his death. According to Pausanias (10.2.5), the Phokian commander was shot down by his own troops, who considered his inexperience and cowardice responsible for their plight. The only man ever to defeat Philip twice, Onomarchos was neither inexperienced nor cowardly, and the Phokian troops who fell on the Crocus Plain had earlier defeated their conqueror. Nothing here can substantiate Pausanias' claim. Even more dramatic is the scene depicted by Philon, who, like Diodoros, saw in the fate of the Phokian leaders an example of divine punishment.³⁹ In this version, Onomarchos' horse, which bolted towards the sea, carried him into the yawning deep. Like other Greek generals, Onomarchos had probably taken his position on foot in the phalanx. Written long after the fact and the entire passage demonstrably erroneous in detail, Philon's testimony must be discarded in favor of Diodoros' sober account. For Diodoros the public display of Onomarchos' corpse was retribution enough, for the temple-robber had been denied honorable burial. So, Philip's treatment of the corpse was not an act of savagery or arrogance. It was the visible sign that he was truly acting as the avenger of Apollo. Philip was presenting himself as a pious leader to the entire Greek world.

The fate of the 3000 prisoners is also of more than morbid interest. Diodoros states: "finally over 6000 of the Phokians and mercenaries were killed, among whom was the general himself; and no fewer than 3000 were captured. Philip hanged Onomarchos, and the others he threw into the sea as temple-robbers".⁴⁰ Although most historians have concluded that

would normally be on the right wing of his line, fled towards the sea, according to Diodoros and Pausanias (10.2.5), Griffith's suggestion (*HM* II.274) that the sea guarded one of his flanks is unlikely, an objection supported by Strabo's observation (9.5.14) that the Crocus Plain was situated in the interior. Obviously, however, the battle was fought quite near the coast.

³⁹ *Apud* Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.14.33; cf. also Justin 8.2.3, and for a general discussion of crucifixion, W. A. Oldfather, *TAPA* 39 (1909) 49–72.

⁴⁰ 16.35.6: τέλος δὲ τῶν Φωκῶν καὶ μισθοφόρων ἀνιρέθησαν μὲν ὑπὲρ τοὺς ἑξακισχίλιους, ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ στρατηγός, ἤλυσαν δὲ οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τρισχιλίων. ὁ δὲ Φίλιππος τὸν μὲν Ὀνόμαρχον ἐκρέμασε, τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὡς ἱεροσύλους κατεπόντισεν. Griffith, *HM*, II.276, admits that grammatically τοὺς δ' ἄλλους ὡς ἱεροσύλους should include both τοὺς

Philip in fact punished the captives with a watery death, Griffith has reasonably stressed the physical difficulties involved in drowning 3000 men.⁴¹ In his opinion, such a deed is no more than “lynch-law”, too terrible even for sacrilegious mercenaries. Nor can he find other examples of premeditated mass-drownings. Finally, he adds that Philip would not have drowned prisoners unless he believed the war to be over. Otherwise, the king would fear reprisals.

These are worthy arguments, though unsupported by any evidence, that merit attention. There is, however, ample reason to conclude that the prisoners met a watery fate. When Diodoros uses the verb καταποντίζω with animate objects, he invariably means “to throw into the sea in order to drown”.⁴² He never uses the verb in connection with the dead. With inanimate objects the verb always means “to sink”. Two cases are especially instructive. Diodoros (13.86.3) describes the Carthaginian Himilcar throwing a herd of cattle into the sea as a sacrifice to Poseidon, and (17.104.1) of Alexander the Great throwing golden cups into the sea after having made libations. In both instances, the deed was an offering to the gods, which is perfectly consistent with Philip’s self-proclaimed role as avenger of Apollo. Moreover, his victorious army of 20,000 was ample for the grisly job. Nor should one automatically assume that a mass-drowning of such mercenaries would shock the Greek world. Even the mild-tempered Isokrates (5.55) felt that Phokian mercenaries were better off dead than alive. Finally, the very fact that Philip intended to pursue the Sacred War, which the Thessalians urged him to do, was probably a factor in his decision. He had no intention of allowing these mercenaries to live to fight another day, as had the survivors of Philomelos’ army. Philip’s treatment of these prisoners may later have prompted Phalaikos to surrender Thermopylai to Philip in return for the safe conduct of himself and his mercenaries (Diod. 16.59.3). Dreadful indeed was the punishment, but it was entirely consistent with Philip’s role as Apollo’s champion and with his other acts of calculated terrorism.

ἐξακισχίλιους and οὐκ ἐλάττους τῶν τρισχιλίων. The harshness does not sound like an invention of the devout Diodoros, who abhorred cruelty, even towards the sacrilegious: 16.31.2.

⁴¹ Diod. 16.38.1. Griffith, *HM*, II.275–277, is probably right to state that no other such mass-drowning of this magnitude took place in Greek history, and he points to the difficulty of drowning 3000 men. Men whose hands are tied find it hard to swim. Furthermore, there was a religious element to Philip’s action, for Diodoros (16.25.2) reports that it was Greek custom to deny temple-robbers proper burial. Among those who accept the mass-drowning are Beloch, *GG* III².1.477; A. Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934) 105; Westlake, *Thessaly*, 176; Ellis, *Philip*, 83; Wirth, *Philipp II*. 49.

⁴² McDougall, *Lexicon in Diodorum Siculum*, s.v. καταποντίζειν, and especially 4.33.8, 10; 13.86.3; 14.112.1. Illustrative is 5.83.4, where Diodoros tells of the miraculous escape of Tennes, who was shut up in a chest and thrown into the sea.

Philip's decision to assume this religious role stemmed from complex motives. It pleased the Thessalians, who wanted not only to liberate Delphoi but also to regain their former pre-eminence there.⁴³ Yet intervention in central Greece would involve him in the Sacred War, thus constituting a departure from his earlier and traditional Macedonian policy. Since the Thessalians lacked the power to impose upon the king a policy uncongenial to him, the decision to assume the position of Apollo's defender, illustrated by his conduct at the Crocus Plain, must have been his own, a sign that he was no longer acting merely as the ally of the Thessalians. A second and personal motive was that Philip intended to use the Sacred War as his means of entering the mainstream of Greek affairs. He had previously confined himself to the north, with only the Athenians to confront him. To those in central and southern Greece he was a relatively unknown factor. The Sacred War provided him with some unique advantages. First and above all, it gave him the opportunity to present himself as a disinterested, pious, and essentially Greek leader—not a semi-civilized barbarian who only grappled with Illyrians, Thracians, and other such uncouth peoples. He could thereby project an image of himself conducive to winning the goodwill of the Greeks.⁴⁴ This devout stance was particularly valuable against his principal Greek enemy, the Athenians. He could to great advantage contrast his devotion to Apollo with Athens' support of the temple-robbers. Moreover, he could enter the Sacred War entirely on his own terms and in his own right. Not a member of the Amphiktyonic Council, he was not bound by their decisions and not necessarily tied to their war, except insofar as he himself desired. He had not been involved in the events that had precipitated the war, and could intervene after the wholesale plundering of the sanctuary. His motives appeared pure. At the same time, his ascendancy in Thessaly gave him an unofficial voice in the deliberations of the Amphiktyonic Council and the possibility of influencing decisions concerning the war. The avenger of Apollo could automatically expect the friendship and co-operation of Thebes and its allies, especially the Peloponnesian states of Argos, Messene, and the attenuated Arkadian League. All of this put him in an excellent position to turn Greek disunity to his own advantage, whenever he chose.

More immediately, the battle of the Crocus Plain sealed the fate of Pherai, and gave Philip the opportunity and the leisure to settle Thessalian affairs to his satisfaction, a goal not to be achieved until Pagasai and Pherai had fallen to him. Philip seems to have dealt first with Pagasai, perhaps to deny the Athenians a foothold in Thessaly, and conquered it

⁴³ Dem. 5.23; 8.65; 18.43.

⁴⁴ Cf. Diod. 16.1.4; Justin 8.2.5–7.

easily. His treatment of the port is instructive because it divulges the nature of Philip's designs on Thessaly. Having reduced Pagasai, the king did not hand it over to the Thessalian Confederacy, but instead installed a garrison to enforce his will and his claim that the place belonged to him by right of conquest. Since nothing suggests that Pagasai had ever been a member of the Thessalian Confederacy, Philip need not treat it as a rebel state of his allies. Legally, he was fully within his rights, but practically Pagasai demonstrated that Philip had come as a conqueror, not as a liberator. There remained the question of Pherai, and the answer was not long in coming. Philip advanced against the isolated city, where Lykophron and Peitholaos had had time to contemplate the lessons to be learned from the fate of Onomarchos' 3000 mercenaries. Although not daring to risk defeat at the hands of the champion of Apollo, they nonetheless occupied a strong position at Pherai, one that promised Philip another long siege. They struck a bargain with the Macedonian in which they surrendered the city to him in return for safe passage to Phokis for themselves and 2000 mercenaries. Although later the tyrants journeyed to Athens, where Peitholaos at least was awarded Athenian citizenship, only to be stripped of it subsequently, they failed to rally the Athenians to new efforts against Philip. In contrast with his treatment of Pagasai, Philip dealt mildly with Pherai. He seems originally not to have held it with a garrison, for in 349/8 he had to enter Thessaly once more to bring it back under control (cf. pp. 106–107 below). Thereafter, it became a Macedonian possession like Pagasai. So was removed the last major obstacle to Philip's domination of Thessaly.⁴⁵

If the fall of Pherai left Thessaly to Philip, he still had much to do in the region, primarily in putting an end to the endemic fractiousness of the Thessalian cities, which did not need the excuse of outside interference to justify their internecine warfare. Still acting as leader of the Confederacy, Philip embarked on a policy of reducing all Thessaly to his will, using in fact Thessalian disunity as the pretext to tighten his grip on the entire region. Although some cities joined him of their own accord, others were reduced by force. He intervened in the Hestiaiotis, a region of western Thessaly, where he took control of several cities. In a war between Pelinna

⁴⁵ Pagasai: Dem. 19, 12, 22; 2.11; 4.35; 19.260; Ps.-Dem. 10.67; *IG* IV 617; Diod. 16.31.6. If Diod. 16.31.6, 37.1, can be believed, some time must have elapsed before Philip moved from Pagasai to Pherai. Between the two events there was time for Phayllos to assume command in Phokis, for Diodoros says specifically that the tyrants and their mercenaries fled to Phayllos. Griffith, *HM*, II.281–285, uses Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F249, as evidence for a Thracian campaign at this point, a view easily refuted by Badian, *Pulpuđeva* 4 (1983) 61–62. Pherai: Dem. 2.14; 8.65; 9.12; 19.320. Peitholaos and Lykophron in Athens: Arist. *Rhet.* 3.9.7, 10.7; Ps.-Dem. 59.91. Philip in 344: Diod. 16.69.8.

and Pharkedon (cf. p. 68 above), he stormed the latter and exiled the survivors, a fate also suffered by Triikka. Philip also gained Gomphoi, which he made into a Macedonian city, renamed Philippopolis. In so doing, he eliminated or dominated the major cities of the district. The strategically important region of Perrhaibia, which bordered Macedonia, he likewise secured by arms. He seized Magnesia to the east of Pagasai and some of the islands offshore. Magnesia, like Pagasai, he treated as the spoils of war. From Hestiaiotis in the west to Perrhaibia in the north to Magnesia in the east Philip brought the outlying areas of Thessaly under his control, thus isolating the major cities of the interior. When finished, he was lord of Thessaly.⁴⁶

The evidence indicates that at this point the Thessalians elected Philip archon of the Confederacy, an office that he thereafter held for life. It is quite unlikely that the Thessalians would have bestowed the office on him before his victory at the Crocus Plain. No one needed an archon unable to win battles, and afterwards there was no one to say him nay. The best evidence for this extraordinary event comes from the contemporary Demosthenes, who in 349 observed that Philip was able to establish his own form of government in Thessaly and to use Thessalian revenues for his own purposes.⁴⁷ Philip's position as archon of the Thessalian Confederacy was legally independent of his kingship of Macedonia, but there was little real chance that Thessaly could fashion a policy not to Philip's liking. Thessaly would now follow the lead of Macedonia because Philip was the leader of both. Philip's campaign of 353 was easily the most successful venture of his career to date and perhaps the most important. The increase in his might meant that a new and daunting power now loomed in the north. What Jason of Pherai dreamed Philip achieved.

Only with his Thessalian settlement completed did Philip march on Thermopylai. He intended to follow up the gains made at the Crocus Plain by carrying the war to Phokis itself. The Athenians, for once responding with speed and will, dispatched a force to hold the pass. Further details are regrettably lacking. The size of the Athenian force is unknown, though doubtless smaller than Philip's army. Nevertheless, Thermopylai

⁴⁶ Hestiaiotis: Polyainos 4.2.18–19; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F82; Steph. Byz. s.v. "Philippoi"; Diod. 18.56.5; cf. Strabo 9.5.17. Gomphoi: Stählin, *Das hellenische Thessalien*, 126. Perrhaibia: Isok. 5.20. Magnesia: Isok. 5.20; Dem. 1.9, 22; 2.7, 11–12; Diod. 16.31.6; Strabo 9.5.16. Philip's methods: Isok. 5.20; Dem. 19.260; Diod. 16.37.4; Justin 8.3.1–5.

⁴⁷ Dem. 1.22; 2.7, 22–23; 19.318; Justin 8.2.1, 3.1–5; 11.3.2. Philip's position as leader of the army and his right to administer taxes argue for an official executive position within the Thessalian Confederacy, specifically the archonship. Griffith, *HM*, II.285–295, also dates Philip's archonship to this campaigning-season, but Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, 140, dates it to 344; cf. also Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 261–262.

was well suited for defense, and the Athenian navy secured the army's flank. There was additionally the remote possibility of the Athenians receiving reinforcements from their Peloponnesian allies. Despite his superior numbers, Philip must batter his way through the pass in a simple frontal assault that would surely involve heavy losses, a price that he refused to pay. His campaign had been successful, and there was no good reason to risk substantial gains in Thessaly, even for the sake of Apollo, for a possible defeat at Thermopylai. In the light of these odds and considerations, Philip turned back rather than dispute the passage, a fact over which Demosthenes often exulted but not for long. Had Philip been intent on the conquest of Greece in 353, he could have seized control of Thermopylai within a few days of his victory at the Crocus Plain. Yet that does not mean that Philip harbored no future designs on the south. It made far better sense to consolidate his considerable gains in Thessaly than to risk them in an impetuous adventure in central Greece. Firm control of Thessaly anchored his Greek flank, and the Sacred War ensured that the major Greek states would be too occupied to trouble with him, allowing him the opportunity to settle unfinished business in Thrace, an area of far greater immediate importance to Macedonia. Yet at the same time, his archonship, if it were to be taken seriously, demanded that he heed Thessalian wishes. With domestic tranquility secured, the Thessalians expected the liberation of Delphoi and the punishment of the temple-robbers. Hence, Philip must eventually either disappoint them, and thus risk their rising against him, or he must intervene in the Sacred War. In 353 he could reasonably leave the Sacred War to the Thebans in the hope that any victory of theirs would satisfy the Thessalians. If it were again necessary to move on Thermopylai, he would have again, like the rams, walked backwards only to butt the harder. In the meantime, he withdrew to Macedonia. He could afford to wait.⁴⁸

C) *Boiotian postscript (353 BC)*

The Athenian defense of Thermopylai and the departure of Philip ended

⁴⁸ Philip and Thermopylai: Dem. 19.84, 319; Diod. 16.38.1; Justin 8.2.8–12. Cawkwell, *CQ* 12 (1962) 138 n. 2, suggests that the Athenians sent 5000 infantry and 400 cavalry to Thermopylai on the basis of Diod. 16.37.3, without explaining the need for cavalry. Diodoros says that the Athenian and Spartan forces were sent to Phayllos, not to Thermopylai, and the events of Diod. 16.37.3, date to 352, as is seen below, pp. 181–186. Although J.K. Davies, *Athenian Propertied Families* (Oxford 1971) no. 10552, suggests that one of the crowns mentioned in *IG* II² 1496 lines 40–42, 52–55, was awarded to Nausikles for this action at Thermopylai, the inscription dates to 334/3, and gives no reason for the honors. Thus, the inscription provides no specific information about the exploits of Nausikles, who was repeatedly honored by the Athenians (Dem. 18.114).

the major fighting of the year, but in Boiotia the Thebans added a postscript to the war by recovering Orchomenos and Koroneia, Phokian possession of which proved short-lived. The evidence for these events comes from Demosthenes' speech, *On behalf of the Megalopolitans*, delivered in 353/2. Demosthenes says that Orchomenos was uninhabited, but speaks of it as still in Theban hands.⁴⁹ The scholiast adds Koroneia as well.⁵⁰ The best explanation for this testimony is that the Thebans regained the two cities after the defeat of Onomarchos at the Crocus Plain. This explanation also clarifies Diodoros' two reports that in the final years of the war the Phokian general Phalaikos seized several important Boiotian cities, with Orchomenos, Koroneia, and Chorsiai actually being named.⁵¹ Moreover, Diodoros' account is consistent with Demosthenes' speech, *On the Dishonest Embassy*, pronounced in 343, where he speaks of the Phokians having held Orchomenos, Koroneia, and other places at the end of the war.⁵² Nevertheless, in 353 Orchomenos and Koroneia remained only the shells of cities. During the rest of the war, until their recapture by Phalaikos, they posed no obstacle to the march of armies, whether Boiotian or Phokian.

R.M. Kallet-Marx has recently argued against this sequence of events, insisting instead that Orchomenos and Koroneia remained in Phokian hands until the end of the war.⁵³ He bases his hypothesis largely on the existence of a watchtower above the modern village of Evangelistria in the territory of Haliartos. In his opinion, the people of Haliartos built the tower because this was the only time during the fourth century when they were continuously threatened. He further maintains that no contemporary evidence exists to prove the Boiotian recovery of Koroneia and Orchomenos. He also rejects C.T. Fisher's emendation of the participle in Diodoros 16.56.2, preferring the present tense found in the manuscripts to Fisher's aorist.⁵⁴ Lastly, he maintains that all Boiotian raids from 353/2 to 346 focused on Abai and Phokian territory lying between Boiotia and eastern Lokris.

Since this hypothesis affects the interpretation of the later course of the

⁴⁹ 16.4: ὥστε Θηβαίους μὲν Ὀρχομενοῦ καὶ Θεσπιῶν καὶ Πλαταιῶν οἰκισθειῶν ἀσθενεῖς γενέσθαι; 16.25: ἵνα τοῖνυν μὴ τοῦτ' ἐμποδῶν γένηται τῷ Θηβαίους γενέσθαι μικροῦς, τὰς μὲν Θεσπιάς καὶ τὸν Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ τὰς Πλαταιάς κατοικίσεσθαι; cf. also 16.26.

⁵⁰ 'τί οὖν, ἐὰν μὴ συγχωρῶσιν ἡμῖν Θηβαῖοι κατοικίσειν Θεσπιάς καὶ Πλαταιάς καὶ Ὀρχομενὸν καὶ Κορώνειαν' (ed. Dilts).

⁵¹ 16.56.2, 58.1.

⁵² 19.112, 148, 334; cf. also 5.21.

⁵³ In Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA* 308–311; against this view stands the testimony cited in nn. 49–50 above.

⁵⁴ Kallet-Marx prefers to read ἔπειτα τῶν Φωκέων κατεχόντων [instead of Fischer's κατασχόντων] ἱκανὰς τινὰς πόλεις ἐν τῇ Βοιωτίᾳ.

war, it deserves attention. Regarding the tower at Evangelistria, Kallet-Marx admits that he found only some undatable sherds of coarse ware and some coursed trapezoidal walls. Thus, there is no archaeological evidence to date this structure. The inability of the site to offer chronological evidence is particularly regrettable because, as Kallet-Marx recognizes, this area of Boiotia was repeatedly disputed from the mid-fifth century, and the struggle did not end with the Sacred War. Still later in the fourth century armies of the Diadochoi operated here (cf. Plut. *Demet.* 39–40.6), so a date later than 353 is also possible. Kallet-Marx has overlooked the contemporary literary evidence cited above to prove the Boiotian recovery of Koroneia and Orchomenos after Onomarchos' defeat at the Crocus Plain. Furthermore, other contemporary evidence proves a consistent Theban policy, begun with the seizure of Plataia in 373, in which dangerous places were left disarmed and desolate, a point fully appreciated by the Attic orators.⁵⁵ The mere fact that a city was left in ruins certainly does not mean that it was not in Boiotian possession. One always regards emendations with suspicion; but even had Diodoros used the present rather than the aorist participle, it need have been nothing more than his mistake, not surprising in view of the severe abbreviation of his source and his limited understanding of military affairs. Certainly, Diodoros' usage should not be preferred to contemporary testimony, which is consistent. Lastly, Kallet-Marx is incorrect to say that Boiotian operations were limited to eastern Phokis, as the following narrative will amply prove.⁵⁶ Rather, the picture that emerges is one of generalized warfare throughout northcentral Greece. The ability of the Boiotians to range from Doris to Neon and Chaironeia, as well as through eastern Phokis and Lokris, can be traced in part to their recovery of Orchomenos and Koroneia.⁵⁷

Onomarchos' victory at Koroneia had dealt a temporary, but telling, blow more to the morale of the Thebans than to their might. Despite their reconquest of Orchomenos and Koroneia, they suspended military operations for the season, and not through weakness, as future operations would

⁵⁵ Earlier Theban destruction and depopulation of Plataia, Thespiiai, and Orchomenos: Xen. *Hell.* 6.3.5; Isok. 14 *passim*; Dem. 20.109; Diod. 15.46.4–6, 51.3, 57.1, 79.6; Paus. 9.1.8. Demosthenes' *On the Peace*, delivered in 346, mentions this policy during the Sacred War, both with regard to Thespiiai and Plataia (5.10), which the Phokians never captured, and (5.21) to Orchomenos and Koroneia. Other fourth-century testimony confirms this view: Aischin. 2.104 and schol.; 2.116 and schol.

⁵⁶ Future Boiotian operations: Kephisos valley (Diod. 16.38.7); Chaironeia (Diod. 16.38.7, 39.8); Neon (Dem. 19.148); Parapotamioi (Strabo 9.4.16).

⁵⁷ One can suggest, but not prove, that the Haliartans built the tower at Evangelistria as a response to the Phokian capture of Koroneia and the construction of the fort at Palaioastron, since it was now obvious that Haliartos was vulnerable to attack from Mt. Helikon.

prove. Just as they had failed to follow their victory at Neon with the liberation of Apollo's sanctuary, so they now made no attempt to use the battle of the Crocus Plain to subdue the Phokians, to liberate Delphoi, and to end the Sacred War. There were doubtless fewer mercenaries in Delphoi in 353 than there had been in 355, when Onomarchos had led the remnants of Philomelos' shattered army back to the sanctuary. The Thebans could, if willing to take the losses, reap the rewards of Philip's victory, but they shrank from the effort, even though they had the specter of Pammenes' failure before their eyes. Instead, they were content with the recovery of northwestern Boiotia, and perhaps hoped for a diplomatic solution. They thus once more gave the Phokians breathing-space in which to recuperate. Another Phokian army had been destroyed, another Phokian general killed, another victory wasted. The war was no closer to conclusion than before.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE WAR WIDENS (353–347 BC)

A) *Conflict in Central Greece and the Peloponnesos (353–351 BC)*

Despite the fact that the campaigning-season of 353 was a virtual repetition of 355, the Phokians once again rallied, even though again local opposition to the war made itself heard. Once more, the moving force behind continued resistance to the Amphiktyons was a *strategos*, this time Phayllos, the brother of Onomarchos. He had doubtless been a *strategos* in 353, as he had earlier in 354, and may have led the meager remnants of Onomarchos' army back to Delphoi. Now he was elected *strategos autokrator*. Following his brother's example, he plundered the sanctuary still further to build yet another mercenary army. That task was more difficult in 353 than earlier. Even the most hardbitten mercenary could not have been sanguine about Phokian generalship, especially after Neon and the Crocus Plain; and Phayllos' own performance had hitherto been uninspiring. Nor was it necessarily easy to replace 9000 casualties, especially after the grim fate of the defeated at the Crocus Plain. Some idea of the difficulties confronting Phayllos can be had by his doubling of pay in order to attract mercenaries, this a measure almost of desperation. Like Onomarchos, Phayllos also had to re-arm his troops, and to pay for these expenses he minted gold and silver coins, no specimens of which have survived, from dedications at Delphoi. By these measures were the Phokians again prepared to continue the war. In the process, they once more proved that the Sacred War was unique in the annals of Greece: so long as Apollo's treasure and bands of mercenaries lasted, the Phokians could wage war despite losses that would have ruined even a mighty city-state.¹

With Philip still busy in nearby Thessaly, Phayllos quietly re-established Phokian strength, with a major part of his effort being diplomatic. The Phokians had enjoyed little active support from their allies, which had forced them to bear the full brunt of the war virtually alone. The cost in men and money had been high, and Phayllos was reluctant to rely on mercenaries alone. Hence, he called upon his allies for help during the campaigning-season of 352. He sensibly abandoned Onomarchos'

¹ Diod. 16.35.1, 36.1, 37.1; Paus. 10.2.6; Dem. 23.124. Coinage: Head, *Historia Numorum*², 339; cf. also Parke, *Greek Mercenary Soldiers*, 137–138; H. Bengtson, *Philipp und Alexander der Große* (Munich 1985) 61–62.

grandiose Thessalian policy, and instead concentrated on the more reasonable strategy of knocking Thebes out of the war. He planned to resume his brother's attempt to wrest southwestern Boiotia from Thebes. Onomarchos had come very close to total success in this arena, and victory here offered the Phokians their best hope of winning the Sacred War, especially if that could be done before Philip could again intervene. Phayllos' very concentration of effort against Thebes was especially appealing to Sparta and the Peloponnesians, who had no quarrel with Philip and no designs on Thessaly. In 352 Boiotia alone was the target of Phokian arms.²

Phayllos' diplomatic efforts proved so successful that in 352 for the first time in three years Phokis' allies responded to the call for help. The Spartans dispatched 1000 troops, the Achaians 2000, and the deposed tyrants Lykophron and Peitholaos put their 2000 mercenaries at Phayllos' disposal. The Athenians, perhaps heartened by their successful defense of Thermopylai the year before, sent Nausikles at the head of 5000 infantry and 400 cavalry. A number of smaller cities, doubtless those of the West Lokrians among them, also came to Phayllos' aid. These allies had nothing to fear from Philip, who was then busy in the north. This time the Boiotians were entirely alone, with absolutely no prospect of assistance from their allies. Phayllos' supporters mustered at Delphoi in the spring, their combined army numbering not less than 10,000 infantry and probably closer to 15,000. Against them the Boiotians could assemble some 7000–8000.³

Phayllos opened the campaign by striking Boiotia from the northwest, leading his army southwards by way of Abai. He thereby avoided Chaironeia to fall direct upon Orchomenos, which Onomarchos had easily captured. The Boiotians, however, were fully prepared for the attack, and at Orchomenos inflicted upon Phayllos a serious defeat in which the Phokians and their allies suffered heavy losses. Daunted at the outset, Phayllos retreated up the Kephisos valley, only to be brought to bay by vigorous Boiotian pursuit. The opposing forces collided south of Chaironeia, where the land is level and today sown with hay, melons, and corn, the terrain excellently suited for hoplite warfare. The Boiotians again defeated the Phokians. Phayllos lost some 500 dead and no fewer than 400 prisoners, ample testimony that the two sides fought a major battle. Now trapped by the victorious Boiotian army, Phayllos was bent on escape. With Chaironeia and the Boiotians in his path, he suddenly led his army

² Diod. 16.36.1, 37.1–2. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².180–181; Beloch, *GG* III².1.479.

³ Diod. 16.36.1, 37.2–4. Phokian numbers: the allied contingents (16.37.3) together with at least 3000 Phokian mercenaries (Diod. 16.39.3). Cf. A. Raubitschek, "Phayllos", *RE* 19 (1938) 1902.

towards Koroneia in order to reach the safety of Mt. Helikon. A few days later near Koroneia he again engaged the Boiotians, who inflicted still further losses upon him. The battle cost him 50 Phokian dead and another 130 prisoners, but the survivors climbed to safety up the Phalaros valley. In the course of this one campaign the Phokians had lost over 1000 men, not even counting the casualties at Orchomenos. The explanation for this surprising turn of events, given the size of the two armies, probably lies less with Boiotian skill and courage than with Phayllos' incompetence as a general. In all four instances of independent command that he had enjoyed, Phayllos had routinely led his men to defeat, and one can imagine that after Orchomenos they followed him with singular lack of enthusiasm. The Boiotians, who may originally have seemed an easy target, had won a resounding victory. They both continued the war on behalf of Apollo and in so doing refurbished their military reputation. They both continued the war on behalf of Apollo and in so doing also refurbished their military reputation.⁴

Although Phayllos' disastrous campaign ended the fighting in central Greece for the year, the Spartans took advantage of the Sacred War to pursue their particular goals in the Peloponnesos. With Thebes so heavily engaged against Phokis, the Spartans expected the freedom to subjugate Megalopolis and Messene, thereby breaking the ring that Epameinondas had forged around them. The Spartan plan, of which Archidamos was probably the author, involved both diplomacy and direct military action. It probably evolved from discussions with Phayllos over the preceding winter, and explains the presence in 352 of Spartan troops in Phayllos' army. In return for helping Phokis against Thebes, the Spartans expected Phokian aid against Arkadia. Having kept their part of the bargain, they insisted on Phayllos keeping his, despite his failure in Boiotia.

The Spartans hoped to change the political situation in the Peloponnesos that went back to Epameinondas' day. In the diplomatic arena, they supported the claims of several states, all of them enemies of Thebes, expecting in return support for their own goals, which they conveniently left somewhat vague. They argued that Elis should regain Triphylia, which had joined the newly-founded Arkadian League in 369; that Phleious should receive the fortress of Trikaranon, which the Argives had refused

⁴ Diod. 16.37.5–6; cf. Plut. *Sulla* 16.11–12. Topography: personal observations of 5 and 8 August 1980; cf. also Buckler in *Teiresias* Sup. 2, 15–17. If the battle in the Kephisos valley had taken place north of Chaironeia, Phayllos would not have needed to retire towards Koroneia. Kallet-Marx in Beister-Buckler, *BOIOTIKA*, 308–310, adduces this incident to suggest that Boiotian use of the route past Koroneia was by no means easy, without apparently realizing that only Phayllos' retreat caused the Boiotians to fight there. Moreover, this is the only known engagement at Koroneia between its recovery after Onomarchos' death and its recapture by the Phokians in 349 (Diod. 16.56.2).

to surrender in the peace treaty of 365; and that “certain Arkadians” should get what was theirs. All of the territory in question was then in the hands of Theban allies. The last point, concerning the Arkadians, applied to the immediate target of their diplomatic campaign—the rump of the Arkadian League, the capital of which was Megalopolis. Of all their enemies Megalopolis was the most vulnerable, militarily and politically. The foundation of the city had required the forcible incorporation of unwilling populations of many cities and villages into the new capital. As early as 361 some of these people attempted to return to their ancestral homes, and these homes constituted the property that “certain Arkadians” should recover. In short, the Spartans proposed the dissolution of Megalopolis and with it the Arkadian League. Despite the emphasis on Megalopolis, the ultimate goal of the Spartans was the reconquest of Messene, for which they needed a free hand. Success in these areas would have undone Epameinondas’ work, and would have re-established Sparta as the leading power in the Peloponnesos.⁵

The obvious readiness of the Spartans to implement their designs alarmed the Megalopolitans and Messenians, who launched a diplomatic initiative of their own. They found their Argive allies fully prepared to resist Sparta. Alarmed that Thebes could no longer come to their aid because of the Sacred War, they sent ambassadors to Athens seeking help, which prompted the Spartans to send a delegation to counter their efforts. The Messenians openly appealed for an alliance, and perhaps urged an attack on Lakonia itself. To keep the Athenians on their side the Spartans spoke of helping them reconquer Oropos, which the Thebans had recovered in 366. The Spartans also mentioned the obvious advantages of weakening Thebes by making Thespiiai, Plataia, and Orchomenos independent, a totally unrealistic proposal. It is doubtful that anyone took these fatuous proposals seriously, and the Spartans failed to convince a majority of the Athenians. Among others, Demosthenes spoke on behalf of the Messenian cause. He warned his countrymen that the real goal of Spartan foreign policy was the reconquest of Messene, and reminded them that after the battle of Mantinea in 362 they had concluded a peace treaty whereby they were bound to help Messene against invaders. He also spoke against the folly of unduly strengthening Sparta, yet he was hardly less critical when he turned to the Arkadian proposals. The Megalopolitans had requested a formal alliance with Athens without, however, wishing to renounce their treaty with Thebes, an issue that alone made

⁵ Paus. 4.28.1–2. Background of the disputes: Buckler, *TH*, 105, 198–201. Spartan goals: Dem. 16.4, 16–17, 20, 30 with schol. Megalopolis and its population: Buckler, *TH*, 107–109; cf. also Diod. 15.94.1–3. Reconquest of Messene: Dem. 16.8, 20.

any pact impossible. Although Demosthenes urged an Athenian-Megalopolitan alliance, the Athenians voted to remain aloof from the conflict. They refused to attack Lakonia, but promised the Messenians military aid, if the Spartans invaded Messene. The Athenians thereby served notice that Sparta was free to attack Arkadia but not Messene. These results were hardly a major triumph of Spartan diplomacy, but at least they meant that Sparta could pursue its immediate objectives without Athenian interference. Spartan success against Megalopolis might make it impossible for Athens to intervene effectively in Messene.⁶

If the Spartans had some slight reason to be satisfied with the Athenian response, that nonetheless left unanswered the question of how Thebes would react to these events. Those who had hoped that Theban preoccupation with the Sacred War would prevent them from making their presence felt in the Peloponnesos must have been sobered by the Boiotian victories of 352. As in 370, Peloponnesian embassies traveled to Thebes as well as to Athens, and once again the Boiotians promised help. As events proved, the alliance established by Epameinondas was still vital. Just as in the 360s, the Argives and Messenians again stood ready to defend Arkadia, and together with the Sikyonians were prepared to resist a Spartan revanche.⁷

In the summer of 352 the Spartans put their field-army under the command of Archidamos, already a veteran officer and the victor of the "Tearless Battle" of 368. The Spartan army had recently suffered heavy losses at Leuktra, Kromnos, and Mantinea, so in 352 its strength was considerably diminished. In Aristotle's day the citizen-population, which formed the core of the army, numbered only some 1000 men; but the Spartans did not stand totally alone. Lakonia continued to be a populous region, and Aristotle claimed that the land could maintain 30,000 hoplites and 1500 cavalry. Military operations after 369, when Sparta lost Messene, prove the Lakonian *perioikoi* continued to support Sparta. Unfortunately,

⁶ Spartan position: Dem. 16.11, 13, 16, 30; Demosthenes and Messene: Dem. 16.8–10, 17, 20; cf. also Paus. 4.28.2. Peace treaty of 362: Bengtson, *SdA* II². no. 292. Arkadian position: Dem. 16.14, 22, 27, 30. Demosthenes nowhere in this speech mentions a Messenian embassy to Athens, although he champions the Messenian cause. Perhaps his silence is the result of his desire not to draw attention to the previous position of the Messenians as staunch Theban allies; cf. also Pearson, *Art of Demosthenes*, 117. Although the Athenians remained aloof from this war, they cultivated good relations with Megalopolis: *IG* II² 161. Cf. also A.W. Picard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom* (New York and London 1914) 131–134; W. Jaeger, *Demosthenes* (Berkeley 1938) 82–89; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Staatsmänner* (Munich 1983) 282, and H.G. Ingenkamp, *Hermes* 100 (1972) 195–205.

⁷ Epameinondas' alliance: Buckler, *TH*, 71–74. Thebes and the Peloponnesians: Diod. 16.39.2; Paus. 4.28.2; cf. also Beloch, *GG* III².1.480; Griffin, *Sikyon*, 75–76.

their numbers are unknown and unknowable. Sparta's non-Peloponnesian allies had already agreed to dispatch their contingents to Mantinea to await Archidamos' arrival. Mantinea, a Spartan ally that Agesilaos had similarly used as a staging-post in 362, stood astride a major north-south route within the Peloponnesos. There Archidamos could also intercept the Theban and Argive armies before they could reach Megalopolis.⁸

Archidamos launched his campaign by striking direct at Megalopolis. To do so he led his army up the Eurotas valley past the modern village of Leondarion and into the southeastern plain of Megalopolis. This move triggered an immediate response, with the allies of Megalopolis, Arkadian as well as Messenian and Sikyonian, quickly sending their contingents to the city's defense. After some plundering of the countryside and before his enemies could unite, Archidamos marched by way of Asea to Mantinea, where he was joined by 3000 Phokian infantry and a force of 150 cavalry contributed by Lykophron and Peitholaos. Meanwhile, the contingents of Megalopolis and its allies refused pursuit, fearing to risk a pitched battle before the arrival of the Thebans and Argives. Instead, having advanced eastwards to the plain of Asea, they then took the route through the modern villages of Manaris and Arvanito-Kerasia to Karyai at the headwaters of the Alpheios river. Karyai, an Arkadian city of great strategic importance, dominated the highroad between Sparta and Tegea. They thus cut off one of Archidamos' escape-routes, forcing him to take the longer track from Arkadia that led from Pallantion past Asea to Sparta. In so doing, however, they had cut themselves off from their allies, who were approaching from the north. For the moment, there was no hope of joint operations against the invader.⁹

Despite the danger to his communications with Sparta, Archidamos refused to cut short his campaign. Instead, he decided to strike a blow against the traditional enemy, the Argives, but it is impossible to trace the precise route of invasion. W.K. Pritchett has suggested that the king led his army from the Untilled Plain (*Argon Pedion*) east of Mantinea over Mt. Lyrkeion by way of the modern Sangas past Kaparellion to the

⁸ Diod. 16.39.1–3. Spartan numbers: Arist. *Pol.* 2.6.11; cf. also Diod. 16.37.3, although few of the latter would presumably be *Spartiatiai*. Spartan numbers in general: J. Buckler, *Research in Economic History* 2 (1977) 249–279; S. Hodkinson, *CQ* 36 (1986) 378–406; T.J. Figueira, *TAPA* 116 (1986) 165–213. J.F. Lazenby, *The Spartan Army* (Warminster 1985) 168, points out how little is known of Spartan military activities in this period.

⁹ Diod. 16.39.1–5; cf. 16.34.3; Paus. 8.27.10. Roads: Sparta-Megalopolis: W. Loring *JHS* 15 (1895) 26–47; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, V.69–76; personal observations of 18–19 August 1977; Asea-Karyai: Loring, 61–62; personal observations of 17 August 1978. Headwaters of the Alpheios: Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, I.124–125; IV.29–63; V.77–91.

modern village of Lyrkeion, above which stood the ancient Argive city of Orneai. This route, which is the most direct, entails hard walking. An alternate route, which leads into the Argolid from farther north, is much easier, graced by ample water, but is admittedly longer. It crosses Mt. Lyrkeion along a good track, crossing the crest over a low saddle immediately above the modern village of Kephlobryson, with the remains of an ancient watch-tower still overlooking the road (cf. Pl. 6). Once over the mountain, Archidamos marched down the Inachos valley, a steep descent which becomes much more gentle only at modern Kaparellion. Here he stormed and captured Orneia. The Argives quickly sent their army to the beleaguered city; but unsupported and probably out-numbered, they lost a pitched battle in which they suffered more than 200 casualties. The Theban army was still on the march, its route, as in the days of Epameinondas, taking it through Nemea. Led by Kephision, it numbered some 4000 infantry and 500 cavalry. Yet its discipline was poor, which suggests that the Boiotian Confederacy had refused to commit its best troops, those recently victorious over Phayllos, to a distant theater. The Thebans and Argives, who now enjoyed numerical superiority, engaged Archidamos in an inconclusive battle in which they failed to regain Orneai, whereupon both armies retired to their homes. Left with an open field, Archidamos retraced his steps towards western Arkadia. Once again his target was the resources of Megalopolis. Yet instead of attacking the city itself, he led his troops northwest from Megalopolis up the valley of the Helisson river towards Olympia. The southern part of the valley is often steep and rather narrow, almost overshadowed by towering peaks. Here lay the Arkadian city of Helisson, dominating a small, wooded gorge in which the Helisson river rises. Having seized and plundered the small city, the Spartans retired to Megalopolis and thence through western Arkadia to Sparta.¹⁰

These operations, although desultory if only for the simple fact that Archidamos was too weak to storm Megalopolis and thus seize his objective, constitute the most successful Spartan campaign in a decade. On the one hand, Archidamos had driven the Thebans out of the Peloponnesos, and had overwhelmed two cities. If he had failed even to damage Megalopolis, he had at least demonstrated that Sparta was still a match for its enemies. On the other hand, these events brought to light several

¹⁰ Diod. 16.39.4–5. Mantincia-Orneai route: Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, III.38–41. Kephlobryson route: personal observations of 16–17 July 1986. Pritchett, 51–52, following Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 68–69, is wrong to reject the idea that Diodoros had duplicated events at Orneai: cf. pp. 187–191 below. Helisson: W.M. Leake, *Travels in the Morea*, II (London 1830) 51–55; A. Philippson, *Der Peloponnes* (Berlin 1892) 91; Frazer, *Pausanias*, IV.317; personal observations of 6 June 1983.

salient points about Thebes. First, they showed the Greek world that the remnants of Epameinondas' Peloponnesian alliance were still willing and able to co-operate in order to defend themselves. Second, they proved once again a consistent Theban dedication to a policy aimed at crippling Sparta, a policy that not even the hardships of the Sacred War had eroded. Archidamos' campaign in fact justified the continued existence of the alliance and the need for the allies to stand guard against Sparta. Yet the fighting also revealed the weakened condition of the Thebans, who could no longer brush aside Spartan armies at will. The Peloponnesians cannot have been pleased by the poor showing of their Theban allies. Although the campaign ended in stalemate, Archidamos could claim even that as a Spartan victory.

In all, the campaigning-season of 352 had given Phayllos little cause for joy. His own efforts in Boiotia had failed, and even his assistance to Sparta had caused the Thebans no real harm. His plans for operations in 351 were less grandiose but better suited for the security of Phokis. He resolved first to complete Onomarchos' conquest of Epiknemidian Lokris, further securing the region around Thermopylai and eliminating still another Amphiktyon as an independent political entity. In 351 the East Lokrians were as isolated as previously, and operations against them promised to be far less dangerous than challenging the Boiotians again. Phayllos opened the campaigning-season of 351 with an invasion of East Lokris, most of which he quickly overran. Since, unfortunately, details of Phayllos' movements are for the most part lacking, no detailed reconstruction of his campaign is possible. One can only comment on his gains.¹¹

Phayllos' targets were the strategically important cities in the vicinity of Thermopylai. Although one normally thinks of Thermopylai as the short narrow pass between northern and central Greece, specifically Kolonos Hill so heroically defended against the Persians, the area of the pass at Thermopylai to the modern town of Kamena Vourla and farther eastwards is in fact a long, generally narrow corridor, with the sea to the north and mountains to the south. For the most part the land consists of tall, steep-sided hills, like that of the akropolis of Thronion, or lower but nonetheless abrupt hills like that of Skarpheia. Any of these heights, if suitably held, could check movement through the corridor. Consequently, anyone desiring complete freedom of movement through this area must command the entire corridor in order to conduct or hinder sustained operations.¹²

¹¹ Diod. 16.³⁸3. The nominative singular of the name "Naryx" is used here on the authority of Steph. Byz. s.v. "Naryx", even though Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV.156–159; V.168–169, prefers "Naryka". Cf. also Beloch, *GG* III².1.481; Raubitschek, *RE* 19 (1938) 1902–1903.

¹² Cf. Hdt. 7.176; Strabo 9.3.2. Lolling, *Geographie*, 132–133, gives a good concise

Phayllos' campaign won for him the cities of Alponos, Nikaia, and Skarpheia, each in its own way of strategical value for the possession of the Thermopylai corridor.¹³ Tracing these cities from west to east, one begins with Alponos and immediately with a major problem. Epiknemidian Lokris is one of the least explored areas of Greece, and the identification of even major sites is still often controversial. This is especially true of Alponos, which stood near a point where the road through Thermopylai was broad enough only for one cart to pass. The city lay on the coast and commanded a harbor. A likely site for Alponos has been found on a low spur of Mt. Kallidromon that projects northwards on the southern side of the mouth of the Spercheios river. The position of the akropolis is quite strong, its northern side dropping precipitously onto land that today is still swampy. Although its western side is likewise very steep, its eastern is less so (cf. Pl. 7). Modern disturbance of this entire region, especially in the form of road-building and land reclamation, makes any identification difficult and tentative, but literary sources and the natural position of this site provide enough information to allow one to appreciate the strategic importance of Alponos. With its harbor and narrow roadway, overlooked by a fortified akropolis, the city stood in an excellent position to bar the route and to prevent a seaborne force from overwhelming the position easily. Possession of Alponos gave Phayllos control of the western end of the Thermopylai corridor, especially since the city was much less vulnerable to land attack from the west than from the east.¹⁴

description of the area; personal observation of 27 May 1983. The modern area of Thermopylai has undergone significant geological changes since the fourth century, especially because of silting: cf. C. Vita-Finzi, *The Mediterranean Valleys* (Cambridge 1969) 82. Even in Pausanias' day (1.4.3) the area was already swampy.

¹³ Although the sources do not specifically mention Skarpheia among Phayllos' conquests, it can be included on the basis of Diodoros' testimony (16.38.3): Φάυλλος δὲ στρατεύσας εἰς Λοκροὺς τοὺς ὀνομαζομένους Ἐπικνημιδίου τὰς μὲν ἄλλας πόλεις ἐξεπρώσατο πάσας, μίαν δὲ τὴν ὀνομαζομένην Νάρυκα.

¹⁴ Hdt. 7.176, 216; Aischin. 2.132–138, with schol.; SIG³ 419; Demetrios, *FGH* 85 F6; Strabo 1.3.20; Steph. Byz. s.v. "Alponos". Hirschfeld, "Alpenos", *RE* 1 (1894) 1599; Oldfather, "Alpenos", *RE* Sup. 3 (1918) 84–85. For the site: Leake, *Northern Greece*, II.38; R. Hope Simpson, *Mycenaean Greece* (Park Ridge, N.J. 1981) 81; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV.159–162; V.186; personal observations of 8 July 1986.

Pritchett, *Topography*, IV.164–165, has advanced the attractive theory that fourth-century Alponos is to be located at the *palaiokastion* near the modern Anavra. His arguments are: (1) Hope Simpson's site at the mouth of the Spercheios has sherds no later than the Classical period, whereas Alponos thrived as late as 217 BC (SIG³ 419). (2) The site near Anavra has produced no sherds earlier than the fourth century. (3) The city of Nikaia is unattested until the fourth century, and (5) the earthquake of 426 BC (Diod. 12.59.2) probably destroyed Herodotos' Alponos. (6) Therefore, the survivors of the earthquake resettled, some founding Nikaia and giving it its name, the others building the site at Anavra to which was given the old name of Alponos. This ingenious suggestion, despite

The next strategically important place was the harbor of Nikaia, which is most probably located at the modern village of Aghia Trias. The site, of which no buildings or architectural members are now visible, stands between the sea and a line of low foothills inland (cf. Pl. 8). The defensive position of the city does not look strong, especially when compared with Alponos, but the harbor would have been very useful for turning the flank of the pass at Thermopylai and Alponos. The harbor, as it appears today, is shallow, marshy, and rather exposed. Although the Hellenistic historian Memnon of Herakleia claims that the Phokians destroyed Nikaia, the city may have been quickly rebuilt after the Sacred War, for in 339 the Thebans occupied the place against Philip. From Nikaia a coastal road leads eastwards to Skarpheia and Thronion.¹⁵

To the east of Nikaia lay Skarpheia, the akropolis of which stood on the summit of a lone hill south of the modern village of Molos (cf. Pl. 9). The hill juts northwards in the direction of the sea, which is now some distance away. The akropolis is divided into a lower height to the north and an upper elevation to the south. The lower height has been levelled by machinery and planted with olive trees. Below the akropolis, especially to the northwest, the fields abound with sherds, mostly plain ware, amphora handles, and broken roof-tiles. The strategical position of the site is strong. To the north the hill descends steeply to the plain, which is extensive and fertile. To the east the akropolis of Skarpheia drops precipitously into the northern part of the valley of Mendenitsa, while to the south the land also falls away abruptly. The site commands both the road running through

its obvious attraction, suffers from some significant shortcomings. First, the published accounts of surface sherds from the three sites are too inexact to allow precise dating. For all that anyone knows, the classical sherds from Hope Simpson's site could be fourth-century or perhaps even early black-glazed Hellenistic. Secondly, if inhabitants of Herodotos' Alponos resettled at Anavra shortly after 426, Pritchett must account for the absence of fifth-century sherds, a fact that he himself noted when he and E. Vanderpool investigated the site. The span of time between the putative resettlement and the appearance of fourth-century sherds is at least a generation, which argues against Pritchett's theory. Admittedly, Nikaia appears in the literary sources only in the fourth century: Oldfather, *RE* 17 (1936) 224. Yet the site has, to my knowledge, never been systematically explored. On 28 May 1983 I found numerous sherds, some glazed, amphora handles, and pieces of roof-tiles, especially south and west of the modern church of Aghias Trias; but unfortunately the pottery observed was undatable. In view of these problems and until intensive investigation of these sites, it is preferable to follow the ancient *testimonia* and thus to place the fourth-century Alponos on the sea to the east of Kolonos Hill.

¹⁵ Aischin. 2.132, 138; 3.140 with schol.; Ps.-Dem. 11.4; Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F56b; Timosthenes in H. Diels and W. Schubart, *Berliner Klassikertexte* 1 (1904) 53, and more recently L. Pearson and S. Stephens, edd., *Didymi in Demosthenem Commenta* (Stuttgart 1983) *ad loc.*; Diod. 16.59.2; Memnon, *FGrH* 434 F28. Cf. also G. Glotz, *BCH* 33 (1909) 526–546; Oldfather, *RE* 17 (1936) 222–226; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV.162–166; personal observations of 11 August 1980 and 28 May 1983.

the corridor and a path to Mendenitsa, which is some 2½ hours distant.¹⁶

By capturing these places, Phayllos gained command of the entire Thermopylai corridor and the strongpoints along it. With Alponos and Nikaia in his hands, he could baffle seaborne attempts to turn individual positions. He could also receive reinforcements by sea from the Athenians, with whom he had now opened a direct link. These cities usually commanded passes into the interior, and so he further protected the Kephisos valley from attack from the north (cf. pp. 33–36 above). So long as he could hold this region, Phayllos had little to fear from Philip and the Thessalians.

History must deny Phayllos one conquest, that of the mysterious place named Pharygai. In the late fourth century BC Pharygai was a Phokian village situated at the foot of a mountain once known as Akrouzion, later named Galate. The village was located somewhere on the road between Athens and Elateia, thus squarely in the Kephisos valley. The name Pharygai was subsequently and erroneously applied to the Lokrian city of Tarphe, once mentioned by Homer in the *Iliad* and thereafter unknown. Homer places Tarphe in the valley of the Boagrios river near Thronion, and distinguishes it from Skarpheia to the west. Strabo adds the detail that Tarphe was located on a height not far from Thronion. Obviously, then, there is no reason to equate Pharygai with Tarphe, which probably did not exist in historical times. A city named Pharygai located in the Boagrios valley is doubtless a phantom, and the site of Tarphe has yet to be discovered. Phayllos was blissfully unaware of the whole matter.¹⁷

¹⁶ *Iliad* 2.532; *IG IX 1* 3, 314; Strabo 1.3.20; 9.4.4; Paus. 7.15.3–4; Prok. *Gothic War* 8.25.19. Oldfather, "Skarpheia", *RE* 3A (1927) 460–465; Burr, *NEON KATALOGOS*, 35; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV.166–167; personal observations of 11 August 1980 and 26 May 1983. Oldfather, 461, reports the discovery of the inscription cited above near a place named Trochala, which he locates ten minutes south and a little east of Molos. Although Pritchett's investigation of this area revealed nothing, on 25 May 1983 I found at the chapel of Aghios Athanasios, which generally accords with the location of Trochala, ancient marble blocks, including an Ionic capital and three pieces of columns. The sexton professed not to know their place of origin. On the hill described in the text I found *in situ* traces of ancient inhabitation, even though the site has been heavily damaged.

¹⁷ Homer *Iliad* 2.532–533, places both Thronion and Tarphe in the Boagrios valley and Skarphe elsewhere. Hence, he mentions three different sites within proximity of one another, all in Lokris. Plutarch, a native of Chaironeia who had traveled through the area that he describes (*Mor.* 660D), adds revealing information in *Phok.* 33.7, where he treats the itinerary of Phokion to meet Polyperchon: ἀμα δὲ καὶ συνέμειξαν ἀμφοτέροι τῷ Πολυσπέρχοντι, μετὰ τοῦ βασιλέως πορευομένων, περὶ κώμην τινὰ τῆς Φωκίδος Φαρύγας, κειμένην ὑπὸ τὸ Ἀκρούριον ὄρος, ὃ νῦν Γαλάτην καλοῦσιν. Plutarch's account is especially significant because he is the only ancient source to place Pharygai within a specific historical context, that of 319 BC, which makes it difficult to explain how the Phokians could have still held control of a Lokrian place. Rather, Plutarch indicates that the historical Pharygai, which he also places within a topographical context, was a κώμη not a πόλις that

Phayllos found the Lokrian city of Naryx his most difficult adversary. Located somewhat west and above the modern village of Rhenginion, Naryx occupied a narrow spur, the eastern, northern, and western sides of which drop precipitously into deep gorges that prevent ready access to the site, which is vulnerable only from the south, where a road climbs gently to a height above the city (cf. Pl. 10). Naryx was in an excellent position to command a route up the Boagrios valley from Thronion, still in Phokian hands, to the Kephisos valley. Possession of Naryx would mean complete control of communications between Phokis and the sea. Aided by traitors within the city, Phayllos used the cover of night to introduce a body of troops into the city. The Phokian mercenaries fared no better than the Thebans had in the more famous nocturnal attack on Plataia in 431. Phokian troops outside the walls failed to support Phayllos' band, giving the inhabitants the time to rally and drive the intruders from the city, with the Phokians leaving more than 200 dead behind.¹⁸

lay in the vicinity of Elateia, hence well within Phokian territory and far removed from the sites mentioned by Homer and Strabo (cf. below). Lastly, Plutarch bears witness that some place-names within the region had already changed before his day. Strabo (9.4.4–6), who also places Thronion, Skarpheia, and Thermopylai in the same area of Lokris, adds that some cities in Lokris mentioned by Homer no longer existed; and then, out of context, he places Tarphe on a height 20 *stadia* from Thronion in a fruitful and thickly wooded area where there was a temple of Pharygaian Hera. He does, however, equate Pharygai with Tarphe, but the whole passage is corrupt and riddled with *lacunae*. If Tarphe still existed in Strabo's time, which is doubtful, then it must have stood south of Thronion in the upper reaches of the Boagrios valley, but nowhere very close either to Elateia or to Plutarch's Pharygai. Stephanos of Byzantion knows of four sites (*s. vv.*): (1) Pharygai, a well-wooded Lokrian polis, which he erroneously says that Homer calls Tarphe, where there was a spring named Tarphe; (2) Tarphe, a well-wooded Lokrian polis where there was a spring named Pharygai; (3) Skarpheia near Thermopylai; and (4) Naryx, none of them near enough to fit Plutarch's testimony. Stephanos' confusion of Pharygai and Tarphe is immediately apparent. Pritchett's labored attempt (*Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, V.170–171) to emend Strabo's Φαρύγαι to Ναρύκα (9.4.6) is an act of desperation. Even if one accepts Pritchett's contention that Stephanos depended heavily on Strabo, which no one would contest, Strabo does not use the nominative singular of the name Naryx, and Stephanos wrote Ναρύξ not Ναρύκα, which together with his other three geographical entries rules out his text as the source of the alleged corruption. Furthermore, Professor Aubrey Diller, author of *The Textual Tradition of Strabo's Geography* (Amsterdam 1975), kindly informed me by letter (25 December 1983) that "Stephanus Byzantius is of doubtful use for the text of Strabo". On the basis of the present evidence, the equation of Pharygai and Tarphe cannot be dated earlier than Strabo and was not accepted by Stephanos. Moreover, the ancient *testimonia* offer absolutely nothing to indicate that a corruption of the names of Pharygai and Naryx, as imagined by Pritchett, is involved. Cf. also the discussion of Hope Simpson-Lazenby, *Catalogue*, 48–50 and n. 9. W.A. Oldfather, *AJPh* 20 (1916) 43, observes that these Lokrian places were already so obscure in antiquity that ancient geographers were themselves uncertain of their positions and identities. Personal topographical investigation of the Boagrios valley since 1980 has failed to provide new evidence.

¹⁸ Diod. 16.38.3; cf. also 14.82.2; Steph. Byz. *s.v.* "Naryx". Cf. also Schaefer,

Afterwards, Phayllos left Naryx under siege, while he led his main body over the mountain to Abai, obviously as a prelude to an invasion of Boiotia. To do so he led his troops through the Fontana pass, now seldom used, east of Mendenitsa. The walking is very easy, and the way well-watered, and traces of cobbled road testify that this route was used well into modern times. The road enters the Kephisos valley above the modern town of Modion, the entire time of transit being roughly two and a half hours. Despite Phayllos' speed, this time the Thebans were prepared. They set out by night from Orchomenos, and a march of some hour and a half took them to Abai, where they fell upon the Phokians unexpected. After inflicting heavy casualties, they pushed beyond Abai and Hyampolis into the Kephisos valley, which they ravaged. Flushed with success, laden with booty, and perhaps infected with over-confidence, they moved to lift the siege of Naryx. A swift counter-attack by Phayllos caught them off-guard and sent them back to Boiotia in headlong retreat. Phayllos took advantage of his victory to destroy Naryx. Yet at this moment of victory the Phokian general was felled by a mysterious wasting disease, which abruptly put a temporary end to warfare in this theater. Phayllos' illness and the limited Theban success in the Kephisos valley failed to reverse the tide of Phokian victory. In this campaigning-season Phayllos put eastern Lokris permanently out of the Sacred War, which now stood between Phokis and Boiotia.¹⁹

If the Thebans thought that Phayllos' illness meant for them a respite, events in the Peloponnesos quickly disabused them of the idea. Encouraged by Archidamos' campaign of the previous year, the Spartans renewed their attack on Megalopolis. For some reason, they entrusted their forces to a *Spartiates* named Anaxandros, otherwise unknown, and not to Archidamos, who had served creditably the year before. Despite the change in command, the strategy remained the same. As in 352 the Spartan army advanced through the northwestern section of Megalopolitan territory towards Olympia. Despite their indifferent performance against Phayllos, the Thebans again sent a contingent to aid Megalopolis; but only at the city of Thelpousa, near the modern Toumpitsion, did it catch Anaxandros' force. Thelpousa sits above the valley of the Ladon river, which is here rimmed with hills. On its southern side, in the direction of the valley, the city is exposed, and perhaps here the Thebans brought the

Demosthenes, II².182; Oldfather, "Naryka", *RE* 16 (1935) 1772–1775; Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, IV.156–159; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 50; personal observations of 14 July 1986.

¹⁹ Diod. 16.38.4–5, 61.3; Paus. 10.2.6. Fontana pass: personal observations of 14 July 1986.

Spartans to battle. The Thebans defeated them, inflicting severe casualties and capturing Anaxandros together with some 60 others. In two other battles the Thebans were also victorious, but they proved unable to deliver a decisive blow against their enemy. When, after this string of defeats, the Spartans bested the Thebans in battle, both sides retired homewards. Although these engagements were apparently minor, they prevented the Spartans from destroying Megalopolis. The Spartans admitted the failure of their policy by signing a truce with the Arkadians. Unimpressive as these Theban operations were, they were hardly insignificant. Besides proving that Theban arms were still efficient, they testified to the continued commitment of the Boiotian Confederacy to its Peloponnesian allies, and they succeeded in putting Sparta out of the Sacred War.²⁰

During the fighting in the Peloponnesos, the Phokians experienced still another change of political and military leadership. Phayllos' lingering illness proved fatal, which necessitated new elections to the *strategia*. Whereas the deaths of Philomelos and Onomarchos had sparked heated political debate about the war and its conduct, this election was marked by compromise. Before his death, Phayllos had supported the candidacies of two men, one his young nephew Phalaikos, the son of Onomarchos, the other his friend Mnaseas, who could also serve as the guardian of Phalaikos. Phayllos' gesture mollified the family of Mnaseas, which had earlier opposed the aspirations of Philomelos, with whom Onomarchos had allied himself. In 351, then, the two families, for the sake of united leadership, sank their differences for the common good. The outcome meant that the Phokian forces would once again be entrusted to inexperienced generals.²¹

Phayllos' illness and the election of the new generals consumed much of the campaigning-season, but Phalaikos and Mnaseas were nevertheless able to take advantage of Theban intervention in the Peloponnesos. Their target was northwestern Boiotia, a reversion to Onomarchos' strategy, but their campaign proved a failure from beginning to end. The Boiotians surprised the Phokians in a night attack in which Mnaseas and about 200 others were killed. Phalaikos and the rest escaped, and he later launched a cavalry raid down the Kephisos valley towards Chaironeia. His aim was probably nothing more than harassment of Chaironeia, an attempt to

²⁰ Diod. 16.39.6–7; Paus. 8.27.10. Thelpousa: Paus. 8.25.1–3. Frazer, *Pausanias*, IV.285–287; E. Meyer, "Thelphusa", *RE* 5A (1934) 1618–1620; P. Lemerle, *BCH* 63 (1939) 301; personal observations of 6 June 1983. Anaximandros: P. Poralla and A.S. Bradford, *A Prosopography of Lacedaemonians*² (Chicago 1985) 21.

²¹ Arist. *Pol.* 5.3.4; Timaios, *FGrH* 566 F11; Diod. 16.38.6; Paus. 10.2.7. Cf. also Th. Lenschau, "Phalaikos", *RE* 19 (1938) 1612; Laquer, *RE* 15 (1932) 2249; M. Scheele, *ΕΠΙΘΗΓΟΕ ΑΥΤΟΚΡΑΤΩΡ* (Leipzig 1932) 10–12.

hound it and to ravage its land. Meeting his challenge, the Boiotians defeated him in a cavalry battle in which he lost a number of his horse-men. Undaunted, Phalaikos continued his operations in this area, yet he was no longer to have the field to himself. Armistice in the Peloponnesos freed the Boiotian army; and when it returned home, it found Phalaikos once again campaigning in the vicinity of Chaironeia. This time he had come in force against the city, which temporarily fell to him; but the Boiotians marshalled their full strength and drove him from the city. From Chaironeia they marched up the Kephisos valley, plundering the farms and ravaging the heart of Phokian territory. They captured some small towns, but their greatest prize was probably Neon, the scene of the Amphiktyonic victory over Philomelos, which they garrisoned. Laden with booty, they retired to Boiotia, thus ending the campaigning-season of 351.²²

B) *Attrition and stalemate (351–347 BC)*

Although a casual reading of Diodoros' annals suggests that the fighting in the Sacred War lapsed for the next few years,²³ this period was in fact marked by two major developments. One was a continuation of combat between Phokis and Boiotia, which was often intense, and the other was Philip's continued activity in Thessaly. While originally not directly related, these two developments were to draw Thebes and Philip into alliance and ultimately lead to Philip's defeat of the Phokians. For Philip these events opened the door to central and southern Greece. Each campaigning-season weakened the two major belligerents without bringing either of them appreciably closer to victory than before. Even the recent Boiotian success in the Kephisos valley, while heartening, was a decidedly mixed blessing. To garrison Neon was expensive; and Phokian depredations in southwestern Boiotia, together with the yearly strain of fighting, had depleted Theban resources. By 351/0 financial difficulties became another significant impediment to Boiotian hopes of winning the Sacred War. This was the overall situation upon which Philip was soon to capitalize.

²² Phalaikos' cavalry raid: Diod. 16.38.7; his later campaign: Diod. 16.39.8. Although M. Sordi, *Diodori Siculi, Bibliothecae Liber XVI* (Florence 1969) 73, 75, considers these operations a doublet derived from Diodoros' use of two different sources, they are indeed separate events. Cavalry alone had virtually no hope of capturing a well-walled city like Chaironeia. Instead, their goal must have been similar to Epameinondas', when he ordered a cavalry raid on Mantinea in 362: Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.14. Neon: Dem. 19.148. Diodoros' words (16.39.8): ἐνία δὲ καὶ τῶν μικρῶν πολισμάτων ἐλόντες, suggest this as the best occasion for the Theban capture of Neon. Cf. also Strabo 9.3.16.

²³ Cf. Hammond, *CQ* 32 (1938) 150; Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, II.92 n. 186.

Probably not until after the campaigning-season of 351 did the Thebans turn to the king of Persia to solve their financial problems by asking for 300 talents. K.J. Beloch, who offers the best explanation for this curious turn of events, links the Boiotian request to the King's foreign policy. There is much to be said for the suggestion. Earlier, the Thebans had refilled their coffers with barbarian silver, when they sent Pammenes and a large hoplite army to Artabazos. Another Asian adventure was worth the effort; so notwithstanding their earlier support of the rebellious satrap, the Thebans sent a mission to the King. Persian kings had been known to forget old animosities out of expediency, and in 351 any Persian resentment against the Thebans was less than the desire to reconquer Egypt. Moreover, the timing of the Theban appeal was most opportune. In 351 the King's campaign in the west, about which virtually nothing is known, had foundered, and a fresh force of Greek hoplites offered him new hope of success. The military reputation of the Boiotians remained high, and he welcomed the offer with his usual generosity. He sent the Boiotian Confederacy the requested 300 talents, in return for which he doubtless received the service of a large band of hoplites. Despite his preparations, however, he failed to regain Egypt.²⁴

The dispatch of the Boiotian hoplites alone threw the Thebans onto the defensive in 350. Although the Thebans now possessed the money to finance the garrison at Neon, they also needed to maintain contact with it, which invited continued conflict. The Phokians and Boiotians engaged in numerous skirmishes, of which nothing substantial is known. These actions were probably very much like the quick and generally small Theban forays against Spartan garrisons in Boiotia during the early 370s—actions involving relatively small numbers more intent upon disruption than conquest. The primary scene of action was doubtless the Kephisos valley, through which it was very easy to stage quick raids with few troops. Still weary in 350 after prolonged fighting, each side willingly settled for small gains at small risk.²⁵

The failure of the King's Egyptian campaign in 350 released Boiotian

²⁴ King's campaign: Dem. 15.11–12; Isok. 5.101; Diod. 16.44.1, 48.1; Diod. 16.40.1–2 for the 300 talents, which is unnecessarily doubted by Badian, *Pulpuveva* 4 (1983) 58. Although the size of the Boiotian force is unknown, 300 talents could have paid a force of 5000 men at the rate of one *drachma* per day per man for about a year. This fact alone argues against the remarkable suggestion of Hornblower, *Greek World*, 247, that these troops are those of Pammenes (cf. pp. 50–51 above). Since the Boiotian Confederacy needed funds for the Sacred War, the number of troops dispatched to Egypt was presumably less than 5000. Beloch's suggestion: *GG III*².1.483 n. 1; cf. also J.W. Betlyon, *American Numismatic Society, Museum Notes* 21 (1976) 28–35; Frye, *The History of Ancient Iran*, 131–132. The King's forgiveness: Diod. 15.91.1–7; 16.43–45.4.

²⁵ Diod. 16.40.2; raids in the 370s: Plut. *Pel.* 15.6–8. Cf. also Beloch, *GG III*².1.483.

hoplites for service closer to home. The Thebans opened the campaigning-season of 349 with a major strike at Hyampolis. They thus continued the strategy begun in 351 of applying pressure in the Kephisos valley. The Boiotian army entered Phokian territory northwest of Tegyra by an easy road. The route rises steadily but not steeply from the Kopaic basin through a narrow valley, which in turn opens onto a gently rolling upland valley. Near Abai a long, broad view of the Kephisos valley, dominated by Mt. Parnassos, meets the traveler's gaze before the road descends somewhat at the foot of the hill dominated by the akropolis of Abai. There the invaders entered the fertile valley separating Abai in the south from Hyampolis in the north. Abai itself was too strongly situated to fear conquest, but Hyampolis lay in an exposed position. The akropolis of Hyampolis, once walled, sits on a low, flat-topped hill; but today few remains, apart from some broken foundations and short stretches of wall, give evidence of ancient building. Unable to overwhelm either city, the Boiotians ravaged the plain between them, driving off the defenders who sallied forth to oppose them. Having conducted little more in reality than a large raid, the Boiotians returned to their homes.²⁶

If the Boiotian attack surprised Phalaikos, who made no move to relieve Hyampolis, it did not prevent him from pursuing his own strategy, complicated now by the return of the Boiotian troops from Asia. Rather than risk battle in the Kephisos valley, where their strength in cavalry and hoplites gave the Boiotians the advantage, he decided to strike Boiotia over Mt. Helikon. By 349 the fort now known only as Palaioastron above modern Kyriakion (cf. pp. 72–73 above) easily dominated the western part of the mountain. Using the upland route below Palaioastron, he struck first at Koroneia, the scene of Onomarchos' victory in 353, with the city falling easily to his quick and unexpected attack. As had Onomarchos earlier, he defeated a Theban relief-force, upon which he inflicted heavy losses, thus winning firm control of the city. He had won a major victory with surprising ease, and once again Theban communications with the northwestern basin of Boiotia were in jeopardy.²⁷

For Phalaikos, however, the victory at Koroneia was only a beginning. His troops also overran the fortress of Tilphossaion, a site about which there is some controversy.²⁸ The sources describe the place as a mountain some 50 *stadia* (or nine kilometers) west of Haliartos on the main road

²⁶ Dem. 1.20; 3.8; Diod. 16.56.1; Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².185; personal observations of 5 August 1980 and 2 June 1983.

²⁷ Dem. 3.27 with schol.; Diod. 16.56.2. Cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².185; Buckler, *Teiresias* Sup. 2 (1979) 16, where the date of the attack is incorrect.

²⁸ Diod. 16.56.2; cf. 16.58.1; Dem. 19.141, 148. Theopompus, *FGH* 115 F301, provides contemporary evidence for the form of the name.

to Delphoi, along which passed numerous travelers on foot, mounted, or in wagons. There on level ground were a temple, grove, and cool springs.²⁹ The site best meeting these requirements is modern Petra, a tall rock that forms the northern end of a long spur of Mt. Helikon. Rising steeply above the road between Haliartos and Koroneia, its summit is crowned with the ruins of a fortification (cf. Pl. 11), with black-glazed sherds testifying to the antiquity of the remains. The walls encircle a generous area that is easily defensible, all the more so since on the western and northern sides the slopes are so steep as to be virtually inaccessible. The approach from the south appears easy, but is now rendered nearly impossible by thick undergrowth. The best approach, though not so easy, is from the modern village of Upsilantis to the east. A garrison placed on Petra was in an excellent position to bar the main road between Lake Kopais and Mt. Helikon. It also commanded another, but inferior, road to the immediate south, still marked in places by stretches of cobbled pavement. This track, higher than the main road, runs between Koroneia in the west along the heights overlooking the lake-bed, and proceeding below the lofty peak now named Palaiothēva, descends to the south of Petra onto Upsilantis.³⁰

Some scholars consider Palaiothēva a candidate for Tilphossaion, while others maintain that the entire ridge from Palaiothēva in the south to Petra in the north was known as Tilphossaion.³¹ Palaiothēva rises abruptly like a rocky bastion above the upland route that runs along its foot (cf. Pl. 12). A steep path from the north climbs past a spring to the summit, upon which are the remains of long curtain walls. Since only early classical sherds are reported on the site, one cannot be certain that it

²⁹ *Homeric Hymn to Apollo* 244–276, 377–387; Dem. 19.141, 148; Diod. 4.66.5, 67.1; 19.53.7; Strabo 9.2.27; Plut. *Sulla* 20.4; Paus. 9.33.1–5, who like Diodoros distinguishes Tilphossaion from Alalkomenai. Wallace, *Strabo's Boiotia*, 144–145, provides good secondary bibliography, to which should be added E. Janssens, *L'Antiquité classique* 27 (1958) 114–121.

³⁰ J.M. Fossey, *Teiresias* Sup. 1 (1972) 9–10, best describes the remains; personal observations of 14 August 1980. T. Spyropoulos, *Athens Annals of Archaeology* 6 (1973) 381–384, has discovered a temple at Petra; cf. also J. Knauss, *Die Melioration des Kopaisbeckens durch die Minyer im 2. Jt. v. Chr.* (Munich 1987) 56–59.

³¹ F. Schober, "Tilphossaion", *RE* 6A (1936) 1045; P. Guillon, *Les trépieds du Ptoion*, II (Paris 1943) 120; J. Fontenrose, *TAPA* 100 (1969) 119–131; Fossey, *ibid.*, 14; S. Lauffer, *KOPAIS I* (Frankfurt a.M. 1986) end map. Strabo (9.2.35–36), who shows no evidence of having examined the territory himself, has confused matters. First, he refers to places around Lake Kopais, among which he includes Chaironeia and Leuktra, a manifest error. Secondly, although he knew that Mt. Tilphossaion and Alalkomenai were different places, as did Diodoros (19.53.7), he seems improperly to have understood their geographical relation to each other; cf. instead Paus. 9.34.1; Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.167–169.

was occupied in the later classical and Hellenistic periods.³² The view that Palaiotheva was Tilphossaion is also dubious for a variety of other reasons, including the absence of a temple, a grove, and the unsuitableness of the upland route for wagon traffic. Palaiotheva neither lay on the main road or is it easily noticeable from it, whereas Petra is conspicuous.³³ Unless archaeology can shed new chronological information, one can only say that Phokian occupation of Tilphossaion, here defined as Petra alone, defended Koroneia from Theban counter-attack by closing the two easiest routes from the east. It was certainly in Phalaikos' interest to secure the site of Palaiotheva, for he would thereby further strengthen his hold on the upland track linking Tilphossaion and Koroneia, and in the process protect the communications of his garrison at Petra with its rear. At any rate, with Tilphossaion, Koroneia, and Palaiokastron in his hands, Phalaikos dominated every route west of Haliartos.

To tighten his grip even further Phalaikos again took advantage of the high route over Mt. Helikon, this time to capture Chorsiai, a somewhat isolated city in southwestern Boiotia (cf. p. 37 above). The road from Palaiokastron towards Chorsiai runs onwards from the head of the Phalaros valley and then immediately west of Palaiovouna turns sharply southwards over and down a shoulder thrown seawards by Palaiovouna. A well along the way gives the traveler welcome relief, and a walk of some three hours brings him to the site of Chorsiai, which overlooks the modern bay of Sarandi. The road to Chorsiai also branches to Thisbe, beyond which lay a fertile and hitherto secure area, untouched by the ravages of the long war. Since the cities of Thespiiai and Plataia had long since been destroyed, only the strongly fortified city of Thisbe, loyal to the Boiotian Confederacy, prevented Phalaikos from overrunning the region. Hence, the capture of Chorsiai gave the Phokians the opportunity, however restricted, to thrust deep into Boiotian territory.³⁴

The capture of Koroneia, its outrider Tilphossaion, and Chorsiai, the prizes supported by the fortified site of Palaiokastron, enabled the

³² For a description of the site, cf. Fossey, *ibid.*, 6–9; personal observations of 13 August 1980. For modern bibliography, cf. Pritchett, *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, V.151–156, whose discussion neither adduces new evidence nor indicates personal examination of the site. Cf. also Kallet-Marx, *BOIOTIKA*, 302–307.

³³ In the light of Paus. 9.34.4 alone, καὶ πηγαί—τὴν μὲν Λιβηθριάδα ὀνομάζουσιν, ἡ δὲ ἑτέρα—Πέτρα—γυναικὸς μαστοῖς εἰσιν εἰκασμέναι, καὶ ὁμοιον γάλακτι ὕδωρ ἀπ' αὐτῶν ἄνεισιν, one can urge that Palaiotheva was Mt. Libethrion and that Petra was the separate site presently known by the same name. Petra certainly has the form of a μαστός, and springs exist at both places; cf. also Hitzig-Blümner, *Pausaniae Graeciae Descriptio*, III.1.498.

³⁴ Dem. 19.141; Theopompus, *FGrH* 115 F167; Diod. 16.56.2, 58.1. P. Roesch, *Cahiers d'Histoire* 15 (1970) 374–376. For the site, cf. J.M. Fossey *et al.*, *Khostia* (Montreal 1981); personal observations of 21 June 1971, 11 August 1978, and 9 August 1980.

Phokians to create a triangular system capable of offense and defense—the Boiotian cities forming the base and Palaiokastron the apex of the triangle. Palaiokastron was in an excellent situation to supply and reinforce the Phokian garrisons in Boiotia. In terms of attack, Phalaikos could use the fortress to push troops by way of Koroneia for operations against Boiotian cities in the Kopaic basin, notably Lebadeia and Haliartos, or by way of Chorsiai into the plain once dominated by Thespiiai. Palaiokastron also meant that any Theban counter-attack on Koroneia or Chorsiai mounted from Thisbe risked being taken in flank and totally cut off. The existence of these strongpoints and garrisons enabled the Phokians virtually to put the western basin of Boiotia under siege. Phalaikos had won a major victory, one conceivably capable of disrupting the Boiotian Confederacy and bringing Thebes down in defeat. Because of the importance of Phalaikos' victories, the Thebans probably responded immediately with probing attacks along the Kopais. If so, they met with failure. Phalaikos was determined not simply to win these strongpoints, but also to use them against his enemies.

For the Thebans even worse was soon to come. Having so ruptured Theban communications, Phalaikos seized the opportunity to reconquer Orchomenos, which was probably held by a small Theban garrison, if defended at all. Victory at Orchomenos again isolated Chaironeia, and further put western Boiotia under Phokian control. In this region the only major cities still loyal to the Boiotian Confederacy were Chaironeia and Lebadeia, the one threatened by its proximity to Phokis and by the ease of communications down the Kephisos valley, the other by the Phokian garrison at Koroneia. The natural wealth of this land was largely lost to the Boiotian Confederacy, which had now suffered substantial dismemberment. By the end of 349 Phalaikos had brought Phokis closer to victory than anyone since Onomarchos. Furthermore, his victories promised even greater rewards than those of his predecessors. He had so staggered Thebes that for the first time in years the Phokians could realistically expect to win the Sacred War. Except for Onomarchos' early successes in Thessaly, Phalaikos' triumphs in this year were easily the most brilliant of the war. The campaigning-season of 349 left the Thebans in desperate straits.³⁵

Phalaikos' victories also had repercussions in Thessaly, where they aggravated an already sensitive situation. By 349 the Thessalian Confederacy was obviously unhappy with its archon, Philip, who had been applying Thessalian resources to his own Macedonian ends. Moreover,

³⁵ Dem. 19.141, 148; Diod. 16.56.2, 58.1.

before the year had ended, events in Euboia had further thrown matters in central Greece into upheaval. Fortunately, Demosthenes in two contemporary speeches to his countrymen gives some explanation of the strained relations between the Thessalians and Philip. In the *First Olynthiac*, delivered early in 349, Demosthenes claims that the Thessalian Confederacy had voted to demand the return of Pagasai (cf. pp. 78–79 above). The Thessalians had also hindered Philip from fortifying Magnesia. Demosthenes reports the rumor that the Thessalians would no longer give Philip the revenues from their market and harbor taxes because they felt that these funds should be used for the needs of the Confederacy.³⁶

Demosthenes' testimony is instructive in several ways. First, the Thessalian vote clearly took place at a formal meeting of the Confederacy. The chronology is uncertain. Neither is it known when the league regularly met nor precisely when in 349 Demosthenes delivered his oration. Not mere grumbling, the Thessalian complaints were voiced in an official resolution. The complaints indicate that Philip still held Pagasai long after the battle of the Crocus Plain and that either he or his lieutenants were even then active in Magnesia. Although Philip obviously considered these places his possessions, probably by right of conquest, the Confederacy claimed them as federal territory. It is perhaps impossible to determine, at least with regard to Magnesia, whether the Thessalian complaint was justified. Nor is it enough to dismiss the legalities simply because Philip was in fact the law. Two considerations emerge from these events. Thessalian discontent readily translated itself into civil war, which would drastically interfere with Philip's ambitions elsewhere. Philip had not with such difficulty won such a rich land only to lose it through neglect or indifference. Therefore, despite his many schemes and activities, he must again in 349 devote his attention to Thessaly.

Philip responded quickly and in his usual disarming way. The very first of his later response suggests that he had not been present at the meeting of the Confederacy at which the complaints had been voiced. His absence doubtless had made it easier for the representatives to criticize their archon. Once again, Demosthenes provides the only information, this time in his *Second Olynthiac*, also dated to 349. He repeats that the Thessalians had voted to demand the return of Pagasai and had objected to the situation in Magnesia. Typically, Philip moved promptly to dissipate

³⁶ Demosthenes' verb forms in 1.22 (cf. also the scholion) prove that the Thessalians had actually voted their resolution concerning Pagasai and had done something regarding Magnesia, but that they had not yet taken steps over taxes. That these were federal matters is proven by Demosthenes' use of the phrase τὰ κοινὰ τὰ Θετταλῶν. For the chronology of the *Olynthiacs*, cf. Picard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, 193–204. Cf. also Westlake, *Thessaly*, 184–185; Ellis, *Philip*. 95–96.

distrust and to reaffirm his ostensible commitment to Thessalian interests. He promised the Thessalian Confederacy that he would return Magnesia, thus recognizing the federal claim to the area. It hardly mattered, since as archon he could always maintain that he held the region on behalf of Thessaly. Nonetheless, the gesture alone demonstrated his desire not to antagonize the Thessalians, while upholding the appearance of one who sincerely had Thessalian interests at heart.³⁷

Philip's second response is especially enlightening. He promised the Thessalians that he would fight the Phokian War on their behalf. At first sight this proposal seems surprising, since the Thessalians had earlier, according to Demosthenes, said nothing about the conflict. Nevertheless, Philip's promise explains the complaint about the misuse of Thessalian taxes. The Thessalian complaint and Philip's response demonstrate the understanding that as the archon of the Confederacy the king would further Thessalian policy by taking an active part in the Sacred War. Yet after 353 Philip had turned his back on the temple-robbers in order to pursue his own ambitions in Thrace and to spar with the Athenians. As it happened, Philip appeared amenable enough to allay Thessalian fears, but in fact in 349 Olynthos and the Chalkidike were far more important to him than Phokis. Even so, these events prove beyond doubt that Philip was not allowed to forget the progress of the Sacred War, which was bound up with his own larger ambitions.³⁸

Mysterious events in Pherai also prevented him from forgetting Greek affairs. Diodoros (16.52.9) reports that during 349/8, after his operations in the Chalkidike, Philip moved south into Thessaly, whence he expelled Peitholaos, who had once again become ruler of Pherai. On any count, this episode is remarkable, and some historians have rejected it outright as still another of Diodoros' many chronological blunders. Although that possibility can never be dismissed, a mistake cannot easily be explained, especially since the notice of Peitholaos' expulsion is not a typical Diodoran doublet. Diodoros had earlier (16.37.3) recorded the surrender of the tyrants Peitholaos and Lykophron to Philip and (16.39.3) their participation in the Peloponnesian fighting of 352, all of which had taken place several years before 349/8. The two previous notices and the lapse of time between them and the later entry make it difficult to postulate either a doublet or an incorrect date in Diodoros' chronographic source.³⁹ Nor is

³⁷ Dem. 2.7–11. Once again, the verb forms are instructive, with Philip having actually promised to do things in the future. His response to the Thessalian complaints argues in favor of the traditional order of the *Olynthiacs*.

³⁸ Cf. also Cawkwell, *Philip*, 66.

³⁹ Momigliano's suggestion (*Filippo il Macedone*, 140) that Peitholaos' return to Pherai be dated to 344 is even more unlikely.

it easier to explain the presence of Peitholaos, as G.T. Griffith has attempted, by saying that Diodoros has merely inserted a familiar name for that of a popular leader who had suddenly come to the fore in Pherai.⁴⁰ There is absolutely no evidence to support the suggestion. Diodoros was hardly a master of onomastics, but he tried to the best of his limited ability to report honestly what he had read.

If there be any truth to the testimony of Diodoros, another explanation is needed. His last notice of Peitholaos and Lykophron together dealt with their operations in the Peloponnesos, after which Lykophron disappears from history. Diodoros nowhere records their ultimate fate, as he later (16.61–64) noted the deaths of Archidamos and Phalaikos, a fact perhaps explained by the abbreviated nature of these chapters. Speculation is fruitless, but there is nothing inherently impossible about the return of the two, if Lykophron were still alive, especially in view of continual unrest in Thessaly. Peitholaos, a descendant of Jason, was a member of the most popular and powerful family in Pherai. The populace probably preferred its previous standing in Thessaly to the authority of the Thessalian Confederacy and its Macedonian archon. Now essentially a mercenary commander in need of employment, Peitholaos could serve a special function for the Phokians at little risk to themselves. It was simplicity itself to hire Peitholaos and his mercenaries for service in Thessaly, there to regain Pherai and to take advantage of Thessalian discontent with Philip, even if only to distract the enemy. The use of Peitholaos and his men for service in Thessaly was a gamble that Phalaikos could easily afford to take. At best, the ensuing turmoil could result in a Thessalian rebellion against Philip, at worst the loss of some mercenaries. Whatever the result, no harm would come to Phokis so long as Phalaikos held Thermopylai. Ultimately the gamble failed, in large part because Philip had done his work in Thessaly very well. Even Thessalians distrustful of Philip must have realized that successful resistance to him demanded more than Peitholaos and his Phokian friends could provide and that support of the tyrannical house of Pherai promised only a return to the misery of the 370s and 360s. Philip quickly intervened from the north to expel Peitholaos, about whom nothing further is heard, and to end Phokian ambitions in Thessaly.

⁴⁰ *HM*, II.320–321; cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².139; Sordi, *La lega tessala*, 358. Chronology: Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 FF49–51, 156. Westlake, *Thessaly*, 183 n. 4, uses Demosthenes' testimony (2.14) that the Macedonians had recently (vov) helped the Thessalians against the tyrannical house (which the scholiast mistakenly identifies as the Aleuada) to support Diodoros. This is perhaps to take Demosthenes too literally. After all, in 341 he applied the word "lately" (πρῶν) to events in Thessaly that had happened in 344 (Diod. 16.69.8). Pertinent, however, is Diodoros' knowledge of endemic unrest in Thessaly, which caused Philip continual problems.

There only remained Philip's final reckoning with the Phokians themselves.⁴¹

To these events another should be added—the turmoil that engulfed Euboia from the winter of 349 to the following summer. Much of what transpired on the island is only imperfectly known, but clear enough is Phokian involvement in this episode. Since 357, when unrest swept the island and the Athenians carried the day against a Boiotian force that had also intervened, the major cities of Euboia had been governed by tyrants who were at least nominally friendly to Athens. One of the most important was Ploutarchos, tyrant of Eretria, whose Athenian alliance did not allay domestic unrest there. He exiled his opponent Kleitarchos, who appealed to Phokis for help. Kleitarchos' choice of patron of itself shows how badly hurt Thebes had been in the campaigning-season of 349. The exile expected no help there. Yet Phalaikos' response to the appeal is surprising. Tyrants with cordial ties to Athens, a Phokian ally, promised Phalaikos a quiet and secure region, one additionally significant because of its strategic position. Therefore, the reasons for his next step are not immediately obvious. He lent Kleitarchos a Phokian mercenary force to be used against Ploutarchos in Eretria. That tighter control of Euboia would give Phokis greater security is obvious enough; but unlike the efforts in Pherai, this attempt came at the expense of an ally, albeit one that had helped Phokis precious little. Perhaps the simplest answer is that because of Athens' lukewarm support, Phalaikos felt more secure with Eretria in the hands of his man and that little risk was attached to such a surprise attack. Moreover, he had on hand an idle force of mercenaries who were surely superior to anything likely to be found in Eretria.⁴²

Whatever his motives, Phalaikos this time gambled successfully. With Phokian mercenaries at his back, Kleitarchos drove Ploutarchos from Eretria. The Athenians responded quickly by dispatching a force under the veteran commander Phokion. The incident sparked a widespread rebellion against the Athenians, with the Euboians mustering available troops and appealing to Philip for additional support. The Euboians trapped Phokion at Tamynai; and only a resolute counter-attack, in which the orator Aischines distinguished himself, enabled the Athenians to extricate themselves. This paltry victory marked the highpoint of Athenian

⁴¹ Cf. also Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, 199; Ellis, *Philip*, 95–96; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 106.

⁴² Aischin. 2.169; 3.86–88; Dem. 21.162; Ps.-Dem. 59.4; Diod. 16.57.1; Strabo 10.1.10; Plut. *Phok.* 12.–14. Cf. also G.L. Cawkwell, *CQ* 12 (1962) 125–130; P.A. Brunt, *CQ* 19 (1969) 248–250; J.M. Carter, *Historia* 20 (1971) 418–429; H.-J. Gehrke, *Phokion* (Munich 1976) 7–11; Griffith, *HM*, II.318–319; C. Bearzot, *Foicone tra storia e trasfigurazione ideale* (Milan 1985) 84–94.

success. Although the Athenians doggedly tried to recoup their fortunes, by the summer of 348 they were forced to admit defeat. Euboia became independent of Athens, and Phalaikos' man continued to rule Eretria. The Phokians feared nothing more from this quarter. If Phalaikos could feel satisfied with his work, Philip, who had not responded at all, could feel even more so. The furor caused by Phalaikos' intervention in Euboia distracted the Athenians long enough for Philip unhindered to reduce Olynthos by siege. Although Phalaikos for his own reasons sowed the crop and during his short career profited from its growth, Philip ultimately reaped the harvest. That harvest was rich. The Athenian failure to support Olynthos ended any reasonable hope of stopping Philip in the north. At the time, that was not Phalaikos' problem, and his gamble resulted in the further protection of his eastern flank.⁴³

⁴³ Although Plutarch (*Phok.* 12–14) gives the fullest account of these events, the contemporary Aischines (3.86–88) provides the most important testimony. The orator states that Kallias of Chalkis collected troops from Euboia to resist Phokion's expedition and that he also appealed to Philip for reinforcements (καὶ παρὰ Φιλίππου δύναμιν προσμεταπεμψάμενος). Aischines further maintains that Kallias' brother Taurosthenes (cf. also scholion to Aischin. 2.85) introduced Phokian mercenaries (τοὺς Φωκικοὺς ξένους) into Euboia for additional support. Aischines' testimony was challenged by his scholiast, who avers that the Phokian mercenaries were provided by Phalaikos and that Kleitarchos, not Taurosthenes, led them to Euboia. In the light of the scholiast's criticism, Cawkwell (130) recommends emending Aischines' text so that instead of Φιλίππου there one should instead read Φαλαίκου. Griffith (318 n. 2), who himself rejects the reasons behind Cawkwell's emendation, nonetheless comments that "We are invited to emend Φιλίππου to Φαλαίκου". The invitation should be politely declined. Since the emendation is not palaeographically easy, and since Griffith himself, while rejecting it, nonetheless postulates Philip's participation in these events, one must look to the scholiast himself for the solution of this problem.

The scholiast read in Aischines' text that Phokian mercenaries had seen action in Euboia and that Kallias had asked Philip for reinforcements. His commentary on Aischines 3.103 shows that he knew that Kleitarchos had replaced Ploutarchos as tyrant of Eretria. The scholiast also knew from Aischines (2.130) that Phalaikos, Φωκῆων τυράννος, was in control of Phokis. From the chronological table that he used (cf. his comments on Aischin. 3.103; from the same source he derived the archon-date of Tolmides' circumnavigation of the Peloponnesos; cf. also the scholiast's observations on Aischin. 2.75), he found confirmation of Phalaikos' *strategia*. Even if he had not read in his sources that Phalaikos had lent Kleitarchos help, he could reasonably conclude that the only person capable of providing Phokian mercenaries was Phalaikos. There can be no doubt that he meant to write "Phalaikos" in his scholion, even though one manuscript reads συμβάν περί φυλακῆς instead of λαβών παρὰ Φαλαίκου. The scholiast also saw no reason to correct Aischines about the appeal to Philip, even though he had pointedly challenged Aischines over Taurosthenes' role in these events. In his text of Aischines the scholiast read Φιλίππου.

Kallias' appeal to Philip was eminently sensible. Philip was no friend of Athens; and shortly before these events began had intervened in Thessaly, where he had displayed an air of reasonableness over Magnesia. It must have seemed attractive to call upon him for help, especially at a time after the campaigning-season of 349, when he, like Phalaikos, had idle forces at his disposal. As it happened, Philip had no need to respond at all. Kleitarchos won an easy victory at Eretria with Phalaikos' mercenaries, the Euboians rose

Over the winter of 349 Phalaikos and his enemies could assess their gains and losses. Phalaikos had reason for guarded optimism. He had hurt Thebes badly by disrupting the Boiotian Confederacy on a considerable scale. The challenge facing the Thebans in the campaigning-season of 348 would be somehow to weaken the Phokian grip on western Boiotia. Events in Euboia gave Phalaikos additional cause for satisfaction. Only Philip was a source of concern. Things had gone wrong at Pherai, and Philip had assuaged Thessalian discontent by promising to take a more active role in the Sacred War. For the moment, Olynthos occupied Philip's attention, but the signs were nonetheless vaguely ominous. Perhaps now Phalaikos decided henceforth to maintain a defensive posture in the north; there would be no further operations in Thessaly and nothing further to antagonize Philip. Rather, the Phokian was content to hold the pass through Thermopylai, while aiming his offensive operations at Boiotia.

The Thebans opened the campaigning-season of 348 with a surprising move. Instead of renewing their counter-attacks against the Phokian garrisons at Chorsiai, Tilphossaion, Koroneia, and Orchomenos, they struck directly at Phokis itself. They did so not only to weaken the enemy, but also to bring relief to their hard-pressed garrison in Neon. Since the route by Tilphossaion and Koroneia was dangerous, they probably marched by way of Akraiphia and thence around Lake Kopais to the Abai-Hyampolis road, which leaves the Kopais northeast of Orchomenos in the vicinity of the modern Polygyra. The Boiotian invasion seems to have taken the Phokians by surprise, and their resistance failed to prevent either the destruction of much grain in the Kephisos valley or the beleaguering of the cities there. Although the Thebans had lessened the pressure on the garrison at Neon, they had not rendered it appreciably safer. The Phokians, though taken aback, nonetheless quickly brought succor to their embattled countrymen, some of whom had been temporarily cut off completely. When the Thebans retired over Mt. Hedyllion along the Abai-Orchomenos road, the Phokians intercepted them and brought them to a major battle. Laden with booty and surprisingly inferior in cavalry, the Thebans suffered a major defeat, losing 270 men and surrendering the field to the Phokians. For a hoplite battle, Theban losses were high, and the combination of casualties and unexpected defeat not only further taxed Theban strength but also dampened morale. Despite the initial success of the invasion, the defeat on Mt. Hedyllion erased early Theban gains. If the Boiotian campaign had disrupted any plans of

against Athens, and Athenian attempts to reassert control over the island so distracted them that they failed to render any significant help to Olynthos. Under the circumstances it was to Philip's advantage to "let sleeping dogs lie".

Phalaikos for the summer of 348, the Phokian victory dashed Theban hopes of relieving pressure on western Boiotia, thus leaving them with the same military problem that had existed at the start of the campaigning-season. Added now was doubtless a growing sense of frustration and apprehension, a feeling that ultimate victory remained as elusive as before.⁴⁴

The summer of 347 would only reinforce that feeling. The strength of the Phokian position on Mt. Helikon and the uses to which it could be put became readily apparent in the campaigning-season of 347. This time Phalaikos struck first, not permitting the Thebans to undertake independent action. Along the upland route past Palaiokeastron, thus outflanking Lebadeia, the Phokians dispatched mercenary forces to Koroneia and Chorsiai, whence they harried the countryside. Thisbe in the southwest was hard pressed, but so well-walled and its communications with Thebes so good that its fall was unlikely, as was the case of Haliartos. Lebadeia, endangered by Phokian garrisons in the neighborhood, could at least maintain a precarious link with Chaironeia, which prevented the two cities from being totally isolated. Nevertheless, Phalaikos' strategy of attrition brought ready results. Defenders of the individual Boiotian cities were no match in the field for the Phokian mercenaries, who were everywhere victorious.⁴⁵

Another ominous sign was the construction of a Phokian fort at Abai. The purpose of this fortification was two-fold, first to strengthen communications with the Phokian garrison at Orchomenos and secondly to close the only route of invasion still open to the Thebans, the one that they had used as recently as 348. Phalaikos was tightening his grip on western Boiotia and defending eastern Phokis. The Thebans responded at once by pushing a field-army along the previously used route north of Lake Kopais, and thence westwards through Polygyra. Prompt action paid immediate results. The Thebans easily routed the Phokians in pitched battle; and while most of the defeated fled to their homes, some 500 others took refuge in the temple of Apollo near Abai. The temple was famous throughout Greece as the seat of an ancient oracle made more hallowed by its destruction at Persian hands during Xerxes' invasion. In the vicinity of the temple spread the tents of those building the fortifications and an abundant crop of rushes. The Thebans set fire to both, with the blaze quickly

⁴⁴ Dem. 19.148–149 with schol.; 19.320; Diod. 16.56.2; cf. Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F157. Topography: personal observations of 2 June 1983; cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².184.

⁴⁵ Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F167 (not to be confused with Paus. 9.24.5); Dem. 19.141, 148 (with schol.); Diod. 16.58.1; Skylax *Periplus* 38.

consuming the temple, which remained a charred shell to Pausanias' day, and the Phokian suppliants within. Although Diodoros piously believes that the fire was providential, the skeptic can posit Theban revenge upon people who had sought sanctuary in Apollo's temple at Abai after having for so long plundered his temple at Delphoi. It was another atrocity in a particularly ugly war.⁴⁶

The victory at Abai proved that the Thebans could still win the big battles, but the big battles were not winning the war. With casualties mounting and resources dwindling, the Thebans now admitted to themselves that alone they stood little chance of vanquishing the Phokians so long as Apollo's treasures lasted. Nor did they know, although speculation elsewhere was rife, when the sacred wealth would be exhausted. Perhaps at most they could, unaided, recover the Boiotian cities then in Phokian

⁴⁶ Diod. 16.58.4–6; Paus. 10.35.1–4; Eusebios *Praep. Ev.* 8.14.33. The slaughter of the suppliants is reminiscent of a similar atrocity committed earlier in Arkadia: Xen. *Hell.* 6.5.9. Temple at Abai: Hdt. 1.46; 8.27, 33, 135; Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F11; Paus. 4.32.5. The identity and location of this temple is now the subject of some debate, owing to the excavation of a large temple less than a mile north of the modern village of Kalapodion: R. Felsch *et al.*, *Archäologischer Anzeiger* (1980) 38–118, and personal observations of 29 May 1983. Here Felsch and his colleagues have found a major shrine, the origins of which date to the Mycenaean period and the life of which lasted into Hellenistic times. After the destruction of the two archaic temples, plausibly connected with Xerxes' invasion, Felsch found only minor evidence for further destruction before the Hellenistic period and no traces of the fire mentioned by Diodoros and Pausanias in connection with the events of 347. Although Felsch has found an inscription bearing the name of Apollo, it is still uncertain whether the sanctuary there was dedicated to Apollo or to Artemis, who was also honored at nearby Hyampolis (Paus. 10.35.4). Two other inscriptions, both found at Kalapodion by W.A. Oldfather, *AJA* 19 (1915) 334, bear on the question. One clearly proves that Kalapodion is the site of ancient Kleonai. The other, only partially preserved and that part not easily read, bears the name ΑΠΟΛΛ (side two line 3; the entire right half of this side has been destroyed). Thanks to Dr. B. Bohn it was possible to examine this stone, which is now in the World Heritage Museum of the University of Illinois, without, however, my being able to add any new readings. Although perhaps a manumission inscription dedicated to the tutelary god of the temple, a type commonly found in sanctuaries, names with the prefix "Apollo" are so common that in the absence of an ending one cannot determine whether a god or a mortal is being named.

Three other factors bear upon the matter. Pausanias (10.35.2) actually saw a burnt-out temple during his visit to Abai, which he considered the seat of the famous oracle. Next, his narrative indicates that he traveled no farther north than Hyampolis in the valley now dominated by the village of Exarchos. Therefore, there is no reason to suggest that he even saw the temple excavated by Felsch, which indeed lay in ruins by Pausanias' day. Lastly, Y.V. Yorke, *JHS* 16 (1896) 291–312, who excavated Abai and found there a sanctuary, notes on his map (Pl. 14) the existence of marshes, the natural habitat of rushes, next to it. My first examination of Abai on 5 August 1980 revealed no land now capable of supporting rushes; but, like the now-drained Lake Kopais, the face of the land has been drastically changed by modern irrigation, drainage, and agriculture. On the other hand, the temple near Kalapodion struck me as enjoying good natural drainage, which makes it hard to envisage marshy conditions there. These results are not entirely satisfactory, since they do nothing to identify the temple near Kalapodion. However, there should be no doubt that it was not the famous oracle of Apollo at Abai that figures so prominently in classical history.

hands. But decisive victory over the Phokians was beyond their strength and means. Therefore, sometime in the summer of 347 the Thebans sent an embassy to Philip seeking help. For Philip the appeal came at a convenient time. He had dramatically ended the siege of Olynthos by destroying the city, an act of terror felt throughout the Greek world. He had not yet embarked upon any new scheme, so he was at leisure to consider his options. For years his Thessalian subjects had urged him to end the Sacred War, and doubtless they now warmly supported the Theban mission. This was the situation that Demosthenes had feared at least as early as 349, when he warned that the fall of Olynthos might be followed by joint Theban-Macedonian action. Although Demosthenes spoke specifically of the possibility of an attack on Athens, his general assessment was broadly accurate.⁴⁷

Philip welcomed the Theban embassy for a variety of reasons. He could be sure of support if he intervened, which was strategically important, and he could again enter the fray as the savior of the god. He was reportedly delighted by the discomfiture of the heroes of Leuktra who had failed to produce another Epameinondas or Pelopidas in nine years of war. Yet the Theban appeal also posed for Philip certain real problems. First, he must intervene in such a way that the entire credit for winning the Sacred War belonged to him alone. Merely to help the Thebans defeat Phokis was definitely not in his interests. His championing of those who had long fought the temple-robbers could benefit him considerably in the broader Greek world, both to erase the horror of his destruction of Olynthos and to use against Athens. Since neither the total victory of the Thebans nor their collapse was to his benefit, he decided to provide them with limited help, a reasonable response in view of political and strategical realities. With Thermopylai under Phokian control, it was unwise to commit large forces in central Greece. Nevertheless, by sending a few troops he would risk little, demonstrate his devotion to the wronged Apollo, and win for himself the opportunity subsequently to enter the war on his own terms. He presumably used his fleet to convoy a small relief-force to a Boiotian port on the northern coast.⁴⁸

⁴⁷ Diod. 16.58.2; Dem. 18.19, is contemporary evidence for Theban distress, but his claim that only Philip's offer to help prevented the Thebans from seeking Athenian protection is simply another of the orator's lies. Demosthenes was a master of the half-truth, which is nonetheless a whole lie. Speculations about Delphic wealth: Dem. 3.8; Aischin. 2.131–132; cf. also Ellis, *Philip*, 103–104; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 78. Olynthos: Griffith, *HM*, II.298–328; Spartan reaction thereto: Plut. *Mor.* 215B; Demosthenes' fears: Dem. 1.2; 3.8; Theban-Thessalian unanimity: Dem. 6.14; 19.318, 321; Aischin. 2.140.

⁴⁸ Diod. 16.58.3: this interpretation makes it unnecessary to accept οὐκ ὀλίγους (codd.) in this passage. Philip's fleet: Dem. 4.17, 22; cf. 19.286; Polyain. 4.2.22; and in general H. Hauben, *Ancient Society* 6 (1975) 51–59. There is nothing to prove that the Athenian Proxenos was stationed at Oreos in Euboia at this time: Aischin. 2.133; Dem. 19.52, 154–155. Cf. also R. Sealey, *Wiener Studien* 68 (1955) 145–146.

CHAPTER SIX

PEACE IN 346 BC

The Theban mission to Philip unintentionally brought two significant, but originally unrelated, contemporary developments together. The first was the long conflict between Philip and Athens in the northern Aegean, the second being the failure of the Thebans to defeat Phokis in the Sacred War. Philip stood at the point of conjunction, though not by design. The "War for Amphipolis", as the Athenians called it, involved only themselves and their allies, including those enrolled in the Second Athenian Confederacy, with the Macedonians. Even Philip's position as its archon did not bring the Thessalian Confederacy into the king's war with Athens. Nor had Sparta, Phokis, Thebes, nor the other Amphiktyons played any part in it. At the same time, Athens and Sparta had sided with Phokis against Thebes and the other Amphiktyons, a struggle in which Philip, himself not a member of the Amphiktyony, was not formally a belligerent. The Theban appeal of 347 invited Philip's intervention in defense of Delphoi, in which he would once more oppose Athens, but this time on new grounds and in a different connection. He could in effect combine the "War for Amphipolis" and the Sacred War to further his own ambitions, all to the detriment of Athens.¹

The reduction of Olynthos had freed Philip from any immediate and local danger, while permitting him to pursue a number of different paths, one leading to Greece itself. Philip began with a diplomatic overture to Athens. As early as 348, when Euboian ambassadors offered peace to Athens, Philip had sent with them a message conveying his own willingness to end hostilities. Even before the fall of Olynthos, he reiterated his desire to an Athenian mission sent to discuss the ransom of a prisoner. At that point, Philokrates, the influential and later infamous, Athenian politician moved in the assembly that his countrymen discuss peace with Macedonia. Although the bill was attacked as unconstitutional, Demosthenes successfully defended Philokrates, but Philip's victory over Olynthos complicated everything. At the fall of the city Philip took numerous Athenian prisoners, who to some extent served his ends as hostages. To

¹ "War for Amphipolis": Isok. 5.2; Aischin. 2.70. Although Philip had earlier defeated the Phokians under Onomarchos in Thessaly (cf. pp. 63-64 above), he did so as the ally of Thessaly, not as a participant in the Sacred War. Indeed, he did not become a member of the Amphiktyony until after the war: Dem. 19.111; cf. also *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 74; no. 21 line 5; cf. also Roux, *Amphictionie*, 18.

ransom them the Athenians sent Aristodemos, an actor, which gave the king another opportunity to repeat his desire for peace. Significantly, he added that he also desired an alliance. His display of goodwill failed to convince some Athenians of his sincerity. Others were also skeptical. Ischandros, an Arkadian, urged the Athenians to rally the states of Greece in a general war against Philip, an appeal to which Aischines lent his energetic support in a series of speeches in which he called upon his countrymen to emulate the great deeds of Miltiades and Themistokles. On the motion of Euboulos, Aischines traveled to Megalopolis as the first step in raising the Peloponnesos against Philip. Although the famous orator claimed that his words were met with applause, the Arkadian League was in no mood to help the same Athenians who had a few years earlier refused to protect them from Sparta. The Athenian quarrel with Macedonia was not an Arkadian concern.²

One aspect of these events is more significant for a broader and proper understanding of Greek history than for the course of the Sacred War, and thereby merits a short excursus. In 343 Demosthenes (19.303) complained bitterly that at the time of Ischandros' embassy to Athens in 348 Aischines read to the Athenians the decrees of Miltiades and Themistokles and the ephobic oath. For once, there is ample reason to believe Demosthenes, primarily because Theopompos independently supports his testimony by denying the authenticity of the documents cited. Specifically, in Book 25 of his *Philippika* Theopompos launches a comprehensive assault on Athenian propaganda of the fourth century, in which he rejects the historical validity of the oath of Plataia, Athenian claims about the battle of Marathon, and the purported "Peace of Kallias", while commenting acidly on "all the other things that the city of the Athenians brags about and uses to dupe the Hellenes".³ It should be of particular interest that

² Chronology of Philip's peace feelers: Aischin. 2.12-17; cf. Diod. 16.53.1, 54.1; Dem. 19.10-11, 304-306. Athenian prisoners as virtual hostages: Aischin. 2.100; cf. 2.15. Cf. also T.T.B. Ryder, *LCM* 2 (1977) 219-223.

³ *FGrH* 115 FF153-155. Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².168; E. Schwartz *Hermes* 35 (1900) 108; M. Sordi, *RFIC* 86 (1958) 48-65. C. Habicht, *Hermes* 89 (1961) 1-35, has best discussed the aims of Athenian propaganda at this time, and no one has either improved upon his findings or refuted them. W.R. Connor, *Theopompus and Fifth-Century Athens* (Cambridge, Mass. 1968) 78-98, has, however, provided an excellent treatment of Theopompos' testimony.

"Peace of Kallias": cf. also Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F16. Not only does Isokrates (4.118-120) mention this alleged peace in order to criticize the King's Peace of 386, but he neither names the purported treaty nor gives it a date; and he is so conveniently vague that one can legitimately ask why, if he possessed specific information so vital to his theme, he failed to use it against the Spartan peace with Persia. Nor do the reported terms of this so-called peace inspire confidence in its authenticity, since several are contradictory (e.g. Isok. 7.80; Dem. 19.273; Plut. *Kimon* 13.4-5). Lastly, Theopompos' criticism of fourth-century Athenian boasting about Marathon can be supported by the testimony of

knowledge of such allegedly important fifth-century documents as these is known only from fourth-century oratorical or rhetorical contexts, and all are mentioned in particularly tendentious circumstances.⁴ Demosthenes, a contemporary, stands as proof that these documents were read for the express purpose of exciting Athenian patriotism. That some documents were in fact read is not in question; their authenticity is. Fortunately, the "Peace of Kallias" is irrelevant to the Sacred War, and those who choose to accept it are forced into the inconvenient and unconvincing position of arguing from the silence of fifth-century sources.⁵ The point at issue here is the documents that Aischines read in the *ekklesia*. There is virtually no reason to conclude that they in fact dated from the fifth century. The combined evidence of Herodotos and archaeology amply proves that the agora and akropolis of Athens were destroyed during the Persian invasion of 480/79, which means that the Metroon, where public documents were kept, and both the agora and akropolis, where selected documents were inscribed on stone, were practically levelled.⁶ Not one fragment that can be attributed to a decree of Miltiades or Themistokles has come to light in nearly 150 years of excavation, despite the wealth of epigraphical material discovered, and the notorious "Decree of Themistokles" found in Troizen dates only to the early third century BC.⁷ The


Isokrates. In 4.86 (cf. also Ps.-Lys. 29) Isokrates proudly claims that the Athenians won the battle quite alone, even though Herodotos (6.107–109) had recorded that the Plataians had joined the Athenians in full force before the engagement. In 14.57, where it suits his purposes, Isokrates conveniently remembers the Plataian contribution at Marathon.

⁴ On 20 June 1987 at a conference sponsored by the Liberty Fund at Boston University, Professor M.H. Hansen suggested that documents like the so-called "Themistokles Decree" were not authentic, but rather later compilations of what the Athenians subsequently believed of the past. At the University of Freiburg on 21 May 1986 and later at McGill University on 23 February 1987 I independently suggested a similar origin for the "Peace of Kallias", for which there is likewise no contemporary literary or epigraphical evidence. In each case enough genuine and accurate historical information existed from which to manufacture these documents and to lend them plausibility. Until those who maintain a fifth-century origin for these documents can satisfactorily prove their case, no one else need lend their opinions credence. For the "Oath of Plataia", cf. P. Siewert, *Der Eid von Plataiai* (Munich 1972), who admits that the fourth-century Athenians used the oath as propaganda against Thebes.

⁵ For the "Peace of Kallias", cf. now K. Meister, *Die Ungeschichtlichkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historische Folgen* (Wiesbaden 1982), and the earlier, R. Sealey, *Historia* 3 (1954/55) 325–333. The literature is enormous.

⁶ Destruction of Athens: Hdt. 8.51–53, and for a convenient survey of modern archaeological findings, cf. R.E. Wycherley, *The Stones of Athens* (Princeton 1978) 36, 139–144, 240.

⁷ For the third-century date of the so-called Themistokles decree, cf. Meiggs and Lewis, *GHI* no. 23. Although Herodotos (7.143) mentions a decree of Themistokles, and although Demosthenes (19.303) also refers to such a document, there is nothing to connect Herodotos' decree to Demosthenes', and nothing to connect either to the stone found at Troizen.



Athenians of the fourth century reconstructed these documents, which by definition means that they are anachronistic, and should not be relied upon as authentic evidence for the history of fifth-century Athens. It is now simply impossible to know how much historical truth they contained, and Demosthenes' testimony should stand as a warning that in 348, at any rate, historical truth was less important than the political and rhetorical needs of the day. History for the fourth-century Athenians was less important for its own sake than as a tool of politics.

Thus, conflicting counsels divided Athens, with some unsuccessfully seeking peace and others vainly seeking new allies with whom to continue the war. So matters stood after the campaigning-season of 347, events enough to give Phalaikos and the Phokians ample food for thought. Aischines' failure in the Peloponnesos could only strengthen the Athenian desire for peace, which would doubtless entail the abandonment of Phokis, while Philip's reinforcement of Thebes clearly showed where his sympathies lay. The combination sent a shiver through Phokis. Philip had earlier proved fatal to Phokian ambitions in Thessaly and implacable in his punishment. The destruction of Olynthos grimly suggested what the Phokians could expect at his hands. Phalaikos responded by leading his 8000 mercenaries to the corridor of Thermopylai, where they reinforced Alponos, Nikaia, and Thronion. The garrison at the strong position of Alponos could make a frontal attack from the north very costly; while the garrison at Nikaia, where Phalaikos made his headquarters, guarded the best harbor along the coast. As importantly, occupation in force of Nikaia kept open his naval communications with the Athenians, while denying them, should they join with Philip, the opportunity to stab him in the back. The mercenaries at Thronion, farther to the east, protected a major route over the mountains into the Kephisos valley (cf. p. 33–34 above). Phalaikos had deployed his troops in the best and really the only practicable positions to stop Philip. In Phokis itself the situation fanned an already smouldering discontent. The segment of the population that had consistently, if unsuccessfully, opposed the despoilation of the sanctuary was alarmed by the shadow of Philip. Their anxiety, the depletion of Apollo's wealth, and the corruption of many prominent Phokian leaders combined with the looming threat to trigger a crisis.⁸

⁸ Aischin. 2.131–132; Diod. 16.56.3, 59.2–3; Strabo 9.3.8; Paus. 10.2.7; cf. also Griffith, *HM*, II.324–328. It is not precisely known when Phalaikos occupied Thermopylai in force, but in view of the clear threat to Phokis, he probably did so immediately after the campaigning-season of 347; cf. also R. Sealey, *Wiener Studien* 68 (1955) 146–152. The view that Nikaia was the most important strategic point in the Thermopylai corridor has recently become popular: e.g. Griffith, *HM*, II.543; H. Wankel, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 39 (1980) 58; but it was so only in Phalaikos' peculiar situation in 347/6. Had he to deal only with a simple frontal attack, then Alponos, much like

The hitherto ineffectual opposition in Phokis, no doubt joined by those who were now simply frightened, temporarily won the upper hand. Presumably by means of *apocheirotonia*, they deposed Phalaikos and his fellow generals from office, despite recent victories in the field. Phalaikos' absence alone permitted the opposition to dispute his authority. The Phokians elected Deinokrates, Kallias, and Sophanes as generals, and directed them to determine how the sacred property, sadly depleted by nine years of pillaging, had been used and to demand an audit of it. They obviously hoped to distance themselves from the sacrilege by laying the blame for it on their erstwhile leaders. Although the new generals punished the malversation of some minor figures, Philomelos, Onomarchos, Phayllos—and as they were soon to learn—Phalaikos were beyond their power. It was far too late to pull a veil of propriety over the long spoliation. Furthermore, these events proved to all that Phokis, now divided against itself, was in a poor position to continue the war much longer.⁹

Philip applied further pressure by returning to Thessaly in the winter of 347/6 to intervene in a dispute between Pharsalos and Halos. By using this pretext to lay siege to Halos, he put his field-army and its siege train within easy reach of Thermopylai. Even though he later returned to Pella, he left his able lieutenant Parmenion to continue operations. The danger to the Phokians, both to Phalaikos who was immediately in Philip's path, and to those who opposed him, became clearer, closer, and more ominous. Nor could the Athenians feel pleased at the thought of a Macedonian army so close to Thermopylai, the defense of which now assumed still greater significance. Aischines (2.132) claims that he at least interpreted Philip's move as the prelude to a march on Thermopylai, and many others in Athens agreed that the need for peace with Philip had become much more urgent.¹⁰

Thermopylai for Leonidas, would have been the most suitable position for defense. Phalaikos, however, had to contend with the possibility of frontal assault from the west and a naval flanking movement from the north, whether from Philip's fleet or his untrustworthy Athenian allies, a threat that could have crushed Alponos in a pincer movement in which Alponos could have been taken from the rear. Nikaia, on the other hand, gave him the opportunity to support easily his advanced garrison at Alponos in case of frontal attack, while defending its rear and denying the best harbor along the coast to a hostile fleet. Furthermore, from Nikaia he could all the while maintain contact with Phokis. Under these circumstances, Alponos, despite its considerable strength, was too far forward and too vulnerable from the flank and rear to serve as Phalaikos' headquarters.

⁹ Diod. 16.56.3–57.4; cf. also Dem. 19.53–56. Aischin. 2.117, urged that only those who had plundered the temple be punished, but compare 2.131. Cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².187–188; Griffith, *HM*, II.333; Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 78–79.

¹⁰ Dem. 19.36, 163, 174. In 346 Demosthenes (5.13–14) also urged the necessity for peace. Cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².196. A dispute has recently arisen as to whether the Athenians were willing to oppose Philip actively: E. Lévy, *Athènes devant la défaite de 404* (Paris 1976) 257; Ober, *Fortress Attica*, 60. The Athenians were demonstrably dilatory in

The Thebans also took a significant step, when they sent an embassy representing the Boiotian Confederacy to Philip to negotiate an alliance. The obvious aim of the Boiotians was to enlist Macedonian power to end the Sacred War, which was a frank admission that they could no longer successfully wage war unaided. In the dead of winter, probably in the Attic month of Posideon—which would ordinarily fall between January/February—the Boiotian ambassadors reached Pella, where Philip received them graciously. They found at the Macedonian court a Thessalian embassy, which was surely not accidental. Rather, the Thessalians strongly supported the appeal of their old allies and Amphiktyonic colleagues. The Thessalians, unable to oppose the Phokians since their defeat at Philomelos' hands, had watched the Boiotians fight, often alone, on behalf of the god. As early as 353 they had yearned to regain their ascendancy in Amphiktyonic affairs (cf. pp. 78, 106 above). The combination of Theban exhaustion and Thessalian importunity, especially coming in the face of Phokian *stasis*, made it difficult for Philip to hesitate without angering his Thessalian allies. Furthermore, since Philip himself had early shown an interest in Delphoi (cf. p. 5 above), he understandably desired the glory of winning the Sacred War and liberating the sanctuary.¹¹

This combination of events persuaded the Athenians that further resistance was as dangerous as it was futile. Although Demosthenes (19.139) claimed that the Boiotian embassy reached Pella at the same time as the first Athenian embassy, no one in Athens was surprised by the Theban move. Nor did the Athenians wish through further resistance to suffer the fate of the Olynthians. In the face of this sobering reality, Philokrates' policy appeared more attractive than before. Philokrates reintroduced the proposal for which he had been indicted, and this time enjoyed the satisfaction of seeing overwhelming support for it from such prominent politicians as Demosthenes, Aischines, and Euboulos as well as from the public at large. The treaty between Athens and Philip that resulted, the so-called "Peace of Philokrates", quickly became so notorious and controversial that one can only with difficulty recover its original articles. Philip had offered and the Athenians had accepted peace and alliance between himself and his allies and Athens and its. Each side would keep what it possessed at the time when the peace was made, but the Athenians intended

pursuing operations against the king in the north, but were ready enough to oppose him in the defense of Thermopylai (cf. pp. 74, 125–126). Athenian thinking was decidedly defensive, as Ober rightly observes, even at the cost of possessions and allies overseas.

¹¹ Theban delegation and Thessalian support for it: Dem. 19.139, 318–325; cf. also Aischin. 2.133 and schol.; Diod. 16.59.2. Philip's intentions: Dem. 5.22–23; his early interest in Delphoi: Bengtson, *SdA* II².308; Plut. *Alex.* 3.1.

to lay claim to Amphipolis. These terms were rather simple and ordinary, fully consistent with provisions that the Athenians had often made with other powers. Apart from the question of Amphipolis itself, the Athenians sought to end the "War for Amphipolis" on the basis of the *status quo*. The assembly also selected the ambassadors to negotiate with Philip, among whom were the most illustrious men in Athens: Philokrates, who nominated Demosthenes, who in turn nominated Aristodemos; Demosthenes' friend Ktesiphon was numbered among the envoys, as were Aischines and Neoptolemos, both of whom were actors with experience in diplomacy. Aglaokreon of Tenedos represented the members of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which proves that they were the only ones legally empowered to represent the "allies of the Athenians". As a precaution in the event of failure, the assembly voted, but did not man, 50 ships.¹²

Three years after these events Demosthenes feebly and mendaciously excused Athenian conduct by claiming that originally Philip honestly wanted peace because Macedonia was overrun by marauders and that its ports were closed, which made it impossible to realize his wealth. This ardent nonsense would perhaps have amused the conqueror of the Chalkidike, who now had so much booty that despite his alleged penury he freely gave it away. By 343 Demosthenes was simply trying to rationalize his having played so prominent a part in the Athenian decision to make peace with Philip. The truth, if unflattering to Demosthenes, is grim enough: in 346 most Athenians, Demosthenes prominently included, considered peace with Philip preferable to a combined Macedonian, Theban, and Thessalian invasion of Attika.¹³

A spirited debate has developed among several major scholars on the subject of Philip's intentions in 346 and their importance to Greek history, specifically between G.L. Cawkwell and G.T. Griffith on the one hand and M.M. Markle and J.R. Ellis on the other.¹⁴ Far too often that

¹² "Peace of Philokrates": Dem. 19.150, which had nothing to do with the Sacred War, which Philip and the Amphiktyons settled later on their own terms; cf. Diod. 16.59.4. Terms of the peace: Dem. 19.48, 143, 159, 278; 5.16; Aischin. 2.18; 3.63; cp. *IG* II² 97; Thuc. 4.118.4; Bengtson, *SDA* II².329. Participation of the Second Athenian Confederacy: Dem. 19.278; Aischin. 2.20, 97. Ambassadors: Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².195–196. Fifty ships: Aischin. 2.37, 133; Dem. 3.5; 4.16; 19.322. Demosthenes' complaint (19.48, 55) that Athens had made peace with Philip's heirs probably means no more than that the two parties had intended their pact to last forever: cp. *IG* II² 15 lines 3–4: ἐς τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνον. Naturally, such an agreement, if honored, would involve the posterity of both parties. Lastly, Aischines (2.104) is surely right to deny that the Athenian decree contained a clause demanding that Thebes be stripped of its insolence and that the walls of Boiotian cities be rebuilt. In addition to what is already known of this peace, such language was used in the assembly, but cannot be attested in the inscriptions.

¹³ Compare Demosthenes' claims in 343 (19.315) with his words of 346 (5.14, 19). Philip's booty after Olynthos: Diod. 16.55.

¹⁴ Cawkwell, *Philip*, 108–113; *CQ* 28 (1978) 93–104; Griffith, *HM* II.343–347; Markle, *CQ* 24 (1974) 253–268; *Antichthon* 15 (1981) 62–85; Ellis, *Philip*, 90–124; and in

debate has been marked more by sheer speculation, misuse of the sources, and sometimes even illogic than by sound method. Nonetheless, the issues raised deserve brief attention here, even though the discussion necessarily anticipates events treated later in the narrative. The significant point at dispute can be simply stated: whereas Cawkwell and Griffith conclude that in 346 Philip genuinely supported Thebes and wanted its support, Markle and Ellis argue that Philip actually preferred Athens to Thebes and was only denied his goal by Athenian distrust of his intentions. Although a thorough review of the debate would be redundant, a reasonable starting-point for inquiry is the most recent discussion of the issues, that of Ellis in 1982. As Ellis formulates (44–45) the situation, there were four major aspects of the question of peace: (1) in 346 Thebes was already an ally of Philip, while Athens had long been an enemy; (2) Philip actually moved on Thermopylai and favored Thebes; (3) Demosthenes and Aischines, however, expected the support of Philip, and someone persuaded the Athenians of the king's good intentions towards them; and (4) although Philip made no public promises, he must have privately entrusted his message of friendship for Athens and hostility to Thebes to some of the Athenian ambassadors. From these beginnings, Ellis, in general agreement with Markle, concludes that Philip truly and genuinely preferred Athens to Thebes.

There are no grounds for argument on the first two points, upon which all four scholars, with support from the sources, are in agreement. Ellis is quite correct about Philip's threat to Thermopylai and his friendship with Thebes,¹⁵ but at the same time these facts alone strongly bolster the position of Cawkwell and Griffith. The last two hypotheses, however, constitute the major points of contention. To justify them Ellis concludes (46) that "Athenian expectations of the settlement and the peace must have come via her own envoys out of more-or-less private (*sic*) conversations with the Macedonian king". No evidence supports this view, and the illogical way in which it is formulated indicates its intrinsic weakness. More to the point, Aischines (2.124; cp. Dem. 19.175) easily refuted Demosthenes' charge against him of collusion with Philip, and even the very suspicious behavior of Neoptolemos (Dem. 5.7–8) does not constitute proof that Philip said anything privately (or otherwise) to the Athenian ambassadors. On the contrary, all of the available evidence indicates that Philip himself promised nothing to the Athenians.¹⁶ There remains the possibility that some of Philip's friends at court on his instigation gave the

Adams and Borza, *Philip II, Alexander the Great*, 43–59; cf. also Kelly, *Antichthon*, 14 (1980) 64–83; Wankel, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 39 (1980) 57–62.

¹⁵ Cf. p. 120 above.

¹⁶ Dem. 19.37, 39, 42–43, 45, 48, 68.

ambassadors assurances of the king's benevolence. Aischines (2.100) testifies that Philip's friends promised the envoys that the king would release the rest of the Athenian prisoners taken at Olynthos, if peace were made. Later the orator avers (2.137) that Philip's companions told them that the cities of Boiotia would be re-established after the peace. Even if the latter were true, this rumor was circulated after the first Athenian embassy had agreed to the terms of peace with Philip and after the second Athenian embassy had ratified them. Thus, all of the contemporary evidence argues against Ellis' hypotheses. Nothing here suggests that either Philip or his companions ever mentioned the topics of Thebes, Phokis, or the Sacred War. They were in fact irrelevant to the king's settlement of his war with Athens.¹⁷

The core of Ellis' argument (48) is that Philip had no interest in ruling Greece, which fails to explain why he had marched on Thermopylai in 353 (Diod. 16.38.1) or showed such keen interest in ending the Sacred War, but instead preferred the friendship of Athens, "which despite her powerful navy was no serious threat" to him. Yet on the next page the reader finds the observation that when Philip turned eastwards, "the Athenian navy could offer him important assistance". No aspect of this formulation of the situation can be successfully defended. Ellis has not properly understood either the role of seapower in the planning of an invasion of the Persian Empire or the strategical problems confronting Philip in 346. The question of seapower is complicated in both cases. On the one hand, the battle of Knidos in 394 demonstrated the danger posed by a hostile fleet controlling the Aegean to an invading army operating in Asia Minor.¹⁸ On the other, there is the completely unwarranted assumption of Ellis and Markle that as free and equal allies of Macedonia the Athenians would of their own volition commit their fleet to further Philip's ambitions. In short, it was essential to Philip to hold absolute control over the Athenian navy, and the best way to do so was to dominate Athens itself. Otherwise, he could not realistically plan an invasion of the Persian Empire. So, the problem was both strategic and political, and in 346 a direct attack on Athens was unfeasible without the support of Thebes. Nor, contrary to the views of Ellis and Markle, was the co-operation of the Athenian navy essential to the conquest of Asia Minor, as the example of Alexander the Great clearly demonstrates.¹⁹ Alexander chose to deprive the Persian

¹⁷ This point is proven by Philip's letter to the Athenians, which both Demosthenes and Aischines agree was genuine, in which he said that he did not know what he should do to oblige them; cf. p. 130 below.

¹⁸ Cf. M. Cary in J.B. Bury *et al.*, *The Cambridge Ancient History* VI (1927) 43.

¹⁹ Cf. J.F.C. Fuller, *The Generalship of Alexander the Great* (New Brunswick 1960) 95; cf. also Diod. 17.22.5.

fleet of its bases, located primarily in Phoenicia, by military assault, with his Greek fleet playing a minimal role in the fighting. While the fleet, by its very existence, complicated matters for Persian naval commanders, it never engaged its Persian counterpart in decisive combat. Hence, one can say that Ellis has overestimated the importance of the Athenian navy in this respect.

A sounder appreciation of the situation in 346 comes from a consideration of Philip's immediate plans. As events would soon prove, Philip had poised his army for a massive invasion of eastern Thrace, a daring move for which he bought time by prolonging diplomatic negotiations with Athens (cf. pp. 127–128 below). The Athenian fleet posed a considerable threat to his goals here, for it could with virtual impunity intervene to imperil his lines of communication with Macedonia, to reinforce various points along the Thracian coast, or to engage him directly. Thus, contrary to Ellis' contention, the Athenian fleet was indeed a serious threat to him. Moreover, since the Athenians were allies of the Thracians about to be attacked, Philip must make a separate peace with Athens in the hope of dividing the two. He offered the Athenians the opportunity to rid themselves of an unprofitable war with no further loss to themselves, fully anticipating that even were the Athenians to renew hostilities as a result of his invasion, their response would come too late. In brief, Philip planned to neutralize the Athenian navy through diplomacy. So, Philip's concern about the Athenian fleet had nothing to do with Persia but rather with Thrace, and even with regard to the latter he struck so swiftly that the Athenian navy never opposed him at all.²⁰

Nor is there any reason to agree with Ellis' interpretation of the significance of the Athenian army, which he claims (50–51) was unimportant and yet vital to Philip's plans. Although he lays great emphasis on the refusal of the Athenians to send their hoplites to the Amphiktyonic army after the peace, Philip had by then already decided his policy, while the Athenians were afraid of putting their troops into his hands (cf. Aischin. 2.138–140). Lastly, Ellis and Markle emphasize Philip's desire for peace and alliance and his insistence that no one give aid to the Phokian temple-robbers. The latter stipulation is nothing more than a requirement that Athens end its support of Phokis in the Sacred War. The view that Philip wished to use peace in 346 against Thebes in order to invade Persia, especially when he had not yet even gained control of eastern Thrace, is unsupported by any evidence whatsoever, while flying in the face of the

²⁰ A diplomatic settlement with Athens promised Philip a free hand in the north-eastern Aegean, while aiding materially his ambitions in central Greece, for which he needed Theban support.

strategical realities of the day. Therefore, the fanciful arguments in defense of it need hardly be taken seriously.

In 346 there was no such speculation about the strategical and political situation. The Athenian delegation proceeded to Oreos and thence through Thessaly, their very haste a sign of urgency. These events combined to bring the crisis in Phokis to a head. In desperation the Phokian opposition at Delphoi sent embassies to Sparta and Athens with the offer to hand over to them the strategic points in the corridor of Thermopylai. The combined Spartan-Athenian force could perhaps hold the area against Philip and his allies, and perhaps even influence him to spare Phokis. Not only was it time for Sparta and Athens to earn the sacred money that had been lavished upon them, but they both also had excellent reasons for complying with the request. The Spartans agreed to dispatch Archidamos and 1000 hoplites, the size of the contingent a testimony to the poverty of Sparta and its reluctance to commit its forces so far from home. Although the Phokians could not have been cheered by the response, they fared better at Athens, which was closer to the peril. The Athenians promised the help of Proxenos' force stationed at Oreos, but they failed to co-ordinate his movements with those of Archidamos.²¹

It remained to be seen whether Phalaikos would meekly co-operate with his erstwhile allies and domestic opponents. He was by now too notorious in the Greek world simply to slip away into the night. The stain of sacrilege also marked his mercenaries, as it had those of Philomelos and Onomarchos, thus linking their destiny in no ordinary way to his. The very attempt of the new Phokian leadership to repudiate Phalaikos drove his mercenaries to firmer support of him, in effect making him a power unto himself. Unable to defend himself successfully against the charge of sacrilege, unwilling to serve as the scapegoat for it, and strong enough to enforce his will, Phalaikos defied his domestic rivals by taking matters into his own hands. He arrested the Phokian ambassadors who had offered Thermopylai to Athens. When Archidamos and his 1000 men reached Nikaia, the king was dismissed with the comment that there was more to fear from Sparta than from the government at home. Archidamos had no realistic choice but to retire in the face of an army eight times stronger than his and one holding fortified positions. The Athenian Proxenos later received an equally unfriendly response, whereupon he followed

²¹ Route of the Athenian delegation: Dem. 19.163; Aischin. 2.132-133; cf. Dem. 3.8; Diod. 16.57, 59.1. The Phokians dispatched these embassies sometime before Gamelion (roughly March/April) 346, by which time Phalaikos had regained power: Aischin. *loc. cit.*; cf. J.D. Mikalson, *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton 1975) 120-121, for the date of the Lesser Mysteries, hereafter cited as "Mikalson, *Calendar*". Cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, II².190; Beloch, *GG* III².1.501.

Archidamos' example. Phalaikos' resolution had its effect in Phokis as well. Although details are lacking, he forced his countrymen, now shorn of any hope of outside help, to bow to reality. Having accepted the sombre conclusion that their fate depended on him, they reinstated him as *strategos autokrator*. Yet he now had no reason to harbor feelings of trust or gratitude towards them. The Athenians encountered this new mood when their heralds arrived in Phokis to proclaim the truce of the Lesser Mysteries. They were summarily dismissed, a sign that Phokis would refuse to honor it. Against old enemies and old allies Phokis now stood alone behind a leader whom it had earlier repudiated. It was obvious to all that under these conditions Phokis was in a poor position to continue the war.²²

Whether by accident or intent, the various delegations assembled at Pella at the same time. The Athenians were impressed by the friendly relations between Philip and the Boiotians, upon whom he kept urging gifts. At one point, the Theban Philon in a courtly fashion thanked Philip for his graciousness, but pointedly added that the most welcome gift of all would be his agreement to their official proposals—meaning bluntly his willingness to become a friend and ally of Boiotia and thus to champion the Amphiktyonic cause. Under the circumstances, Philip could hardly delay longer, especially when he had no war on his hands. Intervention in Phokis would embroil him in the larger affairs of Greece, which alone forced him to consider carefully which side to espouse. Nothing recommended the Phokian cause, especially when for a variety of reasons he could make a separate peace with Athens. All of the military and most of the diplomatic considerations inclined him towards a coalition with Thebes and Thessaly, all the more so since the role of Apollo's defender could again serve him as well as it had earlier after the Crocus Plain. The glory of having suppressed the sacrilegious Phokians would serve his reputation better than any ordinary military victory, while perhaps undoing some of the general distaste of his treatment of Olynthos. Moreover, alliance with Thebes offered him several other immediate and long-term practical benefits. Despite being hard-pressed, the Boiotians had repeatedly demonstrated their ability to win the big battles, which meant that their hoplites and cavalry would be a valuable asset against the forces of Phokis and Athens. Even more important, certainly in broader terms, was the Theban system of alliances, especially in the Peloponnesos, where as yet Philip enjoyed little influence. Friendship with the Boiotian Confederacy

²² Phalaikos: Dem. 19.73–74, 77; Aischin. 2.133, 135; Diod. 16.59.2. The surest chronological evidence for these events comes from Aischines' testimony (2.133) that the Phokians refused to honor the sacred truce of the Lesser Mysteries, which were probably held on 20 Anthesterion, or roughly between February/March 346: cf. Mikalson, *Calendar*, 120–121; also R. Sealey, *Wiener Studien* 68 (1955) 145–152; Griffith, *HM*, II.333 n. 3.

opened the way to friendship with its allies. The failure of the Athenian overture to Arkadia assured him that Theban ties to the Peloponnesos were still strong and that neither Sparta nor Athens had weakened them. An alliance with the Boiotians would keep Sparta isolated, and draw the net closer around Athens. All of these factors prompted him to conclude a formal alliance with the Boiotians in which he promised to aid them directly in concluding the Sacred War. He exchanged oaths with the Boiotian envoys, with both parties committed to military action against Phokis in the next campaigning-season. It cannot be known, on the present state of the evidence, whether Philip formally concluded his pact with Thebes before he officially heard the petition of the Athenian delegation, but it would be amazing had the various delegations been unaware of Philip's diplomatic transactions.²³

Philip's warm reception of the Thebans and Thessalians both alarmed the Athenians, and made their mission of peace all the more urgent. Philip received the Athenian ambassadors courteously, repeating his desire for peace and patiently listening to all of their speeches. In addition to peace the Athenians wanted Amphipolis, which was an important aim of their mission, but on this point Philip adamantly refused to yield on the grounds that it was his by right of conquest. On a different point he was willing to be generous. The king's friends assured the Athenians that Philip would release without ransom their countrymen captured at Olynthos, if peace were concluded. The Athenian ambassadors conceded the loss of Amphipolis, which indeed had long been lost to Athens anyway. There is no evidence to indicate that any questions relating to the Sacred War were voiced at this point. The Athenians were fortunate enough to obtain peace with Philip, and Demosthenes (5.14) later that same year advised his fellow citizens that it was unwise to provoke the Amphiktyons. The Athenians claimed that Philip also promised not to invade the Chersonesos while the Athenians were ratifying the peace.²⁴

The negotiations concluded, the embassies returned to their various states, but Philip refused to spend the rest of the winter comfortably by the fire. In fact, his new commitments, the one enjoining him to war on

²³ Philip's alliance with Boiotia: Dem. 5.20; 19.85, 318, 321; cf. Aischin. 2.140; Douris, *FGH* 76 F2; Diod. 16.59.2, 84.5; Justin 8.4.4; Bengtson, *SdA* II².327. Philon: Dem. 19.140. The Athenians knew of Philip's alliance with Thebes when they concluded peace: Dem. 19.318, 321; cf. also Kelly, *Antichthon* 14 (1980) 64–83.

²⁴ Philip and the ambassadors: Aischin. 2.25–35. Amphipolis: Aischin. 2.33; Dem. 19.253. Athenian prisoners: Aischin. 2.100; Dem. 19.168. Chersonesos: Aischin. 2.82. Cf. also Pickard-Cambridge, *Demosthenes*, 268–274; Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, 146–149; Griffith, *HM*, II.336–337; H. Bengtson, *Griechische Staatsmänner* (Munich 1983) 288; *Philip und Alexander der Große*, 66.

behalf of Delphoi and the other to peace with Athens, meant that suddenly every day became additionally precious to him. Even during his deliberations with the Athenian envoys, he was making his preparations for a lightning campaign against Thrace and its king Kersebleptes. Aware of his intentions but unable to hinder them, the Athenians said nothing, even though Philip's target was their ally. They refused to endanger the peace that they had just obtained. Philip's sudden campaign explains several things, the chief being what the king had originally planned to do after the fall of Olynthos and why he had sought at that point alliance as well as peace with Athens. The key is Thrace, long an object of interest to him (cf. pp. 51–53 above). The destruction of Olynthos and the conquest of the Chalkidike removed any significant barrier to his eastward movements along the coast. The region presented him with two enemies, Kersebleptes and Athens. Although the Thracian king was an Athenian ally, he was not a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, with which Philip had just come to terms. Therefore, since the Athenian *demos* and its confederacy had not yet ratified the peace, neither was the new treaty yet in effect nor was Kersebleptes a party to it. From the beginning Kersebleptes' position made it unlikely that he would be included in the negotiations, as indeed the facts prove. Yet not only must Philip achieve his goals in Thrace before the next campaigning-season, when he had committed himself to the Sacred War, but he must also defeat Kersebleptes before the ratification of the peace, thereby preventing him from gaining admission to the confederacy and perhaps as a consequence allowing him the shelter of the peace treaty.²⁵

This much said, the successful invasion of Thrace belongs more to the history of Philip's career than to that of the Sacred War. Sufficient is the king's victory in a campaign of some three months that brought Kersebleptes down in defeat and carried Macedonian arms as far east as the Chersonesos. For the Athenians counter-attack was out of the question, and Aischines (2.73) claims that at the time they did not even know where their own forces were. As so often before, they were too late to baffle Philip's ambitions. Philip had put himself on the European side of the Hellespont, where he could anchor the eastern flank of his empire, both strategically and diplomatically—diplomatically because the King himself in the various Common-Peace treaties had acknowledged that his domain

²⁵ Start of Philip's campaign: Aischin. 2.73, 82–83; its end: Aischin. 2.90–92; cf. also Dem. 19.156, 180, which prove that Athens and its allies had not ratified the peace before Philip's attack. Philip's request for peace and alliance would not necessarily have raised Athenian fears, since the Athenians themselves had earlier combined the two terms: e.g. IG II² 34 line 5. Cf. also Momigliano, *Filippo il Macedone*, 118–119; P. Cloché, *Un fondateur d'empire: Philippe II* (St. Étienne 1955) 151–154.

stopped in Asia. Philip also stood in a good position to threaten the Athenian grain route through the Black Sea. Aischines (2.118) concisely summed up the outcome when he commented: "The matter turned out not as we would have prayed, but as Philip acted".²⁶

Meanwhile, the Athenian ambassadors journeyed homewards through Thessaly. Upon their arrival at Athens, they reported as usual to the *boule*, where Demosthenes, as *bouleutes*, moved the usual vote of thanks to his fellow envoys. Demosthenes also proposed that the matter of peace with Philip be laid before the assembly on the days of 18–19 Elaphebolion, an Attic month roughly corresponding to Julian March/April. The events of those two days provide a curious and complex historical problem. Posterity learns most about it from Demosthenes' indictment of Aischines in 343 for having betrayed his trust as ambassador and from Aischines' speech in his own defense. Although each claims to have supported his case with numerous detailed and dated official documents, they were not included in the published version of the speeches. The modern historian cannot justly criticize ancient literary taste for omitting them: no lover of literature learns Greek in order to read Attic inscriptions.²⁷ Since in addition the speeches were later revised before publication, they do not necessarily reflect all that was actually said at the trial in 343, much less what was said in the assembly in 346. In short, even though the historian has the evidence of contemporaries, he has no contemporary evidence for what transpired on those two days in Elaphebolion 346. Demosthenes and Aischines contradict each other on so many points, many not pertinent to the Sacred War, while others are highly significant, that in the words of Sherlock Holmes, "It is of the highest importance, therefore, not to have useless facts elbowing out useful ones".²⁸

²⁶ Aischin. 2.90–92; Dem. 19.155–158. King's claim: Bengtson, *SdA* II².242.

²⁷ Although the extant manuscripts of the surviving fourth-century orators sometimes include purported public documents, these were sometimes introduced later in antiquity on the model of Attic epigraphy. For a papyrus of *De Corone* with the documents in full, absent from most manuscripts, cf. T. Larsen in *Classical Review* 51 (1937) 161. The best discussion of this and many other related problems can be found in M.H. Hansen, *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes* (Oxford 1987).

²⁸ Homeward journey: Aischin. 2.41; Demosthenes and the *boule*: Aischin. 2.45–46. Dates: Aischin. 2.61; 3.68; Dem. 19.57. Evidence of lying: Dem. 19.218, 231, 326; Aischin. 2.141; cf. 2.127, where he attempts to make use of his victory over Timarchos against Demosthenes. These are only a few of the possible examples. Evidence of revisions: Dem. 19.149; Aischin. 2.124–125, and the arguments used to rebut accusations that do not appear in the extant speeches. For instance, Aischines' accusation (2.10) that Demosthenes had compared him to the tyrant Dionysios of Syracuse, nowhere to be found in Demosthenes' published speech, may be correct, given Demosthenes' absurd statement (19.314) that Aischines wanted to overthrow the democracy: cf. Aischin. 2.171, for a denial. Revision of the speeches argues against an improbable ancient claim that they were never actually delivered: Ps.-Plut. *Mor.* 840C. For a recent discussion of the speeches, cf.

The useful facts are clear enough. The first is the matter of Philip's letter to the Athenians, presumably entrusted to the Macedonian envoys Parmenion and Antipatros, in which the king promised to confer certain unspecified benefits on the Athenians, should they agree to peace. Philip left it to their imagination to decipher his meaning and to raise their hopes, all without committing himself to anything. Although Demosthenes later claimed that his enemy Aischines wrote the letter for Philip, his allegation is absurd and unsupported by any evidence, making it easy for his rival to rebut the charges with all of the contempt that they deserved. Nothing compels the conclusion that anyone but Philip was the author of the letter. The important point is the very authenticity of the letter, which is proven by the agreement of Demosthenes and Aischines, even though they were at dagger's point, that it existed, that the Athenians considered it genuine, and that it bore Philip's name. In the winter of 346 Philip's letter and his affable manner disarmed the fears of the Athenian ambassadors, who credulously carried home his nebulous promise of future benevolence.²⁹

Other useful facts are equally clear. In the two days of debate Philokrates, Demosthenes, Aischines, and others spoke in favor of the peace, and Philip's letter promising unspecified benefits was read. Aischines and Philokrates expatiated on the favors being offered, fools' hopes as they proved. The speakers claimed in brief that Theban control of the Boiotian Confederacy would be ended and the cities of Thespiiai and Plataia rebuilt. As recompense for the loss of Amphipolis the Athenians would receive Oropos and Euboia, neither of them Philip's to give. Phokis would not suffer. Not only can the fear and fantasy of the Athenians be observed here, but there is also a clue that one ambassador was perhaps in Philip's pay, to judge only by his conduct immediately after the peace. The actor Neoptolemos sold his property in Attika before the autumn of 346 and moved to Macedonia with the money. The evidence is admittedly at best circumstantial, as is that against Philokrates, who later fled rather than stand trial. The difference, however, is that no one had brought charges against Neoptolemos, whereas Philokrates went into voluntary exile through despair of receiving a fair hearing. Even so, there is nothing to prove that Neoptolemos mentioned any of these matters, and he does not figure prominently in these events. Demosthenes, who had neither

H. Montgomery, *The Way to Chaeronea* (Bergen-Oslo 1985) 80–83. Holmes: A.C. Doyle, *The Complete Sherlock Holmes* (New York n.d.) 21. Cf. also the thoughtful discussion of J. Sadourny, *Revue des études anciennes* 81 (1979) 19–36; and n. 47 above.

²⁹ Philip's letter: Dem. 19.38–41; Aischin. 2.45, 124–125; Parmenion and Antipatros: Dem. 19.69; cf. in general Griffith, *HM*, II.338–341 (with bibliography), not all of whose conclusions are accepted here.

evidence nor witnesses, utterly failed to convict Aischines of having taken bribes. On the whole, however, the ambassadors needed no gold for them to support the peace that Athens had already offered Philip, especially not now, when his entrance in the Sacred War was imminent. However elated by their hopes or oppressed by their fears, the Athenians had a clear choice before them. Philip had definitely agreed to peace, and his promised benefits could be interpreted at least as a token that he would not rebuke them for sacrilege. The alternative was renewed war.³⁰

Although Demosthenes repeatedly denies that Philip made any promises, he once contradicts himself in a contemptuous allusion to the king's grand promises, for which, however, he admits that Philip wanted no witnesses.³¹ Both assertions cannot be true; and while the mere repetition of the one is no sign of proof, the tendentious way in which the other is presented inspires no confidence, especially since Demosthenes is at pains to prove that Aischines was bribed to expatiate on Philip's assurances. Hence, Demosthenes' testimony here and elsewhere cannot be accepted at face-value. Even though Aischines lamely accuses Demosthenes of misconstruing his words on the issue, he never denies that he spoke in favor of the peace.³² Thus, there is no good evidence, especially in the light of Philip's letter, that the king made any of the specific promises that the Athenians later ascribed to him, but rather that he had expressed feelings of friendship for Athens in accordance with the terms of the treaty under consideration. Certain facts, agreed upon by Demosthenes and Aischines, suggest that Philip intentionally misled a gullible and apprehensive Athenian embassy. The official report of the Athenian ambassadors uniformly endorsed the peace, claimed that significant benefits would result from it, and praised Philip. Demosthenes was himself very conspicuous in his gracious treatment of Philip's ambassadors.³³ One of the foremost actors in these events, Demosthenes proves by his conduct that if at this point he disbelieved Philip's honesty, then he condemns himself as a traitor, a

³⁰ Proponents of the peace: Aischin. 2.47–50, 68, 79; Dem. 19.14; and in 19.15 and 144, where he says that he supported the *dogma* of the allies, he confesses that he too supported the peace, as he did again earlier in 346: 5.13–14. Neoptolemos: Dem. 5.6–8; 19.315. Philokrates: Dem. 19.245, 279; Aischin. 2.6. Various promises: Dem. 5.10; 19.42, 106. Aischines (2.79, 120) admits that he spoke in favor of the peace, while denying Demosthenes' accusations (19.13–15) that he spoke against it on the first day and in favor on the next, his proof (2.63–66) being his averment that Demosthenes' own *probouleuma* forbade debate on 19 Elaphebolion. Yet Aischines (3.71–72) later contradicts his own claim.

³¹ No promises: Dem. 19.37, 39, 45, 48, 68; Philip's big promises: Dem. 19.160. In 346 Demosthenes (5.10) claims that he personally knew nothing of Philip's promises.

³² Cf. n. 30.

³³ Aischin. 2.45, 55, 109, 111; Dem. 19.234–236.

coward, a hypocrite or all three.³⁴ Perhaps the solution is more prosaic: like his fellow ambassadors, Demosthenes too was disarmed by the combination of Philip's charm and cunning and by his own wishful thinking.

At any rate, the Athenians met for two days, on 18–19 Elaphebolion 346, to decide whether to ratify the peace, and if so, to designate the men who were to swear the oaths to Parmenion and Antipatros and to select the ambassadors who would return to Macedonia to receive Philip's oath.³⁵ The Athenians endorsed peace with Philip and his allies on behalf of themselves and their allies, a decision later approved by the allies of the sea-league.³⁶ The Athenians empowered the same board of ambassadors as before to travel to Pella to receive the oath that would make the treaty binding. Aglaokreon again represented the Second Athenian Confederacy (Aischin. 2.97, 126). Until a mutual exchange of oaths was made, a treaty was not in force, even with the agreements made and sworn to by one party, a technicality that permitted Philip to reduce Thrace without violating the treaty (cf. Dem. 19.152). The Athenians also endowed their ambassadors with discretionary powers, when they instructed them to seek any benefits from Philip that they could.³⁷

Several days later on 25 Elaphebolion, after the treaty had been agreed upon and the ambassadors selected, another assembly of the Athenian *demas* convened, at which the principal topic of discussion was the appeal of Kritoboulos of Lampsakos, serving as ambassador of the Thracian king Kersebleptes. Kritoboulos asked permission for the king to be numbered

³⁴ Demosthenes' very indictment of Aischines is conveniently vague in detail and his arguments turbid. The problem involves three points, none of which can be entirely disentangled from another. First, Demosthenes accuses Aischines on at least nine separate occasions of having betrayed Athenian interests at the time when the peace was ratified, specifically after the first embassy and before the second (19.15, 18, 49, 53, 96, 101, 159, 322). Elsewhere, he charges Aischines with malversation during and after the second embassy (19.17, 20, 44, 278). Demosthenes further clouds the issue of Aischines' alleged treason, sometimes blaming him for having seconded the *psephisma* of Philokrates, which was made at the time that the peace was made (19.49, 144, 159). In other places he castigates (19.44, 278) Aischines for having excluded the Phokians from the peace. According to Demosthenes, Philip refused to swear the oath of peace to the Athenian embassy so long as the Phokians were numbered among the Athenian allies. Demosthenes then claims that Aischines and Philokrates on their own authority and prompted by the bribes of Philip struck the names of the Phokians from the treaty in defiance of the assembly's instructions (cf. n. 39 below). At 19.96–97 Demosthenes combines all of these accusations in a sweeping declaration that Aischines was guilty because he had supported Philokrates' *psephisma* and that later during the second embassy he disobeyed the instructions of the assembly, the result of which was to bring ruin to Athenian allies. A significant aspect of these incoherent attacks of Demosthenes is his attempt to hide his own complicity in these events.

³⁵ Aischin. 2.68, 98, 102; cf. 2.61: after the City Dionysia: Mikalson, *Calendar*, 123–130; cf. also Dem. 19.57, 69.

³⁶ Aischin. 2.83–85; 3.73–74; Dem. 19.174.

³⁷ Aischin. 2.104; cf. 2.20; *IG* II² 43 lines 72–75, for a similar clause.

among the Athenian allies. Although there is virtually no likelihood that the Athenians could have then known it, only the day before had Philip completed his conquest of Thrace. Kersebleptes was already defeated, and his envoy proved incapable of salvaging matters. Philip's speed had baffled even this last-minute effort of Kersebleptes to join the Athenian confederacy and thereby enjoy its protection. His position in the negotiations mirrored that of the Phokians. Whether Kritoboulos asked only that Kersebleptes be included in the peace or petitioned that he be enrolled in the Athenian sea-league, which would perhaps attain the same goal, is unknown; but the Athenians voted that he not be included in the treaty. According to Aischines, Demosthenes spoke against allowing parties to join the peace at the last minute, in time certainly to pour the libations to the gods but after the hard work had been done. The truth is perhaps more brutal. If Kritoboulos told the Athenians and their allies the facts of Kersebleptes' situation, then the Athenians saw neither the hope of saving the king nor the reason to anger Philip. Kersebleptes was left to his own destiny. On that same day the Athenian and allied ambassadors gave the oath to Antipatros and Parmenion. The Athenian envoys set out for Macedonia a few days later, on 3 Mounichion.³⁸

There remains the question of Phokis, which was irrelevant to the original Athenian mission to end the "War for Amphipolis". In 343 Demosthenes expressly accused Aischines and Philokrates of having intentionally excluded the Phokians from the peace treaty, but in fact there is no good reason to conclude that the subject of Phokis was ever seriously raised.³⁹ Supposedly, Parmenion and Antipatros warned the Athenians at this point that Philip could not include the Phokians in the treaty because it would violate his oaths already given to the Thebans and Thessalians.⁴⁰ Although the problem is complex, there is ample reason to suspect Demosthenes of lying about the Phokians. In the first place, it was dangerous to espouse the Phokian cause, especially when it was obvious that Philip was prepared to take the field on behalf of Delphoi. That very point was a major theme of Demosthenes' speech, *On the Peace*, delivered in 346, after peace had been made and ratified. As allies of the temple-robbers, lukewarm as they had been, the Athenians risked punishment for their

³⁸ Request of Kritoboulos: Aischin. 3.73; irregularity of the request: Aischin. 3.74; Demosthenes' response: Aischin. 2.84. Oath-giving: Dem. 19.150; departure of the Athenian embassy: Aischin. 2.91–92, 101. Philip's conquest of Thrace: Aischin. 2.90. Cf. also Ellis, *Philip*, 110–111; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 98; for a broader view, cf. D. Kienast, *Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achameniden in Abhandlungen der marburger gelehrten Gesellschaft* (Munich 1971) 13–15.

³⁹ Dem. 19.44, 47, 174, 278.

⁴⁰ Dem. 19.318, 321.

long years of complicity.⁴¹ Stark reality made it plain that the Athenians could neither depend upon Phalaikos—nor he upon them—nor could they shield Phokis without inviting reprisals upon themselves. Nor had they any reason to put themselves at further risk on behalf of Phokis. Phalaikos' rebuff of Proxenos and Athenian military aid justified them in allowing Phokis to seek its own solution, while they ended their own particular war with Philip.

Technically, Philip had every legal right to exclude Phokis from the peace. The Phokians were never represented—officially or otherwise—in the negotiations, as is proven by the absence of an envoy from them or any authorization given to the Athenians to speak for them. Although Phokis was an Athenian ally, it had never been a member of the Second Athenian Confederacy, which was the only body legally representing Athenian allies, as the presence of Aglaokreon amply attests. Aglaokreon could neither speak as a representative of Phokis nor commit it to any agreement. So much is clear, and that much Demosthenes strove to obscure. Three years after these tumultuous events, Demosthenes tried to link the fate of Phokis to the Athenian peace negotiations in order to discredit Aischines and to distance himself from the Peace of Philokrates. Although Phokis was a dangerous liability in 346, by 343 the cloud had passed, allowing Demosthenes the luxury of crocodile tears. One will read the extant speeches of Demosthenes written before 346 without finding any expression of sympathy for the Phokians. After Philip's draconian treatment of them, one finds no floodgate stout enough to hold back the orator's tears. Nevertheless, his very attempt at deceit helps point to the truth. Demosthenes (19.159) claims that when the Athenians first decided to conclude peace with Philip, Philokrates and Aischines tried to draw up a treaty that expressly excluded Phokis and Halos. So irate were the Athenians that they forced Philokrates to erase the clause, demanding instead a treaty in the name of the "Athenians and the allies of the Athenians". Demosthenes (19.278) also provides evidence against his own testimony, when he asserts that Philokrates and Aischines specifically excluded the Phokians from the treaty during the second embassy sent to receive the oath that would conclude the treaty. The one contradicts the other, and neither merits confidence. He also admits (19.279) that he has no evidence to support his claims that Philokrates and Aischines later excluded Phokis from the treaty. The truth is obvious and simple: the Phokians were never a party to the treaty, and Demosthenes' attempt to include them after the fact is a transparent device to turn Athenian sympathy for them to his own ends.⁴²

⁴¹ Dem. 5.14–15; Diod. 16.57.

⁴² G.L. Cawkwell, *Revue des études grecques* 75 (1962) 456, draws upon Justin (8.4.6) and Demosthenes (9.11) to conclude that in 346 Phalaikos had repented of his wayward-

For the next three months the ambassadors of Athens and its sea-league were in Macedonia to receive Philip's oath. There they encountered envoys from Thebes, Thessaly, and Sparta, but the king was finishing his reduction of Thrace. The chief topic of interest in the meantime was Philip's intentions in the Sacred War, a major aspect of which was the treaty with Athens. The Thebans and Thessalians were also present to make arrangements for the military operations against Phokis, soon expected to begin. The Spartan ambassadors came because of the crisis and Philip's earlier offer to help them substantially. Predictably, the convergence of four such embassies was less than peaceful. The Spartans and Athenians lashed out against the Thebans, much to the amusement of the Thessalians, whose response indicated the course of Philip's policy. Such a display can be attributed to the tension of the moment, but there was also the realization that Philip was already the arbiter of events.⁴³

Philip returned from his conquest of Thrace towards the end of Thargelion 346, roughly corresponding to the Julian month of May and thus the beginning of the campaigning-season. The order in which Philip received the various embassies and his discussions with them are alike unknown. One thing seems certainly clear, to judge by subsequent events. Philip assured the Spartans that so long as they did not interfere with his plans in central Greece, they would not be punished for their support of Phokis. In fact, a Macedonian campaign into the Peloponnesos was then unrealistic, but a promise to ignore the original Amphiktyonic fines and to overlook Spartan complicity in the spoliation of the sanctuary were painless concessions for Philip, sufficient to satisfy Sparta, which had not asked for this war and could in no way win it. Nothing more is heard from the Spartans, who had already felt Phalaikos' scorn and who had nothing more to fear from Philip. For Sparta the Sacred War was over. Clever diplomat that he was, Philip had begun to isolate Phokis even before moving against Thermopylai.⁴⁴

Philip could also depend upon his previous agreement with the Boiotian

ness and had himself negotiated with Philip. Nothing in either source supports this interpretation. No credence need be given to Justin, whose epitome of Pompeius Trogus is demonstrably defective. Although in 341 Demosthenes (9.11) claimed that Philip had made an alliance with the Phokians before having marched on Thermopylai, he knows nothing of this pact two years earlier, when he says specifically that Philip would never accept them as allies (19.318, 321). Moreover, a charge of Philip's perfidy to Phokis would have served Demosthenes' purposes marvellously in 343, yet the orator repeatedly insists that Philip never said anything specific about Phokis. Cf. also Ellis, *Philip*, 109; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 99–100; Griffith, *HM*, II.343–345.

⁴³ Three months: Dem. 19.57, 155, where the trip to Pella alone consumed 50 days. Various embassies: Aischin. 2.136; Dem. 19.57–60, 78, 155, 166; cf. also Aischin. 2.101, 108.

⁴⁴ Chronology: Dem. 19.155; promises to Sparta: Dem. 19.76.

Confederacy and the mobilization of the Macedonian, Theban, and Thessalian armies to promise victory in the south. When Philip returned to Pella, he kept his army intact, a sure sign that it could expect to see further action during the dawning campaigning-season. No one in Pella doubted that its ultimate destination was Phokis. The Thebans had also mustered their full field-army; and although Aischines attributes their action to fear, military reality, rather than oratory, suggests that Philip and his allies had agreed upon their strategy when they made their alliance. Philip and the Thessalians would march on Thermopylai from the west, while in a pincer movement the Boiotian army would strike from the south. Against this combination Phalaikos stood little chance.⁴⁵

In these circumstances Philip received the Athenian ambassadors, who were in no position to make demands upon him. Philip wasted no time in consolidating his gains and preparing for the future. Kersebleptes was for him a dead issue, and Thrace, like Amphipolis, was his by right of conquest; nor did an earlier promise not to march on the Chersonesos, if authentic, prevent him from including Kardia, located on the northern neck of the peninsula, among his allies. Of more importance then to the Athenians was the question of Phokis. The conflicting claims of Demosthenes and Aischines make it impossible now to determine precisely what was said at this point. Apparently, Aischines, who was very well informed on Amphiktyonic affairs, made a last-minute plea on behalf of the Phokians. He admitted that the Macedonian expedition against them was just and that Philip was right to punish those who had violated the shrine. Indeed, not even Greek sophistry could obscure that. Aischines made a tactful compromise when he suggested that only the Phokian leaders be punished for the sacrilege, the same ploy that the Phokians themselves had recently attempted. He also asked Philip not to use force, but rather to leave matters to the Amphiktyons, of whom the king was not one. To the last request Philip agreed, which cost him nothing. He could confidently leave a satisfactory settlement to the Thebans, Thessalians, and their allies. Nevertheless, he delayed giving his oath to the Athenians, which would have sealed the treaty.⁴⁶

Not only did Philip politely decline to give his oath to the Athenians, but he also refused to allow his allies to swear theirs. Instead, he detained the envoys, who were virtually his hostages, with a request to help him

⁴⁵ Macedonian army: Aischin. 2.103, 107, 114; Theban army: Aischin. 2.137; Dem. 19.85.

⁴⁶ Kersebleptes and Thrace: Dem. 19.161, 174, 180–181; Aischin. 2.82; Aischines' Phokian appeal: Aischin. 2.114–117, 122; Dem. 19.18; Amphiktyons: Aischin. *loc. cit.*; Dem. 19.50.

settle the dispute between Pharsalos and Halos. Although Demosthenes later claimed that his arch-enemy Aischines had excluded Halos from the peace, in fact the Athenians had no treaty-obligations to the city. Even the treaty between Athens and the Thessalian Confederacy, made in 361, had fallen into abeyance owing to the Sacred War, and the city had been under siege even before the first Athenian embassy had traveled to Macedonia. Philip's unusual request was nothing more than a pretext to delay the ratification of the treaty. Sometime either in very late Thargelion or more probably early Skirophorion, roughly June 346, the Athenian ambassadors traveled southwards to Thessaly, with Philip and his army at their backs. Though not particularly subtle, the device stayed the hand of Athens long enough for Philip to gain much-needed time on his march. In this manner Philip advanced roughly 100 miles, perhaps in as little as six or seven days, while his enemies either misunderstood his intentions or shrank from opposing him. Along the way he was joined by the Thessalian contingent, perhaps at Larisa. Only when he reached Pherai, not more than a three-days' march to Thermopylai, did he halt and consent to swear the oaths that officially concluded peace with Athens and made the two parties allies. Phokis was not included in the treaty. Philip's tactics sufficed to put the Macedonians and Thessalians on the doorstep of Thermopylai before the Athenians could mobilize against him.⁴⁷

Ironically, the Athenian embassy dispatched to conclude peace returned home on 13 Skirophorion, early in the summer, to an atmosphere heavy with the fear of war. Philip was then at Thermopylai. The ambassadors reported the successful completion of their mission, upon which Demosthenes moved the usual vote of thanks. On 16 Skirophorion the Athenian assembly met to give final approval of the treaty. The war for Amphipolis was now over. Nonetheless, fear gripped the city, since it was obvious that Philip and the Amphiktyons were ready to end the Sacred War. On 23 Skirophorion Philokrates offered a proposal, both desperate and face-saving, which called upon the Phokians to surrender the sanctuary to the Amphiktyons, while maintaining that Philip had promised to deal justly with them. The Athenians also threatened to take the field against them if they refused. Perhaps Philokrates hoped, like Aischines shortly before, that Philip would punish only individuals and not Phokis

⁴⁷ Delay in oath-swearing: Dem. 19.152; obsolete Athenian-Thessalian treaty: Bengtson, *SdA* II².293. Oath-swearing: Dem. 19.152, 158, 175. Exclusion of Phokis: Dem. 19.278, 318; Aischin. 2.129. Philip chose Pherai in part to intimidate its citizens, who had earlier refused to follow him (Dem. 19.320). The mere fact that Pherai is less than twenty miles north of Halos sufficiently proves the reason behind Philip's pretext. Cf. also D.J. Mosley, *Philologus* 116 (1972) 145–148, for a less machiavellian interpretation of these events.

as a whole. Reality proved otherwise. The only Amphiktyons with Philip were the Thebans, Thessalians, and Lokrians, none of whom had any reason to be lenient. At the last moment the Athenians admitted the illegality of Phokian actions, and tried to cloak themselves in a mantle of respectability. In fact, they abandoned an ally in its hour of peril to save their own skins.⁴⁸

Philip also had his eyes on the Athenians, to whom he clearly signalled his intentions, when in two letters he summoned his new friends and allies to help him end the Sacred War. It was an ultimatum. With Philip and his allies gathering against Phalaikos, the Athenians, having disavowed the Phokians, now feared for themselves. They were afraid that a response to Philip's summons would merely hand the Athenian army into the king's hands as hostages, a point not lost on the newly-returned ambassadors. Therefore, they prepared for the worst. Fearful that they themselves might be the target of an Amphiktyonic crusade against the sacrilegious, the Athenians brought whatever they could into the city, an echo of the early years of the Peloponnesian War. Their response clearly demonstrated that Philip and the Amphiktyons had nothing to fear from them.⁴⁹

⁴⁸ Demosthenes' vote of thanks: Aischin. 2.123. Philokrates' proposal: Dem. 19.47–49, 59. Amphiktyons with Philip: Dem. 19.50, 62; the scene is reminiscent of Alexander the Great's treatment of Thebes in 335; cf. J.R. Hamilton, *Alexander the Great* (London 1973) 48–50; *Plutarch, Alexander: A Commentary* (Oxford 1969) 28–31. Philip at Thermopylai: Dem. 19.36, 39, 160, 163, 174. A debate has recently arisen over Philip's precise position on 16 Skirophorion 346. In 343 Demosthenes (19.34, 58) wrote that the Macedonian was ἐν Πύλαις, and later (18.32) ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ὤμοσε τὴν εἰρήνην ὁ Φίλιππος προλαβὼν τὴν Θράκην διὰ τούτους, οὐχὶ πεισθέντας τῷ ἑμῷ ψηφίσματι, πάλιν ὠνεῖται παρ' αὐτῶν ὅπως μὴ ἀπιμεν ἐκ Μακεδονίας, ἕως τὰ τῆς στρατείας τῆς ἐπὶ τοὺς Φωκέας εὐτρεπῆ ποιήσαιο, ἵνα μὴ, δεῦρ' ἀπαγγεῖλάντων ἡμῶν ὅτι μέλλει καὶ παρασκευάζεται πορεύεσθαι, ἐξέλθοιθ' ὅμεις καὶ περιπλεύσαντες ταῖς τριήρεσιν εἰς Πύλας ὥσπερ πρότερον κλείσατε τὸν τόπον, ἀλλ' ἂμ' ἀκούετε ταῦτ' ἀπαγγελλόντων ἡμῶν, κάκεινος ἐντὸς εἴη Πυλῶν καὶ μηδὲν ἔχοιθ' ὅμεις ποιῆσαι. In response Aischines (2.130) wrote that his speeches were not responsible for the fact that Philip εἰσῶ Πυλῶν παρήλθε. Cawkwell, *REG* 75 (1962) 453–459; *CQ* 28 (1978) 93–104; *Philip*, 104–105, has interpreted the evidence to mean that Philip at that time was in control of Thermopylai. Ellis in Adams-Borza, *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage*, 50 n. 25, claims uncertainty because of the prepositions. H. Wankel, *Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik* 39 (1980) 57–62, argues that Philip had not yet gained command of the pass. Wankel is surely correct, as can easily be proven by topography and the literary sources cited above. As described above (cf. p. 92), Thermopylai was not only the place where the Greeks temporarily checked the Persians in 480 (specifically at Kolonos hill), but it was also a long corridor. Alponos, the most westerly of Phalaikos' positions, stood east of Kolonos hill and the hot springs that gave their name to Thermopylai. Once Philip had advanced beyond this undefended point, he could accurately be described as ἐν Πύλαις, as Demosthenes asserts, and εἰσῶ Πυλῶν, as Aischines avers, even though the king had not yet overwhelmed Phalaikos' westernmost position at Alponos. Philip had not forced a passage through the Thermopylai corridor, and rather than do so militarily he necessarily struck a bargain with Phalaikos; but until he had done so, he could not reasonably be considered to have been in control of the passage through Thermopylai.

⁴⁹ Philip's summons: Dem. 19.51; Aischin. 2.137. The strategical situation: Aischin. 2.138; Dem. 19.58. Athenian fears: Dem. 5.10; Aischin. 2.137–138. Athenian precautions: Aischin. 2.139; Dem. 5.14. Cf. also Griffith, *HM*, II.339–341.

Others also watched the Athenian response to the crisis, none perhaps more keenly than Phalaikos. His own messengers, having observed the deliberations of the Athenian assembly, reported the results to him at once. Word of the Athenian ratification of the peace reached him on 20 Skirophorion, four days after the decision. When the rest of the Phokians learned of the Athenian decision, probably not long afterwards, they lost all hope. For Phalaikos the situation had become all too simple: he could either surrender or fight alone against Philip and his allies. Victory was only a remote possibility, and the Crocus Plain suggested the sort of treatment the vanquished could expect. Moreover, although Phalaikos held a militarily strong, if politically tenuous (cf. p. 119 above), position at Thermopylai, time was on the side of Philip and the Amphiktyons. The rigors of war had even prevented the Phokians from sowing the spring crops. By 27 Skirophorion Phalaikos had learned of the final decision of Athens to abandon Phokis and probably also of the most recent Athenian embassy to Philip, which was technically an embassy to the Amphiktyons, that had only reached Euboia before Phalaikos' own actions compelled it to return home. Alienated from both his erstwhile allies and his fellow countrymen, Phalaikos struck a devil's bargain with Philip in which he traded control of Thermopylai for the safety of himself and his mercenaries. Phokis could fend for itself. Philip accepted the offer, which once again cost him nothing, while giving him much. Phalaikos and his men departed to the Peloponnesos to begin a roving life that for the most part ended in violent death. Left defenseless, the Phokian cities surrendered without further struggle. By midsummer 346 the fighting was over.⁵⁰

With the way through Thermopylai cleared, Philip and the Thessalians marched into Phokis, where they were joined by the Thebans and Lokrians. The cities of the Phokian Confederacy surrendered to Philip alone, doubtless in an effort to avoid Amphiktyonic retaliation. With the Athenians seeking refuge behind their walls and the Spartans safe in Lakonia, Philip need fear no challenge to his position as master of the situation. He had won for himself the glory of having ended the Sacred War in such a way that he could be seen as having upheld traditional Greek values more nobly than some of the Greeks themselves, and all at small cost to himself. He had done what the Thebans, the victors of Leuktra and Mantinea, could not do, and neither the Athenians nor the Spartans would. He

⁵⁰ Phalaikos' messengers: Dem. 19.58; Aischin. 2.130, who were obviously not the Phokian ambassadors whom Phalaikos had earlier arrested: Aischin. 2.133. For the claim that Philip had made an alliance before marching on Thermopylai, cf. n. 42 above. Loss of Phokian hope: Dem. 19.53, 58.61. No Phokian crops in 346: Dem. 19.123. Third Athenian embassy: Aischin. 2.94-95, 130; Dem. 19.121-133; Diod. 16.59.3. Cf. also H.D. Westlake, *CQ* 34 (1940) 43-46.

presented himself as a major figure in Greek politics, without at the same time seeming to be a barbarian intruder. It would in the future prove impossible to keep him north of Thermopylai, either militarily or politically.⁵¹

There remained the dual questions of punishment for despoliation of the sanctuary and restitution for the treasures plundered, both properly and legally matters for the Amphiktyons alone to decide. Despite being master of the field, Philip had no formal right to vote on the consequence of his own actions. Yet he had nothing to fear from the Amphiktyons, who would hardly oppose his wishes; and even if they should, the terms of the Phokian capitulation gave him the right—and the Macedonian army the means—to enforce his will. According to Aischines (2.140), the Thebans and Thessalians acknowledged as much, when they pleaded with Philip to follow their advice on how to treat Phokis; but the specific punishment was surely decided upon when the three agreed to suppress the temple-robbers. Using his victory to best advantage, Philip agreed to hand Apollo's temple back to the Amphiktyons, whom he summoned to Delphoi in order to seal the fate of the Phokians. His message announced the resumption of normal activity at the sanctuary, including the resumption of the Pythian Games. The Athenians refused to send a delegation, largely from fear of Amphiktyonic wrath; nor did Sparta nor any other Phokian ally come forward. Phokis was left to the judgement of its enemies.⁵²

A note on the peace itself is warranted in the interest of clarity, even though it necessitates some repetition of facts.⁵³ The cessation of hostilities in 346 is commonly called the "Peace of Philokrates", a phrase first found in Demosthenes (19.150), but this term should properly be applied only to the peace treaty between Philip and the Athenians that ended the "War for Amphipolis". Thus, when Philip (cf. Ps.-Dem. 12.6) supposedly claimed to the Athenians that they were violating the treaty with him, he referred only to the Peace of Philokrates. This treaty technically had nothing to do with the Sacred War, in which Philip was then not officially a belligerent. Moreover, when Philip did intervene, the Phokians

⁵¹ Phokian surrender: Dem. 19.62, 123, 278; Diod. 16.59.3–4; Justin 8.5.3; Philip's position: Aischin. 2.140; Philip's glory: Diod. 16.60.4. Cf. also Ellis, *Philip*, 116–120; Cawkwell, *Philip*, 101–108; Griffith, *HM*, II.343–347; Wirth, *Philipp* II., 78–93.

⁵² Philip's position within the Amphiktyony: cf. n. 1 above. Theban-Thessalian plea: Aischin. 2.140. Summons to Delphoi: Dem. 19.50; Aischin. 2.117; Diod. 16.59.4. Pythian Games: Dem. 19.128; cf. 19.60. Athenian refusal: Dem. 5.14, 19; 19.12, 132; Aischin. 2.140.

⁵³ Bengtson, *SdA* II².329–331, sets forth the evidence handsomely. Peace of Philokrates applying solely to the "War for Amphipolis": Aischin. 2.70; Dem. 19.53; Ps.-Dem. 7.24; cf. also Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 145–149, with earlier bibliography. Philip's later admission to the Amphiktyony: cf. n. 1 above.

surrendered to him alone, not to the Amphiktyons, of whom he was not at that time a member. Therefore, Philip had no legitimate legal right to speak on behalf of the Amphiktyons, and furthermore he did not presume to do so. Only later was Philip included among the Amphiktyons. Instead, the Amphiktyons, with Philip's blessing, made their own separate peace with the Phokians, which Diodoros (16.60.3) erroneously calls a *koine eirene*.⁵⁴ Diodoros' own evidence proves that this treaty was no Common Peace. In connection with it, Diodoros mentions specifically only Philip and the Amphiktyons; but whether all members of the Amphiktyonic Council attended is doubtful, and the Athenians pointedly did not. There is also no reason to suppose that other states, such as Messene, the Arkadian League, or Athens' maritime allies, participated in the settlement of Delphic affairs. Nor was the king of Persia a party to this "Common Peace". A phantom Common Peace is not unique in the pages of Diodoros, as witnessed by his account (15.76.3) of 365/4; and for the events of 346 an origin for Diodoros' error can reasonably be postulated. In 330 Aischines (3.71) claimed that Athens and Philip had made a Common Peace, which contradicts his own earlier testimony. In 343, when he was fighting for his life, he avers (2.56–60) that the Athenians at the outset had tried to make the Peace of Philokrates a Common Peace, but utterly without success. Demosthenes (19.16) attests to the attempt. The futile Athenian effort and the references to it may have misled Diodoros. Although there was a general conclusion of hostilities in 346, and although at least two general treaties were then made, there was no Common Peace in the accepted sense. A *koine eirene* in 346 exists only as an error of Diodoros.

The Amphiktyons, or more precisely the victors, assembled at Delphoi both to assess the damage done in ten years and to mete out punishment for it. The Phokian people, and not just their leaders, were found guilty of sacrilege, with the exception of Abai, which had never condoned either the seizure or the pillaging of the sanctuary. This verdict was hardly unjust, inasmuch as the *strategoí* from Philomelos to Phalaikos were all legally elected officials of the Phokian Confederacy. The Phokians were excluded from any role in Amphiktyonic affairs, and those who had participated in the spoliation of the temple were put under a curse, this primarily aimed at Phalaikos and his men. Many prominent Phokians had already fled into exile at Athens, where they lived quietly and without molestation. Their property was confiscated and leased to people who paid their rents to the god. The Amphiktyons ordered the statues of Philomelos and Onomarchos that had been erected in the sanctuary to be removed. Yet no

⁵⁴ Cf. Bengtson, *SdA* II².331.

Phokian suffered the ritual fate of being thrown from the Phaidriadaí Rocks, not was anyone sold into slavery. Nonetheless, the Phokians received severe punishment. The walls of their cities were pulled down; and, like the Mantineians in 385, they were thenceforth compelled to live in small villages separated from one another. Three years later Demosthenes (19.81) claimed that Theban troops and Philip's mercenaries were billeted among the villagers and that some Phokian land was rented to foreigners, Athenians among them. The Phokians were ordered to repay Apollo 60 talents a year in semi-annual instalments to coincide with the *pylaiai*, until the entire amount pillaged was repaid. Until the time of full restitution the Phokians were allowed to possess neither horses nor arms, thus preventing them from posing a further military threat to the Amphiktyons. If Demosthenes (19.85) be correct that Philip was resolved from the outset to do all that the Thebans wished, and if Aischines (2.142) be also correct in saying that the Oitaioi wanted all adult male Phokians hurled from the cliffs, then most Amphiktyons refused to give way to the desire for unbridled revenge. As it happened, Amphiktyonic punishment of Phokis was harsh, but it stopped short of any further shedding of blood. Of that there had been more than enough.⁵⁵

The formal end of the Sacred War was celebrated with solemn ritual. Philip and the Amphiktyons made the laborious climb of the Phaidriadaí Rocks above Delphoi, but happily with no cruel intent. In a symbolic gesture they hurled some of the weapons of the Phokians and their mercenaries over the cliff, consigning to them the punishment due to the sacrilegious. The rest they otherwise destroyed, and the horses used by the temple-robbers they sold. After ten years the Sacred War was over.⁵⁶

⁵⁵ Position of Abai: Paus. 10.3.2. Curse on the temple-robbers: Diod. 16.60.1; Paus. 10.3.3. Phokian refugees: Dem. 5.19. Statues of Philomelos and Onomarchos: *FdD* III.5. no. 23 line 114. Fate of the Phokian cities: Dem. 19.325; Diod. 16.60.2; Paus. 10.3.1–2. Phokian repayments *FdD* III.5. no. 14; Diod. 16.60.2.

⁵⁶ Diod. 16.60.3.

CHAPTER SEVEN

EPILOGUE

The Third Sacred War was singularly destructive in physical, intellectual, and political terms alike. The loss of human life had been high, and it is impossible now to measure the degree of suffering of the survivors, especially those in the main theater of war. The havoc wreaked on cities from Lokris, Phokis, and Boiotia to Argos and Arkadia had been widespread and considerable. The heart of Phokis and western Boiotia lay mostly in ruins, and not until the Hellenistic period would the cities here regain a semblance of prosperity. Many treasured works of art at Delphoi went to the smelting furnace to provide the Phokians with gold and silver, an inestimable loss of Greek art. It is bitterly ironic that the wealth of Apollo, the god of culture, financed so much carnage.

The war also took its toll politically, both in theory and practice. It marked the bankruptcy of the polis as a political institution; and even in antiquity Justin (8.1.1–2) observed that the Greek states ruined one another, only to fall prey to Philip. The concept that the polis was free to dominate the others had led to desultory strife in which the Greeks had wasted their strength in sterile conflicts.¹ It is another bitter irony of this bitter time that even so great a thinker as Aristotle, even then perhaps composing the *Politics*, could conceive of nothing newer or better than the polis and its traditional values. The polis, as demonstrated by Sparta, Athens, Thebes, and others, had proved that it could dominate but not integrate. That would be the great contribution of Rome, which united the conqueror with the conquered by means of a common Roman citizenship. The Greek polis, despite its many other undeniable achievements, never accomplished anything so grand. The Sacred War also proved the futility of the *koine eirene* as an instrument of peace. If the Greeks truly depended upon the concept of the Common Peace to settle their differences, end their wars, and bring them prosperity, they were sorely mistaken.² The ideal had been so consistently abused that it no longer carried practical meaning. Even during roughly a century of conflict, from 431 to 338, the Greeks evolved no political concept that could bring them peace.

In terms of practical politics, the two principal effects of the Sacred War were to exhaust the traditional major powers of Greece, especially Boiotia,

¹ Cf. J.A.O. Larsen, *CP* 57 (1962) 230–234.

² Cf. Bengtson, *SdA* II².292, especially lines 1–7; Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, *passim*.

and to permit Philip to enter the mainstream of Greek politics. The surrender of Phokis was in some ways not very significant, for Phokian strength had depended largely on Apollo's treasures, to which there was a limit. Simple attrition could have, and nearly did, wear the Phokians down. The efforts of the Spartans in the war compare poorly to the great days of the Persian wars. How stark is the contrast between the dispatch of Leonidas to Thermopylai and that of Archidamos. Unable to destroy Megalopolis, despite its internal problems, or to reconquer Messene, Sparta no longer counted as a great power. Admittedly, Agis, Kleomenes, and Nabis would again demonstrate the potential might of Sparta, but in the last half of the fourth century the Spartans did well enough to hold onto their homeland. They were isolated in the Peloponnesos, incapable of breaking the ring that Epameinondas had forged around them.

Although the Athenians concluded peace with Philip in 346, and the Amphiktyons refused to take further action against them, Athens was nonetheless hemmed in by enemies. Timotheos' gains in Thrace were forever lost to Philip, and closer to home Thebes and Euboia stood watch on the northern border. The Athenians could depend upon no one in the Peloponnesos, including the impotent Spartans. The Athenians had only their walls, their fleet, and their remaining maritime allies, but these were more than enough to ensure their safety, especially in the absence of a significant Macedonian fleet. Yet even Athenian naval power was at a low point. Athenian naval operations had proven futile and financially expensive, thereby weakening the polis and making large-scale offensive campaigns much less realistic. A state incapable of putting down rebellion in Euboia could do no real harm to Macedonia. Athens was still the strongest seapower in Greece, but there are limits to the effectiveness of seapower, especially against a strong and well-protected land power. Nothing better demonstrates Athenian weakness than the terror of those who in 346 sought the shelter of the fortified city, and even Demosthenes (5.14) later that year warned the assembly against provoking the victors. A weakened and weary Athens stood on the defensive.

To Thebes victory brought much-needed relief and the restoration of the Boiotian Confederacy, but only the shell of it. If the Thebans lost to Philip the glory of having won the Sacred War, they had at least received in recompense the Boiotian cities earlier captured by the Phokians. Even so, the inhabitants of Orchomenos, who unsuccessfully begged permission to leave Boiotia, shared the fate of the Plataians and Thespians: although they remained to work the land, they added nothing, owing to their disenfranchisement, to the military and political power of

the Boiotian Confederacy.³ Although the Athenian orators stridently denounced Philip's strengthening of Thebes, in truth Boiotia was so wasted by the conflict that its dreams of hegemony belonged to the past. Yet Thebes had hardly become a cipher; and in 346 the Boiotians, their network of alliances, especially their ties to the most powerful Peloponnesian states, and their geographical position were essential components of the balance of power in Greece. They were still a very valuable military and diplomatic asset and a useful friend. Yet Thebes, like Athens, now stood on the defensive; and Thebes especially needed time in which to recuperate from the rigors of war. Although the Boiotian army had repeatedly destroyed mercenary armies, it had also taken its losses; and its performance against the Spartans in the Peloponnesos demonstrated its decline in quality from the days of Epameinondas and Pelopidas. While still formidable, as it would again prove at Chaironeia, it was no longer an instrument of hegemony.⁴ Hence, the three major powers of Greece—Sparta, Athens, and Thebes—had reduced one another to a position of stalemate, in which none could unaided conquer the others and none was willing to seek a diplomatic or political solution to the deadlock.

Without question the most important result of the Sacred War was the emergence of Philip as the major power in Greek politics. His entry could not have been better. He came not as an invader, but as the champion of Pythian Apollo, invited by the god's stoutest but unsuccessful defenders. Philip's practical gains went considerably beyond the mere glory of having ended the Sacred War. Not only did he assuage Thessaly, but he also overshadowed Thebes and isolated Athens. First, he satisfied his Thessalian friends, who were determined, but alone unable, to regain their customary prominence at Delphoi. The Thessalian representatives Kottyphos and Kolosimmos, both staunch supporters of Philip, thereafter played a prominent part in Amphiktyonic affairs. At last Philip returned Magnesia to the Thessalians, and even awarded them the newly-acquired Nikaia, which was not Thessalian territory. Far more useful and significant was Philip's alliance with the Thebans, which opened to him the arena of Peloponnesian politics. Boiotian allies in the south were immediately inclined towards him for his aid to Thebes and his gracious conduct at Delphoi. Moreover, the weakened condition of Thebes in 346 meant that its Peloponnesian allies would look to their new friend for support, as immediately became apparent. At Megalopolis, which had long depended upon Thebes for its very survival, the Arkadian League honored

³ Even though some Orchomenians begged permission to leave Boiotia (Aischin. 2.141), their petition was probably not granted, but at least some Boiotians found refuge in Athens.

⁴ Cf. p. 121–125 above.

him for his successful intervention, and in Argos his deeds met with the same reception. Although the Athenians appealed to Messene for help, their speeches failed to move the Messenians to oppose Philip. In short, Philip took over Epameinondas' entire Peloponnesian policy, which together with his own ties in the north made him the arbiter of Greek politics.⁵

Philip also found new friends in the Peloponnesos, even among those not traditionally allied to Thebes. In Elis, recently an opponent of Thebes, an ardent group of pro-Philip supporters sprang up; and much to the dismay of the Athenians, Megara and some cities in Euboea went over to Philip. Put simply, Philip's easy victory was far more important than the mere suppression of Phokis, for it served as the means by which he isolated Athens and ultimately Thebes as well. His success in Boiotia, Euboea, and Megara geographically ringed in Attika, while his new Argive, Arkadian, and Eleian friends continued to isolate Sparta. Not since the early days of Epameinondas' career had anyone enjoyed such widespread diplomatic success against Athens and Sparta. In view of these broad connections and his own strength, it is hardly surprising that Thebes, its foreign policy usurped, and Athens stood virtually alone at Chaironeia in 338.

Perhaps one other feature of these events left its mark on Greek politics or at least foreshadowed Hellenistic practice. For ten years a series of Phokian generals, entrusted with vast powers, employed mercenary armies to defy the citizen armies of various Greek states. In many ways these Phokians can be seen as the harbingers of the Hellenistic kings with their paid, not national, armies. Reliance on mercenaries enabled the Phokians to sustain repeated defeats, some so huge that they would have crippled the ordinary polis. Yet mercenaries also brought Thebes to the brink of defeat. The day of the citizen hoplite was drawing to a close, with the sunset coming heroically at Chaironeia.⁶

Since Philip profited most from the war, it is reasonable to inquire what use he meant to make of his victory. A detailed discussion of his intentions goes beyond a study of the Sacred War, but it can be suggested that the struggle opened to him his first real opportunity to conquer Greece. Although recent scholarship has generally portrayed Philip as the reluctant conqueror, he showed as early as 353 after the Crocus Plain that he had designs in the south. Only a strong, coherent coalition of states could

⁵ Thessalian aspirations: Dem. 5.23; 6.22. Kottippos and Kolosimmos: Tod, *GHI*, II.172; Dem. 18.151. Nikaia: Dem. 6.22. Philip's new standing in the Peloponnesos: Dem. 5.19; 19.204; in Arkadia: 5.18; 19.261; in Argos: 19.261; 5.14; 6.9-11; in Messene: 5.18; 6.27; in Elis: 19.260, 294; in Megara and Euboea: 19.294-295, 334; cf. also 19.87, 219, 326, 334.

⁶ Cf. A. Ferrill, *The Origins of War* (London 1985) 175-186.

stop him, and his diplomacy in 346 and thereafter virtually ensured that none would confront him. With Thebes as his ally, Philip needed only to win the submission of Athens. His subsequent campaigns in the Chersonesos and against Byzantion and Perinthos suggest that he planned to strangle the grain trade in order to reduce Athens to submission, as had been both done and attempted in the past. Whether in 346 Philip seriously considered an invasion of the Persian Empire is pure speculation; but strategic realities indicate that such an undertaking then would have been the height of folly (cf. pp. 121–125 above), and Philip was not a foolish man. The battle of Knidos had already shown that in order to conquer Asia the invader must neutralize any hostile fleet in the Aegean. Philip must either command the Athenian navy or render it ineffectual; he could not, as Alexander the Great later realized, allow it an independent sphere of operations in which it could pose a threat to his communications with Greece. At any rate, it is clear that already by 346 Athens was a central feature in his plans, and the Sacred War had put him in an excellent position to implement them. Philip was the real and the only victor of the Sacred War.

APPENDIX ONE

CHRONOLOGY

I. OUTBREAK AND END OF THE THIRD SACRED WAR

No aspect of the Third Sacred War has been more argued than its chronology and no part of that than its beginning. The sources themselves are varied, ranging from the scattered chronological references of Athenian orators to the narratives, some of them quite brief, of writers who lived long after the event. By far the most important body of information comes from two contemporary inscriptions, both found at Delphoi. The matter is further complicated by the fragments of lost historians, who seem to have taken both Philomelos' seizure and subsequent plundering of the sanctuary as the beginning of the war, while later writers normally begin their accounts with Philomelos' *coup*, though recording both the pillaging of the sanctuary and the Amphiktyonic declaration of war (and thus the formal beginning of war) as later events.¹ Modern scholars have invariably begun their discussions of the topic with the later writers and especially with the narrative of Diodoros. A sounder approach, however, is to examine first the evidence of contemporaries, starting with the literary testimony and continuing with the epigraphical. Only then can the later writers be fairly evaluated, and their testimony gauged against that of contemporaries.

A) *Contemporary sources*

Contemporaries generally state that the war lasted ten years. Although no fourth-century literary source defines what he considered the beginning of the war, each marks its end with a specific event. While failing to give the length of the war, Demosthenes (19.59) states that the Phokians surrendered to Philip on 23 Skirophorion in 347/6.² Skirophorion was the last month of the Athenian year, so this date is very close to the new year. Since the new year began on the evening of the first visibility of the new moon after the summer solstice, a rough date for 1 Hekatombaion can be calculated.³ For 346 the astronomical date of the summer solstice is 28

¹ Cf. Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 T27; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 T9; Diyllos, *FHG* II.360; Diod. 16.14.3, 23.1, 28.4; Justin 8.1.4–11; Paus. 10.2.3–3.1, 8.2; cf. also Arist. *Pol.* 5.3.4.

² The scholiast's equation of Skirophorion with March in the Julian calendar is best rejected.

³ Cf. A.E. Samuel, *Greek and Roman Chronology* (Munich 1972) 64, with bibliography.

June.⁴ To three days before, 25 June, dates the astronomical new moon, and the next new moon after the solstice dates to 24 July.⁵ Because ancient astronomers before Kallippos could not predict the true conjunction, differences of one, two, and three days could exist between the exact lunar month and the observed month.⁶ Although it is impossible to determine which of these two new moons was observed, the new Attic year of 346/5 can be dated either to late June or late July 346 BC. The end of Skirophorion 347/6 would then have fallen a few days earlier than either of these dates.

Demosthenes (19.125–126) gives a second chronological point that corroborates his date. He states that within five or six days of the Phokians' destruction (cf. 19.59–60) word of it reached Athens, causing such alarm that among other things the Athenians considered holding the festival of Herakles within the city walls. Five or six days after 23 Skirophorion would place the incident on either 28 or 29 Skirophorion (barring intercalation), and the Herakleia would presumably be the one celebrated on 4 Hekatombaion.⁷ It is easy to understand why under the circumstances the Athenians would want to hold the festival, less than a week in the future, in a safe place.

Although Aischines (3.99; cf. 2.58–59) sometimes tries to discredit Demosthenes' calendar-dates, his own testimony (2.131–134) supports the date of 347/6 for the peace. Both here and elsewhere Aischines (3.148) calls the Sacred War the "ten-years war (πόλεμος δεκέτης)". Consequently, Aischines substantially agrees with Demosthenes about the date of the end of the war, which he twice says lasted ten years. Lastly, Douris of Samos (*FGrH* 76 F2) also reports that the war lasted for ten years. He adds that it ended in the tenth year when Philip allied himself with the Thebans, which enabled them to defeat the Phokians.⁸ Douris is obviously referring to Philip's full-scale intervention in the Sacred War, not to his earlier activity in Thessaly.⁹ Demosthenes (18.19), supported by

⁴ F.K. Ginzel, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie* II (Leipzig 1911) 579.

⁵ Ginzel, *op. cit.*, I.555, for both dates.

⁶ B.L. van der Waerden, *JHS* 80 (1960) 169. At this point in the Athenian year observation of the moon was easy because of good visibility. The mean monthly incidence of sunshine for Athens in June, July, and August is 2737 hours. The mean number of cloudy days per year at the Peiraeus is 24: British Naval Intelligence, *Greece* (Geographical Handbook Series, London 1944) I.101.

⁷ Mikalson, *Calendar*, 25.

⁸ Jacoby, *FGrH* IIC.118. Douris' source is unknown: cf. R. Kebric, *In the Shadow of Macedon: Douris of Samos* (Wiesbaden 1977) 44. On Kallisthenes, *FGrH* 124 F1; cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* IID.415–416.

⁹ Diod. 16.35; Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 188–201. Diodoros (16.58.1–3) further states that in 347/6 Philip sent some troops to help Thebes, but that he himself moved south in force only in the following year.

Aischines (2.132–135), reports that Philip's response to the Theban appeal occurred shortly before the Peace of Philokrates. Thus, all three fourth-century sources concur that the Sacred War ended with Philip's intervention, which is to be dated to the end of 347/6 or in early to mid-summer 346 BC, which places its outbreak sometime in 356 BC.

Two other pieces of contemporary evidence bear on the problem, without, however, being specific enough to help in solving it. The first is Isaïos' speech *On the Estate of Apollodoros*, which is dated sometime after 358/7 on the strength of a reference to the dual *trierarchia* (7.38).¹⁰ The speech also contains a reference (7.27) to the Pythais, an Athenian festival celebrated at Delphoi.¹¹ Yet since this festival occurred at irregular intervals, one can only say that it was celebrated sometime between 358/7 and the outbreak of the Sacred War.¹² The reference to the Pythais, without connection to any event during or after 358/7, is far too vague to elucidate the chronology of these years.

The second is a passage from Xenophon's *Poroi* (5.8–10), in which the author refers to the Phokian seizure of the sanctuary and the outbreak of hostilities. Although most scholars place the publication of the *Poroi* after the Social War (4.40), the only definite chronological reference is this isolated allusion to the Sacred War.¹³ Nevertheless, the verb forms in this passage indicate only that trouble had broken out in Greece, that certain unspecified states were currently at war, that the Athenians were not in fact at that moment demonstrably seeking the independence of Delphoi, but that instead of engaging in diplomatic activities to remedy the situation they were involved in war along with unnamed allies. All that this passage proves is that the Phokians had already seized the sanctuary and that Athens had entered the war.¹⁴ The lack of more specific information means that the *Poroi* is likewise too vague to be of any use in determining the chronology of these events.¹⁵

¹⁰ H.W. Parke, *JHS* 59 (1939) 80–83; B. Jordan, *The Athenian Navy in the Classical Period* (Berkeley 1975) 74 n. 60.

¹¹ A. Boethius, *Die Pythais: Studien zur Geschichte der Verbindungen zwischen Athen und Delphi* (Upsala 1918).

¹² Although Parke, *art. cit.*, prefers to date it to summer 355 BC, he admits that summer 356 BC is also possible, as for that matter is still an earlier date.

¹³ Cf. H.R. Breitenbach, *RE* 9A (1966) 1754, who also points out various parallels between passages of the *Poroi* and those of Isokrates' *On the Peace*, dated to 355. R. Sealey, *JHS* 75 (1955) 75–76, however, observes that the *Poroi* could have been published as late as the Peace of Philokrates and that all arguments about one author borrowing from the other are based only on speculation.

¹⁴ Sordi, *RFIC* 36 (1958) 142, concludes that the *Poroi* depicts an interval between the seizure and the outbreak of hostilities, even though the present participle, συμπολεμοῦντες, indicates that Athens was at that point an active belligerent.

¹⁵ Cf. P. Gauthier, *Un commentaire historique des Poroi de Xénophon* (Geneva-Paris 1976) *ad loc.* All that can reasonably be gleaned from Xenophon's remarks is that he felt that Athens still had time to achieve a diplomatic settlement of the conflict.

Even more instructive than these literary sources are two inscriptions which shed invaluable light on Amphiktyonic affairs.¹⁶ The first is an Amphiktyonic inscription found in 1947,¹⁷ and the second is part of a list of accounts erected by the city of Delphoi.¹⁸ Taken together, these documents give a reasonably detailed picture of events at Delphoi. The Amphiktyonic inscription dates to the spring-pylaia of the archonship of Herakleios, 357/6 (lines 1–3). Since the name of the month is not included, this inscription refers to the regular meeting of the pylaia (lines 2–3), which began on 1 Bysios (roughly February/March), the eighth month of the Delphian year, and ended on the last day of Apellaos, which began with the first new moon after the summer solstice.¹⁹ The inscription lists the names of three *prostateuontes* (a presiding committee of *naopoioi*), which consisted of a Theban and two Thessalians (lines 5–8), three *argurolgeontes* (collectors of funds), which included Aristagoras of Delphoi, Damophanes of Corinth, and Amphares of Phokis (lines 9–12). The inscription ends with a partial list of the Amphiktyons who had paid their contributions for the reconstruction of the temple (lines 13 *ad fin.*).

The Delphian accounts (*FdD* III.5. no. 19–20), unlike the Amphiktyonic inscription, record the transactions of a fund peculiar to the Delphians. This payment, separate from that of the other Amphiktyons, went to the *naopoioi* for the rebuilding of the temple.²⁰ The accounts of this special fund were originally inscribed on four stelai, of which the first and fourth are lost. The extant text begins with the archonship of Argilios (358/7), and records such specific information as the year and the pylaia in which the Delphians made disbursements, the exact sums paid, the names of those who received the funds and of those who witnessed the transactions, and the purpose of the disbursement.

No. 19 (lines 3–4) records one payment under both the spring-pylaia of the archonship of Herakleios (357/6) and the month Apellaos of the archonship of Aristoxenos (356/5). Roux (177–178) has explained this double dating, which occurs elsewhere in the accounts, as the result of the discrepancy between the Delphian and Amphiktyonic calendars. Since the eponymous archon of Delphoi took office in the last month of the spring-pylaia, which was itself dated by the name of the preceding archon, the Delphians inscribed both the pylaia and the name of the Delphian

¹⁶ For an early appreciation of the significance of some of these documents, cf. P. Cloché, *BCH* 40 (1916) 78–142; N.G.L. Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 62–64, hereafter cited simply as “Hammond”.

¹⁷ J. Pouilloux, *BCH* 73 (1949) 177–200, hereafter “Pouilloux”.

¹⁸ *FdD* III.5. no. 19–20.

¹⁹ Roux, *Amphictionie*, 3, 39–50, 235.

²⁰ Roux, *op. cit.*, 172–175.

archon under whom the payment was actually made. Thus, this payment was made in the last month of the spring-pylaia and in the first month of the Delphian civil year. Apellaïos began with the first new moon after the summer solstice. In 356 BC the summer solstice at Athens occurred around midnight of 27 June and the first new moon thereafter on the evening of 14 July.²¹ Hence, if the new moon was properly observed, Apellaïos began on 14 July 356 BC. Noteworthy also is the fact that Aristagoras, known from the Amphiktyonic inscription, resigned as a *naopoios* at this point, hence before the end of the spring-pylaia, with Nikomachos of Delphoi assuming his duties (lines 4–5).

Four months later in the autumn-pylaia of Aristoxenos' archonship Nikomachos, Damophanes of Corinth, also mentioned in the Amphiktyonic inscription, Xenotimos of Sikyon, and two Argives received Delphian funds for the reconstruction of the temple (lines 8–30). Although work continued by the order of all the *naopoioi*, only these five men were actually present at Delphoi (lines 10–11). The others had absented themselves.

In the spring-pylaia of Aristoxenos (355 BC) the *naopoioi* did not meet (line 31), nor did they again until the spring-pylaia of Nikon's archonship (354/3). The *naopoioi* of that session included Philolaos of Sparta, who had also served in 357/6 (line 35, cf. line 6), Agesarchos of Delphoi, Nikeas and Euormos of Lokris, and six others, all of them either Phokians or allies of Phokis (lines 34–36). Furthermore, the account specifically states that the funds were paid to "the *naopoioi* in the time of war" (τοῖς ναοποιοῖς ἐν τῷ πολέμῳ: line 37). This is the first appearance of this term, which is used only to describe all of the *naopoioi* of the years 354–351 (line 66). Moreover, the Delphians recorded the balance of funds from the spring-pylaia of Argilios (357 BC) to the spring-pylaia of Theucharis (351 BC), the latter being the last meeting of "the *naopoioi* in the time of war" (lines 68–70).

A full board of *naopoioi* did not meet until the autumn-pylaia of the archon Damoxenos (346 BC), after peace had been established (ἐπεὶ ἡ εἰρήνη ἐγένετο: line 71). At this same time, Philolaos of Sparta, who had been prominent for so many years, now disappears from the accounts forever.²²

These two inscriptions give the best indication of the chronology and the course of events at Delphoi. To return first to the Amphiktyonic document, two aspects of this inscription are particularly pertinent. The

²¹ Ginzl, *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie*, I.579; II.554.

²² Xenotimos of Sikyon, another *naopoios* "in the time of war", likewise disappears from the accounts in 346: cf. Roux, *Amphictionie*, 109.

presence of a Theban and two Thessalians as presidents of the *naopoioi* proves that the spring-pylaia of 356 BC began normally and that Philomelos had not at that point seized the sanctuary. Their presence led Pouilloux (198) to conclude that the Phokian *coup*, if it occurred in this pylaia, could only be placed at the extreme end of it, in the course of the summer. Yet the *argurologeontes*, who do not appear in earlier documents, indicate that conditions during that pylaia were already unsettled.²³

To explain the creation of the *argurologeontes* Roux (114, cf. also 105–111) suggests that Philomelos' seizure of the sanctuary hindered the reunion of all the *naopoioi*, making it necessary for those assembled at Delphoi to accomplish all of the tasks of the entire college of *naopoioi*. To do so they divided the work among themselves, with the collection of funds falling to a newly-created board of *argurologeontes*. The tensions that led to the outbreak of the Sacred War adequately explain why the *naopoioi* took additional measures to account for Amphiktyonic funds, all the more so since their duties were not by definition political in nature. Responsible only for the actual rebuilding of the temple, they received Amphiktyonic monies which they paid to those who worked on the temple. In unstable and ominous times it was sensible and circumspect to be especially careful to account precisely for the sums that passed through their hands.

Yet the career of Aristagoras argues against Roux' suggestion that the *argurologeontes* were instituted after Philomelos' seizure of Delphoi. If Aristagoras was either appointed by Philomelos to serve on the board or agreed to do so voluntarily after the *coup*, one immediately wonders why he failed to finish his term, for the Delphian accounts (line 5) specifically testify that in Apellaios 356 BC he was no longer a *naopoios*. More reasonable is the supposition that he resigned in protest against the seizure of the sanctuary or was removed afterwards because he refused to co-operate with the Phokians.²⁴ The date of Aristagoras' departure from office no doubt marks the time of Philomelos' *coup*, as Pouilloux (198) had earlier supposed. Moreover, the reason for the establishment of the *argurologeontes* is not far to seek. Given the Phokian and Spartan refusals to pay the original fines, much less the doubling of them, the *naopoioi* doubtless realized that further trouble lay ahead. For their own protection in the event of strife the *naopoioi* took the additional precaution of establishing officials whose primary responsibility was to provide detailed accounts of their financial dealings.

Another factor probably contributed to Aristagoras' departure in

²³ *FdD* III.5. no.5 line 2; no.7 line 3; no.9 col. IIB lines 10–11.

²⁴ Roux, *Amphictionie*, 109, himself reaches this conclusion in another connection, a view for which Cloché, *BCH* 40 (1916) 95, had argued forcefully.

Apellaios 356 BC. The new eponymous archon at Delphoi was Aristoxenos, who had been exiled from Delphoi in 363/2.²⁵ He had found refuge in Athens, which supported Philomelos. Aristoxenos' very presence as archon proves that the government that had exiled him had been overthrown. It further indicates that he enjoyed the support of Philomelos. Aristagoras was clearly not an exile and thus presumably no adherent of Aristoxenos' coterie, which further strengthens the supposition that he left office because of Philomelos' actions.

If Philomelos' *coup* took place shortly before the new Delphian year, it would also explain two other facts listed in the Delphian accounts. First, it would give the best explanation for the activities of the *naopoioi* in the autumn-pylaia of Aristoxenos. During that time the rebuilding of the temple continued under the auspices of all the *naopoioi*. Yet only a handful of them, none of whom was Theban or Thessalian, was actually present at Delphoi, and these all from states friendly to the Phokians. Those absent gave their approval of the work in writing.²⁶ Since the Amphiktyons did not declare war until after the seizure of the sanctuary, since work on the temple continued despite political events, and since it was dangerous for Phokian enemies to venture into Delphoi, the *naopoioi* on hand had to carry out the duties of the entire college, to which the absent *naopoioi* subsequently gave their approval.

Secondly, seizure of the sanctuary in summer 356 BC explains both the timing of the Amphiktyonic declaration of war and the specific terminology of the Delphian accounts. The *naopoioi* at Delphoi during Aristoxenos' spring-pylaia are not called "the *naopoioi* in the time of war". That expression is nowhere used before 354/3 and not again after 352/1. This alone indicates that as of the fourth month of this pylaia the Amphiktyony was still at peace. After this fourth month no further Delphian funds were paid out, and the inscription reports (line 31) that the *naopoioi* did not meet during the spring-pylaia of Aristoxenos. When they next meet, they are called "the *naopoioi* in the time of war". The most reasonable explanation of these facts is that the Amphiktyons officially declared war on the Phokians during the autumn-pylaia of Aristoxenos, at or after the fourth month of the Delphian year, in the late autumn or early winter of 356 BC. Lastly, after registering the activities of "the *naopoioi* in the time of war", the Delphians placed the next meeting of the *naopoioi* at the autumn-pylaia of 346 BC after the end of the war. Since the autumn-pylaia regularly convened on 1 Boukatios, it fell shortly after the Athenian month of Skirophorion, in the early summer of 346 BC.

²⁵ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 4; cf. also no. 15 lines 22–23; no. 16 lines 31–33; *IG* II² 109 col. B line 21.

²⁶ Pouilloux, 198–199; Roux, *Amphictionie*, 109.

Additional evidence that the sanctuary was still free in 357 comes from an inscribed treaty between Philip and the Chalkidians, found in 1934. Dated to late 357 or early 356, it contains stipulations involving the Delphic oracle, and a copy of the treaty was to be erected at Delphoi (lines 7, 9, 15). Lines 12–13 even state that the god had prophesied that friendship would be beneficial to the Chalkidians and Philip. It is very unlikely that the contracting parties would have chosen Pythian Apollo for this important role, if the sanctuary were then in impious hands.

In summary, these inscriptions testify that Philomelos' seizure of the sanctuary occurred in summer 356, that the Amphiktyons declared war on Phokis in late autumn or winter 356, and that peace was made in early summer of 346. This evidence is substantially in harmony with that of contemporary literary sources, specifically that the Sacred War lasted ten years, having ended in Skirophorion 347/6.

B) *Later sources*

The chronological details of later sources are almost hopelessly confused. This is especially true of the testimony provided by the Parian Marble, which stands out as such an anomaly that it can immediately be dismissed as useless. The inscription (*FGrH* 239 A75) records the Phokian seizure of the sanctuary under 366/5, which disagrees with all contemporary evidence, and consequently must be rejected.²⁷

Chronological confusion likewise reigns in Diodoros, the principal narrative source for the war, and in Pausanias, who had read widely and had toured Phokis. Diodoros' testimony can be most conveniently given in schematic form:

	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Event</i>
1.	14.117.8	387/6	Kallisthenes covered 30 years of history, beginning with the King's Peace and ending with Philomelos' seizure of the temple at Delphoi.
2.	16.14.3	357/6	Demophilos continued Ephoros' history, beginning with the seizure of the sanctuary and Philomelos' pillaging of the oracle. The war lasted eleven years until the destruction of those who had shared the sacred wealth.
3.	16.14.4	357/6	Kallisthenes ended his history with the seizure of the sanctuary and the crime of Philomelos.
4.	16.14.5	357/6	Diyllos began his history with the robbing of the temple.
5.	16.23.1	355/4	Sacred War began and lasted nine years; Philomelos seized the temple.
6.	16.30.1	354/3	Philomelos plundered the sanctuary.
7.	16.59	346/5	Sacred War ended with the Boiotian alliance with Philip and the Phokian surrender, Punishment of the temple-robbers recorded. The war had lasted for ten years.

²⁷ Cf. Jacoby, *FGrH* IID.697–698.

The chaos is immediately apparent. Numbers 1 and 3 are consistent in saying that Kallisthenes' *Hellenika* covered the events of 30 years, from 387/6 to 357/6. Number 3 claims that Kallisthenes also described the crime of Philomelos in addition to his *coup*, by which, as Number 2 indicates, is meant the plundering of the temple. Hence, Number 3 places the seizure and the pillaging of the sanctuary in the same archon-year. Yet Numbers 5 and 6 state that these events were separated by an entire archon-year, and that neither event took place in 357/6. Numbers 3 and 4 suggest that Diyllos took one of the same events for the starting-point of his history that Kallisthenes used for his conclusion. Number 3 claims that the Sacred War began in 357/6, and Number 5 contradicts 2 and 7 about the length of the war. In effect, Numbers 2, 5, and 7, while all agreeing that the war ended in 346/5, each gives a different date for its beginning, ranging from 357/6 to 355/4. Yet Diodoros' own statement (Number 7) that the war ended in 346/5, and had begun ten years earlier contradicts his date of 355/4 (Number 5) for its beginning.

Some matters are ostensibly clearer than others. First, there is little reason even to conclude that Diodoros is accurately reporting the contents of his predecessors' works (Nos., 1–4). For instance, why Diyllos would have begun his history with the plundering of the sanctuary without having first described its seizure is inexplicable. The carelessness with which Diodoros reports the end of Kallisthenes' *Hellenika* (Nos. 1–2) further supports this contention. Second, if Diodoros is to be taken at face-value, Numbers 5 and 6 indicate that he rejected 357/6 as the date of the initial events of the war. Thus, for reasons of his own he has discarded the testimony of contemporary historians, at least as reported in his cavalier fashion, in order to place the outbreak of the war in 355/4. Even that date conflicts with his testimony about the war ending ten years later in 346/5. Lastly, Diodoros' date of 346/5, the only thing about which he has been consistent, is proven wrong by contemporary literary and epigraphic sources.²⁸ In short, Diodoros is clearly not a master of chronology, and his testimony on these matters has no independent value. Furthermore, regarding this topic, at least, it is a mistake to conclude that he could even accurately epitomize what he found in his sources.

Pausanias' testimony, while more consistent than Diodoros', presents its own difficulties. Pausanias twice (9.6.4; 10.2.4) states that the war lasted for ten consecutive years, and he twice says (10.3.1, 8.2) that it ended in the tenth year after the seizure of the sanctuary. That event he dates precisely (10.2.3) to 357/6, when Herakleides was *prytanis* at

²⁸ Cf. p. 155 above, and F. Chamoux, *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (1983) 11.

Delphoi, Agathokles archon at Athens, in the fourth year of the 105th Olympiad. Afterwards, he says (10.2.4) that the Thebans declared war, and the conflict raged for ten years. Its end he also dates precisely (10.8.2) to 348/7, when Theophilos was archon at Athens and in the first year of the 108th Olympiad.

Pausanias' dating of the beginning of the war agrees with Diodoros' notice of the historical works that took the *coup* as a major chronological point. Yet his date for the end of the war disagrees significantly with all contemporary evidence and even with Diodoros'. The former alone makes it impossible to conclude that Pausanias was using a reliable, contemporary work.²⁹ He may have depended on a chronographic list as defective as the Parian Marble.³⁰ Certainty is unattainable, speculation fruitless. Since his date for the end of the war is wrong, there is no logical reason to accept that for its beginning. Pausanias' testimony, like Diodoros', can be accepted only if supported by better evidence.

Of all the dates given by Diodoros and Pausanias only one coincides with that confirmed by contemporary sources: that of Agathokles' archonship for the seizure of the sanctuary.³¹ This testimony, taken in conjunction with the epigraphical evidence, points also to summer 356 BC as the date of Philomelos' *coup*. Pausanias in particular provides a clue to the Athenian archon-date of these events. With the Herakleides of 10.2.3 emended to Herakleios in the light of the Amphiktyonic inscription, and with Herakleios' term coinciding with Agathokles' archonship at Athens, one can conclude that the seizure of the sanctuary occurred towards the end of the Athenian year in Agathokles' archonship.³² In this lone instance the testimony of these secondary sources receives support from contemporary evidence.

C) Conclusions

The results of this inquiry yield some secure dates according to both the Julian and Athenian calendars. Contemporary inscriptions indicate that Philomelos seized the sanctuary in the summer of 356 BC, in the Delphian archonship of Herakleios (357/6), which Pausanias equates with the Athenian archonship of Agathokles. Delphian accounts further reveal that a

²⁹ Roux, *Amphictionie*, 83, suggests that Pausanias' source was an unknown historian who had used a *fasti delphici*, which is unacceptable in view of the incorrect date for the end of the war; cf. also p. 17 n.17 above.

³⁰ U. Kahrstedt, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin 1910) 27.

³¹ Diod. 14.117.8; 16.14.3–5; Paus. 10.2.3.

³² Cf. Pouilloux, 197–198; Roux, *Amphictionie*, 82–86.

brief span of four months of the autumn-pylaia of Aristoxenos' Delphian archonship (356/5), separated the *coup* from the Amphiktyonic declaration of war, which fell in the Athenian archonship of Elpines. Therefore, war was officially declared in late autumn or early winter of 356 BC. Aischines and Douris testify that the war lasted for ten years, without indicating whether they meant archon-years or campaigning-seasons. Demosthenes states that the war ended towards the last days of Skirophorion (347/6 or 346 BC), with which Aischines substantially agrees. The Delphian accounts support their testimony, for they record the first meeting of the Amphiktyony after the peace under the autumn-pylaia of the Delphian archon Damoxenos (346/5 or 346 BC).

II. DIODOROS AND THE BEGINNING OF THE SACRED WAR

Diodoros' account of the prelude and initial events of the war is the most detailed narrative extant. Though brief, the description of events seems confused and repetitive. Its historical value has been repeatedly attacked and occasionally defended. Beginning with A. Schäfer in 1856 and continuing until the present day, many scholars have concluded that Diodoros has unwittingly duplicated certain episodes in his narrative.³³ A hearty few, notably F. Reuss and N.G.L. Hammond, have totally rejected the existence of a doublet, insisting instead that Diodoros' report is coherent and intelligible.³⁴ A brief review of Diodoros' testimony is necessary before arguments about its validity can reasonably be assessed.

A) Diodoros' account

Diodoros begins his account at 16.23.1 by stating that in the Athenian archonship of Kallistratos (355/4) Philomelos seized the sanctuary of Apollo at Delphoi, thereby kindling the Sacred War, which lasted for nine

³³ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².495–498, the second edition is cited here only for convenience; C.A. Volquardsen, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichte bei Diodor, Buch XI bis XVI* (Keil 1868) 110–113; Kahrstedt, *Forschungen zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts*, 27–38; E. Pokorny, *Studien zur griechischen Geschichte im sechsten und fünften Jahrzehnt des vierten Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Greifswald 1913) 20–25; K. Uhlemann, *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der Geschichte Philipps von Makedonien und des Heiligen Krieges im 16. Buch Diodors* (Strassburg 1913) 115–118; P. Cloché, *Étude chronologique sur la troisième guerre sacrée (356–346 avant J.-C.)* (Paris 1915) 4–39; *Études classiques* 8 (1939) 161–170; Beloch, *GG III*².2.26–31, 62–277; M. Tonev, *Studia philologica Serdicensia* 1 (1938) 203–212; Sordi, *RFIC* 36 (1958) 134–150; *Diodori Siculi, Bibliothecae Liber XVI* (Florence 1969) xxii–xxx. These authors will henceforth be cited by name only.

³⁴ Reuss, *NJbb* 153 (1896) 317–326; Hammond, *JHS* 57 (1937) 44–64; cf. also L. Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, II (Paris 1952) 47.

years.³⁵ After recounting the grounds for complaint against the Spartans and Phokians (23.2–3), he states that the Amphiktyons found against them both. Philomelos (23.4) urged his countrymen to resist the Amphiktyons and (23.6) to press their own claim to the presidency of the sanctuary. Thus, chapter 23 deals primarily with the Phokian reaction to the charge and the fine.

Chapter 24 describes the Phokian measures to oppose the Amphiktyons. At 24.1 Philomelos, having been elected *strategos autokrator*, traveled to Sparta seeking the support of King Archidamos and informing him of his intention to seize the sanctuary and then to claim the presidency of it. When Archidamos promised secret aid, including a sum of money (24.2), Philomelos recruited (ἐμισθώσατο) mercenaries and chose 1000 Phokians as peltasts. Thereupon, having gathered (ἀθροίσας) a multitude of soldiers, and having seized the sanctuary, he slew the Thrakidai and confiscated their property (24.3). In response, some neighboring Lokrians launched a campaign against Philomelos, but were forced to retreat when they lost a battle near Delphoi (24.4). Elated by his success, Philomelos erased the decrees of condemnation, and afterwards spread word that he intended neither to plunder the oracle nor to commit any other illegal act (24.4–5).

In chapter 25 the Boiotians assembled and voted to send troops to aid the oracle, which army was duly dispatched (ἐξέπεμψαν), although nothing else is subsequently heard of it. In the meantime, Philomelos fortified the sanctuary. He was also collecting (ἡθροίζε) many mercenaries, having raised the pay by half, and picking the best of the Phokians (τῶν Φωκέων ἐπιλέγων τοὺς ἀρίστους), he quickly gathered (ἡθροισεν) a force of over 5000 men, with whom he was protecting Delphoi (25.1). Afterwards, having invaded Lokris and having ravaged much enemy territory, he encamped near a certain unnamed river that flowed by a fort. Having unsuccessfully attacked the fort, he lifted the siege, but afterwards lost 20 men in a skirmish with the Lokrians. When the victors refused to relinquish the dead because they were temple-robbers (25.2), Philomelos renewed battle and forced the Lokrians to exchange the dead. Since he then commanded much of Lokrian territory, he permitted his soldiers to plunder at will, after which he returned to Delphoi to consult the oracle (25.3).

³⁵ Diodoros' Roman dates, by which these events are also dated, are in error by four years. According to G. Perl, *Kritische Untersuchungen zu Diodors römischer Jahrzahl* (Berlin 1957) 157, this discrepancy does not apply to Greek events, since Diodoros used different sources for his Greek and his Roman dates. Nonetheless, this fact should stand as a warning to those inclined to attribute chronological accuracy to Diodoros. For Diodoros' confusion over the chronology of the Spartokid dynasty, cf. T.R. Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 197.

Chapter 26 is a digression on the tripod at Delphoi, after which chapter 27 continues the narrative.³⁶ At that point Philomelos, in full control of the oracle, forced the Pythia to give him an oracular pronouncement, to which was later added an omen (27.1–2). He next dispatched embassies to the major Greek cities explaining that even though he had seized the sanctuary, he had no evil designs on the sacred treasures. Instead, the dispute was basically over the presidency of the sanctuary (27.3). He promised to make an inventory of the sacred property, and appealed either for active support or neutrality (27.4). While Athens, Sparta, and others allied themselves with Philomelos, the Thebans, Lokrians, and “certain others” entered into (ἐπανεῖλαντο) war with Phokis on behalf of the god.

Chapter 28 begins a new archon-year (354/3), during which Philomelos was collecting (ἡθροίζε) a multitude of mercenaries, and was choosing (κατέλεγε) from the Phokians those who were fit for the army. Although he refrained from plundering the sacred dedications, he exacted money from the Delphians. Having financed a considerable army with this money, he led it into the field (ὑπαιθρον): 28.2. When the Lokrians launched a campaign against him, he defeated them at the Phaidriadai Rocks, and forced many of them to throw themselves over the cliffs. In dejection the Lokrians sent ambassadors to Thebes asking for Boiotian support (28.3). When the Boiotians called upon the Thessalians and other Amphiktyons to declare war on the Phokians, they did so, while the other states of Greece took one side or the other (28.4).

Chapter 29 catalogues the combatants, listing which states took which side, before examining in detail why the Spartans supported the Phokians. Diodoros states (29.2) that in the Leuktrian War the Thebans lodged a formal complaint against the Spartans for Phoibidas’ illegal seizure of the Kadmeia. The Amphiktyons fined the Spartans, who were unable to pay within the allotted time, whereupon the fine was doubled (29.2). He concludes (29.3–4) by saying that although the Spartans refused to raise up war for themselves because of the Amphiktyonic verdict, they supported the Phokian claim to the presidency of the sanctuary in the hope that their allies would annul the verdict against them.

In chapter 30 Diodoros resumes his narrative of the burgeoning conflict, beginning with the Boiotian decision to campaign against the Phokians. To meet this threat Philomelos decided (ἔκρινε) to collect a multitude of mercenaries, which he did by increasing pay by half. The cost of the impending war led him to seize the sacred dedications and to plunder the oracle. In 30.2 Diodoros depicts Philomelos’ mercenaries as

³⁶ For a similar digression, cf. 15.66.2–6; 17.7.4–7.

impious men. Because of his great resources Philomelos quickly formed a considerable force of over 10,000 foot and horse. With this army he invaded Lokris, defeating the defenders in a cavalry battle, even though the Boiotians had come to their aid (30.3). Afterwards, some 6000 Thesalians and neighboring peoples arrived in Lokris, only to suffer defeat at a hill named Argolas. The Boiotians having then appeared, 13,000 in number, to reinforce their allies, 1500 Achaians from the Peloponnesos arrived to reinforce the Phokians.

These massed forces come to grips in chapter 31. When the Boiotians executed many captured mercenaries as temple-robbers before an unnamed city (31.1), Philomelos' men forced him to seize enemy stragglers for the sake of meting out like punishment (31.2). Afterwards, when both armies were marching through a rough, tree-covered area, their leading elements ran afoul of each other. In the ensuing battle the Boiotians defeated the Phokians, and Philomelos committed suicide to avoid capture (31.3–4). His subordinate officer Onomarchos recovered those who survived the rout (31.5).

B) *Diodoros and his critics*

Most scholars have concluded that Diodoros has unintentionally given two parallel accounts of the outbreak of the war within the space of a few chapters. With one exception, the "doublists", as one can call them, attribute this failing to Diodoros' use of two different sources for the same events.³⁷ According to most doublists, the two sources can be distinguished chiefly by their political or moral coloring or by their degree of historical accuracy and objectivity.³⁸ Others, however, see no significant difference in tone, historical skill, or outlook between the two versions.³⁹ Beloch (*GG* III².2.27–28) and A. Bellemans (*Phoibos* 10/12 [1955–58] 50) have concluded that Diodoros mistakenly copied the same source twice. Oddly enough, moreover, there is no overall agreement about where the doublet begins. Some place it before 27.1,⁴⁰ some at 27.1,⁴¹ or after 27.1.⁴² Nor is there much agreement about which events are

³⁷ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².495; Volquardsen, 110–113; Kahrstedt, 30; Uhlemann, 115; Pokorny, 16; Cloché (1915) 8–9; (1939) 162; Tonev, 208–211; Sordi, 145–146; *Diodori Siculi*, xxvii–xxxiii.

³⁸ E.g. Volquardsen, 110–113; Uhlemann, 107–117; Tonev, 209; Sordi, (1958) 147.

³⁹ E.g. Cloché (1915) 4–5; Kahrstedt, 35–36.

⁴⁰ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².495–497, yet 497 n. 1, suggests some uncertainty; cf. also E. Schwartz, *Hermes* 44 (1910) 488.

⁴¹ Kahrstedt, 30; Beloch, *GG* III².2.29–30; Cloché (1915) 38–39; (1939) 162–163; Tonev, 204, 208.

⁴² Volquardsen, 110; Uhlemann, 79; Sordi, 143.

doublents. For example, although Beloch (*GG* III².2.28), Uhlemann (81), and Pokorny (21) consider 28.1 a doublet of 24.2, Kahrstedt (29) thinks 27.5 the counterpart of 24.2, and Tonev (204) sees no doublet at all. Likewise, Kahrstedt (28) considers 24.1 the first part of a doublet with 27.3, Volquardsen (110) thinks that the entire chapter is repeated in chapters 27–28, and Sordi (144–145) finds the parallel to 24.1–2 in 28.1–2. In fact, the major areas of agreement are limited to two doublets: 24.4 = 28.3 and 25.1 = 30.1.⁴³ The very amount of disagreement among the doublists, both in terms of where the doublet begins and which events are duplicated, arouses doubt.

Not only have the doublists failed to prove that Diodoros used two sources here, but it can also be demonstrated that in fact he relied upon only one and that he compiled book 16 in precisely the same way as the preceding books. To prove the point two typical examples will suffice—Volquardsen's attempt to differentiate the sources on the grounds of the 'tone of the account' and Uhlemann's on the content and method of dating.

According to Volquardsen (110–113), chapters 23–27 should be separated from the rest of the account of the outbreak of the Sacred War because they are drawn from a source different from that of chapters 28–30.3. The latter repeat the same events, and the two sources vary in some details, but the basic difference is in the entire tone of the accounts. The first source is marked by little partisanship, although there is a slight inclination towards the Phokians. The second source is decidedly hostile to Philomelos and the Phokians. While Volquardsen admits that the first source states that the Boiotians and Lokrians were fighting on behalf of the god, he claims that this is too feeble to prove the author's hostility towards the Phokians. The first source also takes a more rational approach to religion and natural events than the second, which is moral and pious in sentiment.

In the first place, Diodoros' very intentions are moral, and any moralizing found in his work is far more likely to be his than his sources'.⁴⁴ Diodoros routinely draws his facts from his sources, upon which he puts his own interpretation. Furthermore, Volquardsen is wrong. Philomelos and the Phokians are censured in chapters 23–27, with Philomelos being called rash and lawless (23.1: ἀνὴρ θράσει καὶ παρανομίᾳ διαφέρων; cf. 16.14.4). Nor is it flattering to the Phokians to be told that such a man

⁴³ Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, I².493, 495; Volquardsen, 110; Pintschovius, in *Programm Hadersleben* (1900) 18; Kahrstedt, 29; Pokorny, 16; Cloché (1915) 21; Tonev, 205, with, however, accepting the equation of 25.1 with 30.1; Sordi (1958) 144.

⁴⁴ Cf. 1.1.3–5; 15.1.2–5; B. Farrington, *Head and Hand in Ancient Greece* (London 1947) 55–87; Buckler, *TH*, 268–270.

enjoyed the highest reputation among them (23.4). Philomelos tried unsuccessfully to prove that the Amphiktyonic judgement was unjust. Philomelos' troops are accused of being temple-robbers by the Lokrians (25.2), and Philomelos' treatment of the Pythia is hardly attractive (27.1). Although Philomelos and the Phokians are not editorially castigated, as they are in 30.1–2, never are they portrayed as being in the right. Diodoros' attitude is consistent throughout.

Volquardsen's claim that one part of Diodoros' account is rational and the other religious or superstitious again points to the hand of Diodoros himself. An analogous case is his treatment of the fate of Bouris and Helike (15.48–49), where Diodoros gives natural explanations of the earthquakes and floods that destroyed the two cities. Nevertheless, his own view, like that expressed in 16.30, inclines to the religious or superstitious explanation.⁴⁵ In short, there is nothing in 16.23–30.3 that is not typically Diodorean. Volquardsen's criteria for postulating two different sources for Diodoros' account of the beginning of the war are invalid.

Nor do Uhlemann's criteria prove more successful. Uhlemann (115–118), who accepts Volquardsen's arguments about the existence and nature of the doublet, actually adds little to the main argument. According to Uhlemann, one method of distinguishing between sources involves their factual accuracy. He avers that the charge lodged against the Phokians in 23.3 cannot have been made by a contemporary, for this charge belongs to the Sacred War of 339. Yet Diodoros (23.5) states that Philomelos addressed this very point by claiming that only a small parcel of land was involved. Here is direct association of Philomelos and the charge. Moreover, Roux (164–172) has clarified the background of this fourth Sacred War, and in the process underscored the confusion and imprecision of the testimony of Demosthenes and Aischines, the principal sources for it. Roux is surely right, for in 339 those who had usurped sacred land were the Lokrians of Amphissa, not the Phokians; and a wide range of charges, most not levelled against the Phokians, were lodged against them (Aischin. 3.113). Uhlemann cannot successfully explain why, if Diodoros has confused the two different situations, he has attributed only one accusation from the later incident to the earlier.

Uhlemann's main argument is based on the duration of the war. Uhlemann uses Diodoros' statements about the length of the war, given as nine years at 23.1 and as ten years at 59.1, as evidence of a doublet. He next attempts to distinguish the two sources on the basis of chronological statements. Yet he ignores 14.3, where the length of the war is given as eleven years. Any argument based on chronology is weak, for Diodoros often

⁴⁵ Similarly, cf. his explanation of the fate of Dionysios I: 15.74.1–4.

contradicts himself in book 16, as his two statements about the length of the Social War (7.3; 22.2), the destruction of Methone (31.6; 34.4–5), and the capture of Orneai (34.3; 39.4) demonstrate. Nor is this sort of confusion limited to book 16. Diodoros gives different dates for the assassination of Alexander of Pherai (15.61.2; 16.14.1), a case similar to his confusion over the reign of King Kleomenes of Sparta (15.60.4; 20.29.1).⁴⁶ Contradictory dates, even within the same book, are typically Diodorean. They cannot support theories of doublets or prove different sources.

In short, there is nothing in either section of 23–31, wherever one wants to divide it, that cannot be found elsewhere in Diodoros' history. The efforts to prove a doublet on the basis of Diodoros' reliance on two different sources are largely subjective and ineffectual. Whatever problems exist in these chapters result from Diodoros' reading of a single history.

The only systematic attack on the theory of the doublet comes from N.G.L. Hammond, who denies the existence of one.⁴⁷ Claiming that such a doublet would be unique in all of Diodoros' history, he also argues that the narrative is credible and consistent in all points. Like Beloch and Cloché among the doublists themselves, he rejects the idea that there is any difference in "tone and tendency" within chapters 23–31. Lastly, taking Cloché as typical of the doublists, he attacks the very concept of a break in Diodoros' account. Specifically, Hammond argues that at chapter 27.1 Diodoros resumes his narrative after the excursus of 26 with the words *κρατῶν τοῦ μαντείου προσέταττε*, the imperfect being called "resumptive", and that therefore 27.1 is by no means a break. The narrative then continues without repetition of events. He further argues that Diodoros clearly distinguishes between the seizure of Delphoi and the official declaration of the Sacred War. According to him, Diodoros also draws a distinction between the personal propaganda of Philomelos and the official position of the Phokian state. Hammond likewise differentiates between the Boiotian declaration of war and that of the Amphiktyony. Finally, he claims that Diodoros emphasizes the growing strength of Philomelos and his growing need for money that led him to plunder the sanctuary.

⁴⁶ Another example of Diodoros' weakness in chronology is his "Common Peace of 366", so apparently precise in its details and terminology: 15.76.3; Buckler, *TH*, 251–255.

⁴⁷ *JHS* 57 (1937) 44–53; F. Reuss, *NJbb* 153 (1896) 317–326, also argues against a doublet on the grounds that Diodoros used only one source, that being Theopompos. Reuss' position is undermined by his reliance on trifling and often quite tenuous similarities of wording or content to establish Diodoros' use of Theopompos: e.g. Diod. 16.63.1 and Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F232; Diod. 16.84.3 and Theopompos F328; Diod. 16.87 and Theopompos F236.

A major weakness of Hammond's basic position is his flat denial of narrative-doublers in Diodoros, which is simply wrong. Hammond (48) claims first that "a double narrative account of the same events" here would be unique, second that such an extensive doublet of the events of one year is likewise unknown, and third that the break in the account does not come "at a historical milestone".

It is true that no other doublet is as long as the one proposed by the doublists. Yet Hammond's flat denial of the presence of narrative-doublers in Diodoros' work is refuted by the major duplication of events in 11.79.4-83, dealing with the battles of Tanagra and Oinophyta, duplications that have never successfully been explained away.⁴⁸ This narrative-doublet also proves that Diodoros' repetitions can be far longer than Hammond would admit. Generally, however, Diodoros' doublets are brief, as in the case of the siege of Methone (16.31.6; 34.4-5) and the fighting around Orneai (16.34.3; 39.4), both repeated in different archon-years. G.L. Barber pointed out long ago when dealing with the battle-pieces that Diodoros misunderstood military events, and repeated stock phrases in his descriptions of battles.⁴⁹ Diodoros' confusion and duplications are not limited to pitched battles. His accounts of extended operations are frequently so chaotic and bedecked with duplications that they are hardly recognizable as the same events when they are compared to better sources. Three examples alone can support this conclusion. In his account of Leuktra Diodoros makes a doublet of the truce (15.54.6; 56.4; cp. Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.15). Yet he also places Archidamos' relief force before the battle, as he does Jason of Pherai's appearance on the field. Both arrived after the fighting (Xen. *Hell.* 6.4.6-26). Diodoros' report of the battle is hopelessly muddled. His account of Epameinondas' second Peloponnesian campaign, while free of doublets, puts events out of sequence, and misconstrues Epameinondas' attempt on Corinth.⁵⁰ Lastly, in his account of Mantinea Diodoros duplicates Spartan commanders, assigning some deeds to a nonentity, Agis, and the others to Agesilaos, when in fact Agesilaos was the sole commander.⁵¹ Here again Diodoros jumbles so many events that much of his testimony must be rejected. These examples denote two striking characteristics: Diodoros' misunderstanding of military affairs leads him often to confuse and sometimes to duplicate events; and when Diodoros' accounts of extended campaigns

⁴⁸ G. Busolt, *Griechische Geschichte*, III (Gotha 1897) I.319 n. 2; E. Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, IV¹ (Darmstadt 1975) I.562 n. 1; K.R. Walters, *AJAH* 3 (1978) 188-189, the views of the last are unlikely given Diodoros' tendency to duplicate elsewhere.

⁴⁹ *The Historian Ephorus* (Cambridge 1935) 140-144.

⁵⁰ 15.69.1-70.1; cp. Xen. *Hell.* 7.1.15-23; Buckler, *TH*, 98-100, 296 n. 42.

⁵¹ 15.82.3-88; cp. Xen. *Hell.* 7.5.4-27; Buckler, *TH*, 205-219.

can be compared to those of a better source, his are generally inferior and can even be unrecognizable as the same engagement. The bulk of the evidence thus proves that especially when Diodoros deals with military affairs, one cannot rule out of hand inexplicable confusion and duplication.⁵² Hence, Hammond's first claim is incorrect; and while his second point is strictly accurate, the befuddled treatment of Tanagra and Oinophyta proves Diodoros capable of major doublets.

Hammond's third objection to the position of the doublets is that no "historical milestone" intervened to prompt the doublet. Yet when dealing with military affairs particularly, Diodoros has no need of "historical milestones" to lead him astray. A perfect example of this comes from Agesilaos' invasion of Arkadia in 370 BC. At 15.59.4 (370/69) Diodoros claims that Agesilaos attacked Tegea and ravaged the countryside, terrifying the enemy.⁵³ At 15.62.1–3 (369/8) he tells of another Spartan invasion of Arkadia, this one under the direction of Polytropos. Although Polytropos tried to hold Orchomenos, the Arkadians under Lykomedes counter-attacked, defeating him. Xenophon (*Hell.* 6.5.12–15), however, records only one invasion, that of Agesilaos, during which Polytropos was a mercenary commander charged with the defense of Orchomenos. When Lykomedes defeated Polytropos' force, Agesilaos continued the campaign alone. Whereas Diodoros dissociates these events, even putting some details in different archon-years, the whole episode actually took place within the space of a few days. Without Xenophon's *Hellenika* it would be impossible to prove that Diodoros' two campaigns were in fact one and the same event. No "historical milestone" occurred in the course of this campaign, and it is impossible to suggest what caused Diodoros to break it as he has. Hammond's third point can be dismissed.

Another part of Hammond's position can be set aside with equal ease. Throughout his discussion Hammond draws a distinction between Philomelos' "personal propaganda" and the official position of the Phokians, a distinction that does not exist in Diodoros' narrative.⁵⁴ Hammond begins by stating that fines had been imposed upon "individual Phocians" in 23.3. After Philomelos had seized the sanctuary (24.3), according to Hammond (46 n. 11), he spread reports that were personal propaganda. In his interpretation of 27.1–4 he again claims (47 n. 15)

⁵² Although S. Lauffer, *Historia* 8 (1959) 315–348, has suggested that Diodoros has duplicated the Common Peace of 375 and 371, Diodoros has only shifted some details of one to the other; cf. Ryder, *Koine Eirene*, 124–130. Diodoros 14.109.1–2 (388 BC) and 15.7.2 (386 BC) is a minor doublet.

⁵³ Diodoros was relying on Ephoros here; cf. Barber, *Ephoros*, 123–137.

⁵⁴ Cloché (1939) 164, 169, who saw the error of the argument, does not develop the point into a rebuttal. Neither Tonev (189–190) nor Sordi (138) seems to have recognized its significance. Cf. Larsen, *GFS*, 45.

that the Boiotians had before that point replied to Philomelos' private message, but that during the winter Philomelos, "having secured the approval of the Phocian commons, published the complicity of the Phocian state in the official embassies". Lastly, Hammond asserts (50) that when Philomelos "gained the support of the Pythian priestess (27,1), and received the official support of the Phocian people (27,2), then (and only then was it possible) he issued an official manifesto to the Greek governments".

None of Hammond's claims can be found in the Greek. First, Diodoros (23.3) makes it abundantly clear that the Amphiktyonic fine fell on all of the Phokians: οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς ἐπεργασάμενοι πολλὴν τῆς ἱερᾶς χώρας τῆς ὀνομαζομένης Κιρραίας δίκας ὑπέσχον ἐν Ἀμφικτύοσι καὶ πολλοῖς ταλάντοις κατεκρίθησαν. No word here of "individual Phocians"; οἱ δὲ Φωκεῖς, the whole people, were arraigned on the charge. More significantly, Hammond misunderstands 24.1, when the Phokians elected Philomelos *strategos autokrator* before the seizure of the sanctuary. Far from being a lone adventurer, Philomelos thereafter acted as the legally elected executive of the Phokian state. When he consulted with Archidamos (24.1-2), he did so as the head of state, and continued to do so until his death. His embassies, whether to the Boiotians or whomsoever, were also officially representing the Phokians. Hammond's "personal propaganda", upon which he lays so much emphasis in his discussion, did not exist.

Equally unfortunate is Hammond's interpretation of Diodoros' words αὐτὸς διέδωκε λόγον at 24.5, which refer to Philomelos' proclamation after the seizure of the sanctuary. The whole passage reads: [after the seizure of the sanctuary and Phokian victory over the Lokrians, Philomelos] αὐτὸς δὲ διέδωκε λόγον ὥς οὔτε συλᾶν τὸ μαντεῖον διέγνωκεν οὔτ' ἄλλην οὐδεμίαν παράνομον πρᾶξιν συντελεῖν βεβούλευται, τῆς δὲ προγονικῆς προστασίας ἀμφισβητῶν καὶ τὰς τῶν Ἀμφικτυόνων ἀδίκους ἀποφάσεις ἀκυρῶσαι βουλόμενος βοηθεῖν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις τῶν Φωκέων. Hammond considers the phrase αὐτὸς διέδωκε λόγον as proof that Philomelos acted as an individual, even though Diodoros (24.1) had already reported Philomelos' election as *strategos autokrator*. Hammond supports this claim by the analogy of Diodoros' usage at 16.22.2 and 16.89.2. The first of these refers to a report spread about the Persian king's official policy; and the second concerns the intentions of Philip after Chaironeia, in which he informed the Greeks of his intention to make war on Persia. He did so as the king of Macedonia. In each case the message involved a sovereign king and his official policy. There is no reason to conclude that Diodoros uses this phrase at 24.5 for the activity of a private individual. Rather the two examples that Hammond cites support the view that Philomelos was acting in an official capacity. In no significant instance can Hammond's

arguments be sustained, and thus no one is compelled to accept them.

The question to be resolved, if possible, between the doublists and their opponents is whether a major narrative-doublet exists, whether Diodoros has only repeated some specific incidents, or whether he has described some similar events in similar terms. Yet one wonders whether order can be made of Diodoros' account. The doublists in effect postulate "orderly confusion", as though Diodoros' method of compilation can be reduced to some intelligible system. Diodoros gets so many things wrong for no apparent reason that search for a single principle to explain his lapses proves vain. Not usually consistent, he is often chaotic. On the other hand, Hammond especially makes serious errors, ignores pertinent aspects of the problem, and refuses to refute those who postulate a break at 28.1, a view that Sordi has since resurrected. Like many people, Hammond assumes that Diodoros is capable of copying accurately even a single narrative source, when in fact there is a great deal of evidence to the contrary. This aspect is all the more significant since so many episodes in Diodoros' account are so surprisingly similar that outright rejection of duplication, without proof, is unconvincing.

Perhaps the best way to cut the Gordian knot is to reopen the question in order to determine whether these episodes are distinct events or repetitions. A logical starting-point is the place at which all of the arguments, for and against, converge. Since the doublists generally agree on two doublets, 24.4 = 28.3 and 25.1 = 30.1, a view combatted by Hammond and L. Lerat, these passages merit detailed scrutiny.⁵⁵ Chapter 24 records Philomelos' initial movements. He hired (ἐμισθώσατο) a multitude of mercenaries, and chose (ἐπέλεξε) 1000 Phokians to serve as peltasts. Having gathered (ἄθροίσας) a multitude of soldiers, and having seized the sanctuary, he slew those called Thrakidai, whose possessions he then confiscated, and calmed the other Delphians (24.3). The response to Philomelos' *coup* comes in 24.4. The Lokrians who lived nearby immediately (οἱ πλησίον οἰκοῦντες παραχρῆμα) launched a campaign against Philomelos. In a battle around Delphoi, the Lokrians, having been defeated, fled homewards with great losses (γενομένης δὲ περὶ Δελφῶν μάχης οἱ μὲν Λοκροὶ λειφθέντες καὶ πολλοὺς ἀποβαλόντες τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἔφυγον εἰς τὴν οἰκείαν). All agree that these Lokrians were from Amphissa.⁵⁶ In short, having recruited mercenaries and having seized the sanctuary, Philomelos repelled a Lokrian attack on Delphoi.

In 28.1 Philomelos was later collecting a multitude of mercenaries (μισθοφόρων τε πλῆθος ἤθροίξε; cp. 24.3: ἄθροίσας δὲ στατιωτῶν πλῆθος),

⁵⁵ Hammond, 54–55; Lerat, *Les Locriens de l'Quest*, II.47–49.

⁵⁶ E.g. Cloché (1915) 21; Hammond, 46 n. 10; Lerat, II.47.

and was choosing (κατέλεγεν) from the Phokians those who were fit for the army. Although he was keeping his hands off the sacred treasures, he plundered the Delphians, who were prosperous and wealthy.⁵⁷ Having readied a considerable force, he led it into the field (προήγαγεν εἰς ὑπαίθρον). The Lokrians having launched a campaign against him, a battle was fought around the rocks called Phaidriadaí, in which Philomelos, having proved victorious, killed many of the enemy and forced not a few of the survivors to hurl themselves from the cliffs.

The similarities in these two passages are too many to be accidental. Philomelos twice gathered a multitude of mercenaries, and twice enrolled Phokians for military service (24.1; 28.1). He twice plundered Delphians of their possessions (24.3; 28.2). The Lokrians launched a campaign against Philomelos in 24.4 (ἐστράτευσαν ἐπὶ τὸν Φιλόμηλον), and did so again in 28.3 (στρατευσάντων ἐπ' αὐτὸν). In both instances a battle was fought near Delphoi (24.4; 28.3), for the Phaidriadaí Rocks rise above the sanctuary of Apollo.⁵⁸ In both encounters the Lokrians were repulsed with heavy losses (24.4; 28.3). Furthermore, to accept the historicity of this second episode one must give credence to a remarkable series of events. According to the account in chapter 28, if taken at face value, the Lokrians decided to renew the contest even though they had already suffered defeat (24.4), had failed to defend their land from devastation (25.2–3), and now were challenging an army even stronger (28.1) than the one that had earlier driven them from the field.⁵⁹ This reconstruction is so incredible that strong arguments are needed to prove these two episodes distinct events.

Neither Hammond nor Lerat can disprove this conclusion. Lerat (II.48) limply states that the war between the Lokrians and Phokians was a series of *coups de main* analogous to one another. Hence, he assumes what he fails to prove. Although Hammond at least advances arguments in defense of his position, he is no more successful than Lerat. He claims (51) that the engagement of 24.4, which he elsewhere (46) calls a skirmish despite Diodoros' words περὶ Δελφούς μάχης, was "in defence of Philomelos' position at Delphi", while the battle of 28.3 is decisive, "offered by Philomelos in the open by the Phaetriadae rocks (an unknown locality, but presumably not a periphrasis for περὶ Δελφούς)". Only in his last statement is he right: περὶ Δελφούς is far more likely to be a periphrasis for the lesser known περὶ τὰς Φαιδριάδας. His ignorance of the location of the Phaidriadaí Rocks is decisive against his own

⁵⁷ τοὺς δὲ Δελφούς εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ πλούτῳ διαφέροντας; for this meaning of διαφέρω, see *LSJ*⁹ s.v. II.7.

⁵⁸ Souda s.v. *Aisopos*; schol. Aischin. 2.142; cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, V.248.

⁵⁹ Cf. Cloché (1939) 166–169; Sordi, 144.

argument. Since they are not in open territory, but tower above the sanctuary itself, both passages refer to a Lokrian attack on Delphoi that forced Philomelos to fight a defensive battle in which he was victorious. Hammond himself admits that "only if the circumstances are strongly similar, need we entertain suspicions of a parallel passage". They are, and we do. This is indisputably a doublet.

The second doublet to win general acceptance is 25.1 = 30.1 (cf. p. 168 above).⁶⁰ As in the previous case, the two passages share a number of similarities. In both the Boiotians launched a campaign, and in both Philomelos responded by collecting mercenaries (25.1; 30.1, in the latter of which the phrase *μισθοφόρων ἀθροίζειν πλῆθος* occurs yet again: cf. 24.1; 28.1). With this force Philomelos invaded Lokris (25.2; 30.3). In both cases a battle was fought near a hill (25.2; 30.3), for the unnamed *φρούριον ὄχυρόν* of the former passage was in all likelihood situated on a hill.⁶¹ In both instances the allies, the Lokrians in the first and the Boiotians in the second, at first refused to treat Philomelos' troops in accordance with custom because they were temple-robbers, relenting only when Philomelos repaid them in kind (25.2–3; 31.1–2). In both cases the moral is the same: even in a just cause there is no justifiable reason to disregard custom and common humanity.

Yet unlike the earlier example, a number of differences exist here. In 25.1 Philomelos' force numbered around 5000, while in 30.3 he commanded around 10,000 infantry and cavalry. In 25.2 Philomelos confronted only Lokrians, although the Boiotians had sent help, but in 30.3–4 he dealt with Boiotians and Thessalians. In 25.2 Philomelos lifted his unsuccessful siege of the fort, and suffered a defeat afterwards. In 30.3, however, he won a cavalry battle near Argolas, which he did not attempt to take. In 25.2 the Lokrians refused to give up the dead because they were temple-robbers, whereas in 31.1 the Boiotians executed prisoners as temple-robbers. These discrepancies are undeniable.

Still another factor complicates this case, namely Diodoros' confusion of military events. As mentioned, the details of war routinely suffer at Diodoros' hands, and it is impossible to deny that the evolutions of the armies in both passages are imperfectly described. In 25.1 the Boiotian army marched out never to be heard from again. Hammond (46) solves the mystery by interpreting *προεκάθητο τῶν Δελφῶν* to mean that with his 5000 troops Philomelos was "possessing himself of all the passages to Delphi". This is simply a mistranslation. The Greek says nothing about

⁶⁰ Cloché (1915) 22–27; (1939) 168, and Tonev, 205, dissent from the other doublists on this point.

⁶¹ Cf. *LSJ*⁹ s.v. *φρούριον*.

passes. Rather, it means literally that he caused his men to be posted in front of Delphoi.⁶² The mystery remains, and because of it there is no way of knowing what part the Boiotian army played in these affairs. In short, there is absolutely no reason to conclude that Diodoros has here given a complete account of the action, nor can one know what is missing. Boiotian field-armies normally consisted of infantry and cavalry,⁶³ but Lerat (II.48) claims that because of the terrain cavalry would have been unable to operate in eastern Lokris. In the first place no one knows where the armies campaigned. Furthermore, the attempt to put the first of these conflicts in eastern Lokris and the second in western merely assumes that these incidents are distinct. Moreover, Lerat is not even correct about eastern Lokris. The extensive plain of Kirrha below Delphoi, which bordered on Lokrian territory, was quite suitable for cavalry.⁶⁴

The confusion is still more obvious in 30.1ff. Diodoros states that the Boiotians aided the Lokrians at the time of a cavalry battle with Philomelos (καὶ τῶν Βοιωτῶν βοηθησάντων τοῖς Λοκροῖς ἵππομαχία συνέστη), yet their role in the battle is not described. Afterwards, the Lokrians were further reinforced by the Thessalians and others, whereupon another battle was fought at Argolas. Thereafter, the Thessalians fall out of the narrative, as Hammond (47 n. 20) duly notes. At that point (30.4) the Boiotians appeared (ἐπιφανέντων) on the scene, even though they had supposedly just supported the Lokrians in a cavalry battle, a difficulty that Hammond (47) fails to notice. Nor does Diodoros suggest that these Boiotians were reinforcements for a vanguard dispatched earlier. Once again, Diodoros has so muddled events that no clear picture of the military evolutions emerges from his account.

In another writer the differences between the two Lokrian campaigns might possibly be enough to indicate a description of two different events in similar terms. Yet Diodoros' obvious confusion and his tendency to duplicate military events, both familiar characteristics of his work, militate against this conclusion here.

Those who deny that these two passages are doublets sometimes assume that the first recounts operations in eastern Lokris and the second later movements in western Lokris, a view unsupported by Diodoros' narrative.⁶⁵ In defense of his position Hammond (50–51) argues that the two

⁶² Sordi, 137, gets this right without, however, applying it against Hammond's argument.

⁶³ Salmon, *Étude sur la Confédération béotienne*, 186–190; Buckler in Roesch and Argoud, *La Béotie antique*, 239.

⁶⁴ Paus. 10.37.5–38.1; cf. Frazer, *Pausanias*, V. 458–459.

⁶⁵ Cf. Clodé (1939) 166 n. 2; Lerat, II.48. Sordi, 144–145, is undecided on this point.

invasions of Lokris were different in nature. In his view, that of 25.2–3 was “a defensive action, undertaken against attacks delivered by the Locrians of Amphissa supported by Boeotian troops”. Earlier, owing to a mistranslation Hammond (46) claimed that the Boiotians had been stopped from supporting the Lokrians because the passes were blocked against them. He further asserts (57 n. 29) that the action of 25.3 was limited to the environs of Delphoi, and can “reasonably be represented as defensive”.

Hammond’s reconstruction cannot stand, even on its own terms. In the first place, Philomelos had already repulsed a Lokrian attack in 24.4, which can legitimately be called a defensive action on the part of the Phokians. Philomelos was then secure in his position at Delphoi, and to remain on the defensive he needed only to maintain that position. The campaign of 25.2–3 was an invasion of Lokris unprovoked by any further Lokrian military action. An invasion of foreign or enemy territory is by definition offensive in nature, even when justifiable or motivated by feelings of revenge. Hence, these operations cannot accurately be called defensive in nature. Moreover, Hammond is wrong to assert that the action was limited to the region around Delphoi. Diodoros (25.3) states precisely the opposite: κρατῶν δὲ τῶν ὑπαίθρων καὶ πολλὴν πορθήσας τῆς Λοκρίδος ἐπανήλθεν. Being master of much of Lokris took Philomelos far afield from Delphoi. Hammond’s entire interpretation of this episode is so deficient that it cannot convincingly be used as an argument against a doublet.

Lerat (II.47–48) puts a different interpretation on 25.2–3. In his opinion Philomelos invaded Lokris in revenge for the attack of 24.2. Yet a Phokian invasion of all eastern Lokris makes no sense, even in terms of revenge, at this point in the narrative, a point that Cloché makes abundantly clear.⁶⁶ Here one can reasonably ask why Philomelos would have antagonized the rest of eastern Lokris, if only the people of Amphissa had reacted to the seizure of the sanctuary. The last thing that he needed at that point was a host of additional enemies. In firm control of the sanctuary, he had already announced his peaceful intentions (24.5). Offensive operations would only belie his public statements.⁶⁷ On the other hand, an invasion of western Lokris after the Amphiktyons had declared war (28.4) is entirely reasonable, for it was only there that Philomelos could readily confront his principal enemies in the field at

⁶⁶ Cf. (1939) 165–169.

⁶⁷ Hammond, 50, makes the incredible claim that Philomelos had failed to control the area around Delphoi (cf. Diod. 16.24.4–25) and hence could not send embassies abroad. Philomelos had already gained control of Delphoi (Diod. 16.24.3), and Hammond’s attempt to link this invasion to the diplomatic program of Diod. 16.27.3–4 has been successfully refuted by Cloché (1939) 165–167.

once. And, with the Amphiktyons officially at war, he had no further reason to hesitate. What he had failed to achieve by diplomacy he could hope to win by arms.

Another striking oddity of 25.2 (cf. 31.3) is the condemnation of Philomelos' mercenaries as *ιεροσυλοί*. Hammond (47 n. 19) himself admits that sacrilege was first committed when Philomelos appropriated sacred funds. Whether or not one agrees with this distinction, Philomelos did not plunder the temple until after this invasion (30.1). Even the Amphiktyonic declaration of war against the Phokians as *hierosuloi* came after this campaign (28.4). Although the noun can mean merely "sacrilegious people", Philomelos consistently denied that his seizure of the sanctuary was an act of sacrilege, and as consistently disavowed any intentions of plundering the sacred treasures (24.5; 27.3–4; 28.2). Perhaps more to the point, Diodoros (14.3–4) seems to agree with him in drawing a distinction between the seizure of the temple and the pillaging of it.⁶⁸ Even though certainty in this matter is impossible, especially with an author whose usage is as casual as Diodoros', it is quite possible that the very charge of *hierosulesis* is part of the confusion. The charge makes best sense only after the Amphiktyonic declaration of war and Philomelos' pillaging of the temple.

In sum, the bulk of the evidence indicates that chapters 25 and 30 are doublets, notably because of the many similarities of detail between them, the impossibility of Hammond and Lerat to prove that two different areas of Lokris were the scenes of action, and the odd accusation of *hierosulesis* (at least in 25). The military operations of neither chapter are completely and satisfactorily set forth, and no intelligible reason can be adduced for those of 25.2–3. The differences between the two accounts can be attributed to Diodoros' demonstrated confusion over military affairs and to his deficient description of both campaigns.

The Lokrian campaign of 28.3 carries the seed of another doublet, the two declarations of war on the Phokians (27.5; 28.4).⁶⁹ At 27.5 Diodoros states that after the defeat of the first Lokrian intervention (24.4) and the first Phokian invasion of Lokris (25.2–3), Philomelos sent embassies to major Greek states promising not to lay hands on sacred property but only to claim the presidency of the sanctuary (27.3). The Boiotians, Lokrians, and "certain others" answered by declaring war. It is very difficult to

⁶⁸ 16.14.3: τῆς καταλήψεως τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς ἱεροῦ καὶ τῆς συλήσεως τοῦ μαντείου ὑπὸ Φιλομήλου τοῦ Φωκέως; 14.4: τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ἱεροῦ καὶ παρανομίαν Φιλομήλου τοῦ Φωκέως. Cf. also 14.5. Sacrilege, by Diodoros' definition, means that someone had actually stolen something that rightfully belonged to the gods: cp. 16.56.3, 58.2–3, 59.1, and in general, McDougall, *Lexicon in Diodorum Siculum*, s. vv. *ιεροσυλεῖν*, *ιεροσυλῆσις*, *ιεροσυλία*, *ιερόσυλος*.

⁶⁹ Also suggested by Kahrstedt, 29; Pokorny, 17; cf. also Tonev, 181–182, 190; Sordi, 145. The doublet is denied by Hammond, 52, without argument.

determine who these "others" are if not fellow Amphiktyons, in which case the embassies of 28.3 are otiose. At 28.3, however, Diodoros states that the Lokrians, having sent ambassadors to Thebes seeking help,⁷⁰ the Boiotians sent embassies to the Thessalians and other Amphiktyons calling for a joint war against Phokis. Although it could be argued that Diodoros has in fact recorded two stages in the allied decision to go to war, with the Boiotians, Lokrians, and "certain others" having taken the first step, the Amphiktyonic declaration of war as the result of the second un-historical Lokrian intervention is suspicious. A declaration of war earlier makes better sense. After all, blood had been spilled (24.4), and Philomelos' embassies had defiantly declared that the Phokians would neither pay the fine nor withdraw from the sanctuary. At that point the alternatives left to the Amphiktyons were acquiescence or war. Yet once the second Lokrian intervention is eliminated as a doublet, the reason for the Lokrian appeal at that point obviously disappears as well. Indeed, the repetition of this campaign probably led Diodoros to repeat the Amphiktyonic decision to go to war. Thus, 28.4 is merely a doublet of 27.5, though providing more details of the way in which the Amphiktyons made and implemented their decision.

Similarly, Diodoros' notices of Philomelos' recruitment of mercenaries are repetitious, even though one might reasonably postulate, as does Hammond (52), a gradual increase in numbers to meet an increasingly imminent threat. Nonetheless, various aspects of the repetitions are quite suspicious.⁷¹ At 24.2 Philomelos hired mercenaries, paid in part by his own funds and partly by money given him by Archidamos. To complement this force he added 1000 Phokians to serve as peltasts. At 25.1 he was still collecting (ἡθροίζε) mercenaries, even though he had just repelled the Lokrian attempt to free the sanctuary. He attracted these mercenaries by offering them one and a half times the usual rate of pay. In addition he chose the best (ἀρίστους) Phokians for his army. At 28.1 he was still collecting (ἡθροίζε) mercenaries; and having already mustered the best Phokians for service, he turned to the able (εὐθέτους). Finally, at 30.1, after all of this activity, Philomelos decided (ἔκρινε) to collect a host of mercenaries, which he did once again by increasing the pay by half.

Of these four instances, those of 25.1 and 28.1 occur in passages already identified as doublets. In both cases Philomelos' recruitment of merce-

⁷⁰ Cf. 25.1, where supposedly the Boiotians had already sent help.

⁷¹ Most scholars accept a later augment to Philomelos' force, without admitting all of Diodoros' notices: cf. Kahrstedt, 29; Uhlemann, 115–117; Cloché (1915) 22–23; (1939) 167–168; Beloch, *GG* III².2.28; Sordi, 144.

naries precedes events erroneously placed and scarcely comprehensible in the absence of those events. Moreover, Diodoros' testimony at 25.1 about the increase of pay becomes suspicious in view of 30.1, where the same increase is repeated, this time as a response to the imminent Amphiktyonic intervention. So too with the enrollment of Phokians in the army. At 24.2, where Philomelos began to build his army, he enrolled 1000 Phokians, obviously picked men, who are doubtless the "best" of 25.1 and the "able" of 28.1. Yet once 25.1 and 28.1 are eliminated, Philomelos' hiring of mercenaries makes sense. At 24.2 he began recruitment before he had seized the sanctuary—after all, he needed troops to enforce his will—but after he had been supplied with funds. With this force he repelled the Lokrians. When it became obvious that his diplomatic ventures had generally failed and that the Amphiktyons would intervene, he decided to build a huge mercenary army and raised pay by half to attract large numbers.

The logical conclusion is that Diodoros is guilty of a major narrative-doubling in which significant events are repeated. The striking thing about Diodoros' account is the parallelism of the main sequence of events: Phokian control of the sanctuary (24.3; 27.1),⁷² enrollment of mercenaries (24.2; 28.1), Lokrian attempts to free Delphoi (24.4; 28.3), and Phokian invasion of Lokris (25.2–3; 30.3–31.2). The accompanying details are so confused that no principle of composition can account for them. Whether one can discern a specific break, either at 27.1 or 28.1, as the doublists have attempted, is impossible to determine in view of certain similarities of events (e.g. 24.5, 27.3; 27.5, 28.4) within these chapters and the number of details omitted in one strain of the doublet or the other. Diodoros' confusion was neither orderly nor rational. In all likelihood, it stemmed from the very complexity of the events themselves, especially the military operations, which Diodoros so badly misunderstood.

Yet once the two major doublets are eliminated, it is easy to construct a coherent sequence of events. After having seized the sanctuary (24.3), Philomelos repulsed the Lokrians at Delphoi (24.4). Owing to confusion and the repetition of many details, the events of chapter 25 can be dismissed as a doublet. With Delphoi firmly in his hands (27.1–2) Philomelos dispatched embassies to the major Greek states justifying his conduct and promising no harm to the sanctuary (27.3–4). The second Lokrian intervention (28.3), which is somewhat confused and repetitious of 24.4, can also be eliminated as a doublet. When the Boiotians sent ambassadors to the other Amphiktyons calling for war against the Phokians (28.4), Philomelos plundered the sanctuary (30.1), and then launched his

⁷² Even though at 27.1 Diodoros realizes that Philomelos had seized it previously.

invasion of Lokris (30.3), which culminated in his defeat and death (30.3–31.5).

III. FROM THE BATTLE OF NEON TO THE BATTLE OF THE CROCUS PLAIN (355–353 BC)

A) *Neon, Methone, and Pammenes at Maroneia* (355–354 BC)

The next major chronological problem is to determine the order of events from the battle of Neon to the battle of the Crocus Plain. The Amphiktyons declared war on Phokis in late autumn or early winter 356 (cf. pp. 157–158 above). The campaign that culminated in the battle of Neon was fought during the regular campaigning-season, to judge by the easy movement of armies over mountainous terrain. Of first importance is the date of the battle of Neon, in which Philomelos was defeated and killed. Diodoros (30–31.5) places the battle in 354/3 as the culmination of Philomelos' invasion of Lokris, and Pausanias (10.2.4) locates the battle at Neon in Phokis. Diodoros gives two other indications of Neon's date. First, he says (31.6) that it took place while Philip reduced Methone and Pagasai, and he mentions (34.1) under 353/2 that the Theban general Pammenes led 5000 soldiers to aid the rebellious satrap Artabazos against the King. Yet he later (34.4–5) places Philip's operations against Methone under 353/2, without making any further reference to Pagasai.

The only contemporary evidence for the events at Methone comes from an Athenian inscription, *IG II*² 130, dated to the third day of the fifth prytany of the archonship of Kallistratos, or in about December 355.⁷³ The inscription (lines 11–12) honors Lachares of Apollonia for his own service and for sending his son into Methone. Some substantial peril and assistance must have been involved on Lachares' part, for the Athenians did not vote such honors merely for good intentions.⁷⁴ These honors are best explained by Lachares' having brought relief to Methone in December 355/4, when it was already under siege, or at the very least when it was immediately threatened with siege. Consequently, contemporary evidence indicates that Diodoros' dates of 353/2 (34.4) or even 354/3 (31.6) for the beginning of the siege of Methone are both wrong.

No contemporary source dates the fall of Methone. Demosthenes (1.9)

⁷³ Cf. Kahrstedt, 42, whose date of December is commonly accepted: e.g. Hammond, 58; Toney, 174, although he is more precise ("about 26 December") than contemporary knowledge of the Athenian calendar will allow.

⁷⁴ On this point, cf. Buckler, *TH*, 238–239.

claims that the Athenians refused to respond to the first appeal of the Methonians for help, which is strictly true since Lachares' exploit was voluntary and private. Demosthenes later (4.35) states that an Athenian expedition to Methone arrived too late. All that Diodoros (34.5) indicates is that the siege lasted "a while" (καὶ μέχρι μὲν τινος οἱ Μεθωναῖοι διακατέρουν).

The lack of precise, dependable dates has consequently led scholars to various opposing views, which include disagreement over the date of the battle of Neon and the siege of Methone and the exact chronological relationship between them. While Beloch (266–268) and Cloché (1939, 179) date Neon to autumn 355 BC (355/4) and the fall of Methone to summer 354 BC (355/4), Tonev (166, 175) puts Neon in autumn 355 BC and Methone in winter 353 BC (354/3). Hammond (57–60) and Sordi (148–149), on the other hand, keep the two events close together by dating Neon to spring 354 and Methone to summer 354 BC. Those postulating a date of 354 for Neon have consistently failed to offer a convincing reason why the Amphiktyons waited for an entire year, including at least one campaigning-season, before trying to liberate Delphoi. Some persuasive explanation is absolutely essential to account for this otherwise inexplicable delay, and none has yet been forthcoming.

The problem stands thus: lacking a contemporary, independent date either for the battle of Neon or for the fall of Methone, all that one has is Diodoros' statement that while Neon was being fought, Philip reduced Methone and Pagasai. Yet Diodoros gives two different dates for the siege of Methone, and fails completely to place the fate of Pagasai in its narrative context. In neither case can Diodoros literally be right, since Methone was invested in winter 355/4, and there is absolutely no reason to conclude that Neon was the culmination of a winter campaign. Here is where Pammenes' Asian expedition and Philip's northern activities can determine the dates of Neon and the fall of Methone.

Demosthenes (23.183) states that Philip journeyed to Maroneia, where he reached an agreement with Pammenes and Kersebleptes. He adds that at that time the Thracian king Amadokos was hostile to Philip. Dionysios (*Letter to Ammaios* 1.4, 725) dates this speech to 352/1, which in turn provides evidence that the meeting took place on Pammenes' outward way; for when Philip returned to Thrace after his Thessalian campaigns the situation in Thrace had completely changed.⁷⁵ Amadokos then joined Philip in the struggle against Kersebleptes (schol. Aischin. 2.81). The immediate questions, then, are why Maroneia was chosen for the scene of

⁷⁵ For the accuracy of Dionysios' dates, cf. R. Sealey, *REG* 68 (1955) 77–120; and n. 28 above.

the meeting, especially since Pammenes could as easily have met Philip at Methone, if it were then under siege, as at Maroneia or anywhere else along the coast. Secondly, it must be asked why Kersebleptes was included in this meeting, especially since Thracian affairs had no bearing on the Sacred War. Since one meeting place was as convenient as another for Pammenes, a situation must be sought in which Maroneia fitted into the activities of Philip and Kersebleptes, and was a convenient spot for them both.

Polyainos (4.2.22) provides additional evidence for Philip's activity around Maroneia. Polyainos states that while Philip reduced Maroneia and Abdera, Chares laid an ambush for him at Neapolis. Chares' force consisted of 20 triremes, which indicates that the incident took place during a normal campaigning-season.⁷⁶ Philip, who avoided the trap, moved safely westwards. Hence, the testimony of Demosthenes and Polyainos places Philip at Maroneia together with Pammenes and Kersebleptes at a time when the Athenians were able to operate safely off Neapolis. The key to such an occasion lies chiefly with the policies of Philip and Kersebleptes.

Philip's movements are rather easily traced. Beginning with the capture of Amphipolis in late 357, Philip concentrated his attention to the north and east of Methone.⁷⁷ Pydna fell early in 356, and Poteidaia, from which Athenian *klerouchoi* were expelled, fell later that same year.⁷⁸ Also by mid-summer 356 (356/5) Philip had gained Krenides, and had probably also founded Philippoi.⁷⁹ At that point Philip's activities in the northwestern Aegean had provoked war with the Athenians, who concluded an alliance with the kings of Thrace, the Paionians, and Illyrians.⁸⁰ Philip's establishment of Philippoi put him squarely on Neapolis' doorstep. Probably around this time Philip razed Galepsos and Apollonia, and Ellis may very well be right to date the Macedonian occupation of Oisyme, which was renamed Emathia, to this period.⁸¹

In 356, then, Philip was expanding eastwards along the coast of the

⁷⁶ Both Ellis, 77, and Cawkwell, 75, neither of whom systematically discusses chronology, place Polyainos' episode before Philip's Thessalian intervention.

⁷⁷ Dem. 1.5, 8; Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F42; Tod, *GHI* II.150; Diod. 16.8.2.

⁷⁸ Pydna: Dem. 1.5; Diod. 16.8.3. Poteidaia: Tod, *GHI* II.158; cf. 146; Dem. 2.7; 4.35; 6.20; 23.107; Libanios *Introduction to Olyn.* 1 2; Plut. *Alex.* 3.8; Paus. 5.23.3.

⁷⁹ Tod, *GHI* II.157; Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F37 = Theopompos, *FGrH* 115 F43; Diod. 16.3.7.

⁸⁰ Tod, *GHI* II.157; Diod. 16.22.3.

⁸¹ Galepsos and Apollonia: Strabo 7.F35; cf. Thuc. 4.107.3; 5.6.1; Steph. Byz. "*Galepsos*"; cf. also A.W. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides* III (Oxford 1956) 580. Oisyme: Ellis, 72, 256 n. 39; cf. Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F36; Strabo 7.F11; Steph. Byz. "*Emathia*", "*Oisyme*". Indeed, Philip's destruction of Apollonia and the desire for revenge may have prompted Lachares to resist Macedonian efforts to take Methone.

northwestern Aegean, with Neapolis immediately in his path, and opposed by the Athenians and the king of Thrace. These conditions prompted an appeal from Neapolis to Athens in early summer 355 (356/5), and Chares' dispatch to Neapolis must have resulted from this appeal.⁸² This chronology is strengthened considerably by Demosthenes' testimony (23.183, dated to 352/1 by Dionysios) that Chares filed the report concerning Philip's negotiations at Maroneia with Pammenes and Kersebleptes. Since both Chares and Philip had full use of their naval forces, Chares' attempt to ambush Philip after his attack on Maroneia and Abdera must have occurred between Neapolis' appeal in early summer 355 (356/5) and Philip's siege of Methone in mid-winter 355 (355/4). Pammenes' meeting with Philip must date to this same time, which in turn proves that Neon was fought earlier in that same campaigning-season of 355.

The activities of Kersebleptes support this chronology. Demosthenes (23.10, 179) states that Kersebleptes tried to extend his territory by encroaching upon the realms of Amadokos and the sons of Berisades. This represents a shift from Kersebleptes' earlier policy of co-operation with Berisades, who died probably in 357/6, Amadokos, and the Athenians.⁸³ Pressure from Kersebleptes and from Philip forced the sons of Berisades to ally themselves with Athens in the first prytany of 356/5 (356), an alliance that was in effect a renewal of their father's agreement (Tod, *GHI* II.157). Thus, in 356 and 355 Amadokos, whose realm stretched from the Hebros river to Maroneia, was being crushed between Kersebleptes moving westwards and Philip advancing to the east. Here is the real reason for the meeting at Maroneia: Philip felt it necessary to come to some agreement with Kersebleptes on boundaries in particular and Thracian affairs in general before he could turn south against Methone. In fact, Pammenes' role in this meeting may have been minor, although his support of Philip would have tipped the military and diplomatic scales heavily against Kersebleptes.⁸⁴ Philip no doubt assured Kersebleptes that Maroneia and Abdera were the limits of his eastward expansion and that his immediate objectives lay elsewhere. Kersebleptes was in effect left a free hand in his attempt to subdue Amadokos. This agreement must have been all the more attractive to both parties, for they had Athens and Amadokos as common enemies of their designs. By renouncing his alliance with Athens and gaining the friendship of Philip, Kersebleptes had an excellent opportunity to re-establish Kotys' kingdom in its entirety. It

⁸² Tod, *GHI* II.159; the Athenians acted upon the appeal in the ninth prytany of the archon-year.

⁸³ Tod, *GHI* II.151; cf. also P. Cloché in *Mélanges Glotz* I (Paris 1932) 215–226.

⁸⁴ Cf. pp. 50–53 above.

was a sensible arrangement, doomed only by Philip's ultimate ambition and success. When Philip next returned to Thrace in 353/2, he dealt handily with Kersebleptes, who was forced to cede all of the Chersonesos to Athens, with the exception of Kardia, in exchange for alliance and support.⁸⁵ In brief, the activities of both Philip and Kersebleptes not only put them in the same region at the same time, but they also provide the best explanation for the meeting at Maroneia, which took place in 355.

The chief objection to this reconstruction comes from Hammond's argument that Pammenes' mission to Asia could not have preceded Demosthenes' speech *On the Symmories*, which Dionysios dates to 354/3.⁸⁶ Concluding from the absence of any reference to Pammenes' mission in the speech, Hammond contends that Thebes was at that time still pursuing a pro-Persian policy. Though an argument from silence, Hammond's point deserves attention, for admittedly Demosthenes' claim (14.33) that Thebes would not side with the King would probably have been strengthened by an allusion to Pammenes' support of Artabazos. Yet at the same time, as L. Pearson has pointed out, one of the salient characteristics of this speech is its vagueness, even to the extent of not depicting the diplomatic situation that prompted the speech in the first place.⁸⁷

There are two good reasons why Demosthenes may have preferred not to be too explicit about the reasons behind the King's military predicament. First, the King had angrily demanded that the Athenians recall Chares from service with Artabazos, and the Athenians had bowed to his command, thus ending the Social War.⁸⁸ Surely no good would have come from reminding the Athenians of that. Secondly, having backed down, the Athenians would not necessarily have enjoyed hearing that the Thebans, their hated enemies, were willing to brook the King's anger by pursuing a policy from which the Athenians had flinched. In short, any reference to Artabazos' rebellion was likely to be very sensitive and best avoided, which explains why Demosthenes refers only to rebellions by Orontes and the Egyptians (14.31). Moreover, if in addition to these considerations, Pammenes had already had cordial dealings with the enemies of Athens at Maroneia, any allusion to the Theban general was likely to provoke an unwelcome reaction. For all of these reasons any explicit

⁸⁵ *IG* II² 1613 lines 298–300; Diod. 16.34.4.

⁸⁶ *Letter to Ammaios* 1.4 (725); Hammond, 60. The dates offered for Pammenes' expedition range from spring 354 (Beloch, *GG* III² 2.269), summer 354 (Tonev, 167; Sordi, 150) to spring 353 (W. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien* [Marburg 1892] 211; Cloché (1939) 181; Hammond, 60.

⁸⁷ *The Art of Demosthenes*, 113–116.

⁸⁸ Diod. 16.22; cf. Isok. 7.8, 81. Dionysios *Lysias* 12, dates the Social War to 357/6–356/5.

reference to Pammenes threatened to damage rather than promote Demosthenes' case.

Artabazos' rebellion and his need for Greek support provide another argument in favor of dating Pammenes' mission to 355. Once the Athenians had left him in the lurch, Artabazos quickly needed troops to fill the void. He doubtless wasted no time in turning to Thebes for help in the hope of rebuilding his strength before the next campaigning-season.

Taken together, the evidence allows a surprisingly consistent reconstruction of events. War was officially declared late in 356 BC, and Pammenes can be placed at Maroneia late in 355 BC. The battle of Neon took place in the spring or summer of 355, a date made all the more probable in view of the Amphiktyonic desire to free Delphoi. This conclusion is further strengthened by the ease with which the various armies negotiated Mt. Kallidromon, which was obviously blocked neither by snow nor mud. This reconstruction also eliminates the need to postulate an unaccountably strange delay of a full year or more between the Amphiktyonic declaration of war and initial military operations. Neon resulted in Philomelos' death and a serious setback to Phokian hopes. At the same time, however, it gave the Thebans, who considered Neon the end of the war (Diod. 32.1), the opportunity to dispatch Pammenes to Asia and Onomarchos the breathing-space necessary to recoup Phokian fortunes.

*B) Phokian campaigns and Philip's intervention in Thessaly
(354–353 BC)*

Although a secure date for the beginning of Philip's siege of Methone helps immensely to date Neon and Pammenes' visit to Maroneia, the lack of a firm date for its fall throws one back on Diodoros' narrative to establish the chronology of Onomarchos' campaigns in Boiotia and Philip's two interventions in Thessaly. Even here, however, some contemporary evidence sheds welcome light on the chronology of these events.

Diodoros relates (32–33.3) that when Onomarchos had rebuilt Phokian forces, he invaded Lokris, captured Thronion, and intimidated the Amphissans into submission. He next invaded Doris and Boiotia, where he captured Orchomenos but suffered defeat at Chaironeia (33.4). Chapters 34–36 then fill out the archon-year of 353/2 at the end of Diodoros' account of the Sacred War. In 38.1 Diodoros records Philip's unsuccessful attempt to force Thermopylai after his victory in Thessaly, an event dated to 352/1. In this section Diodoros records Philip's operations against Methone (34.4–5), even though he has earlier said (31.6) that Philip took both Methone and Pagasai in 354/3. After the fall of Methone Diodoros retails (35.1–2) Philip's first intervention in Thessaly, in which he fought

three battles and lost two. Philip then retired to Macedonia, while Onomarchos campaigned in Boiotia (35.3). Returning to Thessaly, Philip fought the battle of the Crocus Plain, in which Onomarchos was defeated and slain (35.3–6). Afterwards, Philip reduced Pherai, put Thessalian affairs in order, and marched towards Thermopylai. Significantly, however, Diodoros fails to include the fall of Pagasai in this sequence of events.

Imbedded in these chapters is the notice (34.3) of a battle near Orneai, an Argive city, which subsequently fell to the Spartans (353/2). This, like the previous notice of the fall of Methone and Pagasai (31.6), fills out the archon-year, a typical device of Diodoros. As in the case of Methone, the full details of the events at Orneai are described later under the archon-year 352/1 (39.1–5).⁸⁹ Diodoros' method is the same in both cases.⁹⁰ Moreover, the presence of the exiled tyrants of Pherai in the Peloponnesos (39.3) proves that these events occurred after Philip had liberated Pherai, which preceded his march on Thermopylai. Consequently, the Peloponnesian events, regardless of Diodoros' dates for them, took place after Philip's victory over Onomarchos and his reduction of Pherai.

Most scholars agree that Diodoros has compressed the events of two campaigning-seasons into one archon-year, just as he had earlier narrated (21–22.2) the entire Social War, which lasted at least two years (Dion. *Lys.* 12), under 356/5. Yet they disagree considerably about the sequence of events, which they distribute in a congeries of archon-years. Beloch (*III*².2.266–270) begins by vacillating between summer 355 BC (266) for the battle of Neon and autumn 355 BC, or 354/3 (275). He also concludes that Philip's activities fall under two archon-years, with the capitulation of Methone dating to the last month of 355/4, or summer 354. Thereafter occurred Philip's first intervention in Thessaly, dated scarcely before July 354 BC (354/3), his first defeat at the hands of Onomarchos in the fall of that same year, and his return to Macedonia over the winter. According to Beloch, Philip returned to Thessaly in the spring or summer of 353 BC, while Onomarchos operated in Boiotia, and captured Pagasai. In mid-summer 353/2 Philip defeated Onomarchos at the Crocus Plain, captured Pherai, and marched to Thermopylai.

Hammond (54–67), on the other hand, lowers all of these dates by a year. He places the battle of Neon in 354 BC (354/3) and the fall of Methone around August 354 BC, or 354/3. He next postulates three different occasions on which Philip intervened in Thessaly. The first

⁸⁹ At 36.1 Diodoros employs this technique again for Phayllos' activities, which are fully described under the next archon-year (37).

⁹⁰ This alone is perhaps decisive against Hammond's view (68) that 34.3 is simply a war between Argos and Sparta and that 39.1–5 is a general Peloponnesian war.

occurred immediately after the capture of Methone, when Philip responded to a Thessalian invitation to reduce Pagasai, which fell in autumn 354 BC, or 354/3. According to Hammond, Philip next entered Thessaly in late summer 353 BC, or 353/2, and defeated Onomarchos upon his return to Thessaly in the spring or summer of 352 BC (353/2), after which he marched on Thermopylai. Hammond does not, however, explain how Philip was able to hold Pagasai after his defeat in 353 BC. Hence, Hammond concludes that the battle of Neon and the fall of Methone date to 354 BC (354/3) and that Philip's next two campaigns in Thessaly occurred in 353 and 352 BC, both in the archon-year 353/2.

Cloch  s findings are more in accord with Beloch's than with Hammond's.⁹¹ Cloch   places the battle of Neon in autumn 355 and the fall of Methone in 354 at the beginning of 354/3. In his view, Philip entered Thessaly for the first time in summer or autumn 354, and captured Pagasai. Nonetheless, Philip lost the city after his defeat by Onomarchos later in that same year. In 353 Philip returned to Thessaly, defeated Onomarchos, reduced Pherai, and once again captured Pagasai. From there he marched on Thermopylai in the second half of 353. Cloch  s Julian dates for the battle of Neon, the fall of Methone, and Philip's two Thessalian expeditions agree with Beloch's, but Cloch   postulates two sieges of Pagasai.

Tonev (166–167, 175–177) reaches some conclusions significantly different from those of the others. The battle of Neon belongs in autumn 355 and the fall of Methone, after a siege that lasted the entire winter, dates to winter 354/3. Philip's two campaigns took place in the same year, 352, with the first occurring in the first half of 353/2 and the second in the autumn of the year.

Sordi (148–152) supports a number of Hammond's positions. Neon she dates to 355/4, probably spring 354 BC, with Methone falling in summer (July/August) 354, or 354/3. The Thessalians first invited Philip perhaps between autumn 354 and spring 353, during which Pagasai fell. Philip's defeat at the hands of Onomarchos happened in 353, and Philip returned to Thessaly in spring 352. Sordi accepts Diodoros' date of 352/1 for Philip's march to Thermopylai. Lastly, Martin (188–201), who does not date the battle of Neon, concludes that Methone fell in 354 BC, 354/3, and that Philip's two Thessalian ventures date to 354 BC (354/3) and to 353 BC, in the second half of 354/3. Pagasai, in his view, fell at this point (end of 354/3) and that Pherai fell at the beginning of 353/2. Finally, Martin places Philip's march to Thermopylai at the beginning of 353, shortly after the reduction of Pherai.

⁹¹ (1939) 179–182, 191–192; cf. also (1915) 64–66, 74–75, 90–91.

The problem stands thus: there is no contemporary, independent date for the fall of Methone, after which Philip entered Thessalian affairs. Moreover, Diodoros, who gives two different dates for the fall of Methone, fails completely to place the fate of Pagasai in its narrative context. Since there is no way of determining, apart from Diodoros' narrative, how long Methone held out against Philip—the analogy of Poteidaia in the Peloponnesian War suggests the difficulties involved even in making an intelligent guess—the problem must be solved by interpreting Diodoros' history in the light of the only other evidence available, specifically Dionysios' dates for several of Demosthenes' speeches.

Dionysios gives two archon-dates that bear directly upon Diodoros' narrative. In the first he states that the Athenians sent a force to Thermopylai in the archonship of Thoudemos (353/2) to thwart Philip.⁹² Thus, when in 352/1 Demosthenes mentioned that the Athenians had recently stopped Philip at Thermopylai, he makes the first recorded allusion to this event.⁹³ Hence, Dionysios' date is a year earlier than Diodoros' date of 352/1 (38.1). Moreover, as was seen, Diodoros divorced Philip's victory in Thessaly from his march on Thermopylai by an entire archon-year, whereas the two are usually seen as parts of the same campaign.⁹⁴ Consequently, Dionysios gives good evidence that Philip's second venture took place in 353/2.

Dionysios' second date (*Letter to Ammaios* 1.4, 725) is the archonship of Thoudemos (353/2) for Demosthenes' speech *For the Megalopolitans*.⁹⁵ In this speech Demosthenes argues in favor of accepting an alliance with the Megalopolitans, and his remarks indicate that fighting had not yet broken out in the Peloponnesos. His comments find their context in the turmoil that led to the fighting around Orneai. His testimony has an immediate bearing on Diodoros' account of the conflict there, which Diodoros (34.3; 39.1–7) dates, as he does the fate of Methone, in two different archon-years. Another clue to the chronology comes from Diodoros (39.3), who says that the exiled tyrants of Pherai sent forces to the Peloponnesos. Since Dionysios has already dated Philip's success in Thessaly to 353/2, which led to the expulsion of the tyrants, the Peloponnesian operations must belong in the latter half of 353/2, or 352 BC. This conclusion accounts for the absence of any reference to fighting in Demosthenes' speech. It likewise explains how Philip's victory in Thessaly could be dated to the same

⁹² *Dein.* 13.665, cited erroneously by Beloch (*GG* III².2.267) as *Demosth.* 13 p. 655, a reference taken apparently without inspection by Hammond (57 n. 43) and J.R. Ellis, *CP* 72 (1977) 32 n. 2.

⁹³ *Dem.* 4.17.

⁹⁴ The lone exception here is Sordi, 152, whose reasons are unclear.

⁹⁵ Cf. Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, 228 n. 31; Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes*, 116–117.

archon-year as the participation of the Pheraian mercenaries in Peloponnesian military affairs, which cannot easily belong to the same campaigning-season. Nor immediately after the Crocus Plain could the Phokians risk further weakening themselves by sending 3000 troops to help Sparta (39.3).

Taken together, Diodoros' narrative, Dionysios' dates, and Demosthenes' testimony prove that Philip's victory in the battle of the Crocus Plain took place in 353 BC (353/2), which places his first Thessalian intervention in 354 BC. The latter, in turn, indicates that Methone also fell in 354 BC. Unfortunately, however, it is impossible to determine in which archon-year the siege of Methone ended. It could as easily have occurred in late 355/4 as early 354/3. Nonetheless, the sequence of events is quite clear: Methone was invested in winter 355 BC, fell sometime during the summer of 354 BC,⁹⁶ which also saw Philip's first unsuccessful operations in Thessaly, which were in turn followed in 353 BC by Philip's second Thessalian venture, itself capped by victory at the Crocus Plain and the abortive march on Thermopylai.

This sequence also provides the framework for Onomarchos' operations in central Greece. The battle of Neon ended warfare in central Greece in the campaigning-season of 355. Over the winter Onomarchos rebuilt Phokian forces (Diod. 32–33.2). During 354 he campaigned in eastern Lokris, Doris, and Boiotia (Diod. 33.3–4; 34.2). Meanwhile, Philip went from Methone to Thessaly, where he operated against Lykophron, tyrant of Pherai.⁹⁷ Philip's intervention provoked Onomarchos to dispatch Phayllos to Thessaly; and when Philip still proved successful, Onomarchos intervened himself, defeating Philip and driving him back to Macedonia (Diod. 35.1–2). As noted above, Philip's defeat marks the end of the campaigning-season of 354, even though Diodoros places all of these military actions in 353/2.

Onomarchos' capture of Koroneia probably belongs early in the campaigning-season of 353 before his defeat in Thessaly (Diod. 35.3–6), although certainty is impossible owing to Diodoros' obscure language and compression of events: μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα [Philip's defeat at the hands of Onomarchos] ὁ Φίλιππος μὲν ἀνεχώρησεν εἰς Μακεδονίαν, Ὀνόμαρχος δὲ στρατεύσας εἰς Βοιωτίαν ἐνίκησε μάχῃ τοὺς Βοιωτοὺς καὶ πόλιν εἴλε Κορώνειαν. κατὰ δὲ τὴν Θετταλίαν Φίλιππος μὲν ἐκ τῆς Μακεδονίας μετὰ τῆς δυνάμεως ἄρτι κατηντηκῶς ἐστράτευσεν ἐπὶ Λυκόφρονα τὸν Φερῶν

⁹⁶ Because of the extensive fighting in Thessaly during this campaigning-season (cf. pp. 63–68 above) one can reasonably suppose, but not prove, that Methone capitulated early in the summer.

⁹⁷ Diod. 34.4–35.1. For the meaning of μετακληθεῖς at 35.1; cf. Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 188–191, whose arguments against Griffith, *CQ* 20 (1970) 67–68, are decisive.

τύραννον. While one could possibly date the capture of Koroneia to 354, the campaigning-season of that year had already seen the end of the siege of Methone, Onomarchos' operations in central Greece, Philip's and Onomarchos' interventions in Thessaly, where three battles were fought. It is therefore far more probable that Onomarchos' success at Koroneia took place early in 353 before the battle of the Crocus Plain.

Finally, the Crocus Plain gave Philip the time and opportunity to settle Thessalian affairs to his satisfaction. His work in Thessaly was so extensive as to consume the rest of the campaigning-season. First, he reduced to submission Pherai, Pagasai, Magnesia, and the rest of Thessaly (Dem. 1.12; 2.11–12). He occupied Magnesia and the islands off shore (Dem. 2.7, 11; Strabo 9.5.16).⁹⁸ He was made leader of the Thessalians (Justin 11.3.1–2), which included his management of public revenues. According to the constitution, then, he was archon of the Thessalian Confederacy,⁹⁹ in which capacity he settled a number of Thessalian political affairs.¹⁰⁰

When he had completed his Thessalian arrangements, he marched to Thrace (Dem. 1.13, and schol.), where he besieged Heraion Teichos (Dem. 3.4), and fell ill (Dem. 1.13; 3.5). Upon his recovery, he marched immediately against Olynthos (Dem. 1.13). In sum, Philip spent the rest of the campaigning-season of 353 consolidating his position in Thessaly before returning to Thrace and pursuing his ambitions in the north.¹⁰¹ In central Greece the death of Onomarchos opened the way to the last military operations of 353. The Boiotians took the opportunity to regain Orchomenos (Dem. 16.4, 25), an event not recorded by Diodoros.¹⁰² While Philip dealt with Thessalian affairs, this victory marked the end of the campaigning-season of 353.

IV. MILITARY OPERATIONS IN CENTRAL GREECE AND THE PELOPONNESOS (352–350 BC)

For the rest of the Sacred War Diodoros is the principal source of dates,

⁹⁸ Dionysios *Letter to Ammaios* 1.4 (726) dates the *Olynthiacs* to 349/8, which proves that these events preceded the siege of Olynthos.

⁹⁹ Cf. *IG* II² 116, 175; *SEG* XVII 243; Sordi, *La lega tessala* 207–208; Larsen, *GFS*, 12–26.

¹⁰⁰ Dem. 9.25, claims that as of that moment Philip had been doing the Greeks harm for not quite 13 years. Toney, 172, argues that Demosthenes' testimony supports a date of 353 for Philip's activity in Thessaly. Yet none of Demosthenes' specific references to Philip's harm to the Greeks dates before the destruction of Olynthos. Thus, the orator adroitly avoids the fact that Philip and Athens, much to Athens' loss, had been at odds in the north long before the destruction of Olynthos.

¹⁰¹ Martin, *CP* 76 (1981) 198–201, argues in favor of dating Philip's second Thracian venture to 353/2 against Ellis, *CP* 72 (1977) 32–39. A serious flaw in Ellis' reconstruction is his uncritical acceptance of Hammond's chronology.

¹⁰² Cloché (1915) 99.

for epigraphy fails completely, and Demosthenes' dated speeches provide only occasional help. Diodoros' narrative, by no means a full account even by his standards, gives only the highlights of the action, and even those in an unusually incomplete, compressed, and garbled form. This observation is reinforced by Demosthenes' infrequent allusions to events lacking from Diodoros' history. Most notably, Demosthenes (19.148) mentions that at one point the Phokians successfully pinned the Theban garrison within the walls of Neon. The Theban capture and retention of Neon are major events, and yet they find no place in Diodoros' text. Thus, when Kahrstedt, Pokorný, and Cloché date events to specific months or even weeks, they overlook a fact of basic importance: it is impossible to obtain precise results from imprecise evidence. The most that one can reasonably hope to do is to put events in the right campaigning-season.

Diodoros' history of these years embraces the events of the Sacred War (36.1; 37; 38.3–7; 40.1–2), a note on Philip's movements (38.1–2), warfare in the Peloponnesos (34.3; 39.1–7), and chronological notices of various occurrences (36.2–5). Diodoros omits the Sacred War under 350/49, which he devotes solely to fighting in the Persian Empire (46–52.8), as he does most of 351/0 (40.3–45).

According to Diodoros, Phayllos took command after the death of Onomarchos, and rebuilt the army by hiring mercenaries, coining money, acquiring a large supply of arms, and summoning help from his allies (36.1; 37.1–2). The Spartans, Achaians, Athenians, and the exiled tyrants Lykophron and Peitholaos all sent contingents, with which Phayllos invaded Boiotia (37.5). He twice suffered defeat in the Kephisos valley (37.5); and a few days after the second encounter, he was again defeated near Koroneia (37.6). His losses were heavy.

After an allusion to Philip's move onto Thermopylai and his return to Macedonia (38.1–2), Diodoros resumes his account of the Sacred War. Phayllos reduced nearly all of Epiknemidian Lokris (38.3), but was defeated at Abai by the Boiotians, who then pillaged a great deal of Phokis (38.4). The Boiotian attempt to lift the Phokian siege of Naryx failed when Phayllos drove them off and captured the city (38.5). At that point Phayllos fell ill and afterwards died. The young Phalaikos took command, and because of his youth Mnaseas was chosen as *strategos* as well (38.6). Mnaseas was soon killed in battle, and a short while later Phalaikos was defeated in cavalry battle near Chaironeia (38.7).

Diodoros next turns to the fighting in the Peloponnesos, to which he had alluded in 34.3 (353/2). Under 352/1 he narrates all of the action. He begins by stating that Archidamos and the Spartans overran the territory of Megalopolis (39.1). The Argives, Sikyonians, and Messenians

immediately sent aid, and the Thebans dispatched 4500 troops (39.2). The Spartans were reinforced by 3000 Phokian infantry and 150 cavalry from Lykophron and Peitholaos, and afterwards the entire army encamped at Mantinea (39.3). The Spartans and their allies then captured Orneai, inflicting serious losses on the Argive force that attempted to relieve it (39.5). At that point the Thebans appeared on the scene, and after a stubborn battle all the belligerents returned home, with the Spartans sacking Helisson along the way (39.5). The action continues without a break in 39.6, in which the Thebans thrice defeated the Spartans, who suffered heavy losses. When the Spartans won an important battle, the armies on both sides went home. Whereupon, the Spartans and Megalopolitans concluded a truce, followed by the Thebans likewise returning home (39.7). In Boiotia the Thebans found Phalaikos at Chaironeia, from which they drove him. From there they continued into Phokis, sacking the area and capturing some towns (39.8).

As just mentioned, Demosthenes' speech on behalf of the Megalopolitans, together with Dionysios' archon-date for Philip's attempt on Thermopylai, securely place the beginning of war in the Peloponnesos in the campaigning-season of 352 BC. The only other piece of contemporary evidence bearing on these events comes from Demosthenes' speech *Against Aristokrates* which Dionysios (*Letter to Ammaios* 1.4, 725) dates to 352/1. At 23.124 Demosthenes mentions that Phayllos was still alive and in full control of Phokian affairs at that time. Demosthenes' speech is concerned with Thracian affairs, but the real villain of the piece is Charidemos, not Philip, which suggests a date early in 352/1—after Philip's return from Thessaly and before the high tide of his success there.¹⁰³

Diodoros' narrative also indicates that this description of events in central Greece and the Peloponnesos should be divided between two campaigning-seasons. In both cases Diodoros indicates that the sequence of events began in one archon-year (353/2), although he places the full account of them entirely under the following year (352/1).¹⁰⁴ Phayllos probably spent the rest of 353 quietly in Phokis, confronting the massive tasks of providing new leadership and rebuilding the Phokian army. In 353 he probably did not find mercenaries flocking to his banner. The battle of the Crocus Plain had entailed staggering casualties by Greek standards. Some 6000 mercenaries and Phokians were killed in action, and more than 3000 prisoners were drowned as temple-robbers (35.6). The huge casualties and the grim fate of the prisoners must have made Phayllos' recruitment of mercenaries to fill the ranks very difficult and time-

¹⁰³ Cf. Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, 98–115; Pearson, *The Art of Demosthenes*, 68–73.

¹⁰⁴ Cf. 36.1; 37.1–6 for central Greece and 34.3; 39.1–5 for the Peloponnesos.

consuming. The difficulty of his task is indicated by his doubling of pay. Before he could even begin to hire mercenaries, he had to plunder the sanctuary, and strike the coins needed to pay them. In any case, it was safer to remain quiet so long as Philip was still in Thessaly, from which he could easily make his presence felt.¹⁰⁵ Nor would Phayllos want to provoke the Thebans, who had taken advantage of the Crocus Plain to recapture Orchomenos (Dem. 16.4, 25). Accordingly, he no doubt steadily rebuilt his strength for operations in 352.

These factors argue strongly against Kahrstedt (44–46), Pokorny (33), Cloché (1915, 89–90), Beloch (III².2.270–271), and Tonev (172) that Phayllos was able later in 353 to invade Boiotia. Cloché allots a mere six weeks to Phayllos' efforts to recoup Phokian fortunes, as though the replacement of 9000 mercenaries could be done in a day. These scholars do not appreciate the magnitude of the disaster suffered by the Phokians at the Crocus Plain, where the losses were considerably greater than those at Delion (424), Mantinea (418), Koroneia (395), and Leuktra (371) combined. The Crocus Plain was probably the bloodiest battle of classical Greek history, and mercenaries made up the vast majority of the casualties. Moreover, many of the survivors were unarmed (Diod. 35.5; 36.1). In addition, the disaster at the Crocus Plain was not the first to befall a mercenary army under Phokian command. The bloody defeat at Neon, together with that at the Crocus Plain, cannot have inspired confidence in Phokian military leadership. The prospect of future defeat doubtless stood as a chilling specter to prospective mercenaries, therefore the need to double pay. There is simply no reason to think that Phayllos could readily make good Phokian losses in a short time.

As mentioned above, after the campaigning-season of 353 Philip left for the north to campaign in Thrace. His departure from Thessaly of itself probably made it easier for Phayllos to rebuild his army over the winter, and made his allies all the readier to answer his call for assistance in spring 352, when they would face only the Boiotians. Lykophron and Peitholaos, driven from Pherai, put their 2000 mercenaries at his disposal (Diod. 37.3). Phayllos began his operations in spring 352 by leading his and the allied forces into Boiotia, where they met defeat at Orchomenos (37.5). This check was merely the hapless beginning of a single campaign. After the repulse at Orchomenos, Phayllos endured a second defeat in the Kephisos valley, from which he retreated to Koroneia, where he met a third defeat, but one that did not prevent the survivors from escaping up

¹⁰⁵ Even Thermopylai would not necessarily have posed an insurmountable barrier to Philip, if he and the Thebans had attacked it simultaneously. Cf. also J.A.O. Larsen, *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 116–128, for a route to circumvent Thermopylai entirely.

the Phalaros valley and along the heights of Mt. Helikon. Once again, Phokian forces had taken serious losses: not fewer than 1080 killed or captured, or roughly the same casualties as those suffered by the Spartans at Leuktra.¹⁰⁶ Even though these operations would not necessarily have consumed much time, they were expensive in lives; and the Phokian mercenaries, whether veteran or newly-recruited, could not have been cheered by still another major failure of Phokian generalship. Nor at that point would Phokis' allies have seen much point to prolonging hostilities. Having sustained heavy losses while also risking allied contingents, and having barely managed to slip out of Boiotia, all without having done damage to the Thebans, Phayllos probably remained on the defensive at home during the rest of the campaigning-season. Phayllos' retreat from Koroneia (37.6) marks the end of fighting in central Greece in 352.

In this same campaigning-season (39.1), war broke out in the Peloponnesos. Having assisted Phayllos in the north, the Spartans now called upon the Phokians for help in the south against Megalopolis. Phayllos dispatched 3000 infantry, and Lykophron and Peitholaos contributed 150 cavalry (39.3). Phayllos' willingness to lend his allies such a large contingent indicates that he had no further designs in central Greece for the moment. The presence of the tyrants' mercenaries also proves that the Peloponnesian campaign cannot have been simultaneous with Phayllos' Boiotian invasion. The Boiotians, free at the moment from the Phokian menace, sent 4500 troops to the aid of Megalopolis (39.2). Diodoros clearly marks the end of these operations: he thrice mentions that after the Spartans had captured Orneai, the combatants returned to their homes (34.3; 39.5). Although Diodoros continues his narrative without break at 39.6 with a Theban victory at Thelpousa, it is impossible to see why the Thebans would have sent an army a second time and so late in the same campaigning-season. The fighting in the Peloponnesos (39.1–5) is marked by substantial assistance from the Phokians and Thebans to their Peloponnesian allies, capped by a major battle. All of these events—both those in Boiotia (37.1–6) and those in the Peloponnesos (39.1–5)—date to the campaigning-season of 352 BC, which spans the archon-years 353/2 and 352/1.¹⁰⁷

In central Greece the campaigning-season of 351 opened with Phayllos'

¹⁰⁶ Cf. Buckler, *TH*, 291 n. 30.

¹⁰⁷ Kahrstedt (44–47), Pokorný (29–44), Cloché (1915, 88–107). Beloch (*GG* III².2.270–272), and Tonev (171–172), who expend much argument on the season and the very month of events, agree that the major fighting in central Greece and the Peloponnesos took place in 352 and 351, with 39.5 marking the end of Peloponnesian operations in 352. Because of their belief that Phayllos was able to restore Phokian fortunes as early as 353, they postulate—without any consensus—some fighting in both theaters in 353, a view combatted above (cf. pp. 188–189).

successful invasion of Epiknemidian Lokris. Nonetheless, the Thebans had good reason to be satisfied with the military operations of 351. Although they had lost a battle to Phayllos at Naryx (38.5), they had discomfited him in a night attack, after which they launched an invasion of Phokis marked by widespread plundering.¹⁰⁸ Shortly afterwards, Phayllos fell ill and later died (38.6). His successor was Phalaikos, a youth who was put under the tutelage of Mnaseas (38.6). Mnaseas was killed in battle with significant losses among his troops and young Phalaikos tasted defeat in his first battle as sole commander (38.7). The Thebans had already inflicted great damage on the Phokians and their forces (38.4, 7), so they could feel secure enough at home to send additional aid to their Peloponnesian allies in that same campaigning-season (39.6–7).

Precisely when operations in the Peloponnesos began in 351 is unknown. Diodoros resumes his account with a Theban victory over the Spartans at Thelpousa (39.6), which at least indicates that Theban participation in these events occurred after the fighting in central Greece. Phalaikos took advantage of the absence of a sizeable part of the Boiotian army to seize Chaironeia (39.8), the northwesternmost and thus most exposed portion of Boiotia. Phalaikos proved unable to hold the city, especially when the Thebans were able to pit against him the entire Boiotian army, which included those who had recently seen service in the Peloponnesos (39.8). Nonetheless, the relief of Chaironeia and the invasion of Phokis (39.8) brought to a close military operations in Greece in 351.

According to Diodoros (40.1–2), in 351/0 the Thebans were weary of war and short of funds, whereupon they sought reconciliation with the King. There is ample reason to conclude that for once Diodoros' date is reliable. Beloch (III².1.483 n.1) suggests a connection between the King's gift and his plans to reconquer Egypt. Diodoros (16.44.1, 48.1) refers without details to an unsuccessful Persian campaign in Egypt, which receives support from contemporary sources. Demosthenes (15.11–12) especially, speaks in the present tense of the King's plans going awry in Egypt, and mentions reports that the King had already met with failure, a fact supported by Isokrates (5.101). Demosthenes' specific reference to Artemisia secures the date as 351.¹⁰⁹ Therefore, it is best to interpret the King's gift as payment for the services of Boiotian hoplites. Although the

¹⁰⁸ This operation provides a good example of the impossibility of dating these events with precision. Kahrstedt (46) dates these movements to June, the time of the harvest, because of Diodoros' allusion to the Boiotian pillaging of Phokis. Cloché (1915) 106, objects that the pillaging could only have been confined to movable objects. Cf. also Pokorný, 34–35. In truth, since Diodoros is not specific, no one can be certain of when in the campaigning-season this invasion occurred.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Diod. 16.45.7; Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 250; Beloch, *GG* III².2.144.

chronology of the King's campaign is unknown, it apparently lasted into 350. In 351 Boiotian troops saw extensive fighting in central Greece and the Peloponnesos, and probably few would have been available for service with the King. A plausible date for the Theban overture to the King is immediately after the campaigning-season of 351. The King was then in Asia Minor, probably in Phoenicia (cf. J.W. Betlyon, *ANSMN* 21 [1976] 28–35), where he could be speedily reached. Furthermore, his plans of reconquest were already meeting difficulties. Although by Greek standards 300 talents was a great deal of money, to the King it was probably little enough to pay for a force of veteran and recently victorious hoplites. The sum also suggests that the Thebans sent the King a considerable contingent. In view of the evidence, one can conclude that Boiotians took the field with the King in 350, which, as Beloch also suggests, accounts for the meagre fighting in Greece during the year. Although the Phokians and Boiotians continued to raid each other's territory, and although a number of skirmishes resulted, no notable actions took place in 351/0. Diodoros ignores the Sacred War completely under 350/49.

V. THE FINAL ACT (349–346 BC)

Diodoros' narrative, highly compressed and deficient, is the only chronological source for the final campaigns of the Sacred War. In chapter 56 (347/6) Diodoros returns to the war after having dealt with Philip's operations against Olynthos. He states (56.1) that the Boiotians sacked much Phokian territory around Hyampolis, and defeated the enemy, who lost 70 men. Afterwards (56.2) the Boiotians themselves suffered defeat at Koroneia, where they lost many men. When the Phokians seized several important Boiotian cities, the Boiotians responded by destroying the grain in Phokis, but they were defeated again on their homeward journey. Diodoros next (56.3–57.4) describes Phalaikos' deposition from the *strategia* for pillaging the temple and the trial of Philon, who was especially active in the mischief.

Chapter 58 resumes the narrative of military operations. Having captured Orchomenos, Koroneia, and Chorsiai,¹¹⁰ the Phokians harassed the Boiotians, ravaging their lands and defeating them in skirmishes. At length, the Boiotians appealed to Philip for help (58.2), and he responded by sending some men (58.3). When the Phokians began building a fort at Abai, the Boiotians attacked, driving off many of them, while the rest died in a fire at the temple of Apollo nearby (58.4–6). Lastly, at 59.1

¹¹⁰ For Chorsiai instead of Korsiai, cf. P. Roesch, *Cahiers d'Histoire* 15 (1970) 374–376.

(346/5) Diodoros describes the diplomatic and military events that led to the conclusion of war. As established earlier (cf. pp. 149–150), all of the immediate events preceding Phalaikos' surrender of Thermopylai to Philip belong to the last part of 347/6, so Diodoros' archon-date must be dismissed. Furthermore, Demosthenes (19.158–159) and Aischines (2.132–133) prove that the diplomatic activities preceding Philip's intervention consumed several months, which receives support from Justin (8.4.1–12). All of the military operations of 56 and 58 must, therefore, be placed before the winter of 347/6.

Although Schäfer (II².185–186) dates all of these events to 347 BC, his view has not won acceptance. Instead, Kahrstedt (47), Cloché (1915, 112–118), Beloch (III².2.273), and Tonev (197) separate the two Boiotian invasions of Phokis (56.1–2) by a winter. Cloché, who argues the point at greatest length, puts forward two reasons for the division. He places the campaign of 56.2 in 348/7 because the Boiotians destroyed the Phokian grain, and he can see no useful purpose in an invasion earlier in that same campaigning-season, one that presumably had left the immature crop intact. More importantly, he emphasizes the significance of the Phokian seizure of several important Boiotian cities between the two invasions. He next places the first Boiotian invasion of Phokian territory and the battles of Hyampolis and Koroneia in 349. Cloché (1915, 117–118) further supports his date of 349 for the first Theban invasion by pointing out that in that year Demosthenes (1.25–26; 3.8) emphasized Phokian weakness. To this can be added Demosthenes' testimony (3.27) that at this same time the Thebans too had their hands full, meaning that they were fully engaged in the Sacred War, as the scholiast points out. Thus, there is good contemporary evidence to indicate sustained fighting at this point. The events of 56.1 meet this situation easily.

Cloché's two points carry weight, and there is good reason to conclude that the Phokian capture of Orchomenos, Koroneia, and Chorsiai separates the two campaigning-seasons (56.2; 58.1). Although Cloché cannot decide whether these Phokian victories were won late in the campaigning-season of 349 or in spring 348, a case can be made for 349, especially since the Boiotian invasion of Phokis (56.2) clearly dates to a time early in the campaigning-season, as Kahrstedt (47) recognizes. Once these cities had fallen to the Phokians, the immediate response of the Boiotians would surely have been to counter-attack, if only to stop the Phokian advance and to keep open communications between the two basins of Boiotia. All else was secondary, including the ravaging of Phokian territory, and Cloché is no doubt right to suggest that the result was a good deal of desultory fighting around these places, fighting that consumed the rest of the campaigning-season of 349.

Diodoros' account of the events of 348, beginning with the Boiotian invasion of Phokis, is incomplete, as the testimony of Demosthenes testifies. Demosthenes (19.148) states that the Phokians not only managed to hold Orchomenos, Koroneia, and Tilphossaion, but they also pinned the Theban garrison at Neon within the walls. Moreover, they defeated the Theban army at Hedyleion, where the invaders lost 270 men.¹¹¹ The scholiast to this passage adds that the Phokians came to the relief and rescued some of their countrymen who had been besieged and cut off. Here, then, is evidence of major operations, which Demosthenes places in connection with the Phokian occupation of the Boiotian cities.

Taken together, Demosthenes and Diodoros provide a fuller picture of the events of 348. The Phokians had retained control of the Boiotian cities despite previous counter-attacks. Moreover, with Koroneia and Tilphossaion in their hands, they had cut off the easiest line of communications with northern Boiotia and the Theban garrison at Neon. In spring 348, rather than renew their counter-attacks, the Boiotians readied a stroke against Phokis itself. Cloché (1915, 117 n. 1) suggests that the primary reason for this expedition was to force the Phokians to defend their own land. Another reason was probably to bring relief to the hard-pressed garrison at Neon. Since the road by Koroneia and Tilphossaion was closed to them, the Thebans probably marched by way of Akraiphia and around Lake Kopais to the Abai-Hyampolis road, which leaves the Kopaic basin a little northwest of Orchomenos. Diodoros (56.2) states that the Thebans were defeated on their return march, and Demosthenes (19.148) tells of a serious Theban defeat at Hedyleion. Since Hedyleion is a height on the road between the Kephisos valley and Orchomenos,¹¹² the two battles are surely one and the same. In addition, the Phokians were able to throw the Theban garrison in their own territory onto the defensive. Thus, there is every reason to conclude that the summer of 348 saw considerably more fighting in central Greece than Diodoros reports. The widespread Theban destruction of crops met Phokian opposition, with the campaign culminating in a major pitched battle, which ended Theban operations for the season.

In 347 after the loss of their cities, which they had proved unable to retake, and their defeat at Hedyleion, the Thebans settled down to a grim war of attrition. The Phokians used their new bases to spread devastation across several areas of Boiotia (58.1), thereby forcing the Thebans onto the defensive. Unable to defeat the marauders, much less to dislodge

¹¹¹ Cloché (1915) 115–116, places these events in 348/7 without further comment.

¹¹² Cf. also schol. Dem. 19.148: W. Dindorf, *Demosthenes*, VIII (Oxford 1851) 406 *ad loc.*

them, the Thebans appealed to Philip for help (58.2). His response (58.3) enabled them later in that campaigning-season to disrupt the fortification of Abai and thus to keep open that road to the Kephisos valley (58.4–6).

Only Tonev (196–197) objects to this sequence of events. His denial is unaccompanied by proof, and the only argument offered is that nowhere in book 16 does Diodoros include the events of more than two years under one archon. His claim is easily disproved by Diodoros' subsumption of the events of the Social War under one archon (16.21–22; cf. 7.3), and thus his objections can readily be discarded.

Consequently, the final events of the war can be distributed as follows: in 349 the first Boiotian invasion of Phokis and the battles of Hyampolis and Koroneia took place (56.1). Afterwards, the Phokians captured Orchomenos, Koroneia, Tilphossaion, and Chorsiai, probably late in 349. Phokian success was followed in 348 by a Theban attack on Phokis, with considerable fighting near Neon and throughout the Kephisos valley, culminating in a Theban defeat at Hedyleion (56.2; Dem. 19.148 with scholion). The year 347 saw Phokian pillaging of Boiotia, the Theban appeal to Philip, and the Theban victory at Abai (58.1–6). Phalaikos' deposition from office and later reinstatement (56.3–57.4) probably occurred after the campaigning-season, when the conduct of generals was normally scrutinized. There was no practical reason earlier to halt the progress of military events, especially when the army had achieved success. Nor did it make any sense either to disband the mercenary army in the middle of the campaigning-season or to pay it for remaining idle. Furthermore, in 347 the only hope of the Phokians was Phalaikos' occupation of the Thermopylai corridor. The war ended in 346 BC with the diplomatic and military movements that brought Philip through Thermopylai (cf. specifically p. 155 above).

APPENDIX TWO

INTERNAL POLITICS AT DELPHOI

The literary sources amply document a consistent internal opposition, both in Delphoi and Phokis itself, to the policies of the successive Phokian generals. Within the general framework of this evidence must be fitted that provided by various inscriptions. Although the two types of sources do not allow precise analysis of local affairs in Phokis, enough material exists to permit a broad understanding of events there.

To begin with the literary sources, Diodoros (16.24.3, 28.2) in a doublet avers that Philomelos slew the Delphian Thrakidai and confiscated their property. It is, however, impossible to determine whether Philomelos wished only to intimidate the Delphians or to destroy the most prominent of those opposing his efforts. If he had wished to stifle all Delphian opposition, then he failed; for after his death, Onomarchos encountered considerable resistance from moderate Phokians, or in Diodoros' words (16.32.2) the fairest and most equitable (ἐπιεικέστατοι) of them. Although Onomarchos arrested the Phokians and confiscated their property (Diod. 16.33.3), he likewise failed to eradicate the opposition, which later impeached Phalaikos and indicted some minor officials (Diod. 16.56.3–57.4). In 346 many Phokians were exiled and cursed (Diod. 16.60.1), but in 326/5 Alexander the Great decreed that with some exceptions exiles were free to return to their homes (Dein. 1.82; Diod. 17.109.1; 18.8.2–5), a measure repeated in 319 (Diod. 18.56). The people of Abai condemned Phokian policy throughout the war (Paus. 10.3.2).

The epigraphical sources add a number of details that clarify these broad events, but they require a starting-point of 363. In that year the Athenians gave sanctuary to Astykrates and his colleagues (*IG II²* 109), who are listed in lines 21–24 of the inscription: Aristoxenos, Archedamos, Archelas, Astykrates, Damotimos, Echekratidas, Elpinikos, Hegesarchos, Menon, Nikandros, and Patrokleidas. Fragmentary Delphic inscriptions (*FdD* III.5.15–18) record the rental of lands confiscated from these men and the names of those who leased them; and although the names of Elpinikos, Echekratidas, and Patrokleidas are absent from them, Pomtow argues vigorously that the length of the names coincides closely with the missing portion of the stone.¹ While admittedly an argument from silence it is nonetheless difficult, especially in view of the

¹ Pomtow, *Klio* 6 (1906) 111, 405, hereafter cited as "Pomtow".

Athenian evidence, to explain why the property of four exiles was not confiscated along with that of the others. The information can perhaps be most easily set forth in tabular form:

Table 1

<i>Exile</i>	<i>Lease-holder</i>	<i>Fate of lease-holder</i>	<i>Source*</i>
Archedamos	Antichares	unknown	No. 16 11. 7, 53
Archedamos	Larisaians	x	No. 16 11. 14-15
Archelas	Aristokrates	exiled	No. 16 11. 16-17
Astykrates	Echekratidas	unknown	No. 16 11. 4, 50
Astykrates	Kolosimmos	hieromnemon, 343/2	No. 16 1. 18
Astykrates	Kottyphos	hieromnemon, 343/2	No. 16 11. 3, 49
Astykrates	Kriton	unknown	No. 16 11. 1, 47
Astykrates	Lakon	unknown	No. 16 1. 9
Astykrates	Phillidas	unknown	No. 15 1. 2
Astykrates	Pleistias	unknown	No. 16 11. 2, 48
Astykrates	Xenodamos	unknown	No. 15 1. 14
Damotimos	Epikratidas	unknown	No. 16 11. 13, 59
Damotimos	Lyson	uncertain	No. 16 11. 15, 61
Damotimos	Xenophanes	unknown	No. 16 11. 11-12
Hagesarchos	Achaion	unknown	No. 16 11. 7, 53
Menon	Xenodamos	unknown	No. 15 1. 14

*Under sources, all of the inscriptions cited are in *FdD* III.5; and since many of the participants appear in more than one inscription, for the sake of convenience, only one citation is listed in Table 1. Additional information about individuals can easily be found in the admirable index to the volume.

The information contained in Table 1 demonstrates clearly the difficulty of interpreting the course of internal affairs in Delphoi during the Sacred War. Mysteries are more abundant than solutions. It is obvious that Astykrates owned more land than the other exiles, and the honors bestowed upon him by the Athenians clearly designate him as an important man. His land was again confiscated after 346,² which suggests that he publicly supported the Phokians during the Sacred War. Yet absolutely nothing more is yet known of his activities after 363. He disappears from history as inexplicably as he appears. The fate of those who leased the land of the exiles poses problems of its own. The only simple aspect of this problem involves the Larisaians, Kottyphos, and Kolosimmos, all Thesalians who were beyond the reach of Phokian reprisal. It is, however, interesting to note that the two individual Thessalians, both of whom later materially assisted Philip, were already intimately concerned with Delphian and Amphiktyonic affairs.³ Not only were they to prove valuable

² *Ibid.*, 112-115.

³ Kolosimmos: cf. *FdD* III.5, p. 336 *s.v.* Κολόσιμμος Θεσσαλός; *ibid.*, *s.v.* Κόττυφος Θεσσαλός.

to Philip, but as early as 356 they may also have had personal reasons to oppose the Phokian generals. The prominence of the Thessalians in these transactions suggests an additional motive for Phokian hostility towards them after the seizure of the sanctuary and the Thessalian desire for Philip to seek vengeance on their behalf.

The case of the Delphians who rented the confiscated land poses a more puzzling problem. The exiles and their families had a vested interest in reclaiming their lands, and in order to do so they must support Philomelos and his successors.⁴ On the other hand, those who had rented the confiscated land could hardly have successfully opposed the returned exiles in the face of Philomelos' troops. Although it is an ominous sign that virtually none of them reappears in the extant sources, this silence does not necessarily compel the conclusion that they were all executed or exiled for their actions. The warning signal comes from the career of Aristokrates, who had leased the land of Archelas, but was exiled only sometime after 354/3.⁵ Clearly, he was no supporter of the new Phokian order, but he was at least allowed to live in peace at Delphoi after the return of the exiles. Perhaps the same is true of Lyson, who rented one plot of land confiscated from Damotimos. He may be the same Lyson who later served as the eponymous archon of Delphoi in 316/5, but certainty is impossible.⁶ That revenge was not necessarily pervasive is perhaps suggested by the family history of Kriton, who rented some land of Astykrates. Although Kriton himself is never heard from again, his son Archelas served as Delphian *bouleutes* in 326/5 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 27) and another son, Euarchidas in 318/7 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 83). Regardless of what happened during the Sacred War, this family obviously retained its land; and even though it may have suffered eclipse under the Phokians, it was still prosperous and prominent enough to play an influential part in later Delphian politics. One can only speculate about the fate of the others, but at least there is sufficient reason to suspect that the renting of confiscated land was not an automatic excuse for later reprisal.

The careers of the returned exiles are rather clearer, as Table 2 indicates. The evidence proves that a number of them played prominent roles in the government established by the Phokian generals:

⁴ Aristion father of Nikandros (*FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 56), who was a *prytanis* in 341 (*FdD* III.5. no. 22 lines 12, 37) obviously preserved his resources during the war.

⁵ Cf. *FdD* III.5. no. 16 lines 16–17, 62–64; no. 17 lines 26–28; Pomtow, 122–125.

⁶ The problem is complicated by the presence in the inscriptions of two men named Lyson, one with a patronymic: Λύσων Εὐδάλκου, and one without: Λύσων Δελφός. Lyson son of Eualkos: *FdD* III.5 no. 16 lines 15, 61; no. 17 line 23. Lyson the Delphian: *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 38; no. 20 line 85. Lyson the archon: *FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 93.

Table 2

<i>Exile</i>	<i>First office</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Later office</i>	<i>Date</i>
Aristoxenos	archon	356/5	bouleutes	321/0
Hagesarchos	naopoios	354-1		
Menon	bouleutes	352/1	naopoios	321/0
Echekratidas	treasurer	339/8	bouleutes	326/5
Damotimos	bouleutes	334/3		
Nikandros	prytanis	332/1		
Archelas	prytanis	321/0		
Patrokleidas	bouleutes	319/8		

In the absence of significant new evidence little can be added to Pomtow's fine analysis of the economic aspects of the returned exiles and their properties. Yet the subsequent political careers of these men bear some interest. Aristoxenos returned to Delphoi in 356/5 to become archon (*FdD* III.5.19 lines 4, 8, 31). He served as *bouleutes* in 321 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 64), and again under the archon Orestas (*FdD* III.1.135 line 10; 414 lines 4-5). His life spared at the end of the Sacred War, he may have regained the franchise under Alexander's amnesty. Although nothing further is known of Archedamos' career after 363, Archelas held the position probably of *prytanis* in 321/0 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 61) and *bouleutes* in 316 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 93). Astykrates and Elpinikos, like Archedamos, disappear from the sources after 363. Echekratidas son of Thessalos⁷ was treasurer at Delphoi as early as 339/8 (*FdD* III.5.47 col. 1 line 45) and *bouleutes* in 326/5 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 29). Hagesarchos came to the fore shortly after returning from exile, serving as *naopoios* from 354/3 to 352/1 (*FdD* III.5.19 lines 34, 38, 41, 51, 58, 63), after which nothing more is heard of him. Menon was a *bouleutes* during the war (*FdD* III.5.19 line 64) and *prytanis* in 328/7 (*FdD* III.5.16 line 40).⁸ Nikandros served as a *prytanis* in 332/1 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 56), and Patrokleidas as *bouleutes* in 319/8 (*FdD* III.5.20 line 81).⁹

Some safe conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. Although

⁷ Thessalos is not known to have had a public career, but he rented the confiscated lands of Aigylos: *FdD* III.5. no. 15 line 7; no. 16 lines 22, 68; no. 17 line 31; no. 18 line 5.

⁸ Μένων Θρασέα Δελφός was a *naopoios* in 321/0: *FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 65.

⁹ Cf. Pomtow, 98 n. 1. The case of Diokles (*FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 42, who was *bouleutes* in 354/3, is of singular interest. Although nothing more is heard of him, his son Eukrates (cf. *BCH* 109 [1985] 237) removed the bases of the statues of Onomarchos and Philomelos that had been erected in the sanctuary (*FdD* III.5. no. 23 col. II lines 39-44). Cf. also *FdD* III.5. no. 23 col. I lines 64-66; and J. Bousquet's discussion of the new inscription. Eukrates may very well have done his best to distance himself from his father's collaboration with the Phokian *strategoi*. Nothing more is known of his later career, unless he is the same Eukrates whose patronymic is unknown found elsewhere in the inscriptions: *FdD* III.5, p. 333 s.v. Εὐκράτης Δελφός.

some of those listed in Table 2 were prominent during the Sacred War, none of them held any official position between 346 and 339. Many again become prominent later in the fourth century, when they reappear holding various public offices. While Alexander's amnesty of 326/5 readily explains their re-emergence later in the century, it cannot account for their reappearance as early as 339 (cf. also Table 3). Pomtow (116, 405) suggests that a local amnesty was granted before the battle of Chaironeia, and indeed a suitable historical situation easily explains such a development. In 339, in anticipation of his conflict with Thebes and Athens, Philip re-constituted the Phokian Confederacy.¹⁰ It was distinctly in Philip's interest to restore harmony in Phokis and to prevent an influential body of exiles, a perennial source of trouble, from undermining his efforts. To judge by the later careers of the exiles the reconciliation between them and their countrymen was genuine and effective, but it may ultimately have been due more to Alexander's amnesty than to any patriotic desire for harmony.¹¹ The significant exceptions here are Astykrates, Aristoxenos, and Archedamos, whose lands were still being leased as late as 330 or perhaps even until the time of Alexander's amnesty.¹²

The existence of people opposed to the Phokians, already known from the literary sources, is confirmed by epigraphy. A curious inscription, found in 1895 points to the difficulties involved in interpreting internal events at Delphoi during the Sacred War:¹³

[Ἀρισ]τοκράτης Ἀνδρομάχου
 [Ἀρ]χεμαχίδας Δαμέα καὶ τὸ γένος
 [Ἀ]ριστόμαχος Πειθαγόρα καὶ τὸ γένος
 [Λάκ]ων Πειθαγόρα καὶ τὸ γένος
 5 [Σιμυ]λίων Πειθαγόρα καὶ τὸ γένος
 [- - - - -]ιώνδα¹⁴ καὶ τὸ γένος
 [- - - - Ἀρ]ιστίωνος καὶ τὸ γένος
 [- - - - - κ]αὶ τὸ γένος
 [- - - - -]λαΐδα

Line 4 [Νι]κων Homolle, *BCH* 23 (1899) 514; Pomtow; [Λά]κων Homolle, *BCH* 25 (1901) 134. Line 5 [Ἀρισ]τίων Homolle. Line 6 [Αἰσχυ]ρώνδα Homolle. Line 9 [Πυ]λαΐδα Homolle.

¹⁰ Wirth, *Philipp II.*, 132, 181 n. 53. Pomtow, 405, suggests instead that the exiles were allowed to return when the new temple was dedicated, but were again expelled after Chaironeia.

¹¹ Pomtow, 405.

¹² *Ibid.*, 112–116.

¹³ T. Homolle, *BCH* 23 (1899) 514–516; Pomtow, 122.

¹⁴ Homolle's restoration of Αἰσχυρώνδα in line 6, while attractive, is difficult to accept. The names in the list begin in the nominative singular followed by the patronymic. The

The problems presented by this inscription are many and its precise date uncertain. Aristokrates, who had rented the confiscated land of Archelas¹⁵, but had been allowed to remain at Delphoi had nonetheless somehow so offended the authorities that he was subsequently sent into exile. The expulsion of the sons of Peithagoras is especially revealing, although any exact interpretation of events is rendered impossible by epigraphic uncertainties. If Homolle's restoration of the name Lakon in line 4 be correct, then again one finds a link to the exiles of 363. Lakon had rented a parcel of land belonging to Astykrates.¹⁶ Of even greater interest, if Pomtow's restoration of line 5 be accepted, is Simylian, the most eminent of Peithagoras' sons. He returned to Delphoi immediately after the war, and from 346 to 319 repeatedly served as *naopoios* and at one point as archon.¹⁷ The exile of Aristokrates and the sons of Peithagoras certainly suggest that a concerted and probably prolonged effort was made to resist the Phokians, an effort made by rich and important people at Delphoi.

The only name to suggest a date for this event is that of Archemachidas who served as a *bouleutes* in the spring-pylaia of Nikon's archonship, or 354/3, and even this information further clouds the issue. Archemachidas voluntarily co-operated with the Phokians, but was nevertheless exiled during the war. It is tempting to suggest that after the defeat of Onomarchos at the Crocus Plain he was among those who stoutly favored ending the war, for which he was banished. At any rate, despite the uncertainties involved, this inscription indicates that there was a consistent opposition among some very influential Delphians to the Phokians, and the example of Archemachidas proves that significant shifts of opinion occurred in Delphoi during the course of the war. Obviously, the Phokian generals could never entirely depend upon the steadfast support of the Delphians.¹⁸

Delphian inscriptions prove that in 346 a number of leading pro-

printed transcription, which was made by P. Perdrizet, suggests that the inscription is perhaps stoichedon, which would make it impossible to suggest a name of only three letters in length to precede Homolle's restoration. Admittedly, I have not seen the inscription itself.

¹⁵ *FdD* III.5. no. 16 lines 16–17, 62–64; no. 17 lines 26–28.

¹⁶ *FdD* III.5. no. 16 lines 9, 55. No Νίκων Πειθαγόρα is known to Delphic prosopography.

¹⁷ Simylian also rented the confiscated lands of Agathon. For his career, cf. *FdD* III.5, p. 341 s.v. Σιμυλίων Πειθαγόρα Δελφός, and J. Bousquet, *BCH* 109 (1985) 221, lines 5–6.

¹⁸ Pomtow (122), as a result of erroneous chronology, links this event to Onomarchos' assumption of power (Diod. 16.33.3). Even though it is always tempting to link events from literary and epigraphical sources, one simply cannot put this particular episode into a specific context. Nor is there anything to recommend Pomtow's suggestion (124) that these people were partisans of the Thrakiadai, to judge by Archemachidas' service as *bouleutes*.

Phokians were exiled, chief among them Astykrates, Aristoxenos, Archedamos, and Menon and their property confiscated.¹⁹ In addition to them, at least six others suffered the same fate: Agathon, Aigylos, Epikles, Kalligenes, Dionakas, and Peisias, none of whom is known to have held public office thereafter.

The evidence for the careers of those who served in official positions during the Sacred War can easily be summarized in Table 3:

Table 3

Careers of Delphian officials εν τῷ πολέμῳ					
Name	Office	Date	Later career	Date	Source*
Ἀγήσαρχος	naopoios	354-1	none		20
Ἀθανίς	bouleutes	352/1	none		21
Αἰγύλος	bouleutes	356/5	none		22
Ἀπήμεντος	bouleutes	356/5	none		23
Ἀριστόξενος	archon	356/5	bouleutes	321/0	24
Ἀρχεμαχίδας	bouleutes	354/3	none		25
Δεινόμαχος	bouleutes	354/3	treasurer, etc.	339/8	26
Διοκλῆς	bouleutes	354/3	none		27
Δίων	bouleutes	352/1	prytanis	327/6	28
Εὐφραντος	bouleutes	356/5	none		29
Ἡράκλειτος	bouleutes	354/3	none		30
Θεόχαρις	bouleutes	353/2			
Θεόχαρις	archon	352/1	none		31

¹⁹ Pomtow (111-112), who also (104) argues, doubtless rightly, that Damotimos, *bouleutes* in 343/2 (*FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 92, 95) was not exiled again. The case of Nikandros, who was *prytanis* in the archonship of Pleiston, and who was also cited by Pomtow in support of his thesis, is rendered more difficult by the uncertainty of the date of Pleiston's archonship. Although Pomtow thought that it was in 326, Roux (*Amphictionie*, 234) tentatively suggests that it was in 322/1, which would place it after Alexander the Great's general amnesty.

²⁰ Rather than repeat evidence already published and readily available elsewhere, footnotes 20 to 45 will usually refer the reader to the index of *FdD* III.5, with page-number and name of the entry. Thus Ἀγήσαρχος in the Delphic inscriptions, although one reads Ἡ[ρί]σ[α]ρχος in *IG* II² 109 line 23. Therefore, cf. *FdD* III.5, p. 327 s.v. Ἀγήσαρχος Δελφός.

²¹ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 64.

²² *FdD* III.5, p. 327 s.v. Αἰγύλος Δελφός.

²³ *FdD* III.1. no. 146 line 5; cf. also Buckler, *Klio* 68 (1986) 349-350.

²⁴ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 4, 8, 31; III.1. no. 135 line 10 (*bouleutes*); no. 146 lines 4-5 (archon); no. 392 lines 12-13; no. 414 lines 4-5.

²⁵ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 38.

²⁶ *FdD* III.5, p. 331 s.v. Δεινόμαχος Κρατησίχου Δελφός.

²⁷ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 42; *BCH* 109 (1985) 237.

²⁸ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 59; no. 20 line 100.

²⁹ *FdD* III.1. no. 40 line 5; no. 392 lines 13-14; no. 393 (restored).

³⁰ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 42.

³¹ *FdD* III.5, p. 334 s.v. Θεόχαρις (Θευ-) Δελφός; his sons Εὐφραντος (*FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 96) and Εὐάγορος (*FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 97) were connected with work on the temple in 315/4.

Table 3 contd

<i>Name</i>	<i>Office</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Later career</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Source*</i>
Ἰερῖνος	archon	355/4	none		32
Καλλαγόρας	bouleutes	352/1	none		33
Καλλικράτης	bouleutes	356/5	bouleutes	320/19?	34
Κλεινίας	bouleutes	352/1	none		35
Κλέων	bouleutes	354/3	none		36
Κλέων Τιμοκράτεος	bouleutes	354/3	none		37
Λύσων	bouleutes	354/3	archon?	316/5	38
Μαίμαλος	bouleutes	356/5	archon	315/4	39
Μαχίδας	bouleutes	354/3	bouleutes	343/2	40
Μένων	bouleutes	352/1	prytanis	328/7	41
Νίκων	archon	354/3	hieromnemon	324/3	42
Ὀρηχίδας	bouleutes	352/1	archon	?	43
Σακέδαλλος	bouleutes	356/5	none		44
Φειδίλας	bouleutes	354/3	none		45

*Cf. the footnotes.

The conclusions to be drawn from this data are clear enough. Very few of those who co-operated with the Phokians during the war subsequently held public office. Of those who did, only Machidas did so shortly after the Peace of 346, and it is impossible to explain this anomaly. Those who did thereafter serve in an official capacity did so, with the exception of Deinomachos, no earlier than 328/7 and most somewhat later. Despite the amnesty, whether the putative one of Philip or the attested one of Alexander, the majority of those recorded to have held office during the Sacred War thereafter led private lives. Whatever stigma was attached to those who had supported the Phokians during the Sacred War had disappeared by the 320s.

Prosopography shows as well that both the pro-Phokians and their opponents were aristocrats, and the nature of their dispute was the right of

³² *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 31.

³³ *Ibid.*, line 64.

³⁴ *FdD* III.1., p. 413 s.v. Καλλικράτης Δελφός.

³⁵ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 59.

³⁶ *FdD* III.5, p. 336 s.v. Κλέων Δελφός.

³⁷ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 52.

³⁸ Cf. n. 6 above.

³⁹ *FdD* III.1, p. 415 s.v. Μαίμαλος Δελφός.

⁴⁰ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 lines 38, 104. Τλάσων Μαχίδα Δελφός was *bouleutes* in 318/7 (no. 20 lines 83–84), as was another son, Φλείαξ Μαχίδα Δελφός (no. 20 line 85).

⁴¹ *FdD* III.5, p. 338 s.v. Μένων Δελφός. His brother Πάτρων was *bouleutes* in 318/7: *FdD* III.5. no. 20 line 84.

⁴² *FdD* III.5, p. 339 s.vv. Νίκων Δελφός; Νίκων Δελφός ἄρχων.

⁴³ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 52.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.* s.v. Σακέδαλλος Δελφός.

⁴⁵ *FdD* III.5. no. 19 line 52.

Phokis to administer, much less to plunder, Apollo's sanctuary. Nothing suggests that other questions, such as democracy or oligarchy, entered into the situation.⁴⁶ These men were not revolutionaries, and they did not change the form of government at Delphoi. Office-holders changed, but the constitution did not. Resistance of those who had seized the sanctuary and to those who supported them was constant throughout the Sacred War; and even though opponents often suffered for their deeds, they were never strong enough to supplant the Phokian generals. Even the impeachment of Phalaikos was possible only because he and his mercenaries were then holding positions at Thermopylai. The Peace of 346 brought the return of anti-Phokian exiles and the restoration of their property, and at the same time the banishment of a number of pro-Phokians, including some of the exiles of 363. In 339 Philip apparently granted a partial amnesty, and later some of the pro-Phokians played significant roles in Delphian politics. By perhaps 330 all of those once exiled in 363 were allowed to return to Delphoi and resume normal life, as did their descendants. The fate of their property, however, is uncertain.⁴⁷ In the last two decades of the fourth century members of both sides held important offices in Delphoi, apparently serving together amicably. Not only did Philip end the Sacred War, but he also ended *stasis* at Delphoi.

⁴⁶ It cannot even be proven that a consistent policy of retaliation towards those who had rented confiscated lands was a deciding factor.

⁴⁷ Pomtow (126), whose conclusion is amply supported by the evidence presented in Table 1.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography includes neither the works cited under Abbreviations (p. XI above) nor the articles in *RE*.

- Badian, E., "Philip II and Thrace", *Pulpuđeva* 4 (1983) 51–71.
- Beister, H. and J. Buckler, ed., *BOIOTIKA: Vorträge vom 5. Internationalen Bötien-Kolloquium zu Ehren von Professor Dr. Siegfried Lauffer* (Munich 1989).
- Bengtson, H., *Philipp und Alexander der Große* (Munich 1985).
- Buckler, J., "Boiotian Aulis and Greek Naval Bases", in Department of History, United States Naval Academy, ed., *New Aspects of Naval History* (Baltimore 1985) 13–24.
- , "Delphi und die Söhne des Kersebleptes", *Klio* 68 (1986) 348–350.
- , "Pammenes, die Perser und der Heilige Krieg", in H. Beister and J. Buckler, *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 155–162.
- , "Thebes, Delphoi, and the Outbreak of the Third Sacred War", in P. Roesch and G. Argoud, ed., *La Béotie antique* (Paris 1985) 237–246.
- Burr, V., *NEΩN KATAΛΟΓΟΣ* (Leipzig 1944).
- Bursian, C., *Geographie von Griechenland*, 2 vols. (Leipzig 1862, 1872).
- Cargill, J., *The Second Athenian League* (Berkeley 1981).
- Cartledge, P., *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta* (Baltimore 1987).
- Cawkwell, G., *Philip of Macedon* (London and Boston 1978).
- Cloch  , P., "Ath  nes et Kerseblept  s de 357–356    353–352", in *M  langes Gustave Glotz* I (Paris 1932).
- , "La Chronologie de la troisi  me guerre sacr  e jusqu'en 352 avant J.-C.", *Les   tudes classiques* 8 (1939) 161–204.
- , *  tude chronologique sur la troisi  me guerre sacr  e* (Paris 1915).
- , "Les naopes de Delphes et politique hell  nique de 356    327 av. J.-C.", *Bulletin de correspondance hell  nique* 40 (1916) 78–142.
- , *Th  bes de B  otie* (Namur n.d. [1952]).
- Daux, G., "Remarques sur la composition du Conseil amphictionique", *Bulletin de correspondance hell  nique* 81 (1957) 95–120.
- Du  ani  , S., *Arkadski Savez IV Veka* (Belgrade 1970).
- Ehrhardt, C., "Two Notes on Philip of Macedonia's First Intervention in Thessaly", *Classical Quarterly* n.s. 17 (1967) 296–301.
- Ellis, J.R., "The Date of Demosthenes' First Philippic", *Revue des   tudes grecques* 79 (1966) 636–639.
- , *Philip II and Macedonian Imperialism* (London 1976, reprint Princeton 1986).
- , "Philip and the Peace of Philokrates", in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza, ed., *Philip, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington, D.C. 1982) 43–59.
- , "Philip's Thracian Campaign of 352–351", *Classical Philology* 72 (1977) 32–39.
- Felsch, R. et al., "Apollon und Artemis oder Artemis und Apollon", *Arch  ologischer Anzeiger* (1980) 38–118.
- Flath  , Th., *Geschichte des phokischen Kriegs* (Plauen 1854).
- Fossey, J.M., *The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis* (Amsterdam 1986).
- Frazier, J.G., *Pausanias's Description of Greece*, 6 vols. (London 1898).
- Gauthier, P., *Un Commentaire historique des Poroi de Xenophon* (Geneva and Paris 1976).
- Gehrke, H.-J., *Phokion* (Munich 1976).
- Ginz  l, F.K., *Handbuch der mathematischen und technischen Chronologie*, 3 vols. (Leipzig 1906–1914).
- Hamilton, C.D., "The Early Career of Archidamus", *Classical Views* n.s. 1 (1982) 5–19.
- , "Philip II and Archidamus", in W.L. Adams and E.N. Borza, *Philip II, Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Heritage* (Washington, D.C. 1982) 61–83.

- Hammond, N.G.L., "Diodorus' Narrative of the Sacred War", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 57 (1937) 44–72.
- Head, B.V., *Historia Numorum: A Manual of Greek Numismatics*, 2nd ed. (Oxford 1911).
- Helly, B., ed., *La Thessalie* (Paris 1979).
- Hill, G.F., *Historical Greek Coins* (London 1906).
- Hofstetter, J., *Die Griechen in Persien* (Berlin 1978).
- Hope Simpson, R., and J.F. Lazenby, *The Catalogue of Ships in Homer's Iliad* (Oxford 1970).
- Hornblower, S., *The Greek World 479–323 BC* (London and New York 1983).
- Ingekamp, H.G., "Die Stellung des Demosthenes zu Theben in der Megalopolisrede", *Hermes* 100 (1972) 195–205.
- Jaeger, W., *Demosthenes* (Berkeley 1938).
- Kahrstedt, U., "Delphi und das heilige Land des Apollon", in G.E. Mylonas and D. Raymond, edd., *Studies Presented to David Moore Robinson II* (St. Louis 1953) 749–757.
- , *Forschung zur Geschichte des ausgehenden fünften und des vierten Jahrhunderts* (Berlin 1910).
- , *Griechisches Staatsrecht I* (Göttingen 1922).
- Kallet-Marx, R.M., "The Evangelistria Watchtower and the Defense of the Zagara Pass", in H. Beister and J. Buckler, edd., *BOIOTIKA* (Munich 1989) 301–311.
- Knauss, J., *Die Melioration des Kopaisbeckens durch die Minyer im 2. Jt. v. Chr.* (Munich 1987).
- Knauss, J., B. Heinrich, H. Kalcyk, *Die Wasserbauten der Minyer in der Kopais—die älteste Flußregulierung Europas* (Munich 1984).
- Larsen, J.A.O., "Phocis in the Social War of 220–217 B.C.", *Phoenix* 19 (1965) 116–128.
- Lauffer, S., *KOPAIS, Untersuchungen zur historischen Landeskunde Mittelgriechenlands I* (Frankfurt a.M. and New York 1986).
- Lawrence, A.W., *Greek Aims in Fortification* (Oxford 1979).
- Leake, W.M., *Travels in the Morea*, 3 vols. (London 1830).
- , *Travels in Northern Greece*, 4 vols. (London 1835).
- Lerat, L., *Les Locriens de l'Ouest*, 2 vols. (Paris 1952).
- Lolling, H.G., in I. Müller, ed., *Handbuch der klassischen Altertums-Wissenschaft*, III. *Geographie und politische Geschichte des klassischen Altertums* (Nördlingen 1889) 101–349.
- Martin, T.R., "Diodorus on Philip II and Thessaly in the 350s B.C.", *Classical Philology* 76 (1981) 188–201.
- , "A Phantom Fragment of Theopompus and Philip II's First Campaign in Thessaly", *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 86 (1982) 55–78.
- McDougall, J.I., *Lexicon in Diodorum Siculum*, 2 vols. (Hildesheim 1983).
- Meister, K., *Die Ungeschichtigkeit des Kalliasfriedens und deren historischen Folgen* (Wiesbaden 1982).
- Miller, W., "The Marquisate of Boundonitza (1204–1414)", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 28 (1908) 234–249.
- Mikalson, J.D., *The Sacred and Civil Calendar of the Athenian Year* (Princeton 1975).
- Momigliano, A., *Filippo il Macedone* (Florence 1934).
- Mosley, D.J., "Oaths at Pherae, 346 B.C.", *Philologus* 116 (1972) 145–148.
- Oldfather, W.A., "Inscriptions from Locris", *American Journal of Archaeology* 19 (1915) 320–339.
- , "Studies in the History and Topography of Locris", *American Journal of Archaeology* 20 (1916) 32–61, 154–172.
- Palm, J., *Über Sprache und Stil des Diodoros von Sizilien. Ein Beitrag zur Beleuchtung der hellenistischen Prosa* (Lund 1955).
- Papastravu, J., *Amphipolis, Geschichte und Prosopographie* (Leipzig 1936).
- Parke, H.W., *Festivals of the Athenians* (London 1977).
- , *A History of the Delphic Oracle* (Oxford 1939).
- , "The Pythais of 355 B.C. and the Third Sacred War", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 59 (1939) 80–83.
- Pearson, L., *The Art of Demosthenes* (Meisenheim am Glan 1976).
- Perdrizet, P., "Proxènes macédoniens à Delphes", *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 21 (1897) 102–118.

- Perl, G., *Kritische Untersuchungen zu Diodors römischer Jahrzahl* (Berlin 1957).
- Perlman, S., "Isocrates, ΠΑΤΡΙΣ and Philip II", *Ancient Macedonia* 3 (1983) 211–227.
- , "Isocrates' Philippus—A Reinterpretation", *Historia* 6 (1957) 306–317.
- Philippson, A., *Thessalien und Epirus* (Berlin 1897).
- Picard-Cambridge, A.W., *Demosthenes and the Last Days of Greek Freedom* (New York and London 1914).
- Pokorny, E., *Studien zur griechischen Geschichte im sechsten und fünften Jahrzehnt des vierten Jahrhunderts v. Chr.* (Greifswald 1913).
- Pouilloux, J., "Ο ΕΠΙΚΕΦΑΛΟΣ ΟΒΟΛΟΣ", *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 73 (1949) 177–200.
- Pomtow, H., "Eine delphische στάσις im Jahre 363 v. Chr.", *Klio* 6 (1906) 89–126.
- , "Neues zur delphischen στάσις vom Jahre 363 v. Chr.", *Klio* 6 (1906) 400–419.
- Pritchett, W.K., *The Greek State at War*, 4 vols. (Berkeley and London 1971–1985).
- , *Studies in Ancient Greek Topography*, 5 vols. (Berkeley and London 1965–1985).
- Roux, G., *L'Amphictionie, Delphes et le temple d'Apollon au IV^e siècle* (Lyon 1979).
- Ryder, T.T.B., *Koine Eirene* (Oxford 1965).
- Schaefer, A., *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 3 vols., 2nd ed. (Leipzig 1885–1887).
- Schober, F., *Phokis* (Crossen am Oder 1924).
- Sealey, R., "Athens after the Social War", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 75 (1955) 74–81.
- , "Dionysius of Halicarnassus and Some Demosthenic Dates", *Revue des études grecques* 68 (1955) 77–120.
- Sordi, M., *Diodori Siculi, Bibliothecae Liber XVI* (Florence 1969).
- , "La fondation du college des naopes et le renouveau politique de l'Amphictionie au IV^e siècle", *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique* 81 (1957) 38–75.
- , *La lega tessala* (Rome 1958).
- , "La Terza Guerra Sacra", *Rivista di Filologia e d'Istruzione Classica* n.s. 36 (1958) 134–166.
- Stählin, F., *Das hellenische Thessalien* (Stuttgart 1924).
- Tillard, F.B., "The Fortifications of Phokis", *British School at Athens, Annual* 17 (1910/11) 54–75.
- Tonev, M., "Die Chronologie des dritten heiligen Krieges und die Jahreseinteilung im XVI Buch Diodors", *Studia philologica Serdicensis* 1 (1939) 165–212.
- Tronson, A., "Satyrus the Peripatetic and the Marriages of Philip II", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 104 (1984) 116–126.
- Uhlemann, K., *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der Geschichte Philipps von Makedonien und des heiligen Krieges im 16. Buch Diodors* (Strassburg 1913).
- Volquardsen, C.A., *Untersuchungen über die Quellen der griechischen und sicilischen Geschichten bei Diodor, Buch XI bis XVI* (Kiel 1868).
- Westlake, H.D., "Phalaecus and Timoleon", *Classical Quarterly* 34 (1940) 44–46.
- , *Thessaly in the Fourth Century B.C.* (London 1935).
- Wirth, G., *Philipp II.* (Stuttgart 1985).
- Wüst, F., "Amphiktyonie, Eidgenossenschaft, Symmachie", *Historia* 3 (1954) 129–153.
- , *Philipp II. von Makedonien und Griechenland in den Jahren von 346 bis 338* (Munich 1938).
- Yorke, W.W., "Excavations at Abae and Hyampolis in Phocis", *Journal of Hellenic Studies* 16 (1896) 291–312.
- Zahrnt, M., *Olynth und die Chalkidier* (Munich 1971).

INDEX

- Abai, opposition to the seizure of Delphoi, 22; location of, 32-33, 36; first battle at, 97; second, 111-112; 141, 196.
- Achaïans, 39, 41-43.
- Agésilas, 1, 20.
- Aglaokreon, 121, 132, 134.
- Aischines, at Tamynai, 108; failure in Arkadia, 115-118; and decrees of Miltiades and Themistokles, 115-119; Peace of Philokrates, 121-124; first embassy to Philip, 127; first debate at Athens, 129-134; second embassy to Philip, 135-137.
- Alexander of Pherai, 3, 10, 14, 58-59.
- Aleuadaï, 5, 48, 58-59, 62-63.
- Alponos, 34, 41; situation of, 93; Phalaikos' occupation of, 118.
- Amadokos, 52, 171-180.
- Ambrossos, 37, 71.
- Amphiktyonic Confederacy, constitution of, 7-8; political position of Delphoi within, 11, 38, 151-155; *stasis* within, 9-14; and declaration of the Sacred War, 14-21, 27-29; victory over Philomelos, 40-45; over Onomarchos, 49, 53; relations with Philip, 78; end of the war, 140-142.
- Amphipolis, 4, 121, 127.
- Amphissa, 24, 30, 48-49, 55.
- Andronikos, 9, 13, 17.
- Antipatros, 130, 132-133.
- Apollo, *passim*; cf. also Amphiktyonic Confederacy.
- Archidamos, receives Philomelos, 22-23, 39; invades Arkadia, 87-92; rebuffed at Thermopylai, 125.
- Argolas, 34, 41, 43.
- Aristagoras, 25, 151, 153-154.
- Aristoxenos, 25, 151, 154, 196-204.
- Arkadian League, 28, 87-88, 145-146.
- Artabazos, 4, 50-53, 180-181.
- Artaxerxes, 4, 50.
- Astykrates, 9-13, 25, 196-197.
- Athens, and Social War, 4; and Astykrates, 9, 11, 25, 196-197; endorsement of Philomelos, 27-29; and Lokris, 49-50; possible peace efforts of, 70-71; and Crocus Plain, 74-75; checked Philip at Thermopylai, 80-81; and Megalopolis, 88-89; and Euboia, 108-109; and Peace of Philokrates, 114-137; and end of Sacred War, 137-138; aftermath of, 144; cf. also Second Athenian Confederacy.
- Beloch, K.J., 40, 57, 100.
- Berisades, 52.
- Boagrius valley, 54.
- Boiotian Confederacy, cf. Thebes.
- Cawkwell, G.L., 121-124.
- Chaironeia, topographical position of, 36; Onomarchos siege of, 56; Phalaikos' attacks on, 98-99.
- Chares, 3, 50, 74-75.
- Chorsiai, position of, 37; Phokian capture of, 103.
- Crocus Plain, 52, 59, 74-77.
- Daulis, 30, 32.
- Demosthenes, 14, 29, 105, 114; and Peace of Philokrates, 121-124; first embassy to Philip, 127; first debate at Athens, 129-134; second embassy to Philip, 135-137.
- Doris, 30, 32, 55.
- Ehrhardt, C., 61.
- Elateia, 32, 34.
- Ellis, J.R., 121-124.
- Epameinondas, 5, 88-89, 144-145.
- Euboia, 3, 6, turmoil in, 108-109.
- Euboulos, 29.
- Euthykrates, 19, 22.
- Ferguson, W.S., 49.
- Fontana pass, 34, 42, 44, 54, 97.
- Griffith, G.T., 51-52, 61, 66, 68, 77, 107, 121-124.
- Haliartos, 36, 101, 111.
- Halos, Philip's siege of, 119; in Peace of Philokrates, 134, 137.
- Hedylion, Mt., 32, 110, 194.
- Hegesippos (Kroboulos), 29.
- Helikon, Mt., 30, 37, 71-72.
- Hyampolis, location of, 32-33, 36; battle at, 101.
- Jason of Pherai, 59, 64.

- Kallet-Marx, R.M., 82-83.
 Kallidromon, Mt., 30, 32-33, 41, 43-44, 93.
 Kephisos valley, 30, 32-34, 44, 55, 86, 100, 110, 195.
 Kersebleptes, 52-53; defeat of, 127-129; exclusion from the Peace of Philokrates, 132-133, 136.
 Kirrhaian plain, 15-16.
 Kleisoura pass, 32, 41, 43.
 Knemis, Mt., 32-33, 54.
 Kopais, Lake, 30, 36, 71.
 Koroncia, position of, 36; Phokian capture of, 71-73; Theban recovery of, 82-84; Phalaikos' conquest of, 101; 194.
 Krannon, 68-69.
 Kyriakion, 37, 71.
 Laphystion, Mt., 72.
 Larisa, 62, 65, 69, 137.
 Lebadeia, 36, 71, 104, 111.
 Lerat, L., 49.
 Leuktra, 3, 10, 40.
 Lokris, Epiknemidian, 30, 34, 40-41, 49, 55.
 Lokris, Opountian, 33, 55.
 Lokris, Ozolaian, 30, 48-49.
 Lykophron, 48, 58, 65, 86-87, 90-92.
 Macedonia, cf. Philip II.
 Magnesia, 79, 105-106.
 Mantinea, 1, 88.
 Markle, M.M., 121-124.
 Maroncia, 51-53, 177-181.
 Martin, T.R., 61.
 Megalopolis, 1, 6, 87-92, 97-98.
 Mendenitsa, 34, 41, 43.
 Metachoion, 71-72.
 Methone, 63, 181-185.
 Modion, cf. Triteis.
 Naryx, 34, 41, 44, 54, 96.
 Neon, position of, 32; battle at, 44-45, 57; Theban capture of, 99-100, 110, 187.
 Nikaia, position of, 94-95; Phalaikos' occupation of, 118; Philip gives to Thessaly, 145; date of battle, 176-185.
 Nikesipolis, 5, 60-62.
 Oldfather, W.A., 49.
 Olympia, 13, 28.
 Olynthos, 5, 109-110, 113, 114, 118.
 Onomarchos, 22, 44; takes full command of Phokian forces, 45-47; alliance with Pherai, 48; first campaign of, 53-57; intervention in Thessaly, 67-69; invasion of Boiotia, 71-73; and Crocus Plain, 73-76.
 Orchomenos, 36, Phokian conquest of, 55-56; Theban recovery of, 82-84, 88; Phalaikos' capture of 104; returned to Thebes, 144.
 Orneai, battle of, 91; chronology of, 182.
 Pagasai, situation of, 65; fall of, 78-79; Thessalian demands to, 105.
 Palaiokeastron, 72-73, 101, 103-104, 111.
 Palaiovouna, 37, 103.
 Pammenes, 6; at Neon, 42-45; Persian expedition of, 50-53.
 Parapotamioi, 32-33, 56.
 Parke, H.W., 38.
 Parnassos, Mt., 30, 33, 34.
 Peitholaos, 48, 58, 65; support of Phayllos, 86-87; support of Archidamos, 90-92; return to Pherai, 106.
 Phaidriadae Rocks, 24, 30, 142.
 Phalaikos, 87, *strategos autokrator*, 98; first invasion of Boiotia, 98-99; second, 101-104; intervention in Euboea, 108-109; third invasion of Boiotia, 110-111; occupation of Thermopylai, 118; opposition to in Phokis, 118-120, 125; pact with Philip, 139.
 Phalaros valley, 36, 71, 87.
 Phayllos, defeat in Thessaly, 56, 67; becomes *strategos autokrator*, 85-86; invasion of Boiotia, 86-87; invasion of Lokris, 92-97; death of, 98.
 Pherai, situation of, 64; surrender of to Philip, 78; re-introduction of Peitholaos, 106-107.
 Philinna, 5, 60-62.
 Philoboiotos, 32, 44.
 Philip II, 1, and Pammenes, 51-53; first entry into Thessaly, 56-61; second, 63-68; third, 73-80; archon of Thessalian Confederacy and re-organization of, 79-80; and Crocus Plain, 73-75; march on Thermopylai, 80-81; difficulties with Thessalian Confederacy, 104-106; Theban appeal to, 113-114, 120; siege of Halos, 119; first conference with the Greeks, 126-127; defeat of Kersebleptes, 127-129; and Peace of Philokrates, 120-137; pact with Phalaikos, 139; and end of Sacred War, 139; his use of victory, 144.
 Philokrates, 114; and Peace of, 120-134, 137.

- Philomelos, seizure of Delphoi, 18, 21-26; chronology of, 148-155; and battle of Neon, 37-45.
- Phokian Confederacy, 6-7, 40, 45-46, 85, 98; deposition of Phalaikos, 119, the reaction thereto, 125-126; surrender to Philip, 139-141.
- Phokikon, 6, 30.
- Plataia, 37, 88, 144.
- Polygyra, 36, 110-111.
- Pomtow, H., 10-13.
- Rhenginion, 34, 44.
- Second Athenian Confederacy, 3, 29; and the Peace of Philokrates, 128, 132-135.
- Skarpheia, 34, 41, 94.
- Social War, 4, 20, 29.
- Sparta, 1; first attack on Megalopolis, 87-92; second, 97-98; and Peace of Philokrates, 135; cf. also Archidamos.
- Theban Hegemony, 1, 49, 51.
- Thebes, 5-6; and causes of the Sacred War, 15-21; and Neon, 40-45; Onomarchos and, 56; and the Persian king, 100-101; embassy to Philip, 120, 127; alliance with Philip, 126-127, 135-136; at the end of the war, 144-145.
- Thermopylai, 30, 33-34, 41, 54, 92, 118, 139.
- Thespiiai, 37, 88, 144.
- Thessalian Confederacy, 3, 5, 10, 14, 48, 58; and Philip, 62-67; Philip as archon of, 79-80; disputes with Philip, 104-106; and end of the war, 137-138.
- Thisbe, 37, 104, 111.
- Thrace, 51-53; Philip's conquest of, 124, 128-129, 135, and Amadokos, 171-180.
- Thrakidai, 10, 13, 24, 26, 39, 196.
- Thronion, situation of, 34; Phokian capture of, 54-55; Phalaikos' occupation of, 118.
- Tilphossaion, 110-103, 194.
- Tithorea, 32, 33, 44, 51.
- Tithronion, 32, 34, 41, 43.
- Triteis, 34, 41, 44.
- Tronson, A., 60.
- Vassilika pass, 34.

LIST OF PLATES

Pl. 1: THE BATTLEFIELD AT PHILOMELOS' FORTIFICATIONS.

A view of the battlefield from the Phaidriadai Rocks, with Mt. Kirphis in the background. Philomelos' fortifications still run along the ridge to the left, with the battlefield stretching below it to the right.

Pl. 2: MENDENITSA.

The area of Mendenitsa as seen from the south, with the northern Gulf and the island of Euboea visible in the background. The ruins of Mendenitsa can be seen atop the highest point of the ridge that runs eastwards (to the right of the photograph).

Pl. 3: THE BATTLEFIELD OF NEON.

The battlefield of Neon is seen here from the slopes above the modern village of Tithorea, the view looking northwestwards across the Kephisos valley. The houses of the village roughly delineate the shape of the ancient polis, beyond which stretches the gently rolling ground of the battlefield.

Pl. 4: PHILOBOIOTOS.

A view of Philoboiotos as seen from the northwest, illustrating the heights upon which the Phokians attempted to intercept Pammenes' return to Boiotia.

Pl. 5: VIEW WESTWARDS FROM THE AKROPOLIS OF THRIONION.

The akropolis of Thronion, from which this photograph was taken, dominated a major route from Thermopylai to eastern Lokris. The view here looks westwards towards Thermopylai. In antiquity the site was less than 2 ½ English miles distant from the sea.

Pl. 6: PASS ABOVE ORNEAI.

The pass above Orneai to northern Arkadia ran roughly along the line of the modern path, seen in the left foreground through the saddle lying between the peaks.

Pl. 7: ALPONOS.

The site of Alponos is here seen from the east. Construction of the modern motor road, seen in the center of the photograph, has created a saddle separating the akropolis of Alponos (right center) from the rest of the ridge. The land in this area is still being drained for modern agriculture.

Pl. 8: NIKAIÁ.

The village of Aghias Trias, ancient Nikaia, is barely visible in the lower right foreground, with the Gulf and island of Euboia in the background. The harbor itself is concealed by trees, but the view reveals the open nature of this stretch of coastline.

Pl. 9: SKARPHEIA.

The akropolis of Skarpheia as seen from the north. On the height in the left-center of the photograph were found some sparse ancient remains *in situ*.

Pl. 10: NARYX.

The akropolis of Naryx in the foreground as viewed from the southeast.

Pl. 11: PETRA.

The site of Tilphossaion occupied the summit of the peak in the right-center of the photograph, above the line of the modern motor road.

Pl. 12: PALAIOTHEVA.

Upon the heights, viewed from the north, are the abundant remains of fortifications, which guarded a secondary road between southwestern and southeastern Boiotia.